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| Abu Kakr Al-Baghdadi Caliph of ISIS |
Unfinished journey (73)
(Part seventy-three, Depok, West Java, Indonesia, 13
September 2014, 13:06 pm)
United States of plotting to attack targets army ISIS
(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), given the progress that continues ISIS
controlled most energy-rich regions of oil and gas in northern Iraq and Syria.
However, the United States Secretary of State John Kerry asserted, the United
States is not willing to offer any assistance from Iran, and would garner a
coalition of Arab countries and the West, without destroying Iran known keen to
destroy ISIS is Sunni, while the majority Shiite Iran, as well as Iraq is now
controlled by the Shiite-dominated government. While 30,000 troops ISIS also
come from over 70 countries which is a group of Sunni Islam.
The United States opposes Iran's role in the coalition
opposed to ISIS
John Kerry met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Secretary of State John Kerry said is not appropriate for
× Iran to join the coalition against Islamic militants × or ISIS.
During his visit to Turkey, Kerry said he believes the
United States will be able to build an international coalition, with European
countries and the Arab.
Iran and the United States has offered military aid to
fight the ISIS which has controlled the region × northern and western Iraq.
But on the other hand, the United States and Iran × odds
over the nuclear program and policy in Syria.
In a press conference in Ankara on Friday (12/09), Kerry
said he was not formally asked to discuss "Iran's presence" at a
conference in Paris on Monday (15.09), who will discuss efforts to fight ISIS.
"But I think the development of the events at the
moment ... not exactly paying attention to other issues ... with respect to
their relationship with × Syria and elsewhere," said Kerry.
Iran supports the government of President Bashar al-Assad
in Syria ×, when the United States and some European countries and the Gulf ×
providing support to the rebels who seek to overthrow the government.
United States and western countries also held talks with
Iran over nuclear program ×, which could be used to make a bomb, which had been
denied by Iran.
Turkey worries
Last Friday, × Kerry met President Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoglu to ensure cooperation with the Turkish
government in fighting × ISIS.
The militant group controls the western and northern
regions of Iraq and Syria
Turkey refused to permit the use of its air bases to
launch attacks against jihadist groups.
The BBC's Jim Muir in Irbil reported one of the reasons
Turkey because the country was concerned about the lives of 50 of its citizens
were taken hostage by militants, including consular staff in Mosul.
Earlier this week, President Barack Obama revealed plans
to expand Click campaign against ISIS in the region.
France also offers assistance to military action against
ISIS, as part of a coalition to be formed Washington.
Ten Click Arab countries have agreed to assist the United
States against a group called the CIA has more than 31,000 fighters.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Page semi-protected
Islamic State
الدولة الإسلامية (Arabic)
ad-Dawlah l-Islāmīyyah
Rayat al-`Uqab, the "Eagle Banner"; also called
the black flag of jihad
Flag Coat of arms
Motto: باقية وتتمدد (Arabic)
"Bāqiyah wa-Tatamaddad" (transliteration)
"Remaining and Expanding"[1][2]
As of 4 September 2014 Areas controlled by the Islamic
State Areas claimed by the Islamic
State Rest of Iraq and Syria Note: map
includes uninhabited areas.
As of 4 September 2014
Areas
controlled by the Islamic State
Areas claimed
by the Islamic State
Rest of Iraq
and Syria
Note: map includes uninhabited areas.
Capital Ar-Raqqah,
Syria[3][4]
35°57′N 39°1′E
Government Caliphate
- Caliph[5] Ibrahim[6][7]
Establishment
- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
declared 3 January 2014[8][9]
- Caliphate declared 29 June 2014[5]
Time zone Arabia
Standard Time (UTC+3)
Islamic State
الدولة الإسلامية (Arabic)
Participant in the Iraq War, the Global War on Terrorism,
the Iraqi insurgency, and the Syrian Civil War
Active 2004–present[10][11]
(under various names)[12]
Ideology Sunni
Islamism
Salafist Jihadism
Worldwide Caliphate
Anti-Shiaism
Leaders
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Caliph)[5]
Abu Omar al-Shishani (Field Commander)[13][14]
Abu Mohammad al-Adnani (Spokesman)[15]
Headquarters Ar-Raqqah,
Syria
Area of
operations
Iraq Syria
Lebanon[16][17]
Strength 80,000–100,000
(up to 50,000 in Syria and 30,000 in Iraq) (SOHR est.)[18][19]
20,000-31,500 (CIA est.)[20]
Part of al-Qaeda
(2004[21]–2014)[22]
Originated as Jama'at
al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
(The Group of Monotheism and Jihad)
Mujahideen Shura Council
Islamic State of Iraq
Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Allies
Boko Haram[23]
Jemaah Islamiya[24]
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb[25]
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula[26]
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters[27]
Opponents
NATO[28][29][30]
United States[30]
United Kingdom[29]
France[29]
Italy[29]
Germany[29]
Poland[29]
Denmark[29]
Canada[29]
Turkey[29]
Australia (GP) [29]
al-Qaeda
al-Nusra Front[31] (truce)
Ansar al-Islam[32]
Sunni Iraqi Insurgents
Naqshbandi Army [33]
Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
General Military Council for Iraqi
Revolutionaries[34][35]
Islamic Army in Iraq
Iran[36]
Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Quds Force[37]
Iraq
Iraqi Armed Forces
Iraqi Shia militias
Iraqi Turkmen Front[38]
Awakening Councils
Kurdish forces
Peshmerga
People's Protection Units[39]
Assyrian forces
Syriac Military Council[40]
Sutoro[41]
Assyrian Patriotic Party[42]
Assyrian Democratic Movement[43][44]
Qaraqosh Protection Committee[45]
Syria[46]
Syrian Armed Forces
Syrian Opposition[47][48][49]
Free Syrian Army
Syria Revolutionaries Front
Islamic Front
Army of Mujahedeen[50]
United States (aerial operations)[51]
United States Navy[52]
Lebanon
Lebanese Armed Forces[53]
Hezbollah[54]
Turkey
Turkish Armed Forces (border clashes)[55][56][57][58]
General Directorate of Security (raids in
İstanbul)[59][60]
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Armed Forces (border protection)[61]
Indonesia
Indonesian National Police[62]
Battles
and wars
Iraq War
Al Anbar campaign
Second Battle of Fallujah
Civil war in Iraq (2006–07)[citation needed]
Iraqi Insurgency
Operation al-Shabah
Anbar campaign (2013–14)
Northern Iraq offensive (June 2014)
Northern Iraq offensive (August 2014)
Islamic State-United States conflict
Sinjar massacre
Syrian Civil War
2013 Latakia offensive[63]
Syrian Kurdish–Islamist conflict[64]
Battle of Qalamoun[65]
Inter-rebel conflict in Syria
Battle of Aleppo
Deir ez-Zor clashes
Battle of Arsal
The Islamic State (IS) (Arabic: الدولة الإسلامية
ad-Dawlah l-ʾIslāmiyyah), formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL /ˈaɪsəl/; Arabic acronym: داعش Dāʿish) or the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS /ˈaɪsɪs/),[a] is a Sunni jihadist group in the Middle East. In its
self-proclaimed status as a caliphate, it claims religious authority over all
Muslims across the world[66] and aspires to bring most of the Muslim-inhabited
regions of the world under its political control[67] beginning with Iraq, Syria
and other territories in the Levant region which include Jordan, Israel,
Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus and part of southern Turkey.[68] It has been
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, and has been described
by the United Nations[69] and Western and Middle Eastern media as a terrorist
group and by other countries such as Colombia[70] as a fundamentalist and
extremist organization. The United Nations and Amnesty International have
accused the group of grave human rights abuses.
ISIS is the successor to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad
al-Rafidayn—later commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—formed by Abu Musab
Al Zarqawi in 1999, which took part in the Iraqi insurgency against
American-led forces and their Iraqi allies following the 2003 invasion of
Iraq.[68][71] During the 2003–2011 Iraq War, it joined other Sunni insurgent
groups to form the Mujahideen Shura Council and consolidated further into the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI /ˈaɪsɪ/).[71][72] At its height it enjoyed a
significant presence in the Iraqi governorates of Al Anbar, Nineveh, Kirkuk,
most of Salah ad Din, parts of Babil, Diyala and Baghdad, and claimed Baqubah
as a capital city.[73][74][75][76] However, the violent attempts by the Islamic
State of Iraq to govern its territory led to a backlash from Sunni Iraqis and
other insurgent groups circa 2008, which helped to propel the Awakening movement
and a temporary decline in the group.[71][77]
ISIS grew significantly under the leadership of Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi gaining support in Iraq as a result of alleged economic and
political discrimination against Iraqi Sunnis. Then, after entering the Syrian
Civil War, it established a large presence in the Syrian governorates of
Ar-Raqqah, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo.[78] In June 2014, it had at least
4,000 fighters in its ranks in Iraq.[79] It has claimed responsibility for
attacks on government and military targets and for attacks that killed
thousands of civilians.[80] In August 2014, the Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights claimed that the number of fighters in the group had increased to 50,000
in Syria and 30,000 in Iraq,[18] while the CIA estimated in September 2014 that
in both countries it had between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters.[20] ISIS had close
links to al-Qaeda until February 2014 when, after an eight-month power
struggle, al-Qaeda cut all ties with the group, reportedly for its brutality and
"notorious intractability".[81][82]
ISIS’s original aim was to establish a caliphate in the
Sunni-majority regions of Iraq, and following its involvement in the Syrian
Civil War this expanded to include controlling Sunni-majority areas of
Syria.[83] A caliphate was proclaimed on 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—now
known as Amir al-Mu'minin Caliph Ibrahim—was named as its caliph, and the group
was renamed the Islamic State.[5]
Name and name changes
Since its formation in early 1999; as Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd
wa-al-Jihād, "The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad" (JTJ), the
group has had a number of different names, including some that other groups use
for it.[10][71]
In October 2004, the group leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and changed the name of the group to Tanẓīm
Qāʻidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn, "The Organization of Jihad's Base
in the Country of the Two Rivers," more commonly known as "Al-Qaeda
in Iraq" (AQI).[10][84] Although the group has never called itself
"Al-Qaeda in Iraq", this name has frequently been used to describe it
through its various incarnations.[12]
In January 2006, AQI merged with several smaller Iraqi
insurgent groups under an umbrella organization called the "Mujahideen
Shura Council." This was little more than a media exercise and an attempt
to give the group a more Iraqi flavour and perhaps to distance al-Qaeda from
some of al-Zarqawi's tactical errors, notably the 2005 bombings by AQI of three
hotels in Amman.[85] Al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, after which the group
direction shifted again.
On 12 October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council joined
four more insurgent factions and the representatives of a number of Iraqi Arab
tribes, and together they swore the traditional Arab oath of allegiance known
as Ḥilf al-Muṭayyabīn ("Oath of the Scented Ones").[b][86][87] During
the ceremony, the participants swore to free Iraq's Sunnis from what they
described as Shia and foreign oppression, and to further the name of Allah and
restore Islam to glory.[c][86]
 |
| ISIS Cntrol |
On 13 October 2006, the establishment of the Dawlat
al-ʻIraq al-Islāmīyah, "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI) was
announced.[10][88] A cabinet was formed and Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi
became ISI's figurehead emir, with the real power residing with the Egyptian
Abu Ayyub al-Masri.[89] The declaration was met with hostile criticism, not
only from ISI's jihadist rivals in Iraq, but from leading jihadist ideologues
outside the country.[90] Al-Baghdadi and al-Masri were both killed in a
US–Iraqi operation in April 2010. The next leader of the ISI was Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, the current leader of ISIS.
On 8 April 2013, having expanded into Syria, the group
adopted the name "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant", also known
as "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham."[91][92][93] The name is
abbreviated as ISIS or alternately ISIL. The final "S" in the acronym
ISIS stems from the Arabic word Shām (or Shaam), which in the context of global
jihad—as in Jund al-Sham, for example—refers to the Levant or Greater
Syria.[94][95] ISIS was also known as al-Dawlah ("the State"), or
al-Dawlat al-Islāmīyah ("the Islamic State"). These are short-forms
of the name "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham" in Arabic.[96]
ISIS's detractors, particularly in Syria, refer to the
group as "Da'ish" or "Daesh", (داعش), a term that is based
on an acronym formed from the letters of the name in Arabic, al-Dawla
al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa ash-Sham.[97][98] The group considers the term derogatory
and reportedly uses flogging as a punishment for people who use the acronym in
ISIS-controlled areas.[99][100]
On 14 May 2014, the United States Department of State
announced its decision to use "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant"
(ISIL) as the group's primary name.[98] The debate over which acronym should be
used to designate the group, ISIL or ISIS, has been discussed by several
commentators.[95][96]
On 29 June 2014, the establishment of a new caliphate was
announced, and the group formally changed its name to the "Islamic
State".[5][101][102][d]
In late August 2014, a leading Islamic authority Dar
al-Ifta al-Misriyyah in Egypt advised Muslims to stop calling the group
"Islamic State" and instead refer to it as "Al-Qaeda Separatists
in Iraq and Syria" or "QSIS", because of the militant group's
un-Islamic character.[104][105]
List of names
These names are discussed above.
al-Dawlah ("the State")
al-Dawlat al-Islāmīyah ("the Islamic State")
AQI : Al-Qaeda in Iraq : Tanẓīm Qāʻidat al-Jihād fī Bilād
al-Rāfidayn
Da'ish / Daesh (داعش) : al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa
ash-Sham
ISI : Islamic State of Iraq : Dawlat al-ʻIraq
al-Islāmīyah
ISIL : Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS : Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
Islamic State
JTJ : Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād : The Organization of
Monotheism and Jihad
Mujahideen Shura Council
QSIS : Al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria
Ideology and beliefs
ISIS is a Sunni extremist group that follows al-Qaeda's
hard-line ideology and adheres to global jihadist principles.[106][107] Like
al-Qaeda and many other modern-day jihadist groups, ISIS emerged from the
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, the world’s first Islamist group dating
back to the late 1920s in Egypt.[108] ISIS follows an extreme anti-Western
interpretation of Islam, promotes religious violence and regards those who do
not agree with its interpretations as infidels or apostates. Concurrently,
ISIS—now IS—aims to establish a Salafist-orientated Islamist state in Iraq,
Syria and other parts of the Levant.[107]
ISIS's ideology originates in the branch of modern Islam
that aims to return to the early days of Islam, rejecting later
"innovations" in the religion which it believes corrupt its original
spirit. It condemns later caliphates and the Ottoman empire for deviating from
what it calls pure Islam and hence has been attempting to establish its own
caliphate.[109] However, some Sunni commentators, including Salafi and jihadi
muftis such as Adnan al-Aroor and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, say that ISIS and
related terrorist groups are not Sunnis, but modern-day Kharijites—Muslims who
have stepped outside the mainstream of Islam—serving an imperial anti-Islamic
agenda.[110][111][112][113] Other critics of ISIS's brand of Sunni Islam include
Salafists Saleh Al-Fawzan, who claims that Western forces are behind ISIS, and
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.[113]
Salafists such as ISIS believe that only a legitimate
authority can undertake the leadership of jihad, and that the first priority
over other areas of combat, such as fighting non-Muslim countries, is the
purification of Islamic society. For example, when it comes to the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, since ISIS regards the Palestinian Sunni group
Hamas as apostates who have no legitimate authority to lead jihad, it regards
fighting Hamas as the first step toward confrontation with Israel.[114][115]
Goals
Since 2004, the group's goal has been the foundation of
an Islamic state in the Levant.[116][117] Specifically, ISIS seeks the
establishment of a caliphate, a type of Islamic state led by a group of
religious authorities under a supreme leader—caliph—who is believed to be the
successor to Mohammed.[118] In June 2014, ISIS published a document which it
claimed linked ISIS's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to the prophet.[118] That
same month, ISIS removed "Iraq and the Levant" from its name and
began to refer to itself as the Islamic State, declaring the territory that it
occupied in Iraq and Syria a new caliphate and naming al-Baghdadi as its caliph.[5]
By declaring a caliphate, al-Baghdadi was demanding the allegiance of all
devout Muslims according to Islamic jurisprudence—fiqh.[119] ISIS has also
stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations
becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and
arrival of its troops to their areas."[118] ISIS thus rejects the
political divisions established by Western powers at the end of World War I in
the Sykes–Picot Agreement as it absorbs territory in Syria and Iraq.[120][121][122]
Territorial claims
On 13 October 2006, the group announced the establishment
of the Islamic State of Iraq, which claimed authority over the Iraqi
governorates of Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Nineveh and parts
of Babil.[88] Following the 2013 expansion of the group into Syria and the
announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the number of
wilayah—provinces—which it claimed increased to 16. In addition to the seven
Iraqi wilayah, the Syrian divisions, largely lying along existing provincial
boundaries, are Al Barakah, Al Kheir, Ar-Raqqah, Al Badiya, Halab, Idlib, Hama,
Damascus and the Coast.[123] After taking control of both sides of the border
in mid-2014, ISIS created a new province incorporating both Syrian territory
around Albu Kamal and Iraqi territory around Qaim. This new wilayah was
designated al-Furat.[124] In Syria, ISIS's seat of power is in Ar-Raqqah
Governorate. Top ISIS leaders, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, are known to
have visited its provincial capital, Ar-Raqqah.[123]
Governance
British security expert Frank Gardner concluded that the
group's prospects of maintaining control and rule were greater in 2014 than
they had been in 2006. Despite being as brutal as before, ISIS has become
"well entrenched" among the population and is not likely to be
dislodged by ineffective Syrian or Iraqi forces. It has replaced corrupt
governance with functioning locally-controlled authorities. Services have been
restored and there are adequate supplies of water and oil. With Western-backed
intervention being unlikely, the group will "continue to hold their
ground" and rule an area "the size of Pennsylvania for the
foreseeable future", he said.[125][126]
Ar-Raqqah in Syria is the de facto capital of the Islamic
State. It is said to be a "test case" or "show case" of
ISIS governance.[127] As of September 2014, governance in Ar-Raqqah is under
the total control of ISIS, where it has rebuilt the structure of modern
government in less than a year. Former government workers from the Assad regime
maintain their jobs after pledging allegiance to ISIS. Institutions, restored
and restructured, are providing services. The Ar-Raqqah dam continues to
provide electricity and water. Foreign expertise supplements Syrian officials in
running civilian institutions. Only the police and soldiers are ISIS fighters,
who receive confiscated lodging previously owned by non-Sunnis and others who
fled. Welfare services are provided, price controls established, and taxes
imposed on the wealthy. Exporting oil from oilfields that it has captured
brings in tens of millions of dollars.[126][128] ISIS runs a soft power program
in the areas under its control in Iraq and Syria, which includes social
services, religious lectures and da'wah—proselytizing—to local populations. It
also performs public services such as repairing roads and maintaining the
electricity supply.[129]
Analysis
After significant setbacks for the group during the
latter stages of the coalition forces' presence in Iraq, by late 2012 it was
thought to have renewed its strength and more than doubled the number of its
members to about 2,500,[130] and since its formation in April 2013, ISIS grew
rapidly in strength and influence in Iraq and Syria. In June 2014, The
Economist reported that "ISIS may have up to 6,000 fighters in Iraq and
3,000–5,000 in Syria, including perhaps 3,000 foreigners; nearly a thousand are
reported to hail from Chechnya and perhaps 500 or so more from France, Britain
and elsewhere in Europe".[131] Chechen fighter Abu Omar al-Shishani, for
example, was made commander of the northern sector of ISIS in Syria in
2013.[132][133]
Analysts have underlined the deliberate inflammation of
sectarian conflict between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis during the Iraq War by
various Sunni and Shia players as the root cause of ISIS's rise. The
post-invasion policies of the international coalition forces have also been
cited as a factor, with Fanar Haddad, a research fellow at the National
University of Singapore's Middle East Institute, blaming the coalition forces
during the Iraq War for "enshrining identity politics as the key marker of
Iraqi politics".[134]
By 2014, ISIS was increasingly being viewed as a militia
rather than a terrorist group by some organizations.[135] As major Iraqi cities
fell to al-Baghdadi's cohorts in June, Jessica Lewis, a former US army
intelligence officer at the Institute for the Study of War, described ISIS as
"not a terrorism problem anymore", but rather "an army on the
move in Iraq and Syria, and they are taking terrain. They have shadow
governments in and around Baghdad, and they have an aspirational goal to govern.
I don't know whether they want to control Baghdad, or if they want to destroy
the functions of the Iraqi state, but either way the outcome will be disastrous
for Iraq." Lewis has called ISIS "an advanced military
leadership". She said, "They have incredible command and control and
they have a sophisticated reporting mechanism from the field that can relay
tactics and directives up and down the line. They are well-financed, and they
have big sources of manpower, not just the foreign fighters, but also prisoner
escapees."[135]
According to the Institute for the Study of War, ISIS's
2013 annual report reveals a metrics-driven military command, which is "a
strong indication of a unified, coherent leadership structure that commands
from the top down".[136] Middle East Forum's Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi said,
"They are highly skilled in urban guerrilla warfare while the new Iraqi
Army simply lacks tactical competence."[135] Seasoned observers point to
systemic corruption within the Iraq Army, it being little more than a system of
patronage, and have attributed to this its spectacular collapse as ISIS and its
allies took over large swaths of Iraq in June 2014.[137]
While officials fear ISIS may either inspire attacks in
the United States by sympathizers or those returning after joining ISIS,
American intelligence agencies find there is no immediate threat or specific
plots. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel sees an “imminent threat to every interest
we have.” Daniel Benjamin, former top counterterrorism adviser, derides such
alarmist talk as a “farce” that panics the public.[138]
Hillary Clinton stated: "The failure to help build
up a credible fighting force of the people who were the originators of the
protests against Assad—there were Islamists, there were secularists, there was
everything in the middle—the failure to do that left a big vacuum, which the
jihadists have now filled."[139]
Propaganda and social media
The logo of al-Furqan Media Productions
The logo of Al-Hayat Media Center
ISIS is also known for its effective use of propaganda.[140]
In November 2006, shortly after the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq, the
group established the al-Furqan Institute for Media Production, which produces
CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related propaganda products.[141] ISIS's
main media outlet is the I'tisaam Media Foundation,[142] which was formed in
March 2013 and distributes through the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF).[143]
In 2014, ISIS established the Al Hayat Media Center, which targets a Western
audience and produces material in English, German, Russian and
French.[144][145] In 2014 it also launched the Ajnad Media Foundation, which
releases jihadist audio chants.[146]
In July 2014, ISIS began publishing a digital magazine
called Dabiq in multiple languages, including English. According to the
magazine, its name is taken from the town in northern Syria, which is mentioned
in a hadith about Armageddon.[147] Harleen K. Gambhir, of the Institute for the
Study of War, found that while al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire
magazine focused on encouraging its readers to carry out lone-wolf attacks on
the West, Dabiq is more concerned with establishing the religious legitimacy of
ISIS and its self-proclaimed caliphate, and encouraging Muslims to emigrate
there.[148]
ISIS's use of social media has been described by one
expert as "probably more sophisticated than [that of] most US
companies".[149][150] It regularly takes advantage of social media,
particularly Twitter, to distribute its message by organizing hashtag
campaigns, encouraging Tweets on popular hashtags, and utilizing software
applications that enable ISIS propaganda to be distributed to its supporters'
accounts.[151] Another comment is that "ISIS puts more emphasis on social
media than other jihadi groups. ... They have a very coordinated social media
presence."[152] In August 2014, Twitter administrators shut down a number
of accounts associated with ISIS. ISIS recreated and publicized new accounts
the next day, which were also shut down by Twitter administrators.[153] The
group has attempted to branch out into alternate social media sites, such as
Quitter, Friendica and Diaspora; Quitter and Friendica, however, almost
immediately worked to remove ISIS's presence from their sites.[154]
 |
| ISIS Troops |
On 19 August 2014, a propaganda video showing the
beheading of US photojournalist James Foley was posted on the Internet. ISIS
claimed that the killing had been carried out in revenge for the US bombing of
ISIS targets. The video promised that a second captured US journalist Steven Sotloff
would be killed next if the airstrikes continued.[155] On September 2, 2014,
ISIS released a video purportedly showing their beheading of Sotloff.[156] In
the video the executioner says, "I'm back, Obama, and I'm back because of
your arrogant foreign policy towards the Islamic State, because of your
insistence on continuing your bombings and on Mosul Dam, despite our serious
warnings. So just as your missiles continue to strike our people, our knife
will continue to strike the necks of your people." [157] The next scene
shows the same executioner holding the orange jumpsuit of another prisoner, and
saying "We take this opportunity to warn those governments that enter this
evil alliance of America against the Islamic State to back off and leave our
people alone."[157][158]
Finances
A study of 200 documents—personal letters, expense
reports and membership rosters—captured from Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic
State of Iraq was carried out by the RAND Corporation in 2014.[159] It found
that from 2005 until 2010, outside donations amounted to only 5% of the group’s
operating budgets, with the rest being raised within Iraq.[159] In the
time-period studied, cells were required to send up to 20% of the income
generated from kidnapping, extortion rackets and other activities to the next
level of the group's leadership. Higher-ranking commanders would then
redistribute the funds to provincial or local cells that were in difficulties
or needed money to conduct attacks.[159] The records show that the Islamic State
of Iraq was dependent on members from Mosul for cash, which the leadership used
to provide additional funds to struggling militants in Diyala, Salahuddin and
Baghdad.[159]
In mid-2014, Iraqi intelligence extracted information
from an ISIS operative which revealed that the organization had assets worth
US$2 billion,[160] making it the richest jihadist group in the world.[161]
About three quarters of this sum is said to be represented by assets seized
after the group captured Mosul in June 2014; this includes possibly up to
US$429 million looted from Mosul's central bank, along with additional millions
and a large quantity of gold bullion stolen from a number of other banks in
Mosul.[162][163] However, doubt was later cast on whether ISIS was able to
retrieve anywhere near that sum from the central bank,[164] and even on whether
the bank robberies had actually occurred.[165]
ISIS has routinely practised extortion, by demanding
money from truck drivers and threatening to blow up businesses, for example.
Robbing banks and gold shops has been another source of income.[166] The group
is widely reported as receiving funding from private donors in the Gulf
states,[167][168] and both Iran and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have
accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of funding ISIS,[169][170][171][172] although
there is reportedly no evidence that this is the case.[172][173][174][175]
The group is also believed to receive considerable funds
from its operations in Eastern Syria, where it has commandeered oilfields and engages
in smuggling out raw materials and archaeological artifacts.[176][177] ISIS
also generates revenue from producing crude oil and selling electric power in
northern Syria. Some of this electricity is reportedly sold back to the Syrian
government.[178]
Since 2012, ISIS has produced annual reports giving
numerical information on its operations, somewhat in the style of corporate
reports, seemingly in a bid to encourage potential donors.[149][179]
Equipment
The most common weapons used against US and other
Coalition forces during the Iraq insurgency were those taken from Saddam
Hussein's weapon stockpiles around the country, these included AKM variant
assault rifles, PK machine guns and RPG-7s.[180] ISIS has been able to
strengthen its military capability by capturing large quantities and varieties
of weaponry during the Syrian Civil War and Post-US Iraq insurgency. These
weapons seizures have improved the group's capacity to carry out successful
subsequent operations and obtain more equipment.[181] Weaponry that ISIS has
reportedly captured and employed include SA-7[182] and Stinger[183]
surface-to-air missiles, M79 Osa, HJ-8[184] and AT-4 Spigot[182] anti-tank
weapons, Type 59 field guns[184] and M198 howitzers,[185] Humvees, T-54/55,
T-72, and M1 Abrams[186]main battle tanks,[184] M1117 armoured cars,[187] truck
mounted DShK guns,[182] ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns,[188][189] BM-21 Grad
multiple rocket launchers[181] and at least one Scud missile.[190]
When ISIS captured Mosul Airport in June 2014, it seized
a number of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and cargo planes that were stationed
there.[191][192] However, according to Peter Beaumont of The Guardian, it
seemed unlikely that ISIS would be able to deploy them.[193]
ISIS captured nuclear materials from Mosul University in
July 2014. In a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Iraq's UN
Ambassador Mohamed Ali Alhakim said that the materials had been kept at the
university and "can be used in manufacturing weapons of mass
destruction". Nuclear experts regarded the threat as insignificant.
International Atomic Energy Agency spokeswoman Gill Tudor said that the seized
materials were "low grade and would not present a significant safety,
security or nuclear proliferation risk".[194][195]
History
As Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (1999–2004)
Main article: Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (abrreviated JTJ or shortened
to Tawhid and Jihad, Tawhid wal-Jihad, sometimes Tawhid al-Jihad, Al Tawhid or
Tawhid) was started in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and a combination of
foreigners and local Islamist sympathizers.[71] Al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian
Salafi Jihadist who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the Soviet-Afghan
War, but he arrived after the departure of the Soviet troops and soon returned
to his homeland. He eventually returned to Afghanistan, running an Islamic
militant training camp near Herat.
Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, JTJ developed
into an expanding militant network for the purpose of resisting the coalition
occupation forces and their Iraqi allies. It included some remnants of Ansar
al-Islam and a growing number of foreign fighters. Many foreign fighters
arriving in Iraq were initially not associated with the group, but once they
were in the country they became dependent on al-Zarqawi's local contacts.[196]
As Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn
(2004–2006)
It has been suggested that this section be split into a
new article titled Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. (Discuss)
Proposed since August 2014.
Involvement in Iraqi Insurgency
US Navy Seabees in Fallujah, November 2004.
The group officially pledged allegiance to Osama bin
Laden's al-Qaeda network in a letter in October 2004 and changed its official
name to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (تنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في بلاد
الرافدين, "Organization of Jihad's Base in
Mesopotamia").[21][197][198] That same month, the group, now popularly
referred to as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), kidnapped and killed Japanese citizen
Shosei Koda. In November, al-Zarqawi's network was the main target of the US
Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, but its leadership managed to escape the
American siege and subsequent storming of the city. In December, in two of its many
sectarian attacks, AQI bombed a Shia funeral procession in Najaf and the main
bus station in nearby Karbala, killing at least 60 people in those two holy
cities of Shia Islam. The group also reportedly took responsibility for the 30
September 2004 Baghdad bombing which killed 41 people, mostly children.[199]
In 2005, AQI largely focused on executing high-profile
and coordinated suicide attacks, claiming responsibility for numerous attacks
which were primarily aimed at Iraqi administrators. The group launched attacks
on voters during the Iraqi legislative election in January, a combined suicide
and conventional attack on the Abu Ghraib prison in April, and coordinated
suicide attacks outside the Sheraton Ishtar and Palestine Hotel in Baghdad in
October.[200] In July, AQI claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and
execution of Ihab Al-Sherif, Egypt's envoy to Iraq.[201][202] Also in July, a
three-day series of suicide attacks, including the Musayyib marketplace
bombing, left at least 150 people dead.[203] Al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility
for a single-day series of more than a dozen bombings in Baghdad in September,
including a bomb attack on 14 September which killed about 160 people, most of
whom were unemployed Shia workers.[204] They claimed responsibility for a
series of mosque bombings in the same month in the city of Khanaqin, which
killed at least 74 people.[205]
The attacks blamed on or claimed by AQI continued to
increase in 2006 (see also the list of major resistance attacks in Iraq).[206]
In one of the incidents, two US soldiers—Thomas Lowell Tucker and Kristian
Menchaca—were captured, tortured and beheaded by the ISI. In another, four
Russian embassy officials were abducted and subsequently killed. Iraq's
al-Qaeda and its umbrella groups were blamed for multiple attacks targeting the
country's Shia population, some of which AQI claimed responsibility for. The US
claimed without verification that the group was at least one of the forces
behind the wave of chlorine bombings in Iraq, which affected hundreds of
people, albeit with few fatalities, after a series of crude chemical warfare
attacks between late 2006 and mid-2007.[207] During 2006, several key members
of AQI were killed or captured by American and allied forces. This included
al-Zarqawi himself, killed on 7 June 2006, his spiritual adviser Sheik
Abd-Al-Rahman, and the alleged "number two" deputy leader, Hamid Juma
Faris Jouri al-Saeedi. The group's leadership was then assumed by a man called
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir,[208] who in reality was the Egyptian militant Abu Ayyub
al-Masri.[209]
Car bombings were a common form of attack in Iraq during
the Coalition occupation
Inciting sectarian violence
Attacks against militiamen often targeted the Iraqi Shia
majority in an attempt to incite sectarian violence.[210] Al-Zarqawi
purportedly declared an all-out war on Shias[204] while claiming responsibility
for the Shia mosque bombings.[205] The same month, a letter allegedly written
by al-Zawahiri—later rejected as a "fake" by the AQI—appeared to
question the insurgents' tactic of indiscriminately attacking Shias in
Iraq.[211] In a video that appeared in December 2007, al-Zawahiri defended the
AQI, but distanced himself from the crimes against civilians committed by
"hypocrites and traitors" that he said existed among its ranks.[212]
US and Iraqi officials accused the AQI of trying to slide
Iraq into a full-scale civil war between Iraq's majority Shia and minority
Sunni Arabs via an orchestrated campaign of militiamen massacres and a number
of provocative attacks against high-profile religious targets.[213] With
attacks purportedly mounted by the AQI such as the Imam Ali Mosque bombing in
2003, the Day of Ashura bombings and Karbala and Najaf bombings in 2004, the
first al-Askari Mosque bombing in Samarra in 2006, the deadly single-day series
of bombings in November 2006 in which at least 215 people were killed in
Baghdad's Shia district of Sadr City, and the second al-Askari bombing in 2007,
the AQI provoked Shia militias to unleash a wave of retaliatory attacks. The
result was a plague of death squad-style killings and a spiral into further
sectarian violence, which escalated in 2006 and brought Iraq to the brink of
violent anarchy in 2007.[214] In 2008, sectarian bombings blamed on al-Qaeda
killed at least 42 people at the Imam Husayn Shrine in Karbala in March and at
least 51 people at a bus stop in Baghdad in June.
Operations outside Iraq and other activities
On 3 December 2004, AQI attempted to blow up an
Iraqi–Jordanian border crossing, but failed to do so. In 2006, a Jordanian
court sentenced to death al-Zarqawi in absentia and two of his associates for
their involvement in the plot.[215] AQI increased its presence outside Iraq by
claiming credit for three attacks in 2005. In the most deadly of these attacks,
suicide bombs killed 60 people in Amman, Jordan on 9 November 2005.[216] They
claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks that narrowly missed the USS
Kearsarge and USS Ashland in Jordan, which also targeted the city of Eilat in
Israel, and for the firing of several rockets into Israel from Lebanon in
December 2005.[200]
The Lebanese-Palestinian militant group Fatah al-Islam,
which was defeated by Lebanese government forces during the 2007 Lebanon
conflict, was linked to AQI and led by al-Zarqawi's former companion who had
fought alongside him in Iraq.[217] The group may have been linked to the
little-known group called "Tawhid and Jihad in Syria",[218] and may
have influenced the Palestinian resistance group in Gaza called "Tawhid
and Jihad Brigades", better known as the Army of Islam.[219]
American officials believed that Al-Qaeda in Iraq had
conducted bomb attacks against Syrian government forces.[220][221][222]
Al-Nusra Front, another al-Qaeda-inspired group, claimed responsibility for
attacks inside Syria, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that
Al-Qaeda in Iraq members were going to Syria, where the militants had
previously received support and weapons.[223]
Goals and umbrella organizations
See also: Mujahideen Shura Council (Iraq)
In a letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2005, al-Zarqawi
outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq War, which included expelling US
forces from Iraq, establishing an Islamic authority—a caliphate—spreading the
conflict to Iraq's secular neighbors, and engaging in the Arab–Israeli
conflict.[200] The affiliated groups were linked to regional attacks outside
Iraq which were consistent with their stated plan, one example being the 2005
Sharm al-Sheikh bombings in Egypt, which killed 88 people, many of them foreign
tourists.
In January 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—the name by which
Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn was more commonly known—created an
umbrella organization called the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), in an attempt
to unify Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Its efforts to recruit Iraqi Sunni
nationalists and secular groups were undermined by the violent tactics it used
against civilians and its extreme Islamic fundamentalist doctrine.[224] Because
of these impediments, the attempt was largely unsuccessful.[214]
On 13 October 2006, the MSC declared the establishment of
an Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), comprising Iraq's six mostly Sunni Arab governorates,
with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi being announced as the self-proclaimed state's
Emir.[88][206]Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who had been the leader of the MSC, was given
the title of Minister of War within the ISI's ten-member cabinet.[225]
Following the announcement, scores of gunmen took part in military parades in
Ramadi and other Anbar towns to celebrate.[226][227]
According to a study compiled by US intelligence agencies
in early 2007, the ISI planned to seize power in the central and western areas
of the country and turn it into a Sunni Islamic state.[228]
As Islamic State of Iraq (2006–2013)
Strength and activity
US Marines in Ramadi, May 2006. The Islamic State of Iraq
had declared the city to be its capital.
In 2006, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research estimated that Al-Qaeda in Iraq's core membership was "more
than 1,000".[229] These figures do not include the other
six[230][irrelevant citation] AQI-led Salafi groups in the Islamic State of
Iraq. In 2007 estimates of the group's strength ranged from just 850 to several
thousand full-time fighters.[229][231] The group was said to be suffering high
manpower losses, including those from its many "martyrdom"
operations, but for a long time this appeared to have little effect on its strength
and capabilities, implying a constant flow of volunteers from Iraq and abroad.
However, Al-Qaeda in Iraq more than doubled in strength, from 1,000 to 2,500
fighters, after the US withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011.[232]
In 2007, some observers and scholars suggested that the
threat posed by AQI was being exaggerated and that a "heavy focus on
al-Qaeda obscures a much more complicated situation on the
ground".[233][234] According to the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate
and the Defense Intelligence Agency reports, AQI accounted for 15% percent of
attacks in Iraq. However, the Congressional Research Service noted in its
September 2007 report that attacks from al-Qaeda were less than 2% of the
violence in Iraq. It criticized the Bush administration's statistics, noting
that its false reporting of insurgency attacks as AQI attacks had increased
since the surge operations began in 2007.[229][235] In March 2007, the
US-sponsored Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed AQI attacks for that
month and concluded that the group had taken credit for 43 out of 439 attacks
on Iraqi security forces and Shia militias, and 17 out of 357 attacks on US
troops.[229]
According to the 2006 US Government report, this group
was most clearly associated with foreign jihadist cells operating in Iraq and
had specifically targeted international forces and Iraqi citizens; most of
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)'s operatives were not Iraqi, but were coming through a
series of safe houses, the largest of which was on the Iraq–Syria border. AQI's
operations were predominately Iraq-based, but the United States Department of
State alleged that the group maintained an extensive logistical network
throughout the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Europe.[236] In a June
2008 CNN special report, Al-Qaeda in Iraq was called "a well-oiled …
organization … almost as pedantically bureaucratic as was Saddam Hussein's
Ba'ath Party", collecting new execution videos long after they stopped
publicising them, and having a network of spies even in the US military bases.
According to the report, Iraqis—many of them former members of Hussein's secret
services—were now effectively running Al-Qaeda in Iraq, with "foreign
fighters' roles" seeming to be "mostly relegated to the cannon fodder
of suicide attacks", although the organization's top leadership was still
dominated by non-Iraqis.[237]
Decline
The high-profile attacks linked to the group continued
through early 2007, as AQI claimed responsibility for attacks such as the March
assassination attempt on Sunni Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Salam al-Zaubai,
the April Iraqi Parliament bombing, and the May capture and subsequent
execution of three American soldiers. Also in May, ISI leader al-Baghdadi was
declared to have been killed in Baghdad, but his death was later denied by the
insurgents; later, al-Baghdadi was even declared by the US to be non-existent.
There were conflicting reports regarding the fate of al-Masri. From March to
August, coalition forces fought the Battle of Baqubah as part of the largely
successful attempts to wrest the Diyala Governorate from AQI-aligned forces.
Through 2007, the majority of suicide bombings targeting civilians in Iraq were
routinely identified by military and government sources as being the
responsibility of al-Qaeda and its associated groups, even when there was no
claim of responsibility, as was the case in the 2007 Yazidi communities
bombings, which killed some 800 people in the deadliest terrorist attack in
Iraq to date.
By late 2007, violent and indiscriminate attacks directed
by rogue AQI elements against Iraqi civilians had severely damaged their image
and caused loss of support among the population, thus isolating the group. In a
major blow to AQI, many former Sunni militants who had previously fought
alongside the group started to work with the American forces (see also below).
The US troops surge supplied the military with more manpower for operations
targeting the group, resulting in dozens of high-level AQI members being captured
or killed.[238] Al-Qaeda seemed to have lost its foothold in Iraq and appeared
to be severely crippled.[239] Accordingly, the bounty issued for al-Masri was
eventually cut from $5 million to $100,000 in April 2008.[240]
As of 2008, a series of US and Iraqi offensives managed
to drive out the AQI-aligned insurgents from their former safe havens, such as
the Diyala and Al Anbar governorates and the embattled capital of Baghdad, to
the area of the northern city of Mosul, the latest of the Iraq War's major
battlegrounds.[240] The struggle for control of Ninawa Governorate—the Ninawa
campaign—was launched in January 2008 by US and Iraqi forces as part of the
large-scale Operation Phantom Phoenix, which was aimed at combating al-Qaeda
activity in and around Mosul, and finishing off the network's remnants in
central Iraq that had escaped Operation Phantom Thunder in 2007. In Baghdad a
pet market was bombed in February 2008 and a shopping centre was bombed in
March 2008, killing at least 98 and 68 people respectively; AQI were the
suspected perpetrators.
US soldiers and Sunni Arab tribesmen scan for enemy
activity in a farm field in southern Arab Jibor, January 2008
AQI has long raised money, running into tens of millions
of dollars, from kidnappings for ransom, car theft—sometimes killing drivers in
the process—hijacking fuel trucks and other activities.[240] According to an
April 2007 statement by their Islamic Army in Iraq rivals, AQI was demanding
jizya tax and killing members of wealthy families when it was not paid.[241]
According to both US and Iraqi sources, in May 2008 AQI was stepping up its
fundraising campaigns as its strictly militant capabilities were on the wane,
with especially lucrative activity said to be oil operations centered on the
industrial city of Bayji. According to US military intelligence sources, in
2008 the group resembled a "Mafia-esque criminal gang".[240]
Conflicts with other groups
See also: Awakening movements in Iraq and Islamic
Army-al-Qaeda conflict
The first reports of a split and even armed clashes
between Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni groups date back to 2005.[242][243] In
the summer of 2006, local Sunni tribes and insurgent groups, including the
prominent Islamist-nationalist group Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), began to speak
of their dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda and its tactics,[244] openly criticizing
the foreign fighters for their deliberate targeting of Iraqi civilians. In
September 2006, 30 Anbar tribes formed their own local alliance called the
Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), which was directed specifically at countering
al-Qaeda-allied terrorist forces in the province,[245][246] and they openly
sided with the government and the US troops.[247]
By the beginning of 2007, Sunni tribes and nationalist
insurgents had begun battling with their former allies in AQI in order to
retake control of their communities.[248] In early 2007, forces allied to
Al-Qaeda in Iraq committed a series of attacks on Sunnis critical of the group,
including the February 2007 attack in which scores of people were killed when a
truck bomb exploded near a Sunni mosque in Fallujah.[249] Al-Qaeda supposedly
played a role in the assassination of the leader of the Anbar-based insurgent
group 1920 Revolution Brigade, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance
Movement.[250] In April 2007, the IAI spokesman accused the ISI of killing at
least 30 members of the IAI, as well as members of the Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna
and Mujahideen Army insurgent groups, and called on Osama bin Laden to
intervene personally to rein in Al-Qaeda in Iraq.[241][251] The following
month, the government announced that AQI leader al-Masri had been killed by ASC
fighters.[209][213] Four days later, AQI released an audio tape in which a man
claiming to be al-Masri warned Sunnis not to take part in the political
process; he also said that reports of internal fighting between Sunni militia
groups were "lies and fabrications".[252] Later in May, the US forces
announced the release of dozens of Iraqis who were tortured by AQI as a part of
the group's intimidation campaign.[253]
By June 2007, the growing hostility between
foreign-influenced jihadists and Sunni nationalists had led to open gun battles
between the groups in Baghdad.[254][255] The Islamic Army soon reached a
ceasefire agreement with AQI, but refused to sign on to the ISI.[256] There
were reports that Hamas of Iraq insurgents were involved in assisting US troops
in their Diyala Governorate operations against Al-Qaeda in August 2007. In
September 2007, AQI claimed responsibility for the assassination of three
people including the prominent Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, leader of
the Anbar "Awakening council". That same month, a suicide attack on a
mosque in the city of Baqubah killed 28 people, including members of Hamas of
Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigade, during a meeting at the mosque between
tribal and guerilla leaders and the police.[257] Meanwhile, the US military
began arming moderate insurgent factions when they promised to fight Al-Qaeda
in Iraq instead of the Americans.[258]
By December 2007, the strength of the
"Awakening" movement irregulars—also called "Concerned Local
Citizens" and "Sons of Iraq"—was estimated at 65,000–80,000
fighters.[259] Many of them were former insurgents, including alienated former
AQI supporters, and they were now being armed and paid by the Americans
specifically to combat al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq. As of July 2007, this
highly controversial strategy proved to be effective in helping to secure the
Sunni districts of Baghdad and the other hotspots of central Iraq, and to root
out the al-Qaeda-aligned militants.
By 2008, the ISI was describing itself as being in a
state of "extraordinary crisis",[260] which was attributable to a
number of factors,[261] notably the Anbar Awakening.
Transformation and resurgence
In early 2009, US forces began pulling out of cities
across the country, turning over the task of maintaining security to the Iraqi
Army, the Iraqi Police Service and their paramilitary allies. Experts and many
Iraqis were worried that in the absence of US soldiers the ISI might resurface
and attempt mass-casualty attacks to destabilize the country.[262] There was
indeed a spike in the number of suicide attacks,[263] and through mid- and late
2009, the ISI rebounded in strength and appeared to be launching a concerted
effort to cripple the Iraqi government.[264] During August and October 2009,
the ISI claimed responsibility for four bombings targeting five government
buildings in Baghdad, including attacks that killed 101 at the ministries of
Foreign Affairs and Finance in August and 155 at the Ministry of Justice and
Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works in September; these were the
deadliest attacks directed at the new government in more than six years of war.
These attacks represented a shift away from the group's previous efforts to
incite sectarian violence, although a series of suicide attacks in April
targeted mainly Iranian Shia pilgrims, killing 76, and in June, a mosque
bombing in Taza killed at least 73 Shias from the Turkmen ethnic minority.
In late 2009, the commander of the US forces in Iraq,
General Ray Odierno, stated that the ISI "has transformed significantly in
the last two years. What once was dominated by foreign individuals has now
become more and more dominated by Iraqi citizens". Odierno's comments
reinforced accusations by the government of Nouri al-Maliki that al-Qaeda and
ex-Ba'athists were working together to undermine improved security and sabotage
the planned Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2010.[265] On 18 April 2010, the ISI’s
two top leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, were killed in a
joint US-Iraqi raid near Tikrit.[266] In a press conference in June 2010,
General Odierno reported that 80% of the ISI’s top 42 leaders, including
recruiters and financiers, had been killed or captured, with only eight
remaining at large. He said that they had been cut off from Al Qaeda's
leadership in Pakistan, and that improved intelligence had enabled the
successful mission in April that led to the killing of al-Masri and
al-Baghdadi; in addition, the number of attacks and casualty figures in Iraq
for the first five months of 2010 were the lowest since 2003.[267][268][269] In
May 2011, the Islamic State of Iraq's "emir of Baghdad" Huthaifa
al-Batawi, captured during the crackdown after the 2010 Baghdad church attack
in which 68 people died, was killed during an attempted prison break, during
which an Iraqi general and several others were also killed.[270][271]
 |
| John Kerry and Ban Ki Moon |
On 16 May 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed the
new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq;[272] he had previously been the
general supervisor of the group's provincial sharia committees and a member of
its senior consultative council.[273] Al-Baghdadi replenished the group's
leadership, many of whom had been killed or captured, by appointing former
Ba'athist military and intelligence officers who had served during the Saddam
Hussein regime. These men, nearly all of whom had spent time imprisoned by
American forces, came to make up about one-third of Baghdadi's top 25
commanders. One of them was a former Colonel, Samir al-Khlifawi, also known as
Haji Bakr, who became the overall military commander in charge of overseeing
the group's operations.[274][275]
In July 2012, al-Baghdadi’s first audio statement was
released online. In this he announced that the group was returning to the
former strongholds that US troops and their Sunni allies had driven them from
prior to the withdrawal of US troops.[276] He also declared the start of a new
offensive in Iraq called Breaking the Walls which would focus on freeing
members of the group held in Iraqi prisons.[276] Violence in Iraq began to
escalate that month, and in the following year the group carried out 24 waves
of VBIED attacks and eight prison breaks. By July 2013, monthly fatalities had
exceeded 1,000 for the first time since April 2008.[277] The Breaking the Walls
campaign culminated in July 2013, with the group carrying out simultaneous
raids on Taji and Abu Ghraib prison, freeing more than 500 prisoners, many of
them veterans of the Iraqi insurgency.[277][278]
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist on 4 October 2011 by the US State Department, with an
announced reward of US$10 million for information leading to his capture or
death.[279]
As Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2013–2014)
Declaration and dispute with al-Nusra Front
In March 2011, protests began in Syria against the
government of Bashar al-Assad. In the following month violence between
demonstrators and security forces led to a gradual militarisation of the
conflict.[280] In August 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began sending Syrian and
Iraqi ISI members, experienced in guerilla warfare, across the border into
Syria to establish an organization inside the country. Led by a Syrian known as
Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the group began to recruit fighters and establish
cells throughout the country.[281][282] On 23 January 2012, the group announced
its formation as Jabhat al-Nusra l’Ahl as-Sham—Jabhat al-Nusra—more commonly
known as al-Nusra Front. Al-Nusra rapidly expanded into a capable fighting
force with a level of popular support among opposition supporters in
Syria.[281]
In April 2013, al-Baghdadi released an audio statement in
which he announced that al-Nusra Front had been established, financed and
supported by the Islamic State of Iraq[283] and that the two groups were
merging under the name "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham".[91]
Al-Jawlani issued a statement denying the merger and complaining that neither
he nor anyone else in al-Nusra's leadership had been consulted about it.[284]
In June 2013, Al Jazeera reported that it had obtained a letter written by
al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, addressed to both leaders, in which he ruled
against the merger and appointed an emissary to oversee relations between them
and put an end to tensions.[285] In the same month, al-Baghdadi released an
audio message rejecting al-Zawahiri's ruling and declaring that the merger was
going ahead.[286] In October 2013, al-Zawahiri ordered the disbanding of ISIS,
putting al-Nusra Front in charge of jihadist efforts in Syria,[287] but
al-Baghdadi contested al-Zawahiri's ruling on the basis of Islamic
jurisprudence[286] and the group continued to operate in Syria. In February
2014, after an eight-month power struggle, al-Qaeda disavowed any relations
with ISIS.[81]
According to journalist Sarah Birke, there are
"significant differences" between al-Nusra Front and ISIS. While
al-Nusra actively calls for the overthrow of the Assad government, ISIS "tends
to be more focused on establishing its own rule on conquered territory".
ISIS is "far more ruthless" in building an Islamic state,
"carrying out sectarian attacks and imposing sharia law immediately",
she said. While al-Nusra has a "large contingent of foreign
fighters", it is seen as a home-grown group by many Syrians; by contrast,
ISIS fighters have been described as "foreign 'occupiers'" by many
Syrian refugees.[288] It has a strong presence in mid- and northern Syria,
where it has instituted sharia in a number of towns.[288] The group reportedly
controlled the four border towns of Atmeh, al-Bab, Azaz and Jarablus, allowing
it to control the exit and entrance from Syria into Turkey.[288] Foreign
fighters in Syria include Russian-speaking jihadists who were part of Jaish
al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA).[289] In November 2013, the JMA's ethnic Chechen
leader Abu Omar al-Shishani swore an oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi;[290]
the group then split between those who followed al-Shishani in joining ISIS and
those who continued to operate independently in the JMA under a new
leadership.[14]
In May 2014, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri ordered
al-Nusra Front to stop attacks on its rival ISIS.[31] In June 2014, after
continued fighting between the two groups, al-Nusra's branch in the Syrian town
of al-Bukamal pledged allegiance to ISIS.[291][292]
Conflicts with other groups
See also: Inter-rebel conflict during the Syrian Civil
War
In Syria, rebels affiliated with the Islamic Front and
the Free Syrian Army launched an offensive against ISIS militants in and around
Aleppo in January 2014.[293][294]
Relations with the Syrian government
In January 2014, The Daily Telegraph said that Western
"intelligence sources" believed that the Syrian government made
secret oil deals with ISIS and al-Nusra Front, alleging that the militants were
funding their campaign by selling crude oil to the regime from the fields they
have captured.[295]
As Islamic State (2014–present)
On 29 June 2014, ISIS removed "Iraq and the
Levant" from its name and began to refer to itself as the Islamic State,
declaring the territory under its control a new caliphate and naming Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi as its caliph.[5] On the first night of Ramadan, Shaykh Abu
Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, spokesperson for ISIS, described the establishment
of the caliphate as "a dream that lives in the depths of every Muslim
believer" and "the abandoned obligation of the era". He said
that the group's ruling Shura Council had decided to establish the caliphate
formally and that Muslims around the world should now pledge their allegiance
to the new caliph.[296][297] The declaration of a caliphate has been criticized
and ridiculed by Muslim scholars and rival Islamists inside and outside the
occupied territory.[298][299][300][301][302][303]
By that time, many moderate rebels had been assimilated
into the group. In august 2014, a high-level IS commander said that "In
the East of Syria, there is no Free Syrian Army any longer. All Free Syrian
Army people [there] have joined the Islamic State".[304] The Islamic State
had recruited more than 6,300 fighters in July 2014 alone, many of them coming
from the Free Syrian Army.[305]
Analysts observed that dropping the reference to region
reflected a widening of the group's scope, and Laith Alkhouri, a terrorism
analyst, thought that after capturing many areas in Syria and Iraq, ISIS felt
this was a suitable opportunity to take control of the global jihadist
movement.[306]
A week before its change of name to the Islamic State,
ISIS had captured the Trabil crossing on the Jordan–Iraq border,[307] the only
border crossing between the two countries.[308] ISIS has received some public
support in Jordan, albeit limited, partly owing to state repression there.[309]
Raghad Hussein, the daughter of Saddam Hussein now living in opulent asylum in
Jordan, has publicly expressed support for the advance of ISIS in Iraq,
reflecting the Ba'athist alliance of convenience with ISIS with the goal of
return to power in Bagdad.[310] ISIS undertook a recruitment drive in Saudi
Arabia,[173] where tribes in the north are linked to those in western Iraq and
eastern Syria.[311]
In June and July 2014, Jordan and Saudi Arabia moved
troops to their borders with Iraq after Iraq lost control of, or withdrew from,
strategic crossing points, which were thence under ISIS's command.[61][308]
There was speculation that al-Maliki had ordered a withdrawal of troops from
the Iraq–Saudi crossings in order "to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia
and bring the threat of Isis over-running its borders as well".[311]
After the group captured Kurdish-controlled
territory[312] and massacred Yazidis,[313] the US launched a humanitarian
mission and aerial bombing campaign against ISIS.[314][315]
In July 2014, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau declared
support for the new Calpihate and Caliph Ibrahim.[23] In August, Shekau
announced that Boko Haram had captured the Nigerian town of Gwoza. Shekau
announced: "Thanks be to God who gave victory to our brethren in Gwoza and
made it a state among the Islamic states".[316][317]
Human rights abuses
In early September 2014, the United Nations Human Rights
Council agreed to send a team to Iraq and Syria to investigate the abuses and
killings being carried out by the Islamic State on "an unimaginable
scale". Zeid Ra'ad al Hussein of Jordan, who has taken over Navi Pillay's
post as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, urged world leaders to step
in to protect women and children suffering at the hands of Islamic State
militants, who he said were trying to create a "house of blood". He
appealed to the international community to concentrate its efforts on ending
the conflict in Iraq and Syria.[318]
War crimes accusations
In July 2014, the BBC reported the United Nations' chief
investigator as stating: "Fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (Isis) may be added to a list of war crimes suspects in
Syria."[319]
In August 2014, the United Nations accused the Islamic
State of committing "mass atrocities" and war crimes.[320][321]
Religious persecution
ISIS compels people in the areas it controls, under the
penalty of death, torture or mutilation, to declare Islamic creed, and live
according to its interpretation of Sunni Islam and sharia law.[322][323]
It directs violence against Shia Muslims, indigenous
Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac and Armenian Christians, Yazidis, Druze, Shabaks and
Mandeans in particular.[324]
Amnesty International has accused ISIS of the ethnic
cleansing of minority groups in northern Iraq.[325]
Treatment of civilians
During the Iraqi conflict in 2014, ISIS released dozens
of videos showing its ill treatment of civilians, many of whom had apparently
been targeted on the basis of their religion or ethnicity. Navi Pillay, UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, warned of war crimes occurring in the Iraqi war
zone, and disclosed one UN report of ISIS militants murdering Iraqi Army
soldiers and 17 civilians in a single street in Mosul. The United Nations
reported that in the 17 days from 5 to 22 June, ISIS killed more than 1,000
Iraqi civilians and injured more than 1,000.[326][327][328] After ISIS released
photographs of its fighters shooting scores of young men, the United Nations
declared that cold-blooded "executions" said to have been carried out
by militants in northern Iraq almost certainly amounted to war crimes.[329]
ISIS's advance in Iraq in mid-2014 was accompanied by
continuing violence in Syria. On 29 May, a village in Syria was raided by ISIS
and at least 15 civilians were killed, including, according to Human Rights
Watch, at least six children.[330] A hospital in the area confirmed that it had
received 15 bodies on the same day.[331] The Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights reported that on 1 June, a 102-year-old man was killed along with his
whole family in a village in Hama.[332]
ISIS has recruited to its ranks Iraqi children, who can
be seen with masks on their faces and guns in their hands patrolling the
streets of Mosul.[333]
Sexual violence allegations
According to one report, ISIS's capture of Iraqi cities
in June 2014 was accompanied by an upsurge in crimes against women, including
kidnap and rape.[334][335][336] The Guardian reported that ISIS's extremist
agenda extended to women's bodies and that women living under their control
were being captured and raped.[337] Hannaa Edwar, a leading women’s rights
advocate in Baghdad who runs an NGO called al-Amal, said that none of her
contacts in Mosul were able to confirm any cases of rape; however, another
Baghdad-based women's rights activist, Basma al-Khateeb, said that a culture of
violence existed in Iraq against women generally and felt sure that sexual
violence against women was happening in Mosul involving not only ISIS but all
armed groups.[338] During a meeting with Nouri al-Maliki, British Foreign Minister
William Hague said with regard to ISIS: "Anyone glorifying, supporting or
joining it should understand that they would be assisting a group responsible
for kidnapping, torture, executions, rape and many other hideous
crimes".[339] According to Martin Williams in The Citizen, some hard-line
Salafists apparently regard extramarital sex with multiple partners as a
legitimate form of holy war and it is "difficult to reconcile this with a
religion where some adherents insist that women must be covered from head to
toe, with only a narrow slit for the eyes".[340]
Haleh Esfandiari from the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars has highlighted the abuse of local women by ISIS militants
after they have captured an area. "They usually take the older women to a
makeshift slave market and try to sell them. The younger girls ... are raped or
married off to fighters", she said, adding, "It's based on temporary
marriages, and once these fighters have had sex with these young girls, they
just pass them on to other fighters."[341] Yezidi girls in Iraq allegedly
raped by ISIS fighters have committed suicide, as described in a witness
statement recorded by Rudaw.[342]
Guidelines for civilians
After the self-proclaimed Islamic State captured cities
in Iraq, ISIS issued guidelines on how to wear clothes and veils. ISIS warned
women in the city of Mosul to wear full-face veils or face severe
punishment.[343][344] A cleric told Reuters in Mosul that ISIS gunmen had
ordered him to read out the warning in his mosque when worshippers
gathered.[343] ISIS also banned naked mannequins and ordered the faces of both
male and female mannequins to be covered.[345] ISIS released 16 notes labeled
"Contract of the City", a set of rules aimed at civilians in Nineveh.
One rule stipulated that women should stay at home and not go outside unless
necessary. Another rule said that stealing would be punished by
amputation.[129][346]
Christians living in areas under ISIS control who wanted
to remain in the "caliphate" faced three options: converting to
Islam, paying a religious levy—jizya—or death. "We offer them three
choices: Islam; the dhimma contract – involving payment of jizya; if they
refuse this they will have nothing but the sword", ISIS said.[347] ISIS
had already set similar rules for Christians in Ar-Raqqah, Syria, once one of
the nation's most liberal cities.[348][349]
Timeline of events
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2003–06 events
The Al-Askari Mosque, one of the holiest sites in Shia
Islam, after the first attack by Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2006
The group was founded in 2003 as a reaction to the
American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Its first leader was the
Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who declared allegiance to Osama bin
Laden's al-Qaeda network on 17 October 2004.[350] Foreign fighters from outside
Iraq were thought to play a key role in its network.[351] The group became a
primary target of the Iraqi government and its foreign supporters, and attacks
between these groups resulted in more than 1,000 deaths every year between 2004
and 2010.[352]
The Islamic State of Iraq made clear its belief that
targeting civilians was an acceptable strategy and it has been responsible for
thousands of civilian deaths since 2004.[353] In September 2005, al-Zarqawi
declared war on Shia Muslims and the group used bombings—especially suicide
bombings in public places—massacres and executions to carry out terrorist
attacks on Shia-dominated and mixed sectarian neighbourhoods.[354] Suicide
attacks by the ISI also killed hundreds of Sunni civilians, which engendered
widespread anger among Sunnis.
2007 events
Between late 2006 and May 2007, the ISI brought the Dora
neighborhood of southern Baghdad under its control. Numerous Christian families
left, unwilling to pay the jizya tax.[citation needed] US efforts to drive out
the ISI presence stalled in late June 2007, despite streets being walled off
and the use of biometric identification technology. By November 2007, the ISI
had been removed from Dora, and Assyrian churches could be re-opened.[355][not
in citation given] In 2007 alone the ISI killed around 2,000 civilians, making
that year the most violent in its campaign against the civilian population of
Iraq.[353]
9 March: The Interior Ministry of Iraq said that Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi had been captured in Baghdad,[356] but it was later said that the
person in question was not al-Baghdadi.[357]
19 April: The organization announced that it had set up a
provisional government termed "the first Islamic administration" of
post-invasion Iraq. The "emirate" was stated to be headed by Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi and his "cabinet" of ten "ministers".[225]
Name (English transliteration) and notable pseudonyms Arabic name Post Notes
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi
d. 18 April 2010
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurashi[358] (aka Abu
Du'a)[359] أبو عمر البغدادي، أبو بكر البغدادي Emir Abu
Du'a, also known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,[359] is the second leader of the
group.[360]
Abu Abdullah al-Husseini al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi Vice Emir
Abu Abdul Rahman al-Falahi أبو عبد الرحمن الفلاحي
ʾAbū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Falāḥī "First Minister" (Prime Minister)
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (aka Abu Ayyub al-Masri)
d. 18 April 2010
Al-Nasser Lideen Allah Abu Suleiman (aka Neaman Salman
Mansour al Zaidi) أبو حمزة المهاجر War Identity
of al-Muhajir with al-Masri suspected. ISI only used former name. Abu Suleiman
is the second minister of war.
Abu Uthman al-Tamimi أبو
عثمان التميمي
ʾAbū ʿUṯmān at-Tamīmī Sharia
affairs
Abu Bakr al-Jabouri
(aka Muharib Abdul-Latif al-Jabouri)
d. 1/2 May 2007 أبو بكر
الجبوري
ʾAbū Bakr al-Ǧabūrī
(aka محارب عبد اللطيف الجبوري
Muḥārib ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Ǧabūrī) Public Relations Common
spelling variants: al-Jubouri, al-Jiburi.
Abu Abdul Jabar al-Janabi أبو
عبد الجبار الجنابي Security
Abu Muhammad al-Mashadani أبو
محمد المشهداني
ʾAbū Muḥammad al-Mašhadānī Information
Abu Abdul Qadir al-Eissawi أبو عبد القادر العيساوي
ʾAbū ʿAbd al-Qādir al-ʿĪsāwī Martyrs and Prisoners Affairs
Abu Ahmed al-Janabi أبو
أحمد الجنابي
ʾAbū ʾAḥmad al-Ǧanābī Oil
Mustafa al-A'araji مصطفى
الأعرجي
Muṣṭafā al-ʾAʿraǧī Agriculture
and Fisheries
Abu Abdullah al-Zabadi أبو
عبد الله الزيدي Health
Mohammed Khalil al-Badria محمد
خليل البدرية
Muḥammad Ḫalīl al-Badriyyah Education Announced on 3
September 2007
The names listed above are all considered to be noms de
guerre.
3 May: Iraqi sources claimed that Abu Omar al-Baghdadi
had been killed a short time earlier. According to The Long War Journal, no
evidence was provided to support this and US sources remained skeptical.[361]
The Islamic State of Iraq released a statement later that day which denied his
death.[362]
12 May: In what was apparently the same incident, it was
announced that "Minister of Public Relations" Abu Bakr al-Jabouri had
been killed on 12 May 2007 near Taji.[verification needed] The exact
circumstances of the incident remain unknown. The initial version of the events
at Taji, as given by the Iraqi Interior Ministry, was that there had been a
shoot-out between rival Sunni militias. Coalition and Iraqi government
operations were apparently being conducted in the same area at about the same
time and later sources implied that they were directly involved, with
al-Jabouri being killed while resisting arrest. (See Abu Omar al-Baghdadi for
details.)
12 May: The ISI issued a press release claiming
responsibility for an ambush at Al Taqa, Babil on 12 May 2007, in which one
Iraqi soldier and four US 10th Mountain Division soldiers were killed. Three
soldiers of the US unit were captured and one was found dead in the Euphrates
11 days later. After a 4,000-man hunt by the US and allied forces ended without
success, the ISI released a video in which it was claimed that the other two
soldiers had been killed and buried, but no direct proof was given. Their
bodies were found a year later.[363][364]
18 June: The US launched Operation Arrowhead Ripper, as
"a large-scale effort to eliminate Al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorists operating
in Baquba and its surrounding areas".[365] (See also Diyala province
campaign.)
25 June: The suicide bombing of a meeting of Al Anbar
tribal leaders and officials at Mansour Hotel, Baghdad[366] killed 13 people,
including six Sunni sheikhs[367] and other prominent figures. This was
proclaimed by the ISI to have been in retaliation for the rape of a Sunni woman
by Iraqi police.[368] Security at the hotel, which is 100 meters outside the
Green Zone, was provided by a British contractor[369] which had apparently
hired guerrilla fighters to provide physical security.[370][not in citation
given] There were allegations that an Egyptian Islamist group may have been
responsible for the bombing, but this has never been proven.[371]
In July, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi released an audio tape in
which he issued an ultimatum to Iran. He said: "We are giving the
Persians, and especially the rulers of Iran, a two-month period to end all
kinds of support for the Iraqi Shia government and to stop direct and indirect
intervention ... otherwise a severe war is waiting for you." He also
warned Arab states against doing business with Iran.[372] Iran supports the
Iraqi government which many see as anti-Sunni.[citation needed]
Resistance to coalition operations in Baqubah turned out
to be less than anticipated. In early July, US Army sources suggested that any
ISI leadership in the area had largely relocated elsewhere in early June 2007,
before the start of Operation Arrowhead Ripper.[373]
2009–12 events
In the 25 October 2009 Baghdad bombings 155 people were
killed and at least 721 were injured,[374] and in the 8 December 2009 Baghdad
bombings at least 127 people were killed and 448 were injured.[375] The ISI
claimed responsibility for both attacks.
The ISI claimed responsibility for the 25 January 2010
Baghdad bombings that killed 41 people, and the 4 April 2010 Baghdad bombings
that killed 42 people and injured 224. On 17 June 2010, the group claimed
responsibility for an attack on the Central Bank of Iraq that killed 18 people
and wounded 55.[376] On 19 August 2010, in a statement posted on a website
often used by Islamist radicals, the ISI claimed responsibility for the 17
August 2010 Baghdad bombings.[377] It also claimed responsibility for the
bombings in October 2010.[verification needed]
According to the SITE Institute,[378] the ISI claimed
responsibility for the 2010 Baghdad church attack that took place during a
Sunday Mass on 31 October 2010.[379]
8 February 2011: According to the SITE Institute, a
statement of support for Egyptian protesters—which appears to have been the
first reaction of any group affiliated with al-Qaeda to the protests in Egypt
during the 2011 Arab Spring Movement—was issued by the Islamic State of Iraq on
jihadist forums. The message addressed to the protesters was that the
"market of jihad" had opened in Egypt, that "the doors of
martyrdom had opened", and that every able-bodied man must participate. It
urged Egyptians to ignore the "ignorant deceiving ways" of
secularism, democracy and "rotten pagan nationalism". "Your
jihad", it went on, is in support of Islam and the weak and oppressed in
Egypt, for "your people" in Gaza and Iraq, and "for every
Muslim" who has been "touched by the oppression of the tyrant of
Egypt and his masters in Washington and Tel Aviv".[380]
In a four-month process ending in October 2011, the
Syrian government reportedly released imprisoned Islamic radicals and provided
them with arms "in order to make itself the least bad choice for the
international community."[381]
23 July 2012: About 32 attacks occurred across Iraq,
killing 116 people and wounding 299. The ISI claimed responsibility for the
attacks, which took the form of bombings and shootings.[382]
In August 2012, two Iraqi refugees who have resided in
Kentucky were accused of assisting AQI by sending funds and weapons; one has
pleaded guilty.[383]
2013 events
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2012–14 Iraqi protests: Iraqi Sunni demonstrators
protesting against the Shia-led government.
Starting in April 2013, the group made rapid military
gains in controlling large parts of Northern Syria, where the Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights described them as "the strongest
group".[384]
11 May: Two car bombs exploded in the town of Reyhanlı in
Hatay Province, Turkey. At least 51 people were killed and 140 injured in the
attack.[385] The attack was the deadliest single act of terrorism ever to take
place on Turkish soil.[386] Along with the Syrian intelligence service, ISIS
was suspected of carrying out the bombing attack.[387]
By 12 May, nine Turkish citizens, who were alleged to
have links with Syria's intelligence service, had been detained.[388] On 21 May
2013, the Turkish authorities charged the prime suspect, according to the
state-run Anatolia news agency. Four other suspects were also charged and 12
people had been charged in total.[clarification needed] All suspects were
Turkish nationals whom Ankara believed were backed by the Syrian
government.[389]
In July, Free Syrian Army battalion chief Kamal
Hamami—better known by his nom de guerre Abu Bassir Al-Jeblawi—was killed by
the group's Coastal region emir after his convoy was stopped at an ISIS
checkpoint in Latakia's rural northern highlands. Al-Jeblawi was traveling to
visit the Al-Izz Bin Abdulsalam Brigade operating in the region when ISIS
members refused his passage, resulting in an exchange of fire in which
Al-Jeblawi received a fatal gunshot wound.[390]
Also in July, ISIS organised a mass break-out of its
members being held in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. British newspaper The Guardian
reported that over 500 prisoners escaped, including senior commanders of the
group.[391][392] ISIS issued an online statement claiming responsibility for
the prison break, describing the operation as involving 12 car bombs, numerous
suicide bombers and mortar and rocket fire.[391][392] It was described as the
culmination of a one-year campaign called "destroying the walls", which
was launched on 21 July 2012 by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; the aim was
to replenish the group's ranks with comrades released from the prison.[393]
In early August, ISIS led the final assault in the Siege
of Menagh Air Base.[394]
In September, members of the group kidnapped and killed
the Ahrar ash-Sham commander Abu Obeida Al-Binnishi, after he had intervened to
protect members of a Malaysian Islamic charity; ISIS had mistaken their
Malaysian flag for that of the United States.[395][396]
Also in September, ISIS overran the Syrian town of Azaz,
taking it from an FSA-affiliated rebel brigade.[397] ISIS members had attempted
to kidnap a German doctor working in Azaz.[398] In November 2013, Today's
Zaman, an English-language newspaper in Turkey, reported that Turkish
authorities were on high alert, with the authorities saying that they had
detailed information on ISIS's plans to carry out suicide bombings in major
cities in Turkey, using seven explosive-laden cars being constructed in
Ar-Raqqah.[399]
From 30 September, several Turkish media websites
reported that ISIS had accepted responsibility for the attack and had
threatened further attacks on Turkey.[400][401][402][403]
In November, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
stated: "ISIS is the strongest group in Northern Syria—100%—and anyone who
tells you anything else is lying."[384]
In December, there were reports of fighting between ISIS
and another Islamic rebel group, Ahrar ash-Sham, in the town of Maskana, Aleppo
in Syria.[404]
In December, ISIS began an offensive in Anbar province in
Iraq, changing insurgency there into a regional war which involved the United
States and most of the states in the area.[citation needed]
2014 events
See also: Anbar clashes (2013–14), Northern Iraq
offensive (June 2014), Northern Iraq offensive (August 2014) and 2014 American
intervention in Iraq
See Timeline of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
events in 2014 for a full list of 2014 events. Some of the most recent events
are listed below:
September 2014
1 September: The German government's Cabinet decision to
arm the Kurdish Peshmerga militia was ratified in the Bundestag by a "vast
majority" of votes, after an emotional debate.[405]
2 September: The IS released a video showing the
beheading of a man whom they identified as American journalist Steven
Sotloff.[406][407]
4 September: A member of the Islamic State issued a
threat to Russian President Vladimir Putin, vowing to oust him over his support
of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria.[408][409]
5 September: The German Bundeswehr dispatched the first
of a planned series of cargo planes to Iraq, loaded with helmets, vests,
radios, and infrared night-vision rifle scopes. After a three-hour stopover in
Baghdad for inspection, the aircraft will deliver the equipment to German
personnel already in Erbil for distribution to the Kurdish fighters.[410]
Qassem Soleimani, Commander of the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds
Force, has been to the Iraqi city of Amirli, to work with the United States in
pushing back militants of the Islamic State.[411][412][413]
8 September: The Islamic State carried out a double
suicide attack in a town north of Baghdad killing 9 people and wounding 70
others.[414]
10 September: After ISIL had outraged American opinion by
beheading two American journalists and had seized control of large portions of
Syria and Iraq in the face of ineffective opposition from American allies,
President Obama decided on a new objective for a rollback policy in the Middle
East. He announced: "America will lead a broad coalition to roll back this
terrorist threat. Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately
destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism
strategy".[415]
Notable members
Mugshot of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by US armed forces while
in detention at Camp Bucca in 2004
Leaders
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (killed in 2006)
Abu Ayyub al-Masri (killed in 2010)
Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi (killed in 2010)
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (caliph of the self-declared Islamic
State)
Caliph
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the× Muslim head of state. For
other meanings of "Caliph", see Caliph (disambiguation).
Abdülmecid II is the last Caliph of Islam from the
Ottoman dynasty.
The Caliph (Arabic: خليفة ḫalīfah/khalīfah) is the head
of state in a Caliphate, and the title for the ruler of the Islamic Ummah, an
Islamic community ruled by the Shari'ah. The word derives from the Arabic About
this sound خليفة Khalīfa (help·info). Following Muhammad's death in 632, the
early leaders of the Muslim nation were called Khalifat Rasul Allah, the
political successors to the messenger of God (referring to Muhammad). Some
academics prefer to transliterate the term as Khalīfah. A Calipha is either a
female caliph or the wife or widow of a caliph. There was one known instance in
history that a calipha ruled a Caliphate: Sitt al-Mulk was regent of the
Fatimid Caliphate from 1021 to 1023. Some caliphas, such as Zaynab
an-Nafzawiyyah and Al-Khayzuran bint Atta, wielded great influence in the
courts of their husbands.
Succession to Muhammad[edit]
Main article: Succession to Muhammad
These articles are based on the
Caliphate
خِلافة
Mohammad adil-Rashidun empire-slide.gif
Main Caliphates[show]
Parallel Caliphates[show]
Portal icon Islam portal
v t e
[hide]Islam
"Allahu" in Arabic calligraphy
Allahu in Arabic calligraphy
Beliefs[show]
Practices[show]
Texts Laws
[show]
History Leaders
[show]
Denominations[show]
Culture Society
[show]
Related topics[show]
Portal icon Islam portal
v t e
In his book The Early Islamic Conquests (1981), Fred
Donner argues that the standard× Arabian practice at the time was for the
prominent men of a kinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death
and elect a leader from amongst themselves. There was no specified procedure
for this shura or consultation. Candidates were usually, but not necessarily, from
the same lineage as the deceased leader. Capable men who would lead well were
preferred over an ineffectual heir.
Sunni Muslims believe and confirm that Abu Bakr was
chosen by the community and that this was the proper procedure. Sunnis further
argue that a caliph should ideally be chosen by election or community
consensus.
Shi'a Muslims believe that Ali, the son-in-law and cousin
of× Muhammad, was chosen by× Muhammad as his spiritual and temporal successor
as the Mawla (the Imam and the Caliph) of all× Muslims at a place called
al-Gadhir Khumm. Here Mohammad called upon the around 100,000 gathered
returning pilgrims to give their bayah (oath of allegiance) to× Ali in his very
presence and thenceforth to proclaim the good news of× Ali's succession to his
(Muhammad's) leadership to all× Muslims they should come across.
Word usage / etymology[edit]
The word "caliph" is derived from the Arabic
word khalifa (خليفة ḫalīfah/khalīfah) meaning "successor",
"substitute", or "lieutenant". In Matthew S. Gordon's The
Rise of Islam, caliph is said to translate to "deputy (or representative)
of God." It is used in the Quran to establish Adam's role as
representative of God on earth. Khalifa is also used to describe the belief
that man's role, in his real nature, is as khalifa or viceroy to Allah.[1] The
word is also most commonly used for the Islamic leader of the Ummah; starting
with Abu Bakr and his line of successors.
The first four Caliphs: Abu Bakr as-Siddiq, Umar ibn
al-Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, and Ali ibn Abi Talib are commonly known by×
Sunnis, mainly, as the Khulafā’ur-Rāshideen ("rightly guided
successors") Caliphs.
It should be noted that in Indonesia, the term caliph
traditionally has a looser meaning, and has been applied to numerous leaders.
For example, the current sultan Hamengkubuwono X has 'caliph' in his title, but
without serious meaning.
History[edit]
Succession and recognition[edit]
Sunni and Shi'a Muslims differ on the legitimacy of the
reigns of the× Caliphs, the first four× Caliphs. The Sunnis follow the×
Caliphates of all four, while the Shi'ites recognize only the× Caliphate of Ali
and the short× Caliphate of his son× Hasan. This schism occurred following the
death of Muhammad.
According to Sunni beliefs, Muhammad gave no specific
directions as to the choosing of his successor when he died. At this time there
were two customary means of selecting a leader: having a hereditary leader for
general purposes, and choosing someone with good qualities in times of crisis
or opportunities for action.
While Sunni and Shia Islam differ sharply on the conduct
of a caliph and the right relations between a leader and a community, they do
not differ on the underlying theory of stewardship. Both abhor waste of natural
resources in particular to show off or demonstrate power.
In the initial stages the latter way of choosing leadership
prevailed among the leading companions of Muhammad. Abu Bakr was elected as the
first caliph or successor to Muhammad, with the other companions of Muhammad
giving an oath of allegiance to him. Those opposing this method thought that
Ali, Muhammad's nearest relative, should have succeeded him. However the
appointment of the next two caliphs varied from the election of Abu Bakr. On
his deathbed, Abu Bakr appointed Umar as his successor without an election by
the community of Believers. The oath, approving the appointment of Umar, was
taken only by the Companions present in Medina at the time. This led to certain
groups disputing the authority of Umar. Umar also altered the way his successor
would be found. Before he was assassinated, Umar decided that his successor
would come from a group of six. This group included Ali and Uthman, another
companion of Muhammad. These six would have to establish from among themselves
Umar's successor. Ultimately Uthman was chosen as Umar's successor, becoming
the third Caliph. After the assassination of Uthman, Ali was elected as the
fourth Caliph
Ali's caliphate and the rise of the Umayyad Dynasty[edit]
Ali's reign as Caliph was plagued by great turmoil and
internal strife. Ali was faced with multiple rebellions and insurrections. The
primary one came from a misunderstanding on the part of Mu'awiyah, the governor
of Damascus, marking the beginning of the end of the Caliphs. The Persians,
taking advantage of this, infiltrated the two armies and attacked the other
army causing chaos and internal hatred between the Companions at the Battle of
Siffin. The battle lasted several months, resulting in a stalemate. In order to
avoid further bloodshed, Ali agreed to negotiate with Mu'awiyah. This caused a
faction of approximately 4,000 people that would be known as the Kharijites, to
abandon the fight. After defeating the Kharijites at the Battle of Nahrawan,
Ali would later be assassinated by the Kharijite Ibn Muljam. Ali's son Hasan
was elected as the next Caliph, but handed his title to Mu'awiyah a few months
later. Mu'awiyah became the fifth Caliph, establishing the Umayyad Dynasty,[2]
named after the great-grandfather of Uthman and Mu'awiyah, Umayya ibn Abd
Shams.[3] (All Caliphs after Mu'awiyah aren't considered true caliphs from an
islamic perspective, though it was used as a title afterwards.)
Umayyads[edit]
Main article: Umayyad Caliphate
The expansion of the caliphate under the Umayyads.
Expansion under
Muhammad, 622-632
Expansion during
the Patriarchal Caliphate, 632-661
Expansion during
the Umayyad Caliphate, 661-750
Under the Umayyads (661 to 750 AD, and 929 to 1031 in the
Iberian Peninsula), the Muslim empire grew rapidly. To the West, Muslim rule
expanded across North Africa and into Spain. To the East, it expanded through
Iran and ultimately to India. This made it one of the largest empires in the
history of West Eurasia, extending its entire breadth.
However, the Umayyad dynasty was not universally
supported within Islam itself. Some Muslims supported prominent early Muslims
like az-Zubayr; others felt that only members of Muhammad's clan, the Banū
Hashim, or his own lineage, the descendants of ʻAlī, should rule. There were
numerous rebellions against the Umayyads, as well as splits within the Umayyad
ranks (notably, the rivalry between Yaman and Qays). Eventually, supporters of
the Banu Hisham and Alid claims united to bring down the Umayyads in 750.
However, the Shiʻat ʻAlī, "the Party of ʻAlī", were again
disappointed when the Abbasid dynasty took power, as the Abbasids were
descended from Muhammad's uncle, Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib and not from ʻAlī.
Abbasids[edit]
Map of the Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent
Main article: Abbasid Caliphate
The Abbasids would provide an unbroken line of rulers for
over five centuries (750-1258 AD). It consolidated Islamic rule and cultivated
great intellectual and cultural developments in the Middle East. But by 940 the
power of the caliphate under the Abbasids was waning as non-Arabs, particularly
the Turkish (and later the Mamluks in Egypt in the latter half of the 13th
century), gained military power, and sultans and emirs became increasingly
independent. However, the caliphate endured as both a symbolic position and a
unifying entity for the Islamic world.
During the period of the Abbasid dynasty, Abbasid claims
to the caliphate did not go unchallenged. The Shiʻa Said ibn Husayn of the
Fatimid dynasty, which claimed descent from Muhammad through his daughter,
claimed the title of Caliph in 909, creating a separate line of caliphs in
North Africa. Initially covering Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, the
Fatimid caliphs extended their rule for the next 150 years, taking Egypt and
the Levant, before the Abbasid dynasty was able to turn the tide, limiting
Fatimid rule to Egypt. The Fatimid dynasty finally ended in 1171. The Umayyad
dynasty, which had survived and come to rule over the Muslim provinces of
Spain, reclaimed the title of Caliph in 929, lasting until it was overthrown in
1031. This period of upheaval was known as the Fitna of al-Ándalus.
Fatimids[edit]
Map of the Fatimid Caliphate also showing cities.
Main article: Fatimid Caliphate
The Fatimid Caliphate or al-Fātimiyyūn (Arabic الفاطميون)
was a Berber Shi'ite dynasty that ruled over varying areas of the Maghreb,
Egypt, Malta and the Levant from 5 January 909 to 1171, during the time that
the (Sunni) Abbasid Caliphate ruled from Baghdad. The caliphate was ruled by
the Fatimids, who established the Egyptian city of Cairo as their capital. The
term Fatimite is sometimes used to refer to the citizens of this caliphate. The
ruling elite of the state belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shi'ism. The
leaders of the dynasty were also Shi'ite Ismaili religious tribes, hence, they
had a religious significance to Ismaili Muslims. They are also part of the
chain of holders of the title of Caliph, as recognized by Shi'ites majority.
Therefore, this constitutes a rare period in history in which some form of
Shi'ism and the title of Caliph were united to any degree. The Fatimids,
however, are not recognized nor counted by the Sunnis as a caliphate.
With exceptions, the Fatimids were recorded to exercise a
slight degree of tolerance towards non-Shi'ite sects of Islam, as well as
towards Jews, Christians and pagans, due to the Shi'ite minority in every
single land they conquered.[1]
Shadow Caliphate[edit]
1258 saw the conquest of Baghdad and the murder of the
Abassid ruler al-Musta'sim by Mongol forces under Hulagu Khan. A surviving
member of the Abbasid House was installed as Caliph at Cairo under the
patronage of the Mamluk Sultanate three years later. However, the authority of
this line of Caliphs was heavily restrained to ceremonial and religious
matters, and Muslim historians refer to it as a "shadow" of Abbasid
rule.[citation needed]
Ottomans[edit]
The Ottoman Empire.
Main article: Ottoman Caliphate
As the Ottoman Empire grew in size and strength, Ottoman
rulers beginning with Mehmed II began to claim caliphal authority. Their claim
was strengthened when the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks in 1517 and annexed the
Arab lands. The last Abbasid ruler at Cairo, al-Mutawakkil III, became a
political prisoner and was taken to Constantinople (conquered in 1453), where
he was forced to surrender his authority to Selim I. However Ottoman rulers
were known by the title of Sultan.
According to Barthold, the first time the title of caliph
was used as a political instead of symbolic religious title by the Ottomans was
in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca ending the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774. The
outcome of this war was disastrous for the Ottomans. Large territories,
including those with large Muslim populations such as the Crimean Peninsula,
were lost to the Christian Russian Empire. However, the Ottomans under
Abdulhamid I claimed a diplomatic victory, the recognition of themselves as
protectors of Muslims in Russia as part of the peace treaty. This was the first
time the Ottoman caliph was acknowledged as having political significance
outside of Ottoman borders by a European power. As a consequence of this
diplomatic victory, as the Ottoman borders were shrinking, the powers of the
Ottoman caliph increased.
Around 1880 Sultan Abdulhamid II reasserted the title as
a way of countering creeping European colonialism in Muslim lands. His claim
was most fervently accepted by the Barelwis of British India. By the eve of the
First World War, the Ottoman state, despite its weakness vis-à-vis Europe,
represented the largest and most powerful independent Islamic political entity.
But the sultan also enjoyed[citation needed] some authority beyond the borders
of his shrinking empire as caliph of Muslims in Egypt, India and Central
Arabia.
Abolition of the institution[edit]
Main articles: Turkish War of Independence and Atatürk's
Reforms
The Khilafat movement (1919–1924) was a pan-Islamic,
political protest campaign launched by Muslims in British India to influence
the British government and to protect the Ottoman Empire at the end of the
First World War. After the Armistice of Mudros of October 1918 with the
military occupation of Istanbul and Treaty of Versailles (1919), the position
of the Ottomans was uncertain. The movement to protect or restore the Ottomans
gained force after the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) which imposed the
partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and gave Greece a powerful position in
Anatolia, to the distress of the Turks. They called for help and the movement
was the result. The movement had collapsed by late 1922.
The new ruler of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, wanted a
secular state. On 3 March 1924, the Turkish Grand National Assembly dissolved
the institution of the Caliphate.
Prior to its reestablishment, occasional demonstrations
were held calling for the reestablishment of the Caliphate. Organisations which
call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate include Hizb ut-Tahrir and the
Muslim Brotherhood.[4]
Ahmadiyya Caliphate[edit]
Main article: Khalifatul Masih
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, a messianic movement in
Islam, believes that the Ahmadiyya Caliphate established after the passing of
the community's founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the re-establishment of the
Rashidun Caliphate (The Rightly Guided Caliphs)[5] as prophesized by
Muhammad.[6] The current successor to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is Khalifatul Masih V,
Mirza Masroor Ahmad residing in London, England.[7]
The Ahmadiyya community's Caliph (Khalifa) has overall
authority in all religious and organizational matters. According to Ahmadis, it
is not essential for a Muslim Caliph to be the head of a state but instead the
spiritual and religious significance of the Caliph should be emphasized. The
Ahmadiyya believe their community is about 10 to 20 million strong in 200
countries and territories of the world.
Titular uses[edit]
Religious leaders[edit]
In 19th century Sudan, Mohammed Ahmed so-called "the
Mahdi" was succeeded by Abdallahi ibn Muhammad "the Khalifa".
In the Ahmadiyya sect, khalifatul Masih is the title of
the successors of its founding Messiah, except in the break-away Lahore branch,
which is led by its own Emirs.
Secular offices[edit]
In Morocco, the Sherifian Monarch awarded the title
Khalifa or Chaliphe, here meaning 'Viceroy', to royal princes (styled Mulay),
including future Sultans, who represented the crown in a part of the sultanate:
especially in the former royal capitals Marrakesh, Fes
and Meknes
also in other mayor cities, e.g. in Shawiya, Casablanca,
Tafilalt, Tadla, Tiznit Tindouf, in the valley of the Draa River and in
Tetouan.
but also, in the 20th century, as irrevocably fully
mandated Representative of the Sultan in the Spanish Zone, known after him in
Spanish as el Jalifato (note the definite article; although the Spanish word
can also be applied to other deputies of various Moroccan officials), besides
the Alto comisario (de facto governing 'High Commissioner') of the colonial
'protector' Spain, which called his office el Jalifa (not Califa, the word for
any 'imperial' Caliph, ruling a califato):
19 April 1913 - 9 November 1923 Mulay al-Mahdi bin
Isma'il bin Muhammad (d. 1923)
9 November 1923 - 9 November 1925 Vacant
9 November 1925 - 16 March 1941 Mulay Hassan bin al-Mahdi
(1st time) (born 1912)
16 March 1941 - October 1945 Vacant
October 1945 - 7 April 1956 Mulay Hassan bin al-Mahdi
(2nd time)
Sokoto Caliphate[edit]
The leaders of Sokoto Caliphate have used the title
Caliph (Amir al-Mu'minin) from 1804.
The Islamic State (ISIS)[edit]
On 29 June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
declared the territories under its control (on the Iraq-Syria border) to be a
new Caliphate, naming Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph. [8]
Other uses[edit]
Khalifa can have a definition, be a first name, or family
or tribe name. Like many titles, Khalifa also occurs in many names.
It is the family name of the Al Khalifa dynasty, rulers
of the peninsular Arab nation of Bahrain, who are descended from the Bani Utub
tribe.
Authority of the successor[edit]
The question of who should succeed Muhammad was not the
only issue that faced the early Muslims; they also had to clarify the extent of
the leader's powers. Muhammad, during his lifetime, was not only the Muslim
political leader, but the Islamic prophet. All law and spiritual practice
proceeded from Muhammad. Nobody claimed that his successor would be a prophet;
succession referred to political authority. The uncertainty centered on the
extent of that authority. Muhammad's revelations from God were soon written
down (the Qur'an), which was a supreme authority, limiting what any leader
could legitimately command, though few "Caliphs" actually abided by
it.
Ads by OffersWizard×However, some later caliphs did
believe that they had authority to rule in matters not specified in the Quran.
They believed themselves to be temporal and spiritual leaders in issues not
commanded in the Quran, and insisted that implicit obedience to the caliph in
all things not contradicting the Quran, was the hallmark of the good Muslim.
Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, in their book God's Caliph, outline the
evidence for an early, expansive view of the caliph's importance and authority.
They argue that this view of the caliph was eventually nullified (in Sunni
Islam, at least) by the rising power of the ulema, or Islamic lawyers, judges,
scholars, and religious specialists. The ulema insisted on their right to
determine what was legal and orthodox. The proper Muslim leader, in the ulema's
opinion, was the leader who enforced the rulings of the ulema, rather than
making rulings of his own, unless he himself was qualified in Islamic law.
Conflict between caliph and ulema, akin to a modern judiciary, was a recurring
theme in early Islamic history, and ended in the victory of the ulema. The
caliph was henceforth limited to temporal rule only. He would be considered a
righteous caliph if he were guided by the ulema. Crone and Hinds argue that
Shi'a Muslims, with their expansive view of the powers of the imamate, have
preserved some of the beliefs of the early Umayyad dynasty which ironically,
they despise. Crone and Hinds' thesis is not accepted by the scholars, however,
who have evidence that the reason behind this is that the Rashidun and Umayyad
leaders were Ulema themselves.
Most Mainstream Muslims (non-Shi'ites) believe that the
caliph has always been a merely temporal ruler, and that the ulema has always
been responsible for enforcing orthodox, Islamic law (shari'a). As for the
special role ascribed to the first four caliphs, Islamic tradition holds that
they were followers the Qur'an and the way or sunnah of Muhammad in all things
and, for this reason, calls them the Rashidun, the Rightly Guided Caliphs. They
also believe that the Khilafah ended towards the end of Ali's reign and not
with the fall of the Ottomans. Every Muslim leader after Ali and Muawiyah, they
say, were not legitimate due to they not being accepted by all the Muslims.
Caliphs are not a significant part of mainstream Islam as opposed to the
Shi'ites.
Al-Ghazali on the desired character traits for
administration[edit]
Al Ghazali's "Nasihat al-Muluk" or "Advice
for Kings", part of the Nasîhatnâme genre, gave ten different ethics of
royal administration:
The ruler should understand the importance and danger of
the authority entrusted to him. In authority there is great blessing, since he
who exercises it righteously obtained unsurpassed happiness but if any ruler
fails to do so he incurs torment (in the afterlife) surpassed only by the
torment for unbelief.
The ruler should always be thirsting to meet devout
religious scholars and ask them for advice.
The ruler should understand that he must not covet the
wives of other men and be content with personally refraining from injustice,
but must discipline his slave-troops, servants, and officers and never tolerate
unjust conduct by them; for he will be interrogated (in the afterlife) not only
about his own unjust deeds but also about those of his staff.
The ruler should not be dominated by pride; for pride
gives rise to the dominance of anger, and will impel him to revenge. Anger is
the evil genius and blight of the intellect. If anger is becoming dominant it
will be necessary for the ruler in all his affairs to bend his inclinations in
the direction of forgiveness and make a habit of generosity and forbearance
unless he is to be like the wild beasts.
In every situation that arises, the ruler should figure
that he is the subject and the other person is the holder of authority. He
should not sanction for others anything that he would not sanction for himself.
For if he would do so he would be making fraudulent and treasonable use of the
authority entrusted to him.
The ruler should not disregard the attendance of
petitioners at his court and should beware of the danger of so doing. He should
solve the grievances of the Muslims.
The ruler should not form a habit of indulging the
passions. Although he might dress more finely or eat more sumptuously, he
should be content with all that he has; for without contentment, just conduct
will not be possible.
The ruler should make the utmost effort to behave gently
and avoid governing harshly.
The ruler should endeavor to keep all the subjects
pleased with him. The ruler should not let himself be so deluded by the praise
he gets from any who approach him as to believe that all the subjects are
pleased with him. On the contrary, such praise is entirely due to fear. He must
therefore appoint trustworthy persons to gather intelligence and inquire about
his standing among the people, so that he may be able to learn his faults from
men's tongues.
The ruler should not give satisfaction to any person if a
contravention of God's law would be required to please him for no harm will come
from such a person's displeasure.
Single Caliph for the Muslim world[edit]
According to the Sahih Muslim hadith, Muhammad said:
The children of Israel have been governed by Prophets;
whenever a Prophet died another Prophet succeeded him; but there will be no
prophet after me. There will be caliphs and they will number many (in one
time); they asked: What then do you order us? He said: Fulfil bayah to them,
only the first of them, the first of them, and give them their dues; for verily
Allah will ask them about what he entrusted them with[9]
According to the Sīrat Rasūl Allāh of Ibn Isḥaq,
Abu-Bakr, Muhammad's closest friend, said:
It is forbidden for Muslims to have two Amirs for this
would cause differences in their affairs and concepts, their unity would be
divided and disputes would break out amongst them. The Sunnah would then be
abandoned, the bida'a (innovations of rituals) would spread and Fitna would
grow, and that is in no one's interests".[10]
Umar bin Al-Khattab another disciple of Muhammad is
reported by the same source to have said: "There is no way for two
(leaders) together at any one time"[10]
(Referring in the quotes above to two leaders in the same
land.)
Imam Al-Nawawi a 12th-century authority of the Sunni
Shafi'i madhhab said: "It is forbidden to give an oath to two caliphs or
more, even in different parts of the world and even if they are far
apart"[11]
Notable Caliphs[edit]
Main article: List of Caliphs
Rashidun ("Righteously Guided")
Abu Bakr, first Rashidun Caliph. Subdued rebel tribes in
the Ridda wars.
Umar (Umar ibn al-Khattab), second Rashidun Caliph.
During his reign, the Islamic empire expanded to include Egypt, Jerusalem and
Persia.
Uthman Ibn Affan, third Rashidun Caliph. The various
written copies of the Qur'an were standardized under his direction. Killed by
rebels.
Ali (Ali ibn Abu Talib), fourth Rashidun Caliph.
Considered by Shi'a Muslims however to be the first Imam. His reign was fraught
with internal conflict, with Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan (Muawiyah I) and Amr ibn
al-As controlling the Levant and Egypt regions independently of Ali.
Hasan ibn Ali, fifth Caliph. Considered as "rightly
guided" by several historians. He abdicated his right to the caliphate in
favour of Muawiyah I in order to end the potential for ruinous civil war.
Muawiyah I, first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. Muawiyah
instituted dynastic rule by appointing his son Yazid I as his successor, a
trend that would continue through subsequent caliphates.
Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (Umar II), Umayyad caliph who is
considered one of the finest rulers in Muslim history. He is also considered by
some (mainly Sunnis) to be among the "rightly guided" caliphs.
Harun al-Rashid, Abbasid caliph during whose reign
Baghdad became the world's prominent centre of trade, learning, and culture.
Harun is the subject of many stories in the famous One Thousand and One Nights.
He established the legendary library Bayt al-Hikma ("House of
Wisdom").
Al-Ma'mun, a great Abbasid patron of Islamic philosophy
and science.
Fatih Sultan Mehmed (Mehmed II), an Ottoman caliph highly
regarded for his long succession of campaigns which resulted in a tremendous
extension of direct Ottoman rule.
Suleiman the Magnificent, an Ottoman caliph during whose
reign the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith.
Abdul Hamid II, last Ottoman caliph to rule with
independent, absolute power.
Abdülmecid II, last caliph of the Ottoman dynasty.
Nominally the 37th Head of the Ottoman dynasty.
Several Arabic surnames found throughout the Middle East
are derived from the word khalifa. These include: Khalif, Khalifa, Khillif,
Kalif, Kalaf, Khalaf, and Kaylif. The usage of this title as a surname is
comparable to the existence of surnames such as King, Duke, and Noble in the
English language.
Dynasties[edit]
The more important dynasties include:
The Umayyad dynasty in Damascus (661–750), followed by:
The Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad (750–1258), and later in
Cairo (under Mameluk control) (1260–1517).
The Shi'ite Fatimid dynasty in North Africa and Egypt
(909–1171).
The Rahmanids, a surviving branch of the Damascus
Umayyads, established "in exile" as emirs of Córdoba, Spain, declared
themselves Caliphs (known as the Caliphs of Córdoba; not universally accepted;
929–1031).
The Almohad dynasty in North Africa and Spain (not
universally accepted; 1145–1269). Traced their descent not from Muhammad, but
from a puritanic reformer in Morocco who claimed to be the Mahdi, bringing down
the "decadent" Almoravid emirate, and whose son established a
sultanate and claimed to be a caliph.
The Ottomans rulers (1453–1924; main title Padishah, also
known as Great Sultan etc.) claimed caliphal authority beginning with Mehmed
II. Their claim was strengthened in 1517 when the Ottomans defeated the Mamluk
Sultanate of Cairo and made Egypt part of the Ottoman Empire.
Note on the overlap of Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates:
After the massacre of the Umayyad clan by the Abbassids, one lone prince
escaped and fled to North Africa, which remained loyal to the Umayyads. This
was Abd-ar-rahman I. From there, he proceeded to Spain, where he overthrew and
united the provinces conquered by previous Umayyad Caliphs (in 712 and 712).
From 756 to 929, this Umayyad domain in Spain was an independent emirate, until
Abd-ar-rahman III reclaimed the title of Caliph for his dynasty. The Umayyad
Emirs of Spain are not listed in the summary below because they did not claim
the caliphate until 929. For a full listing of all the Umayyad rulers in Spain
see the Umayyad article.
Claims to the caliphate[edit]
Many local rulers in Islamic countries have claimed to be
caliphs. Most claims were ignored outside their limited domains. In many cases,
these claims were made by rebels against established authorities and ended when
the rebellion was crushed. Notable claimants include:
Abd-Allah ibn al-Zubayr (died 692), who held the Tihamah
and the Hijaz against the Umayyads. Certain scholars considered him a
legitimate Caliph, being a close companion of Muhammad. His rebellion, centered
in Makkah, was crushed by the Umayyad general Hajjaj. Hajjaj's attack caused
some damage in Makkah, and necessitated the rebuilding of the Kaaba.
Caliph of the Sudan, a Songhai king of the Sahel.
The Zaydi Imams of Yemen used the title for centuries and
continued to use the title until 1962.
Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, proclaimed himself
Caliph of the Arabs on 3 March 1924, two days after the office was abolished by
the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (see Sharifian Caliphate) Hussein's
claim was not accepted, and in 1925 he was driven from the Hijaz by the forces
of Ibn Saud due to his lack of support for Shari'ah. He continued to use the
title of Caliph during his remaining life in exile, until his death in 1931.
Kartosuwiryo (died 1962), leader of the Darul Islam
rebellion that aimed to establish a caliphate in Indonesia (and eventually the
rest of South East Asia). While he seldom explicitly claimed to be caliph, he
was regarded as one by many supporters.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared Caliph on June 29, 2014
by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, of which he is the leader.
(Continoe)
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