Guerrilla war, effectively defeat the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan

Unfinished journey (174)

(Part one hundred and seventy-four, Depok, West Java, Indonesia, January 2, 2015, 19:17 pm)

AH Nasution

Guerrilla war, effectively defeat the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan

1945-1950 year group called Darul Islam (DI) in various regions in Indonesia a rebellion against the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

In South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan border to enter operation group Darul Islam Ibn Hajar led. The group is one of a group that is hard to beat, considering they are using guerrilla warfare tactics, attack and run tactics, attacking the village or villages that existed then run forestry company when it comes se troops.

Corporal Agusno, who joined in one company, also includes among other corporal and corporal Usman Rochadi taken from unity Supplies and Transport Command (Bekumdam) Balikpapan, sent to the border forests in East Kalimantan and South Kalimantan around the border of the city of Balikpapan  and Tanah Grogot recalled:

'' Once we were a group suddenly attacked the troops of Ibn Hajar, most of our members were killed, I survived because hidden in the bush '',

'' It appears Ibn Hajar forces around on my body, but they did not see me, '' did before the war my grandfather equipped with salman Antong sort pandan leaves and water in the flush to the body, with spells dato read something, he says so the enemy can not see us if we hide ''.

In addition to Ibn Hajar group TNI soldiers also using guerrilla warfare tactics, which are very powerful when used in the jungle like in Borneo.

Guerrilla war has been shown to be effective when the fighters along with the military against the Dutch colonialists, Japanese, and English in Indonesia.

This tactic is also very powerful in the Vietnam war, when the Vietcong with a simple military equipment against the US military more sophisticated.

Also effective when Mujahideen of Afghanistan against Soviet troops in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1988.

5 Expert Guerilla Tactics The acclaimed World

Vietnam has just lost one of its war hero, General Vo Nguyen Giap. Hundreds of thousands of people Vo Nguyen Giap drove departure, a figure who fought against French colonization and also attack the United States to Vietnam.

5 Expert Guerilla Tactics The acclaimed World

Vo Nguyen Giap also known as a master of guerrilla warfare strategy. He is the lead troops in Vietnam Dien Bien Phu attack with guerrilla strategy.

Vo Nguyen Giap Besides, the world knows many masters of guerrilla warfare. One is the general pride of Indonesia, General AH Nasution. Here's his review.

1. General AH Nasution

General Nasution is known as an expert in guerrilla warfare. His experience as a guerrilla warfare expert comes after approval Renville January 17, 1948. At that time Siliwangi troops moved to Central Java. Nasution then as Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces. Indonesian soldiers when it expects the Netherlands will repeat the military aggression I. Nasution was drafting the people's resistance to the core of guerrilla warfare.

General AH Nasution

General AH Nasution

In military aggression II, Nasution was appointed as Commander of the Army in Java. Headquartered in a village in Prambanan and Progo, Nasution issued various instructions implementation of guerrilla warfare. After becoming Chief of Staff, Nasution was disabled due to events of October 17, 1952. Nasution was reactivated in 1955 and fought against the various rebellions.

General Nasution known as a prolific author. He has written many books of which 11 volumes Around the Indonesian War of Independence. His book Principles of Guerrilla translated into various foreign languages. That said, learn from books Nasution Vietcong during the war against the United States in Vietnam.

Nasution also wrote a memoir titled Meet the Call of duty as much as 8 vols. Nasution died on September 5, 2000. His remains were interred in the TMP Kalibata.

2. Nguyen Giap Vo

Prominent military leader of Vietnam, General Vo Nguyen Giap whose forces can subdue the French at Dien Bien Phu, reveal some secret troop strength.

In late April 1975, North Vietnamese forces managed to make US forces and South Vietnamese troops to its knees. This event is marked with a sad symbol of America as US ambassador to South Vietnam flew by helicopter from the roof of the embassy building.

Vo Nguyen Giap

Vo Nguyen Giap

"We were forced to confront the most powerful imperialist aggressive and cruel. The war lasted for five out of five presidential administration and confront us with unequal strength," said Vo.

"Without holding a gun, Vietnam could stand up and destroy seacoast slavery and then beat two great imperialist to liberate the nation and the people. Let us look back to the thousands of years of history, studying the national culture and traditions and heritage of the Vietnamese military, as well as Vietnamese revolutionary tendencies. "

According to the Vietnamese strength lies in the development philosophy of life and culture with patriotism at its core, (producing) do not give up the desire to fight. This power has been used to overcome the natural violence and foreign aggression.

General Vo registered himself in the military history of Vietnam because of its military strategies are very bright, like besiegers French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the Tet Offensive (Tet Offensive) against the US in South Vietnam in 1968. The flagship strategy is guerrilla warfare.

3. Che Guevara

Ernesto Che Guevara was born on June 14, 1928. He was better known as El Che or Che. He was a revolutionary, physician, intellectual, guerrilla leader, diplomat, military expert at the same time. He liked and hated by many people.

Che Guevara

Che Guevara

Che Guevara could mean love or hate. For some people, the name is the same as the struggle for freedom, but for others means murder. The original name was Ernesto Che Lynch. When young Che dubbed 'Chanco' (swine) because rarely bath, so that his body odor. He changed T-shirts once every week.

Che wrote a book Guerrilla Warfare after the Cuban revolution. The book was published in 1961. Che's book serves as a guide for militants worldwide. Many refer to the principles of guerrilla Che almost like Mao's book. But Che claimed to have never read a book of Mao.

4. Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong was the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. He became President of the People's Republic of China in 1949. At the time he was in power, the Chinese people living under the iron hand.

Mao Zedong

Mao Zedong

In the civil war in China against the nationalist camp, Mao led strategy often adopted by many as a strategy of guerrilla warfare. Principles of Mao war strategy is, when the opponent forward, we retreat. When enemies come together, we harass. When the enemy is tired, we attack. When the enemy retreated, our pursuit. One of the slogans used as a symbol lively Mao strategy is pull your arm before hitting. In this way blow out will be more powerful.

5. Lawrence of Arabia

TE Lawrence or Lawrence of Arabia is a British adventurer, military strategist. He also wrote the masterpiece "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom" (1927). He raised the Arab revolution and begin the fight against Turkey.

TE Lawrence

TE Lawrence

He was instrumental in helping Emirates when dealing with Turkey during World War I.

He introduced the theory of guerrilla tactics in an article he wrote in 1938. In his article he compared the guerrilla fighter with gas. Militants fighting in the area of operations at random. They occupy a cell nucleus or very small while the gas molecules occupy the smallest core place in the container.

Insurgents can rely with the group for tactical purposes but dispersed leadership position. Fighters as it is very hard to beat.

Lawrence struggle filmed in "Lawrence of Arabia" was first released in 1962 by actor Peter O''Toole as the historical character actor. The film managed to get 7 Oscars including best film and best director for David Lean.

Guerrilla warfare

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Guerrilla" and "Guerrilla War" redirect here. For the video game, see Guerrilla War (video game). For other uses, see Guerrilla (disambiguation).

Not to be confused with Gorilla.

Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants such as armed civilians or irregulars use military tactics including ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger and less-mobile traditional military.

Spanish guerrilla resistance to the French invasion in 1808

The term, the diminutive form of "war" in Spanish, is usually translated as "little war", and the word, guerrilla (Spanish pronunciation: [ɡeˈriʎa]), has been used to describe the concept since the 18th century, and perhaps earlier. In correct Spanish usage, a person who is a member of a guerrilla is a guerrillero ([ɡeriˈʎeɾo]) if male, or a guerrillera if female. This term became popular during the Peninsular War, when the Spanish people rose against the Napoleonic troops and fought against a highly superior army using the guerrilla strategy.

The term "guerrilla" was used in English as early as 1809, to describe the fighters (e.g., "The town was taken by the guerrillas"), and also (as in Spanish) to denote a group or band of such fighters. However, in most languages guerrilla still denotes the specific style of warfare. The use of the diminutive evokes the differences in number, scale, and scope between the guerrilla army and the formal, professional army of the state.

Strategy, tactics and organization[edit]

Boer guerrillas during the Second Boer War in South Africa

A Kurdish PKK guerrilla in Iraqi Kurdistan as part of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, 2008

The strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare tend to focus around the use of a small, mobile force competing against a larger, more unwieldy one.[1] The guerrilla focuses on organizing in small units, depending on the support of the local population, as well as taking advantage of terrain more accommodating of small units.

Tactically, the guerrilla army would avoid any confrontation with large units of enemy troops, but seek and eliminate small groups of soldiers to minimize losses and exhaust the opposing force. Not limiting their targets to personnel, enemy resources are also preferred targets. All of that is to weaken the enemy's strength, to cause the enemy eventually to be unable to prosecute the war any longer, and to force the enemy to withdraw.

It is often misunderstood that guerrilla warfare must involve disguising as civilians to cause enemy troops to fail in telling friend from foe. However, this is not a primary feature of a guerrilla war. This type of war can be practiced anywhere there are places for combatants to cover themselves and where such advantage cannot be made use of by a larger and more conventional force.

Communist leaders like Mao Zedong and North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh both implemented guerrilla warfare giving it a theoretical frame which served as a model for similar strategies elsewhere, such as the Cuban "foco" theory and the anti-Soviet Mujahadeen in Afghanistan.[2]

Mao Zedong summarized basic guerrilla tactics at the beginning of the Chinese "Second Revolutionary Civil War" as: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."[3]:p. 124 At least one author credits the ancient Chinese work The Art of War (dating from at least 200 BC) with providing instruction in such tactics to Mao.[2]:pp. 6–7

Agusno

Female Soviet partisans operating under Sydir Kovpak in German occupied Ukraine

While the tactics of modern guerrilla warfare originate in the 20th century, irregular warfare, using elements later characteristic of modern guerrilla warfare, has existed throughout the battles of many ancient civilizations but in a smaller scale. This recent growth was inspired in part by theoretical works on guerrilla warfare, starting with the Manual de Guerra de Guerrillas by Matías Ramón Mella written in the 19th century and, more recently, Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla Warfare, Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare and Lenin's text of the same name, all written after the successful revolutions carried by them in China, Cuba and Russia respectively. Those texts characterized the tactic of guerrilla warfare as, according to Che Guevara's text, being "used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression".[4]

History[edit]

Main article: History of guerrilla warfare

Guerrilla tactics were presumably employed by prehistoric tribal warriors against enemy tribes. Evidence of conventional warfare, on the other hand, did not emerge until 3100 BC in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Since the Enlightenment, ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism have played an important role in shaping insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. [5]

A notable example of guerrilla warfare was during 17th century in India when the Marathas under the leadership of Chhatrapati Shivaji Raje Bhonsle (founder of the Maratha Empire) attacked the surrounding Muslim Kingdoms of Bijapur Sultanate and Qutub Shahi Empire, which had an outright numerical advantage and huge armies, but little knowledge of the geographical layout of the Western Ghats and the Deccan Plateau. He assembled small armies and constantly raided the military camps and won numerous battles even with insignificant numbers. Later, the same principle was utilized in overthrowing the tiranic Mughal Empire.[6]

Similarly, 17th century Jat warriors in India, such as Gokula Raja Ram Jat, also used Dhar (guerrilla) against the Mughal. The number of his regular warriors were not big but the efficacy of their Dhar (guerrilla) tactics and is apparent in their dashing attacks against Aurangzeb's larger Mughal forces, which not only restored the shaken morale of Jat people but also infused in them a vigour that enabled to withstand temporary reverses later on.[7]

Counter-guerrilla warfare[edit]

Main article: Counter-insurgency

Mass shootings of Vendée royalist rebels in western France, 1793

The Third of May 1808 by Francisco Goya, showing Spanish resisters being executed by Napoleon's troops during the Peninsular War.

Polish guerrillas from Batalion Zośka dressed in stolen German uniforms and armed with stolen weapons, fighting in the Warsaw Uprising, the largest anti-Nazi guerrilla warfare in Europe.

A Viet Cong base camp being burned, My Tho, South Vietnam, 1968

A counter-insurgency or counterinsurgency[8] (COIN) operation involves actions taken by the recognized government of a nation to contain or quell an insurgency taken up against it.[9] In the main, the insurgents seek to destroy or erase the political authority of the defending authorities in a population they seek to control, and the counter-insurgent forces seek to protect that authority and reduce or eliminate the supplanting authority of the insurgents. Counter-insurgency operations are common during war, occupation and armed rebellions. Counter-insurgency may be armed suppression of a rebellion, coupled with tactics such as divide and rule designed to fracture the links between the insurgency and the population in which the insurgents move. Because it may be difficult or impossible to distinguish between an insurgent, a supporter of an insurgency who is a non-combatant, and entirely uninvolved members of the population, counter-insurgency operations have often rested on a confused, relativistic, or otherwise situational distinction between insurgents and non-combatants.

Principles[edit]

The guerrilla can be difficult to beat, but certain principles of counter-insurgency warfare are well known since the 1950s and 1960s and have been successfully applied.

Classic guidelines[edit]

The widely distributed and influential work of Sir Robert Thompson, counter-insurgency expert of the Malayan Emergency, offers several such guidelines. Thompson's underlying assumption is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of law and better governance.[10]

Some governments, however, give such considerations short shrift, and their counter-insurgency operations have involved mass murder, genocide, terror, torture and execution.

Historian Timothy Snyder has written, "In the guise of anti-partisan actions, the Germans killed perhaps three quarters of a million people, about 350,000 in Belarus alone, and lower but comparable numbers in Poland and Yugoslavia. The Germans killed more than a hundred thousand Poles when suppressing the Warsaw Uprising of 1944."[11]

In the Vietnam War, the Americans "defoliated countless trees in areas where the communist North Vietnamese troops hid supply lines and conducted guerrilla warfare",[12] (see Operation Ranch Hand). In the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Soviets countered the U.S.–backed Mujahideen with a 'Scorched Earth' policy, driving over one third of the Afghan population into exile (over 5 million people), and carrying out widespread destruction of villages, granaries, crops, herds and irrigation systems, including the deadly and widespread mining of fields and pastures.[13][14]

Many modern countries employ manhunting doctrine to seek out and eliminate individual guerrillas.[citation needed]

Variants[edit]

Some writers on counter-insurgency warfare emphasize the more turbulent nature of today's guerrilla warfare environment, where the clear political goals, parties and structures of such places as Vietnam, Malaysia, and El Salvador are not as prevalent. These writers point to numerous guerrilla conflicts that center around religious, ethnic or even criminal enterprise themes, and that do not lend themselves to the classic "national liberation" template.

The wide availability of the Internet has also caused changes in the tempo and mode of guerrilla operations in such areas as coordination of strikes, leveraging of financing, recruitment, and media manipulation. While the classic guidelines still apply, today's anti-guerrilla forces need to accept a more disruptive, disorderly and ambiguous mode of operation. According to David Kilcullen:

"Insurgents may not be seeking to overthrow the state, may have no coherent strategy or may pursue a faith-based approach difficult to counter with traditional methods. There may be numerous competing insurgencies in one theater, meaning that the counterinsurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy. The actions of individuals and the propaganda effect of a subjective “single narrative” may far outweigh practical progress, rendering counterinsurgency even more non-linear and unpredictable than before. The counterinsurgent, not the insurgent, may initiate the conflict and represent the forces of revolutionary change. The economic relationship between insurgent and population may be diametrically opposed to classical theory. And insurgent tactics, based on exploiting the propaganda effects of urban bombing, may invalidate some classical tactics and render others, like patrolling, counterproductive under some circumstances. Thus, field evidence suggests, classical theory is necessary but not sufficient for success against contemporary insurgencies."[15]

Foco theory[edit]

Main article: Foco

A Tuareg rebel fighter in northern Niger, 2008

Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.

— Che Guevara[16]

In the 1960s, the Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara developed the foco (Spanish: foquismo) theory of revolution in his book Guerrilla Warfare, based on his experiences during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This theory was later formalized as "focalism" by Régis Debray. Its central principle is that vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection. Although the original approach was to mobilize and launch attacks from rural areas, many foco ideas were adapted into urban guerrilla warfare movements.

The Power Of Indonesia

Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare by Nasution

As the people of Indonesia, you must be familiar with a general named Abdul Haris Nasution, the general who had led the division Siliwangi. He is one of Indonesia's best generals. He is a powerful figure, strong, full of spirit of nationalism, and has a brilliant brain. He is the author of the phenomenal book in the military world, "Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare"

In the Revolution of Independence I (1946-1948), when he led the Division Siliwangi, Nasution took the second lesson. People need to support the military. From this reason,was born the idea of guerrilla warfare as a form of people's war. This method is more mature after Nasution became the Commander of Java military division in the Revolution of Independence II (1948-1949).

therefore, he is known as a pioneer of the basic guerrilla war against the Dutch colonialism. Style of this war and then popularized by General Sudirman. The concept of guerrilla warfare was later published in a book that is phenomenal at that time, Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare.

now, the book Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare, has been translated into many languages, even the obligatory books of military academies in several countries, including the elite school for the military world, the West Point of the United States (U.S.).

and you know,one of the secrets of vietnamese victory when fighting against Americans is because the vietnamese army was learned this book.Now, this book is become a reference book of military schools around the world.

The Power Of Indonesia

Strategi Gerilya Warfare oleh Nasution

guerrilla tactics

The Vietcong

The Vietnamese Communists, or Vietcong, were the military branch of the National Liberation Front (NLF), and were commanded by the Central Office for South Vietnam, which was located near the Cambodian border. For arms, ammunition and special equipment, the Vietcong depended on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Other needs were met inside South Vietnam.

       

               

 vietcong Main force Vietcong units were uniformed, full-time soldiers, and were used to launch large scale offensives over a wide area. Regional forces were also full-time, but operated only within their own districts. When necessary, small regional units would unite for large scale attacks. If enemy pressure became too great, they would break down into smaller units and scatter.

Unlike the main troops, who saw themselves as professional soldiers, local Vietcong groups tended to be far less confident. For the most part, recruits were young teenagers, and while many were motivated by idealism, others had been pressured or shamed into joining. They also harbored real doubts about their ability to fight heavily armed and well-trained American soldiers.

Initially, local guerrillas were given only a basic minimum of infantry training, but if they were recruited to a main force unit, they could receive up to a month of advanced instruction. Additionally, there were dozens of hidden centers all over South Vietnam for squad and platoon leader, weapons and radio training. To ensure that the guerrillas understood why they were fighting, all training courses included political instruction.

By the mid-1960s, most main force Vietcong troops were armed with Chinese versions of the Russian AK-47 submachine gun. They also used a range of effective Soviet and Chinese light and medium machine guns, and infrequently, heavy machine guns. In particular, heavy machine guns were valued for defense against American helicopters.

For destroying armored vehicles or bunkers, the Vietcong had highly effective rocket propelled grenades and recoilless rifles. Mortars were also available in large numbers and had the advantage of being very easy to transport.

Many weapons, including booby traps and mines, were homemade in villages. The materials ranged from scavenged tin can to discarded wire, but the most important ingredients were provided by the enemy. In a year, dud American bombs could leave more than 20,000 tons of explosives scattered around the Vietnamese countryside. After air-raids, volunteers retrieved the duds and the dangerous business of creating new weapons began.

Local forces also designed primitive weapons, some designed to frighten intruders, but others were extremely dangerous. "Punji traps" -- sharp spikes hidden in pits -- could easily disable an enemy soldier. Punjis were often deliberately contaminated to increase the risk of infection.

The Vietcong were masters at moving through and blending into the local terrain

Guerrilla Tactics

tunnel In December 1965, Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership ordered a change in a way the war in the South was to be fought. From now on, the Vietcong would avoid pitched battles with the Americans unless the odds were clearly in their favor. There would be more hit and run attacks and ambushes. To counter the American build-up, Vietcong recruitment would be stepped up and more North Vietnamese Army troops would be infiltrated into South Vietnam.

The Vietcong, following the example of Chinese guerillas before them, had always given the highest priority to creating safe base areas. They were training grounds, logistics centers and headquarters. They also offered secure sanctuaries for times when the war might go badly.

Hiding the base areas had always been a high priority for the Vietcong. Now, with American spotter planes everywhere, it was more vital than ever to protect them. In remote swamps or forests, there were few problems, but nearer the capital, it was much more difficult. The answer was to build enormous systems of underground tunnels.

The orders coming from NLF headquarters were absolutely clear. Tunnels were not to be treated as mere shelters. They were fighting bases capable of providing continuous support for troops. Even if a village was in enemy hands, the NLF beneath were still able to conduct offensive operations.

There were complexes big and small scattered across the country. Each villager in a NLF area had to dig three feet of tunnel a day. There was even a standard handbook specifying how tunnels were to be built. The biggest tunnel systems were in the Iron Triangle and the Cu Chi District, only 20 miles from Saigon.

An American soldier carefully examines a Vietcong tunnel--they were often boobytrapped if abandoned

Close-up: Cu Chi

chuchi The base area at Cu Chi was a vast network, with nearly 200 miles of tunnels. Any facility used by the guerillas -- a conference room or training area -- had almost immediate underground access. Hidden trapdoors led below, past guarded chambers, to long passages. At regular intervals, branches led back to the surface and other secret entrances. Some openings were even concealed beneath the waters of streams or canals.

At the deeper levels, there were chambers carved out for arms factories and a well for the base's water supply. There were store rooms for weapons anad rice, and there was sometimes a hospital or forward aid station. Long communication tunnels connected the base with other distant complexes.

Base kitchens were always near the surface, with long, carved-out chimneys designed to diffuse cooking smoke and release it some distance away. Near the kitchens were the guerilla's sleeping chambers, where they could survive for weeks at a time if need be. Everywhere on the top level, there were tunnels leading upwards to hundreds of hidden firing posts for defense of the base.