Whether we are helping our brothers who suffer misfortune?

Unfinished journey (175)

(The one hundred and seventy-five, Depok, West Java, Indonesia, January 3, 2015,22.37 BST)

 Whether we are helping our brothers who suffer misfortune?

Have we been concerned with our brothers who suffer calamities in the country such as landslides in banjarnegara, Central Java, bandung, Flood or accident and theexamination of our brothers who are in Russia, in Chehnya, Xinjiang, China, in thesouthern Philippines, Southern Thailand or against Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar,

Also prolonged suffering in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and other else such as  in Africa

When we have a wealth of course we can help them through the charity/social that isdirectly, or help with our physical energy, if we are not able to physically and material(property), not least through our prayer to God Almighty, so they are given fortitude and patience.

Indeed, Muslims are brothers the other Islamic, although we do not know each other beforehand.

Once we convert to Islam, then they all are our brothers, true brothers, sisters in this world and in the hereafter.

Let us consider the arguments from the Qur'an and the hadith below:

1.Rosululloh SAW said in the Hadith Bukhari:

"The Parable of the Muslims who love each other and love each other is like one body,

If one member of the body feels pain, the whole body will come to feel pain and could not sleep "

2.Sabda Rosululloh SAW in Bukhari:

"It was the perfect person from your faith, so that he loves his brother (fellow Islam) as he loves himself"

3.Rosululloh SAW said in Bukhari:

"A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim neighbor.

Can not persecute or. Let persecuted. Anyone who meets his needs then Allah will fulfill his needs.

Whoever frees his distress, then Allah will free her distress in the Day of Judgment. He who covers his disgrace, then Allah will cover his disgrace on the Day of Resurrection "

4.Rosululoh SAW said in Tirmidhi:

"Your smile for your brother is shodaqoh for you ..."

5.Rosululloh SAW said in Bukhari:

"Whoever cut ties with his brother for a year, then he like to kill her ..."

6.Rosululloh SAW said Abu Dawud:

"It is not lawful for a Muslim to break with his fellow Muslims more than 3 days, and if it dies then he go to hell"

7.Sabda Rosululloh SAW in Bukhari:

"It is not lawful for a man broke more than 3 nights. Passed each other, but that is turned away and that was also turned away. The best among the two is the start greeting "

8.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"People of faith with people of other faith is like a building.

Mutually reinforce each other "

9.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"Among people of faith do not mutually hasud, finding fault with each other, mutual anger and back to back ..."

10.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"Every Muslim against another Muslim is forbidden her his blood, his property (not to be stolen), and his honor (not allowed in abuse, vandalized his honor)"

11.Firman Allah in khujorot: 12

"Men of faith, shun berburuk sangka.sesungguhnya most prejudice is a sin. And do not find fault with others. Do most of you tattle on others. "

Of all the word of Allah and the word Rosululloh SAW above, it is clear that we are people of Islam are brothers.

True brothers, sisters, brothers lively semati, brothers and sisters in the world in the hereafter.

His name is relative, meaning we should love one another, love, caring, mutual greetings, visiting each other, help each other, help each other, and so on just like we behave in siblings. At the sister, the brother, the uncle, the nephew, even our parents.

If the siblings, his usual we not feel heavy for their help when there is trouble, there is a disaster, there is a need.

If siblings we lack money, we are happy to give money, or at least lend his.

If they are there is a need or problem, we necessarily help to escape from problems,

Even to the extent that we suppose to trade something good, then siblings we are interested in buying, we immediately gave her free, or willing to pay the cost of its course without taking, or at least we give a substantial discount for siblings us!

That is natural and true relationships among siblings.

And that is exactly what our relationship among fellow Muslim brothers.

As it is, and should indeed like that.

But, it is whether we practice it ???

In Fact:

There are many among us who have not been able to practice it fully and correctly.

Just imagine, we admit the true Muslims. Almost every day we Koran, studied religion, learning the Koran and Hadith, listen to the advice, tausiah of-cleric cleric and fathers clerics.

But, why our attitude to fellow Muslims is far from the teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith that we examine almost every day ???

If our merchants, we did not give a discount on them, even though they are right brother?

If they ask for help, we are reluctant to help, but they are right brother?

If they do not have money, we are reluctant memberiny or minimal meminjaminya.padahal them right brother?

If they can be a disaster, we are reluctant to help, or we want to help if given upah.padahal them right brother?

If they need a ride, we are reluctant to give a ride on mereka.atau want to give a ride home no money, as long as we can profit. Though it we brothers?

WHERE BROTHERHOOD THAT ???

WHERE siblings ???

STILL OUR MUSLIM KAH ???

OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE AWAY FROM MUSLIM IS BY Rosululloh SAW:

1.Orang Islam against Islam as body one.If one limb pain, then all the body will feel a sense sakitndan can not sleep

2.Orang faith with people of other faith is like a building, where another section mutually reinforcing

3. No one's perfect faith that he loves you as he loves his faith in himself

STILL TOO FAR FROM THE CRITERIA OF A FAITH AS IN spoken Allah:

"Indeed, those that faith is BERSAUDARA ..."

DG HOW WE THEN ???

MUSLIMKAH ALREADY WE, AS A PROPHETIC AND NET Allah ???

If not, start now memuslimkan ourselves ....... Ok?

Alhamdulillah jazakumullohu Khoiro

Muslim chaplain Alfarizi

By: Ndaru Triutomo, S.Si.

Readers are blessed Allah Ta'ala, each we definitely have problems. In fact, sometimes so severe that really test our patience.

Some people have to say "My patience has run out", or even to get out the words "Why I calamity of this kind, what my sin, what my mistake, but I also had a lot of worship, indeed God is not fair". This is partly an example of the words that we often hear. But these words are not justified in the Shari'ah, even showed weak person monotheism.

In this bulletin, we will review briefly about a very important matter to which every Muslim, namely patience.

Patience In 3 Case

Patience is a mental hold and keep it up to do something tidsk should be done. There are 3 forms of patience, namely patient in obedience to God, away from the patient of disobedience to God, and God's patience in destiny painful and troublesome.

[1] Patient In Obedience To God

Patience is important to this type owned by any servant, because the real life often feels heavy to run a variety of obedience. This is because the soul tend to like the ugly nature, as the word of Allah Ta'ala (which means): "Verily the lust commands to evil, except for those my Lord has mercy. Surely my Lord is Forgiving, infinite care. "(Surah Yusuf: 53).

Often we find a charity that he could not be continuous but to do it. They are eager to do many deeds in the beginning of time, but after it was abandoned. That requires patience so that we can continuously in charity, although the practice is simple. Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means) "Practice of the most loved by Allah Ta'ala is the practice of continuous although it slightly." (HR. Muslim).

Allah ta'ala preferred practice of continuous though simple, because it is able to help kontinunya a charity. One attempt to be continuous in the charity is to pray to God, such as by prayer: Allahumma a'inni 'ala dzikrika syukrika wa wa husni' ibadatik (O God, help me to always dhikr / remember You, thank You, and smarten worship Thee). "(HR. Abu Dawud and Ahmad, saheeh).

[2] Tolerance In Avoiding disobedience

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means) "Heaven is overwhelmed by things that are not fun, while hell was overwhelmed by things that are fun lust." (HR. Muslim). It takes patience to be able to keep away from things that are fun lust which in essence will plunge to hell. And disobedience including cases favored by lust.

A believer must control his lust and saw that the wickedness is not a trivial thing, but rather a case that could destroy him. Abdullah bin Mas'ud something from anhu said, "The believers see his sins as if he was sitting on the bottom of the mountain, the mountain he was afraid to overwrite it. While people who fajir (like sin) see his like flies passing over his nose. "(HR. Bukhari). All this can only be done with patience.

[3] Patient In Dealing Providence of God

Included into the pillars of faith is that we believe in their destiny or decree of Allah Ta'ala. There are two kinds of fate that befell man, in the form of pleasure and such sadness and tragedy. In the first type we must be grateful, grateful to God will add His blessings. As for the latter we must be patient. And both (grateful and patient) is the practice of worship that have value in the sight of Allah Ta'ala reward.

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means), "It's amazing the case of a believer. All cases (that happened) is good for him and not this is the case but only on themselves a believer. If he gets the happiness he was grateful then it is good for him. And if stricken by him to be patient then it is also good for him. "(HR. Muslim). Then attitude if misfortune befalls a Muslim is to be patient and believe that behind the tragedy that happened there wisdom of Allah Ta'ala.

As Allah says (which means), "Be sure we shall test you with something of fear, hunger, lack of wealth, lives and fruits. And give glad tidings to those who patiently. (They are) those who, when misfortune befalls, they say: "Inna lillaahi wa innaa ilaihi raaji'uun" (Surely we belong to Allah and to Him is our return.) "(QS. Al-Baqoroh 155-156 ).

In addition, the calamities that befall a believer is a test form, as Allah says (which means), "Do you think that you will enter heaven, And do not come to you (trials) as well as those who passed away before you? they were struck by misfortune and misery, and shaken (by various trials) that said the Apostle and those who believe with him: "When will the coming of God's help?" Remember, Verily God's help it Amat close. "(Surat al-Baqoroh: 214).

God Together People Tolerance

Allah ta'ala says (which means), "Ask for help (to God) with patience and prayer. Allah is with those who patiently. "(Surat al-Baqoroh: 153). In this verse, Allah commanded the believers to ask for help in the matter of the world and the hereafter with patience and prayer. In addition, this noble verse shows the primacy of the person that gets ma'iyyah patient (togetherness) God.

Togetherness God does not always mean the Essence of God is everywhere, including the patient with people, because it is clear that God is above the 'Throne, as in His word (which means), "Merciful The rest upon 'Throne "(QS Thaaha: 5). Unity of God with His servants mentioned in the Qur'an has two meanings, namely general and specific nature.

God togetherness general meaning of God's power and knowledge covering his servant, as in the word of God (which means): "And He is with you wherever you are. And Allah is Seer of what ye do. "(Surat al-Hadid: 4). Togetherness of this kind are common to all His creatures. The togetherness in this paragraph is a special character, which is unity in the sense of care and help of Allah Ta'ala that always accompanies his servant. So that all cases were considered severe, with God's help will feel light and easy. Thus the primacy of the people to be patient. (Taisir Kariimirrahman - Shaykh As-Sa'di).

Patience No Limit

Some people think patience has limits. So if it is considered to have crossed the line, he is allowed to act outside the rules. This feeling is not true. Allah ta'ala says (which means), "Only those who are patient who paid back their reward without limit." (QS. Az-Zumar: 10). God has prepared a reward for those who are impatient with countless reward. This shows the magnitude of the primacy of the patient.

Shaykh al-Sa'di said in his commentary: "So God promises to those who are patient with countless reward, that reward is not limited and is not measurable. It can not happen except for the primacy and patient position on the side of God ". If God has prepared such great reward for those who are patient, then why should we limit patience ?. In addition, we also believe that all the problems that come up, it is impossible to exceed the capabilities of a servant. As Allah says (which means), "God does not burden a person but according to his ability." (QS. Al-Baqoroh 286).

Therefore, all the problems that we experience, we can surely finish with patience, licenses, and the power of Allah Ta'ala. We believe that Allah Almighty is the One who has perfect wisdom in all the provisions given to His creatures. With this belief then it is fitting for us to be patient with all the provisions that happens to us, and remember it is a test for us. If we can be patient then Allah will raise the degree of us on his side.

We experienced exam when compared with the prophets and apostles then still much lighter. The most severe human test is the prophets. And man is tested in accordance with the content of his religious condition. As the history of Mus'ab ibn Sa'id -a tabi'in- of his father, he said, "O Messenger of Allah, which is the most severe human trials?" He sallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam said, "The Prophet, then its like and semisalnya again. Someone will be tested in accordance with the conditions of his religion. If religion is so strong (solid), then the weight of the test anyway. If religion is weak, then it will be tested in accordance with the quality of his religion. A servant will always get a trial until he walked the earth in a clean state of sin. "(HR. Tirmidhi, Saheeh). Therefore, when we are given a test, then remember there are still people who are heavier than the test that we have experienced, so it can help us to be patient.

Reward The Big Beginning Musing

Readers are blessed Allah Ta'ala, we have learned a very great reward for those who are patient. But keep in mind, reward the patient will only be obtained by people who do it at the beginning of the disaster. As for those who are patient after angry, then it also includes things that are good but do not get the promised reward.

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means): "Verily the name patience is when at the beginning of the disaster." (HR. Bukhari). Patience at the beginning of the disaster is very difficult to do, for it is God promised unlimited reward for the culprit. As for those who are not patient, even denounced destiny, so in essence he has denounced God.

Allah ta'ala says (which means), "No calamity befalls a person except with the permission of Allah; and he who believes in Allah, He will give instructions to his heart. And Allah knows all things. "(Surah Taghaabun: 11). Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam also said, "Allah Almighty says,' I am hurt by the children of Adam. He denounced the time, when I was (regulator) time, I am the tossing and turning night and day. "(HR. Muslim). Therefore, when we say, "Damn it all today" then surely we unconsciously have denounced the One who set the time, ie Allah Ta'ala. We seek refuge in Allah from denouncing destiny.

So little discussion of the patient, may we be permitted to act upon and put into a group of people who got the virtue of patience. [Ndaru Triutomo, S.Si.]

Crisis in Chechnya

Author And Page Information

by Anup ShahThis Page Last Updated Saturday, September 04, 2004

This page: http://www.globalissues.org/article/100/crisis-in-chechnya.

To print all information e.g. expanded side notes, shows alternative links, use the print version:

http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/100

A mountainous region, Chechnya has important oil deposits, as well as natural gas, limestone, gypsum, sulphur, and other minerals. Its mineral waters have made it a spa center. Major production includes oil, petrochemicals, oil-field equipment, foods, wines, and fruits. For centuries, the Chechen people's history and relationship with the regional power, Russia, has been full of turmoil.

Map of Chechnya

Maps courtesy of ITA's Quick Maps

The recent crisis during the past decade or so has seen numerous human rights violations and draws parallels to many other conflicts around the world. For example:

It is similar to the situation in Africa, where small nations have been trying to break free from their regional superpowers and colonial rulers.

It is similar to Kosovo or the Gulf War, where allied and NATO forces used humanitarian reasons and mass bombings with precise military technology to wage a high-tech war; here Russia attempts (and has attempted in the past) similar measures, albeit with less success compared to their NATO counter-parts.

It is similar to East Timor, Kosovo, various African and other recent conflicts where, again, the civilians are the main casualties who suffer most from this conflict.

It is similar to the above-mentioned conflicts as various international conventions, treaties and laws are violated by powerful nations in their sphere of influence.

And, as with most other conflicts throughout history, there are trade and access related reasons for this conflict as the issue of geopolitics, Caspian Sea oil and control of it comes to the fore.

Of course, that is not to simply degrade this conflict to “yet another conflict” as each war has unique situations and terrible consequences. However, it is another indication of how power struggles are at work throughout the world and throughout history.

Chechnya's separatist rebellion grows into regional Islamist insurgency

GALLERY

Violence surges in Ingushetia

Russia's heavy-handed tactics have helped transform a separatist rebellion in Ingushetia into something potentially worse: a radical Muslim insurgency that has spread across the region, draws support from different ethnic groups and appears to be gaining strength.

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By Philip P. Pan

Washington Post Foreign Service

Friday, October 30, 2009

SUNZHENSKY, RUSSIA -- Her face wet with tears and framed by a black shawl, Madina Albakova sat in her ransacked living room and described how she had become another teenage widow here in Ingushetia, the most volatile of Russia's Muslim republics.

THIS STORY

In Russia, an intensifying insurgency

Violence surges in Ingushetia

The details emerged between sobs: the arrival of the security forces earlier in the day, her husband's panicked attempt to flee, the gunfire that erupted without warning. He was a law student, barely 20 and "so beautiful," she said, but the soldiers planted a rifle next to his body and called him an Islamist rebel. Then they took everything of value -- the family's savings, a set of dishes, even baby clothes, she said.

Such heavy-handed tactics by the Russian security forces have helped transform the long-running separatist rebellion in Chechnya, east of Ingushetia, into something potentially worse: a radical Muslim insurgency that has spread across the region, draws support from various ethnic groups and appears to be gaining strength.

Moscow declared an end to military operations in Chechnya in April, a decade after then-President Vladimir Putin sent troops into the breakaway republic. But violence has surged in the mountains of Russia's southwest frontier since then, with the assassination of several officials, explosions and shootouts occurring almost daily, and suicide bombings making a comeback after a long lull. On Sunday, a popular Ingush opposition leader was fatally shot, months after the slaying of Chechnya's most prominent human rights activist.

The insurgency is a key reason Russia has been reluctant to support sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program; diplomats say the Kremlin is worried Tehran might retaliate by setting aside sectarian differences and backing the rebels in Muslim solidarity. Washington, meanwhile, is concerned that the area is becoming a recruiting ground for militias in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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At least 519 people were killed in rebel attacks and clashes with government forces from May to September, up from 299 during the same period last year, according to a study by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. The fighting is concentrated in the largely Muslim eastern part of the North Caucasus, an area the size of Oregon with 14 million people from as many as 50 ethnic groups.

After a brief calm following two wars, militant attacks have spiked in Chechnya, as well as in nearby Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. But the violence has been worst in Ingushetia, the smallest and poorest of Russia's provinces, where rebels and security forces compete in brutality and even rights activists carry guns.

A few hours after the soldiers killed Albakova's husband, Movsar Merzhoyev, in this rural district on Oct. 9, a car bomb exploded several miles away in what appeared to be a failed suicide attack. Over the next week, gun battles here left 11 suspected militants and three police officers dead.

Ingushetia has been on edge since June, when a suicide bomber hit the convoy of the republic's president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, putting him in a coma and killing three bodyguards. Two months later, as Yevkurov was returning to work, another suicide attack leveled the police department of Ingushetia's largest city, Nazran, killing at least 24 people and injuring 200 others.

Russia has long blamed violence in the region on Muslim extremists backed by foreign governments and terrorist networks, but radical Islam is relatively new here. In the 1990s, it was ethnic nationalism, not religious fervor, that motivated Chechen separatists. That changed, though, as fighting spilled beyond Chechnya and Russian forces used harsher tactics targeting devout Muslims.

In 2007, the rebel leader Doku Umarov abandoned the goal of Chechen independence and declared jihad instead, vowing to establish a fundamentalist Caucasus Emirate that would span the entire region. After Moscow proclaimed victory in Chechnya in April, he issued a video labeling civilians legitimate targets and reviving Riyad-us Saliheen, the self-described martyrs' brigade that launched terrorist attacks across Russia from 2002 to 2006.

A major figure in the recent violence is Alexander Tikhomirov, a young preacher known here as Sayid Buryatsky who joined the rebels last year after converting to Islam in his native Siberia and studying in Egypt.

Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from Islamic Rebellion in Xinjiang (1937))

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (August 2010)

Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937)

Part of Xinjiang Wars

Date 1937

Location    Xinjiang

Result        Sheng Shicai's pro-Soviet regime established its rule over the whole territory of Xinjiang province

Belligerents

Taiwan Republic of China National Revolutionary Army

Islamic Rebels    Taiwan Xinjiang provincial government

 Soviet Union

Russian Empire White Russian forces

Commanders and leaders

Taiwan Chiang Kai-shek

Taiwan Ma Hushan

Taiwan Ma Ju-lung

Taiwan Pai Tzu-li

Kichik Akhund

Abdul Niyaz †     Soviet Union Joseph Stalin

Soviet Union Sheng Shicai

Taiwan Ma Sheng-kuei

Strength

Republic of China Army Flag.svg 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) around 10,000 Chinese Muslim cavalry and footsoldiers

1,500 Turki Islamic Rebels   5,000 Soviet Russian Red Army troops Several thousand White Russian soldiers and Provincial Chinese troops

Soviet Invasion 1937

In 1937, an Islamic rebellion broke out in southern Xinjiang. The rebels were 1,500 Turki Muslims led by Kichik Akhund, tacitly aided by the 36th Division against the pro-Soviet provincial forces of Sheng Shicai.[1][2]

Contents  [hide]

1 Start of rebellion

2 36th Division invades Kashgar

3 Aftermath

4 See also

5 References

Start of rebellion[edit]

Sheng Shicai had moved against Divisional General Mahmut Muhiti, commander-in-chief of 6th Uyghur Division and deputy chief of the Kashgar Military Region. Muhiti resented the increased Russian influence and formed a secret group around himself. Sheng feared Muhiti may have allied with the Chinese Muslim general Ma Hu-shan. However, the Uighurs of Kashgar heard hostile reports on Ma Hu-shan from Uighur refugees from Khotan suffering under Ma.

Muhiti fled Kashgar on April 2, 1937 with a small number of his subordinates and some amount of gold to India via Yengi Hissar and Yarkand. Shortly before his departure he sent message to Ma Hu-Shan about his proposed arrival at Khotan. In response, Ma Hu-Shan ordered his troops to prepare a parade and feast to honour General Muhiti. This preparation pulled troops who guarded both mountain Passes to Kashmir, which allowed Muhiti the opportunity to change his route and slip through into Kashmir. Muhiti's flight resulted in Uighur troops rising in revolt in Yengi Hissar, Yarkand, and Artush, resulting in the execution of all pro-Soviet officials and a number of Soviet advisers. An independent Turkic administration was set up by two of his officers, Kichik Akhund Sijiang, who commanded troops in Artush, and Abdul Niyaz Sijiang, who commanded troops in Yarkand and Yengi Hissar.

Liu Pin, a provincial commander in Kashgar Region with 700 troops at his command, responded to the rebellion by launching a squadron of nine Soviet planes to bomb Yangi Hissar and Yarkand.[3] After Muhiti reached Srinagar in India, the following year, he went on pilgrimage to Mecca.[4] A buildup of Soviet military assets occurred in Xinjiang before the outbreak of war. Around Kasghar, the Soviets sent AA guns, fighter planes, and soldiers of Russian and Kyrgyz origin in great amounts.[5]

The start of the rebellion in Southern Xinjiang had immediate and tragic impact on the fate of about 400 Uyghur students, who had been sent by the Xinjiang government to the USSR (1935–37) to study in the University of Tashkent. They were all arrested during one night in May 1937 by the NKVD and executed without trials, allegedly by order of Joseph Stalin. Soviet diplomatic staff were also purged throughout the province in Soviet consulates in Urumchi, Karashar, Ghulja, Chuguchak and Altai. Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi Garegin Apresoff (former Soviet consul in Mashhad, Iran and the main architect of Soviet policies in Central Asia and the Middle East) was recalled to Moscow and shot by firing squad for allegedly participating in the so-called Fascist-Trotskyite Plot against Stalin and attempting to overthrow Sheng Shicai's regime on April 12, 1937, on commemoration day of April Uprising four years earlier.

The rebellion is also viewed by some historians as a plot by Mahmut Muhiti and Ma Hu-shan to convert Xinjiang into a base for fighting against Stalinists.[6]

36th Division invades Kashgar[edit]

Meanwhile, Ma Hushan and his Chinese Muslim troops of the 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) were watching the situation with interest, eager to seize more territory. Sheng Shicai surprisingly ordered 36th Division to quell Rebellion of 6th Uyghur Division, although initially 33rd and 34th Regiments of 6th Uyghur Division, which were stationed in Kashgar since August 20, 1934, did not join the Rebellion, because there were those who had previously trained in the USSR (during 1934-1935 a number of officers of 6th Uyghur Division were sent to Tashkent to study at the Military Academy there, also Soviet Generals Rybalko, Obuhoff and Dotkin consequently worked in Kashgar in 1934-1936, being the Soviet military advisers of Sheng Shicai's administration, and participated in organizing and training of staff of 6th Uyghur Division) . Having received the order the Tungans attacked Kashgar airfield on 20 May, but were defeated. Ten days later 1,500 Islamic irregulars under Kichik Akund attacked and seized Kashgar Old City. His troops wore arm bands with the words "Fi sabil Allah" (Arabic: in the way of Allah). The rebellion was followed by a Kyrgyz rising near Kucha and Muslim unrest in Kumul.[3]

Ma Hushan remained at Khotan watching the situation. His Chief of Staff Pai Tzu-li and Ma Ju-lung, the 1st brigade commander at Karghalik, persuaded him to strike against Kashgar. Ma Ju-lung arrived on 2 June at Kashgar to reportedly "put down the rebels of Kichik Akhund", but Kichik Akhund had secretly agreed to back off, he transferred his soldiers and himself to Akau while Kashgar was taken by Ma Hushan without a battle. The Fayzabad-Maral Bashi region was taken by Ma Sheng-kuei's 2nd brigade. Ma Hu-shan strengthened his position Southern Xinjiang and avoided engaging in battle, letting the Turkic Muslim rebels do the fighting as a diversion for Sheng's provincial army.[3]

General Abdul Niyaz

Ma Hushan surrounded Kashgar New City and explained to the British Consulate-General that the Chinese Muslim forces, still official the Kuomintang 36th Division, were acting in covenant with the Turkis (Uighurs) to overthrow the pro-Soviet Provincial government and replace it with an Islamic government loyal to the Republic of China Kuomintang government at Nanjing.[7]

Ma Hushan was paranoid about a Russian attack. He controlled the Kashgar-Khotan area, because it offered him a safe escape to British India, where he could take a steamer from Calcutta safely back to China sea ports, and then to the Gansu and Qinghai. He and his officers repeatedly had vowed to attack the Russians in conversations with Peter Fleming and sought to procure gas masks and airplanes to help them fight.

In August 1937, 5,000 Soviet Russian Red Army troops backed by an air unit and armoured regiment moved into Xinjiang at Sheng Shicai's request, whose Provincial troops suffered defeat from Muslim rebels in July 1937 at the battle near Karashar and were unable to continue their advance on the South. At the end of August Provincial forces, including White Russians, Red Army and NKVD units, heavily defeated Kichik Akhund's troops at Aksu with most of his troops being annihilated, after they were machine-gunned and bombed in air attack by a squadron of 24 Soviet airplanes in the open field near Aksu. As a result, Kichik Akhund and Abdul Niyaz escaped to Kashgar with only 200 men. After this battle Ma Sheng-kuei was bribed by Sheng Shicai to defect and turn against Ma Hushan. Ma Sheng-kuei marched on Kashgar on September 1, 1937, only to find that Ma Hushan, Ma Ju-lung, and Pai Tzu-li withdrew toward Karghalik with the 1st brigade. On 7 September, Ma Hushan and his officers deserted their troops and fled to India with gold. Ma brought thousand ounces in gold, which was confiscated by the British.[8]

The Chinese Muslim General Ma Zhanshan was allegedly one of the commanders of the Soviet army during the invasion. It was reported that he led Russian troops disguised in Chinese uniforms along with bombers during the attack, which was requested by Sheng Shicai.[9] Other sources do not mention this doubtful participation of Ma Zhanshan in this war, since he was a Commander in Chief of Cavalry in the National Revolutionary Army in China in 1937.[10]

General Chiang Yu-fen, a Provincial commander, despatched his men after Ma Hushan's 1st brigade, while other Provincial forces drove Abdu Niyaz and Kichik Akhund towards Yarkand. Red Army aircraft assisted the Provincial forces by dropping bombs, including some that contained mustard gas. These first flew from an airbase in Karakol, USSR, and then from captured airfields in Uchturpan and Kucha.[11] On 9 September Yarkand fell to Sheng, and on 15 September Abdul Niyaz was executed. On October 15 the Soviets bombed the city of Khotan where casualties numbered 2,000.[12][12] The remnants of the 36th division melted away through Kunlun Mountains in Qinghai and Northern Tibet.[3]

Aftermath[edit]

Before the war, Ma Hushan had exchanged message with the Nanjing Kuomintang government and had expected them to send aid, as he said in conversations with Peter Fleming. However, in 1937, at the same time of the Soviet attack, China was invaded by Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The pro-Soviet provincial forces of Sheng Shicai established their control over the whole of Xinjiang. All rivals were eliminated, and the defeat of the 36th division caused the control of the Chinese Central Government in Xinjiang to cease.

A memorial was set up by Sheng Shicai to dead Russians who were killed in combat by Ma Hushan. The memorial included Russian Orthodox crosses.[13][14]

The Republic of China government was fully aware of the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang province, and Soviet troops moving around Xinjiang and Gansu, but it was forced to mask these maneuvers to the public as "Japanese propaganda" to avoid an international incident and for continued military supplies from the Soviets.[15]

Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China

Elizabeth Van Wie Davis

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

January 2008

Overview 

•        The April 1990 armed uprising in Baren marked an increase in Uyghur Muslim violence in Xinjiang, China. Two justifications—ethnic separatism and religious rhetoric—are given. The Uyghurs, who reside throughout the immediate region, are the largest Turkic ethnic group living in Xinjiang as well as being overwhelmingly Muslim. This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and people. 

•        The desired outcome by groups that use violence is, broadly speaking, a separate Uyghur state, called either Uyghuristan or Eastern Turkistan, which lays claim to a large part of China. While some Uyghurs want a separate state, others want to maintain cultural distinction within an autonomous relationship with China, and others are integrating into the Chinese system. There is no single Uyghur agenda.

•        The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang occur sporadically, and the groups that claim responsibility are frequently splintering, merging, and collapsing.  Some of the Uyghur groups make claims that are difficult to substantiate.  Nonetheless, the Uyghur grievances against the Chinese government have old roots. Some of the newer elements include Turkey’s unofficial support and Muslim funding and training from abroad.

•        The heavy-handedness of the multiple “strike hard” campaigns by the central Chinese government in Xinjiang simultaneously tamps down violence in the short-run but fuels a sense of injustice and mistrust among the Uyghurs in the long-run. Beginning in 1996, regular “strike hard” campaigns were used to fight crime and threats to order by mobilizing police, but are used in this decade to deal increasingly with “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” A heavy police presence is a constant in Xinjiang.

•        U.S. policy on this issue is constrained.  Not only does the US need to work with China on issues of geostrategic importance, but also the Uyghurs who use violence have formed limited associations with groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations. The best option for the United States is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.

The Roots of the Problem

A January 2007 Chinese raid on a training camp in Xinjiang killed 18 terrorist suspects and one policeman. Seventeen more suspects were reported captured and explosives were seized. The raid was said to have provided new evidence of ties to “international terrorist forces.”  The raid marks the latest clash between Uyghur Muslim separatists and Chinese security services, reflecting a limited challenge to China’s mainland stability. In Beijing’s view, however, instability in Xinjiang could also bring instability to Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan. As with many of these disputes throughout Asia, the root causes of the problem are a complex mix of history, ethnicity, and religion, fueled by poverty, unemployment, social disparities, and political grievances.

The central government has gone through several waves regarding the treatment of religion and ethnicity within the territory of the People’s Republic of China.  Historically, ethnic minorities that are adherents to religions other than Chinese Buddhism raised fears of social unrest in China.  For instance in the nineteenth century, the Taiping Rebellion—including the Hakka subgroup and Zhuang minorities—and the Hui Minorities War  both had their roots in religious movements.  The Hui, ethnically Chinese but religiously Muslim, are a unique minority in China. The ethnic minorities and Muslim majority in Xinjiang, which means the “New Territories” in Chinese, were largely conquered and integrated into the Chinese state in the 1750s.  Xinjiang became a province in 1884, fixing a firm western border with Russia.  According to the noted historian Jonathan D. Spence, the Xinjiang region was not initially colonized or settled, but was maintained as a strategic frontier zone, with up to 20,000 Manchu and Chinese banner garrisons, at a huge annual cost. The largely Muslim inhabitants kept their own religious leaders, who were bound by salaries and titles to the Qing state (China).   After the dissolution of the Qing Dynasty, the last Chinese dynasty, the Republic of China’s Nationalists gradually saw the country fall into Japanese occupied territories and warlord fiefdoms, including Xinjiang, which was ruled by an autonomous military governor who nervously sought aid and sponsorship first from Soviet Russia and then from the Nationalists, before ultimately surrendering to the Communists in Xinjiang in September 1949.

Although initially declaring the People’s Republic of China as a multinational state  in 1949, the Communist Party’s Anti Rightist Policy of 1957 opposed “local nationalism” among ethnic minorities and clamped down on religions.  A decade later, the harsh Cultural Revolution (1966-76) saw many even greater injustices against ethnic minorities.  Religion was especially suppressed, but so was ethnic language, cultural cuisines and garb.  The Uyghur in Xinjiang, like other Muslim minorities throughout China, saw their religious texts and mosques destroyed, their religious leaders persecuted, and individual adherents punished.  With the more open policies of the late 1970s through the early 1990s, restrictions on minorities and religions began to loosen.  This opening resulted in more minorities speaking out against what were seen as discriminatory economic, religious, and political practices.  The Chinese government began to crack down in Xinjiang in 1996, shortly after the first meeting of the Shanghai Five, soon to be the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose members include Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

In addition to police and military crackdowns, Beijing believes that economic development can undermine Uyghur calls for independence and solve Xinjiang's problems. And economically, Xinjiang has dramatically improved relative to its economy of a decade ago, although it still lags behind the industrialized coastal areas. However, the very improvements attributed to economic enhancement open China to risk in Xinjiang. For example, as part of its development plans, Beijing is connecting Xinjiang to Central Asia through roads, rails and pipelines to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. But these very openings are exposing Xinjiang directly to Islamic militant training and arms as well as the drug trade emanating from these countries and beyond. 

State Responses

The response from Beijing has been officially reasonable, but less so in practice.  In September 1999, National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China was released by the Office of the State Council.  The policy outlines a fairly generous policy toward minorities.   The problem, of course, is always in the actual adherence to policy in real life situations where minorities are often viewed with various preconceived notions of race and ethnicity.  Open tolerance of minorities declined further in Xinjiang after September 11, 2001, when China felt it was now both internationally permissible to “crack down” on separatists in Xinjiang and nationally more urgent to protect its porous borders from an influx of more violent forms of Islam, borders which abut Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.  

Chinese central government policies are also reflected in recent policy statements.  For instance, at the May 2006 meeting of the Chinese National Islamic Council, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, urged Islamic leaders in China to play a positive role in building a “harmonious society.”   The message reflects the Chinese government’s perceived connection between Muslims, many of whom are also ethnic minorities in China, and social unrest.  According to Ye Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, “As Chinese Muslims advance with the nation, this is our response to the many turbid misunderstandings that tarnish the Muslim image: Islam is a peace-loving religion.  Chinese Muslims love peace, oppose turmoil and separatism, advocate tolerance and harmony, and treasure unity and stability.” 

Clearly the Chinese government has been cracking down on Uyghur militants. Western human rights groups are concerned about overall treatment of prisoners and the targeting of minorities, while the Chinese government is concerned that Islamic militant rhetoric and funding are finding their way into China. The issue then becomes whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority, using terrorism and separatism as an excuse to violate their human rights, or whether China itself is a victim of separatists and terror networks like the al-Qaeda camps,  which trained Uyghurs in Afghanistan for activities in Xinjiang.   The Chinese tend to refer to this concern by the three character slogan of separatism, extremism and terrorism, implying a distinct link between the three concepts.  For instance, Chinese President Hu Jintao said on June 17, 2004, that "We have to fight against the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism," in a speech at a summit meeting of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), adding that terrorism in all forms must be suppressed and double standards must be ruled out in fighting what is regarded as a grave threat to world peace and development. Efforts should be made to tackle the problems of regional confrontation and poverty, which are considered the roots of terrorism, said the Chinese president. "Terrorism is not automatically related to certain ethnic groups or religions," he added.  It is clear that the Chinese leadership fears that Xinjiang separatism has and will continue to gain support from transnational Muslim extremists, with possible ramifications both for other latent Chinese separatist movements without a Muslim connection and for other Chinese Muslims without a separatist agenda.

The central government’s policies on separatists include the use of force, certainly evident in Xinjiang, For example, in August 2001, the Chinese military undertook large-scale exercises in Xinjiang with an imposing parade of military hardware through the center of the city of Kashgar.  The Xinjiang exercises, which were spread over almost a month, reportedly involved 50,000 troops, one of the largest ever staged by the Chinese in the region, featuring dozens of armored personnel vehicles, tanks, and camouflaged trucks filled with troops, capped off by a flyover of fighter jets. The parade was presided over by General Fu Quanyou, then chief of general staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and a member of the Central Military Commission. A number of other generals and senior officers, based at the Lanzhou military region which co-ordinates defense in Xinjiang, also sat on the podium to view the parade.  The use of domestic force is possible partly because of the existing international war on terrorism, the prevailing perception of the linkages between terrorism and separatism, the general regional reluctance to condone ethnic separatism, and the global concern that religion is mixing with both terrorism and separatism.

Economic incentives, however, may well be the largest tool in the central government’s policies toward Xinjiang and the Uyghurs, especially the Western Development policies. The western regions, over half of China’s vast expanse of land with its highlands and deserts, are made up of six provinces and three autonomous regions, including Xinjiang. The Western Development policies were first an economic development strategy to reduce poverty and then an urgent social necessity of Chinese leaders. In the early 1980s, then-leader Deng Xiaoping developed a policy to first develop the eastern coastal regions, which already had a better economic foundation than the western regions, and then second to increase the development of the western regions after the development of the eastern regions reached a certain point. In the following decades the poverty gap between eastern and western China widened, resulting in Beijing’s creation in June 1999 of a leading group responsible for the development of the western regions with Premier Zhu Rongji and 17 ministerial-level officials as members. The attempt to use economic tools to address ethnic separatism in Xinjiang reflects the Chinese government’s long-standing belief that most peoples, Uyghurs included, primarily want a good economic life for themselves and their children.

The current Chinese government, under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, is acutely aware of the challenges and dangers that lesser development in the western regions like Xinjiang means for not only China’s overall continued prosperity, but also for political stability, the possible enticements of Islamic extremism, and the calls for ethnic separatism. In 2006, Wang Jinxiang, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission, assured the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that the national strategy to develop the country's western region had made great progress. He said that a total of one trillion yuan (US$125 B) has been spent building infrastructure in western China with an annual average regional economic growth rate of 10.6 percent for six years in a row.   China, continuing with its transportation infrastructure projects, will build twelve new highways in Xinjiang to connect with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. The longest road will stretch 1,680 kilometers from Xinjiang to Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, and finally reach Europe, scheduled for completion before 2010.  Other infrastructure projects either significantly underway or completed as of 2007 are: a south-to-north water diversion, a west-to-east natural gas transfer, a west-to-east power transmission and the completed Qinghai-Tibet Railway.    

 The underlying idea is that if the western regions, most notably Xinjiang, have sufficient development, then the minorities will prosper, be less restive, give less support for separatist  activities, and be more integrated into the fortunes—both economic and political—of China.  A complicating factor that has become manifest along with this economic development has been migration into the western regions, primarily of Han (or majority) Chinese.  Not only is this making the western regions more ethnically Chinese, but also it is reinforcing the “minority” status of the Uyghurs, who watch the better paying jobs go to Han Chinese while the harder labor, poorer paying positions are given to Uyghurs. The other ethnic groups living in Xinjiang—Kazaks, Hui, Kirgiz, Mongols, and others—have more mixed feelings about Han money and people moving into the region.

In addition to the national Western Development policies, there are the provincial and local policies in Xinjiang.   As in many places, politics are local in China.  While it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of Muslim status and politics inside of China, with a Muslim population of approximately 20 million,  there is a decidedly regional, provincial and ethnic character to Islam in China as well. China’s ten Muslim ethnic minorities usually find common cause only when they feel an issue denigrates Islam, as was the case with the offensive Danish cartoons of the Muslim prophet Mohammed. The largest group, the Hui who have blended fairly well into Chinese society, regard some Uyghurs as unpatriotic separatists who give other Chinese Muslims a bad name. The Hui “don't tend to get too involved in international Islamic conflict," said Dr. Dru Gladney, a scholar of Chinese ethnic minorities. "They don't want to be branded as radical Muslims."  

The local perception of groups as radical Muslims or ethnic separatists can have severe consequences. Provincial policies also include the threat of force. Armed police held a large-scale anti-terror exercise in Xinjiang on August 30, 2005. In the exercise, special police forces fought and subdued a group of "armed terrorists" who took over a company building and held some people as hostages following a failed attack at a prison.   

There are mixed policy assessments in the Xinjiang region itself regarding the Uyghurs.  On the one hand, deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a Han Chinese, Zhang Xiuming, implied that separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang is an issue when he said, “We need to take the initiative and go on the offensive, crack down on gangs as soon as they surface and strike the first blow. We must absolutely not permit the three vicious forces to build organizations, have ringleaders, control weapons and develop an atmosphere. We need to destroy them one by one as we discover them and absolutely not allow them to build up momentum.”  On the other hand, the Chair of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government and a Uyghur Chinese, Ismael Tiliwaldi, implied something quite different, when he said, “In Xinjiang, not one incident of explosion or assassination took place in the last few years....Last year Xinjiang’s public security situation was very good...”

It is clear nonetheless that both the central government and the provincial authorities broadly fall on the side of avoiding becoming a victim of terrorist or separatist activities when it comes to the question of whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority or whether China itself is a victim of Uyghur militants.  For instance, following the mass protests and violent riots of April 1990 in Baren township, there were further Uyghur demonstrations and disturbances in various cities including Yining, Khotan and Aksu in the mid-1990s.  This was followed by the Chinese government response: the initiation of a "strike hard" campaign against crime throughout China in 1996 which made Uyghurs and separatists in Xinjiang a key target. After the forceful suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs in the city of Yining in February 1997, several days of serious unrest reigned in the city. A renewed national "strike hard" campaign against crime was initiated in April 2001 and has never formally been brought to a close. Several levels of police conspicuously and daily patrolled the Uyghur sections of Urumqi in 2007; Han police officers patrolled the streets in a six-man formation wearing black uniforms and black flack jackets, armed with batons and side arms. 

China’s official statement on "East Turkestan terrorists" published in January 2002 listed several groups allegedly responsible for violence, including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the Islamic Reformist Party ‘Shock Brigade’, the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkestan International Committee.  There is not always clarity in the way these groups are officially labeled nor do these groups seem to stay static. For instance, in 1997, the Uyghurstan Liberation Front and the United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (UNRF) overcame their differences and joined together in a jihad in Xinjiang. The UNRF fears Uyghurs who agree with China, and announced that it had assassinated an imam of the mosque in Kashgar in 1996 because of his pro-China views.  When China destroyed an Islamist camp in Xinjiang in January 2007, killing 18 suspected terrorists and capturing 17 others, a police spokeswoman, Ba Yan, said the training camp was run by ETIM. 

Some of the issues between Uyghurs and the Chinese government, however, seem unrelated to separatist issues.  In another recent incident, hundreds of Uyghurs protested outside government offices over plans to push them off their farmlands to build a dam, according to a Chinese police official and Radio Free Asia. Police arrested at least 16 protesters in Xinjiang's Yili county, the site of clashes between security forces and Uyghurs in 1997. The June 2004 protests began outside the offices of a reservoir and hydropower station planned for the local Tekas River, according to U.S.-based Radio Free Asia. Authorities plan to move about 18,000 farmers, forestry workers and herders to make way for the reservoir, but protesters said they've been paid only 880 yuan (about US$100) out of 38,000 yuan (US$4,600) promised to them, the station said, citing anonymous witnesses. An officer at Tekas County police headquarters confirmed the June 11, 2004, protest, saying, "The protest was big. People don't want to move because they aren't satisfied with the amount of compensation for resettlement.” 

International Responses

It is less clear how the international community stands on this question of whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority or whether China itself is a victim of Uyghur militants. A report produced in December 2001 by the US Congressional Research Service, for instance, documented a number of armed groups operating in the region.  Its list of armed groups included: the United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan, the Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan, the Wolves of Lop Nor, the Xinjiang Liberation Organization, the Uighur Liberation Organization, the Home of East Turkestan Youth and the Free Turkestan Movement. Pakistan also considers several of these organizations as terrorist or militant separatist organizations.

The US did agree in 2002 to specifically single out ETIM as a terrorist organization in response to a planned attack on the US Embassy in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.  Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage announced that ETIM had been added to a State Department list of terrorist groups, freezing its assets in the United States, saying the group “committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians without any regard for who was hurt.” A spokesman for the embassy went further, accusing ETIM of working with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network and “planning attacks against U.S. interests abroad, including the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.” ETIM's leader and China's most-wanted terrorist, Hasan Mahsum, who was later killed by Pakistani forces on October 2, 2003, said, “We don't have any organizational contact or relations with al Qaeda or the Taliban…. Maybe some individuals fought alongside them on their own.”   Two suspected ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan in May 2002 for planning terrorist attacks. The Kyrgyz government has identified the men as Mamet Yasyn and Mamet Sadyk and said they were planning attacks on embassies, markets and public gathering places in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

However, the US has declined to formally add another Uyghur organization, ETLO, to its list. In a Radio Free Asia interview, conducted on 24 January 2003, the leader of ETLO, Mehmet Emin Hazret reportedly stated, “Our principle [sic] goal is to achieve independence for East Turkestan by peaceful means. But to show our enemies and friends our determination on the East Turkestan issue, we view a military wing as inevitable.”  Regarding other Uyghur militants, Chinese officials asked the United States to return Chinese Uyghurs captured fighting in Afghanistan. The United States has rejected China's claims and in May 2006 released five Uyghurs  to Albania, a neutral third country, while continuing to hold thirteen more Chinese Uyghurs in the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay.  Lawyers for these thirteen Uyghurs say the men were moved to Guantanamo Bay's high-security facility,  while the U.S. Government does not comment on enemy combatants held in Guantanamo.

Pakistan, both a neighbor and friend of China, has taken a more stringent line toward Uyghurs, closer to the policies of most Central Asian neighbors. China and Pakistan agreed to enter into an extradition treaty to facilitate the exchange of prisoners in 2003. Ismail Kadir, reported to be the third highest leader of ETIM, was returned to China in March 2002 following his capture by Pakistani authorities reportedly in either Kashmir or in the city of Rawalpindi, northern Pakistan, home to a sizeable community of Uyghurs. In Pakistan, a senior Interior Ministry official confirmed Kadir's repatriation to China, saying the man had been arrested in March. “He was sent back to China after being interrogated,” the official said giving no further details.  Ismail Semed, allegedly another Uyghur ETIM founder, was executed in Urumqi after being deported from Pakistan where he had fled after serving two jail terms for alleged involvement in the violent Baren uprising in 1990. Semed was convicted in October 2005 of “attempting to split the motherland” and the possession of firearms and explosives.  And Pakistani troops reportedly killed Hasan Mahsum, yet another ETIM leader, in the South Waziristan region of Pakistan on 2 October 2003.   Pakistan President Musharraf stated during his November 2003 visit to Beijing that “his country will never allow anybody, including the terrorist force of ‘East Turkestan’, to use the territory of Pakistan to carry out any form of anti-China activities.”  Thousands of Uyghurs reportedly travel to and from Pakistan for business and religious purposes, particularly to study in Pakistan’s madrassas. China believes that more than 1,000 Uyghurs were trained by bin Laden's forces in Afghanistan,  with approximately 110 returning to China, about 300 allegedly captured or killed by U.S. forces, and about 600 escaping to northern Pakistan.  In addition, some reports suggest that Uyghurs have been trained in unofficial Pakistan militant training camps.  

This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the Uyghur population resident in Central Asia who are associated with the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and individuals.  Uyghurs are often viewed with a great deal of leeriness in Central Asia.  Uyghur separatists within Xinjiang drew inspiration and envy from their Central Asian neighbors' independence after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and they increased their movement toward a separate Uyghur state. Militant Uyghur groups exploited Xinjiang’s porous border with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan to establish training camps outside of China's reach  as well as to move explosives and small arms into China.  Additionally, it is much easier for citizens of surrounding countries to serendipitously travel into China. “This year, we have arrested 19 people from abroad who were sent to Xinjiang for violent sabotage,'” Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan told reporters at a news conference in Xinjiang's capital, Urumqi. “When they entered the territory of Xinjiang, we immediately caught them,” Wang said without elaborating.  

The very rapid growth of economic relations and connecting infrastructure between China and Central Asian countries  has also enabled the enhanced movement of ideas, weapons and people. There are roughly a half million Uyghurs in Central Asia.  Most of the Central Asian governments, notably Kyrgyzstan, have made several attempts to crack down on Uyghurs whom they view as undesirable or militant. There is a tendency to view Uyghurs with suspicion—they are frequently unemployed and thus seen as thieves and troublemakers as well as harboring discontent toward their host governments. Uyghurs in Central Asian countries often join hands with other dissident groups, united by the global Islamic resurgence. For instance, Uzbek leaders believe that ethnic Uyghurs from Central Asia and China are members of the terrorist organization known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  Since the beginning of 2005, there has been a wave of “election-related turmoil” or so-called “Color Revolutions” in Central Asia, with terrorist and extremist forces often funded from outside and uniting religious extremists with political dissidents against authoritarian governments. Afghanistan has witnessed the resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda in the wake of a new wave of terrorist attacks following the Iraq War. More severely, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other extremist groups are quickly winning popular support in Central Asia, particularly in the poverty-stricken Fergana countryside, bespeaking a reemerging grim security situation in the region that poses new challenges to both Central Asian countries and China.

Energy

Although most experts would agree that the primary issues at stake in Xinjiang are ethnic separatism and Muslim extremism, the issue of energy is not negligible.  Not only does Xinjiang have considerable energy resources in terms of gas and oil, in addition to its former role as the Chinese nuclear test grounds, but also Xinjiang is the gateway to Central Asian energy resources.  China is pursuing pipeline deals with its oil rich neighbors in Central Asia, as well as Russia, to help meet the booming economy's demand for energy.

China and Kazakhstan started energy cooperation in 1997, marked by an intergovernmental agreement covering diverse means of collaboration in oil and gas fields, including an oil pipeline between western Kazakhstan and China's Xinjiang. The transnational Atasu pipeline was completed in November 2005. The deal, signed in 2004, came as Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev and President Hu Jintao signed a broad agreement for joint exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. The two sides also are stepping up consideration of plans for a natural gas pipeline to connect gas fields in the Caspian Sea with China.   Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement to build up international passenger and freight rail transport, as part of an effort to boost trade and complete routes through Kazakhstan to Europe.  A China-Kazakhstan rail link opened in 1992.  Additionally, China and Kazakhstan have opened a free trade zone at their mutual border to further enhance their already rapidly growing economic relationship.

Gas pipelines from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to China are also in the works. These pipelines, if connected with the Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline, will also contribute to the implementation of China’s Western Development policies. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, now deceased, and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a framework agreement on oil and gas cooperation on April 3, 2006, including a Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline to be commissioned in 2009.  Turkmenistan's gas reserves are considered to be the largest in Central Asia.  These developments usher in new energy cooperation between China and Central Asia, and these energy supplies—unlike Middle Eastern or other energy supplies—do not require maritime security.

Alternative Futures

The future that most worries the Chinese is that the Uyghur Muslim movement in Xinjiang will, on the one hand, externally hook up with international Muslim movements throughout Asia and the Middle East, bringing with it an influx of Islamic extremism and a desire to challenge the Chinese central government.  On the other hand, the Chinese fear the Uyghur movement could internally radicalize other minorities, whether it was the ethnic Tibetans or the Muslim Hui.  While Beijing is currently successfully managing the separatist movements in China, the possibility of increased difficulty is linked partly to elements outside of Chinese control, such as political instability or increased Islamic extremism in neighboring Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.  Partly, however, the progress of separatist movements in China will be determined by the Chinese themselves in policies and reactions.  If “strike hard” campaigns do or are seen to discriminate against nonviolent Uyghurs and if the perception that economic development in Xinjiang aids Han Chinese at the expense of Uyghurs, the separatist movements will be fueled.

The region as a whole has concerns about growing Uyghur violence.  Central Asian countries, especially those with sizable Uyghur minorities, already worry about Uyghur violence and agitation.  Many of the regional governments, especially authoritarian secular governments, in South Asia and Central Asia are worried about the contagion of increasing Muslim radicalization.  The governments of Southeast Asia are also worried about growing radical networks and training camps, but they also fear the very idea of a fragmenting China.  Not only is China economically important to the region, but also political instability in China would impact all of Asia.

Implications for the United States

Given that the existing scope of the Uyghur Muslim separatist movement in China remains weak and under reasonable control, this need not be a top issue for the United States. Although Beijing has decided to cast this ethnic separatist movement in light of new global perceptions following September 11, 2001, the Uyghur issue, both inside of China and in the neighboring countries, well predates the war on terrorism.  While this is a genuine ethnic separatist movement with at least some ties to global Muslim networks, it is not supported by any of the immediate neighboring country governments and thus is unlikely to erupt into a major concern in the near term.

The United States is constrained in its policy on this issue in any case.  Not only does the US need to work with China on issues of geostrategic importance, but also the Uyghurs who use violence have formed limited associations with groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations.  The best option for the United States is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.

The primary concern for the United States has been  and should remain human rights abuses.  The US-led war on terrorism has led some international human rights organizations to speculate that this new international environment will lead to an increase in human rights abuses globally.  Many of the human rights groups that watch Xinjiang, especially the Chinese “strike hard” campaigns, fear that China is using the war on terror to disregard the human rights of Uyghurs. Not only are human rights abuses abhorrent in and of themselves, but also the Chinese worsen the problem by targeting and antagonizing nonviolent Uyghurs.

A focus on human rights is consistent with the US decision to cite one Uyghur militant group as a terrorist organization, specifically when it was asserted by a third party government that that organization (ETIM) was targeting both civilians and an American embassy, but not to label other Uyghur organizations as terrorists.  There are a few issues with the Uyghur detainees held at Guantanamo, according to a 2007 Congressional Research Service Report, with some Uyghurs being released and other Uyghurs being held indefinitely.   The United States should neither absolutely agree to other countries’ allegations of who is a terrorist nor ignore the growing linkages between extremist organizations that train and arm militants.

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines)

This article is about the insurgency of 1969-2014. For the insurgency of 1899–1913, see Moro Rebellion. For the pre-1899 conflict, see Spanish–Moro conflict.

This article is outdated. (March 2014)

This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling. (December 2014)

It has been suggested that North Cotabato Conflict be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since May 2012.

It has been suggested that Civil conflict in the Philippines be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since February 2014.

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

Part of the Cold War, the War on Terror, and the Civil conflict in the Philippines

PMC BAlikatan Exercise.jpg

MILF militant lying prone.jpg

Above: Filipino and US Troops during the PMC Balikatan Exercise

Below: A member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front training with a light machine gun.

Date March 29, 1969 – ongoing

Location    Philippines (mainly in Mindanao)

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

In 1969, political tensions and open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and jihadist rebel groups.[25] The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established by University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari to condemn the killings of more than 60 Filipino Muslims and later became an aggressor against the government while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group from the MNLF, was established to seek an Islamic state within the Philippines and is more radical and more aggressive. Conflict dates back to 1899 during the uprising of the Bangsamoro people to resist foreign rule from the United States. Hostilities ignited again starting in the 1960s when the government started to resist upcoming rebellions by killing more than 60 Filipino Muslims and continues up to present.

Casualty statistics vary for the conflict however the conservative estimates of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicate that at least 6,015 people were killed in armed conflict between the Government of Philippines and ASG, BIFM, MILF, and MNLF factions between 1989 and 2012.[26]

Contents  [hide]

1 Origins

2 History

2.1 Marcos (1969–1986)

2.2 C. Aquino and Ramos (1986–1998)

2.3 The North Cotabato conflict (2000)

2.4 Estrada and Arroyo (1998–2010)

2.5 Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)

3 See also

4 Notes

5 External links

Origins[edit]

Main articles: Spanish–Moro conflict, Moro Rebellion and Philippine resistance against Japan § Moro resistance on Mindanao and Sulu

The aftermath of the First Battle of Bud Dajo

Fronts and captures in Basilan

The Moros had a history of resistance against Spanish, American, and Japanese rule for 400 years. The origin of the war between the Moros and Filipinos started during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines. During the Spanish–Moro conflict, Spain repeatedly tried to conquer the Moro Sultanate of Sulu,Sultanate of Maguindanao, and the Confederation of sultanates in Lanao. The violent armed struggle against the Japanese, Filipinos, Spanish, and Americans is considered by current Moro Muslim leaders as part of the four centuries long "national liberation movement" of the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation).[27] The 400 year long resistance against the Japanese, Americans, and Spanish by the Moro Muslims persisted and morphed into their current war for independence against the Philippine state.[28]

Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, another conflict sparked in southern Philippines between the revolutionary Muslims in the Philippines and the United States Military that took place between 1899 and 1913. Filipinos opposed foreign rule from the United States that claimed the Philippines as their territory. On August 14, 1898, after defeating Spanish forces, the United States had established a military government in the Philippines under General Wesley Merritt as Military Governor.[29] American forces took control from the Spanish government in Jolo on May 18, 1899, and at Zamboanga in December 1899.[30] Brigadier General John C. Bates was sent to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II. Kiram was disappointed knowing that the American forces would take over since he expected to regain sovereignty after the defeat of Spanish forces in the archipelago. Bates' main goal was to guarantee Moro neutrality in the Philippine-American War, and to establish order in the southern Philippines. After some negotiation, the Bates Treaty was signed which was based on an earlier Spanish treaty. The Bates Treaty did ensure the neutrality of the Muslims in the south but it was actually set up to buy time for the Americans until the war in the north ended.

On March 20, 1900, General Bates was replaced by Brigadier General William August Kobbé and the District of Mindanao-Jolo was upgraded to a full department. American forces in Mindanao were reinforced and hostilities with the Moro people lessened although there are reports of Americans and other civilians being attacked and slain by Moros.

Insurrection began in 1900 and lasted for a year. The American forces then move push inside the settles of Moro people. Kobbé was replaced by George Whitefield Davis as the commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo and put up better relationships with the Moro people.

It continued for more than three decades which resulted in significant loss of life.[citation needed] Military governors were appointed by the United States to ensure peace and stability within the region. The conflict ended at the term of Major General John J. Pershing, the third and final military governor of Moro Province, although major resistance continued in Bud Dajo and Mount Bagsak in Jolo.

Repeated rebellions by the Moros against American rule continued to break out even after the main Moro Rebellion ended, right up to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II. During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the Moros waged an insurgency against the Japanese on Mindanao and Sulu until the Japanese were defeated and driven out.

History[edit]

Marcos (1969–1986)[edit]

Under President Ferdinand Marcos, 68 Filipino Muslim military trainees were murdered in Corregidor allegedly by soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[31][32] The trainees were believed to be a part of an upcoming rebellion.[32] By then, University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to condemn the killings of the 68 Filipino Muslims and to seek the establishment of a Bangsamoro nation through force of arms.[32]

In 1969, the MNLF waged armed conflict against the Philippine government.[32] During one of the fierce battles of the insurgency in 1974, Jolo was burned down and news of the tragedy galvanized other Muslims around the world to pay greater attention to the conflict. Two years later, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement, declaring ceasefire on both sides. Within the agreement provided that Mindanao would remain a part of the Philippines but 13 of its provinces would be under the autonomous government for the Bangsamoro people.[32] President Marcos went against the agreement and violence ensued.

In 1977, Shiekh Salamat Hashim established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group of the MNLF seeking to establish an Islamic state.[33] Conflicts between these rebel groups and the Armed Forces of the Philippines would continue until the end of the regime of President Marcos.

C. Aquino and Ramos (1986–1998)[edit]

Earlier in her term, President Corazon Aquino arranged a meeting with MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and several MNLF rebel groups in Sulu, which paved the way for a series of negotiations. In 1989, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act No. 6734 or the ARMM Organic Act, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.[34]

In 1991, Abdurajak Janjalani, a former teacher who studied Islam in the Middle East, formed the Abu Sayyaf Group after reportedly meeting Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Janjalani recruited former members of the MNLF for the more radical and theocratic Abu Sayyaf.[32]

Under the Presidency of Fidel V. Ramos, several negotiations and peace talks[25] were held and the ARMM was solidified and was to have its own geopolitical system.[32]

The North Cotabato conflict (2000)[edit]

Background

1000 MILF rebels under the command of Umbra Kato have seized control of thirty five villages in the North Cotabato province. 2000 Philippine troops with helicopters and artillery were sent in to the seized area on August 9 to liberate it from the rebels. The MILF had wanted North Cotabato to be included in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The government and MILF had been negotiating for the inclusion of the province in the Muslim Autonomous Region but the Supreme Court had struck down the proposal after hearing concern from local Christian leaders in the region.

Conflict

The rebel troops were ordered to leave the area by their commanders but the contingents under Kato refused to leave the villages they had occupied and instead dug in. The Philippine Army responded on August 9 by bombarding them. The next day, the government forces moved to retake the villages recapturing two of them from the rebels.[35][36]

Estrada and Arroyo (1998–2010)[edit]

Political map of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

During his term President Joseph Ejercito Estrada he declared an "all-out war" against the MILF on March 21, 2000 although a series of negotiations for cessation of hostilities were held.[33] Apparently, several conflicts in and around Mindanao erupted and clashes between the Philippine Military and the rebel groups resulted in massive loss of lives.

During his term, these rebel groups kidnapped three Italian priests, two were later released and one was shot dead;[37][38] seized the municipal hall of Talayan, Maguindanao and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; the bombing of the ferry Our Lady of Mediatrix at Ozamiz; and the takeover of Narciso Ramos Highway. All these incidents resulted in massive loss of investments abroad, especially in the area of Mindanao.

As a result, the Armed Forces of the Philippines launched a successful campaign against these rebel groups and 43 minor camps, 13 major camps including the MILF headquarters, and Camp Abubakar[39] fell. MILF suffered heavy losses and the head of MILF, Sheikh Salamat Hashim, fled the country and sought refuge in Malaysia. On October 5, 2000, 609 rebels surrendered in Cagayan de Oro, along with renegade town mayor Mulapandi Cosain Sarip.[40] These was followed by another massive surrender of 855 rebels on December 29, 2000. President Joseph Ejercito Estrada then ordered that the Philippine flag be raised in Mindanao which symbolized victory. It was raised on July 9, 2000 near a Madh'hab and again the next day along with President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, which held a feast inside a classroom just meters away from a mosque.[39]

As a result, several Islamic rebel groups retaliated, bombing several key locations within the National Capital Region on December 30, 2000. It resulted in 22 deaths and hundreds of people injured. Saifullah Yunos, one of the perpetrators was arrested in Cagayan de Oro as he was about to board a plane bound to Manila in May 2003.[41] In 2004, two members of the Jemaah Islamiyah were arrested, namely Mamasao Naga and Abdul Pata as they were identified by Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi as responsible for the train bombing.[42] al-Ghozi was also arrested, but was later killed in a firefight when he tried to escape the prison on October 13, 2003.

On May 27, 2001, the Abu Sayyaf seized twenty hostages from an upscale resort in Palawan. Four of the hostages managed to escape.[43] The kidnapping group composed of 40 gunmen then seized the Dr. Jose Torres Memorial Hospital and St. Peter's Church compound in the town of Lamitan in Basilan[44] and claimed to have taken captive 200 people although 20 people were confirmed to be taken captive inside the hospital, including the staff and the patients.[45][46]

There was a crossfire between the Army and the Abu Sayyaf rebels in Lamitan following the takeover of Dr. Jose Torres Memorial Hospital which resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers, including the army captain.[46] Up to 22 soldiers were reportedly to have been killed in an effort to rescue the hostages.

Five more captives escaped during the battle at Lamitan. Two of the captives were killed prior to the siege in Lamitan, including the beheading of one.[43] The Abu Sayyaf then conducted series of raids, including one at a coconut plantation[47] where the rebel groups hacked the heads of two men using bolo knives. The owners and a security guard was also held captive and the rebel groups burnt down two buildings, including a chapel a week after the battle in Lamitan.[47] Another raid was conducted in August 2, 2001 on Barangay Balobo in Lamitan, Basilan. After three days, the Philippine Army rescued numerous hostages[48] after they overtook the hideout of the militants where 11 bodies were found beheaded.[49] Other hostages were either released or had escaped.[48]

On June 13, 2001, the number of hostages was calculated at around 28 as three more people were found beheaded in Basilan,[50] including that of Guillermo Sobero.[51] They were beheaded since the Philippine Army would not halt the rescue operation.[51]

The Burhams were still on the group of 14 still held captive according to three hostages who escaped on October 2001.[51] On June 7, 2002, after a year of being held captive, a rescue mission was conducted and resulted in the deaths of Martin Burnham and a nurse named Ediborah Yap[52] after being caught in the crossfire. Martin was killed by three gunshots in the chest while Gracia was wounded in her right leg. By this time Nur Misuari ordered his supporters to attack government targets to prevent the holding of elections on ARMM on November 2001, ushering his exit as the governor of the region.[32] Misuari would be later arrested in 2007 in Malaysia and was deported back to the Philippines for trial.[32]

On July 2004, Gracia Burnham testified at a trial of eight Abu Sayyaf members and identified six of the suspects as being her erstwhile captors, including Alhamzer Limbong, Abdul Azan Diamla, Abu Khari Moctar, Bas Ishmael, Alzen Jandul and Dazid Baize. Fourteen Abu Sayyaf members were sentenced to life imprisonment while four were acquitted. Alhamzer Limbong was later killed in a prison uprising.[53]

These rebel groups, especially the Abu Sayyaf conducted several terror attacks, namely the bombings at Zamboanga in October 2002; the bombing of SuperFerry 14 on February 2004; the simultaneous bombings in Central Mindanao on October 2006; the beheadings of several Philippine Marines on July 2007; the Batasang Pambansa bombing on November 2007; and the 2009 bombings in Mindanao.

Numerous clashes erupted between the Philippine Army and the rebel groups, such as the clash on June 14, 2009 that killed 10 rebels.[54]

Since 2001, the Philippines and the United States have been on a campaign to battle this insurgency, known as War on Terror. To combat the insurgency, the United States and the Philippines conducted the Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines,[55] a part of the worldwide campaign against terrorism known as Operation Enduring Freedom.

Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)[edit]

See also: Zamboanga City crisis

In 2013, two main camps of the Abu Sayyaf group were overrun by forces of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in its latest offensive in Patikul.[56] According to MNLF leader Nur Misuari, the MNLF offensive against the Abu Sayyaf is because of the MNLF opposition to the Abu Sayyafs human rights abuses which goes against Islam.

During the term of President Benigno Aquino III, a series of peace talks for the cessation of hostilities was held, including the meeting of MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ibrahim in Tokyo, Japan which was lauded on both sides.[32] Norway also joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) on January 2011, overseeing the ceasefire agreement between the government and MILF on Mindanao. Despite the peace talks, a series of conflicts erupted. on September 10, 2011, Jal Idris, a hardcore member of Abu Sayyaf, was arrested by government forces after a crossfire between the Philippine Army and the rebel group[57] The Armed Forces of the Philippines also killed three Abu Sayyaf militants in a stand-off[58] the following day after the arrest of Jal Idris.

Terrorism continued throughout President Benigno's term, notable cases include when 4 merchants and a guide were killed by Abu Sayyaf bandits in January 2011.[59] and later a soldier who was killed in a clash against the rebels.[60] In August 2011, rebel factions attacked a village in Sulu, killing 7 Marines and taking 7 civilians captive. They later freed 2 of the hostages after a ransom was paid.[61] Also, several areas of Mindanao were bombed in August by the government, and a Filipino businesswoman was abducted in September 2011[62] who was later freed after the three gunmen were gunned down by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[63]

On October 20th 2011, the MILF was blamed for an attack on 40 government soldiers in the province of Basilan, which lead to the deaths of 19 soldiers and 6 MILF fighters.[64] This thereby violated the ceasefire agreement between the government and MILF. This caused outrage in the government, which lead to the continuation of the war against terrorism in the country.

On the website of the Moro National Liberation Front, Nur Misuari declared its support for China against the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute, calling both China and the Moro people as victims of Philippine colonialism, and noting China's history of friendly relations with the Moros.[65] The MNLF website also denounced America's assistance to the Philippines in their colonization of the Moro people in addition to denouncing the Philippines claims to the islands disputed with China, and denouncing America for siding with the Philippines in the dispute, noting that in 1988 China "punished" Vietnam for attempting to set up a military presence on the disputed islands. The website also pointed out that the Moros and China maintained peaceful relations, while on the other hand the Moros had to resist other colonial powers, having to fight the Spanish, fight the Americans, and fight the Japanese, in addition to fighting the Philippines.[66]

The Zamboanga City crisis erupted on September 9, 2013 when a MNLF faction known by other groups as the Rogue MNLF Elements (RME), under the Sulu State Revolutionary Command (SSRC), led by Ustadz Habier Malik and Khaid Ajibon attempted to raise the flag of the self-proclaimed Bangsamoro Republik at Zamboanga City Hall (which had earlier declared its independence on August 12, 2013 in Talipao, Sulu), and took civilians hostage. This armed incursion was met by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which sought to free the hostages and expel the MNLF from the city. The standoff degenerated into urban warfare, and had brought parts of the city under a standstill for days. On September 28, the government declared the end of military operations in Zamboanga City after successfully defeating the MNLF and rescuing all the hostages.

On January 24, 2014, the Philippines government chief negotiator Miriam Coronel Ferer and MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal signed a peace agreement in Kuala Lumpur. The agreement would pave the way for the creation of the new Muslim autonomous entity called "Bangsamoro" under a law to be approved by the Philippine Congress.[67] The government aims to set up the region by 2016. The agreement calls for Muslim self-rule in parts of the southern Philippines in exchange for a deactivation of rebel forces by the MILF. MILF forces would turn over their firearms to a third party to be selected by the MILF and the Philippine government. A regional police force would be established, and the Philippine military would reduce the presence of troops and help disband private armies in the area.[68]

South Thailand insurgency

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

South Thailand insurgency

Souththailandmap.GIF

Map of the southern provinces of Thailand showing the Malay-Muslim majority areas

Date 1960[5] – ongoing

(55 years)

Location    Southern Thailand (4 provinces[6]—Songkhla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat)

Status        Ongoing

Belligerents

Emblem of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.svg Royal Thai Armed Forces

Emblem of Royal Thai Police.png Royal Thai Police       Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg National Revolution Front (BRN)

Flag of Jihad.svg Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)

Flag of Jihad.svg Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP)

Flag of Jihad.svg United Mujahideen Front of Pattani (BBMP)

Flag of Jihad.svg Islamic Front for the Liberation of Pattani (BIPP)

Flag of Pattani.svg Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

Flag of Jihad.svg Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) [1]

Flag of Jihad.svg BNPP[2]

Pusaka [1]

Pemuda [1]

Black December 1902 [3]

Flag of Jihad.svg Saibillillah [3]

Hikmat Allah Abadan [3]

Supported by: Flag of Aceh.svg Free Aceh Movement [4]

Plo emblem.png Palestine Liberation Organization [3]

Commanders and leaders

Flag of Thailand.svg Sarit Dhanarajata

Flag of Thailand.svg Praphas Charusathien

Flag of Thailand.svg Anupong Paochinda

Flag of Thailand.svg Praphas Charusathien

Flag of Thailand.svg Pongsapat Pongcharoen

Flag of Thailand.svg Kowit Wattana

Flag of Thailand.svg Prayuth Chan-ocha       Flag of Jihad.svg Tunku Yala Nasae [3]

Flag of Jihad.svg Wan Kadir Che Wan

Flag of Jihad.svg Abdullah Sungkar

Flag of Pattani.svg Kabir Abdul Rahman

Flag of Pattani.svg Sama-ae Thanam [3]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Sapaeing Basoe [1]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Masae Useng [1]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Hassan Taib

Tengku Jalal Nasir[2]

Flag of Jihad.svg Nasoree Saesang [3]

Strength

Emblem of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.svg 306,000   5,000 - 30,000 [2]

Casualties and losses

499 soldiers, 312 policemen, and 181 defense volunteers killed[7]   399 dead[7]

Total casualties: 5,352 killed and 9,965 injured[7]

[show] v t e

South Thailand Insurgency

The South Thailand Insurgency (Thai: ความไม่สงบในชายแดนภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย) is an intractable conflict taking place mainly in Southern Thailand. It originated in the 1960s as an ethnic separatist insurgency in the historical Malay Patani Region, made up of the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, but has become more complex and increasingly violent since 2001.

The former Sultanate of Patani, which comprised the southern Thai provinces of Pattani (Patani), Yala (Jala), Narathiwat (Menara)—also known as the three Southern Border Provinces (SBP)[8]—as well as neighboring parts of Songkhla Province (Singgora), and the northeastern part of Malaysia (Kelantan), was conquered by the Kingdom of Siam in 1785 and, except for Kelantan, the area has been governed by Thailand ever since.

Although low level separatist violence had occurred in the region for decades, the campaign escalated after 2001, with a recrudescence in 2004, occasionally spilling over into other provinces.[9] Outside the region, incidents blamed on southern insurgents have occurred in Bangkok and Phuket.[10]

In July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assumed wide-ranging emergency powers to deal with the southern violence, but the insurgency escalated further. On 19 September 2006, a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup. The junta implemented a major policy shift by replacing Thaksin's earlier approach with a campaign to win over the "hearts and minds" of the insurgents.[11] Despite little progress in curbing the violence, the junta declared that security was improving and that peace would come to the region by 2008.[12] By March 2008, however, the death toll surpassed 3,000.[13]

During the Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted a "sense of optimism" and said that he was confident of bringing peace into the region within 2010.[14] But by the end of 2010 insurgency-related violence had increased, confounding the government's optimism.[15] Finally in March 2011, the government conceded that violence was increasing and could not be solved in a few months.[16]

Local leaders have persistently demanded at least a level of autonomy from Thailand for the Patani region and some of the separatist insurgent movements have made a series of demands for peace talks and negotiations. However, these groups have been largely sidelined by the BRN-C, the group currently spearheading the insurgency which sees no reason for negotiations and is against talks with other insurgent groups. The BRN-C has as its immediate aim to make Southern Thailand ungovernable and has largely been successful at it.[17]

Estimates of the strength of the insurgency vary greatly. In 2004 General Panlop Pinmanee claimed that there were only 500 hard-core insurgents. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Around 2004 some Thai analysts believed that foreign Islamic terrorist groups were infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims were balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict.

Over 6,000 people have died and more than 10,000 have been injured between 2004 and 2014 in a formerly ethnic separatist insurgency, which has currently been taken over by hard-line Jihadis and pitted them against both the Thai-speaking Buddhist minority and local Muslims who have a moderate approach or who support the Thai government.

Historical background[edit]

Despite the ethnic affinity of the people of the Patani region with their Malay neighbours to the south, the old Patani Kingdom was led by Sultans who historically preferred to pay tribute to the distant Siamese kings in Bangkok. For many centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas, ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgment of Siamese suzerainty, leaving the Patani rulers largely alone.[18]

Forced assimilation and local nationalism[edit]

Thai rule over the historical Patani region was confirmed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. However, until well into the 20th century, the government in Bangkok had interfered little, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local laws based on Islam regarding issues on inheritance and family. However, by 1934 Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion of a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Patani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand.[19]

The National Culture Act was enforced as a result of the Thaification process, promoting the concept of 'Thai-ness' and its centralist aims. Its 'Mandate 3' was directly aimed at the Patani people.[20] By 1944, Thai civil law was enforced throughout the land including the Patani region overriding earlier concessions to local Islamic administrative practices.[21] The school curriculum was revised to that of a Thai-centric one with all lessons in the Thai language, to the detriment of the local Jawi. Traditional Muslim courts that used to handle civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok. This forced assimilation process and the perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society became an irritant for the harmonious relationship between the ethnic Malay Patani people and the Thai state.[22]

In 1947, Haji Sulong founder of the Patani People’s Movement launched a petition campaign, demanding autonomy, language and cultural rights, and implementation of Islamic law.[2] However, in January 1948, Sulong was arrested on treason charges along with other local leaders branded as 'separatist'. Sulong was released from jail only in 1952 but disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1954.[2]

Denied recognition as a culturally separate ethnic minority, Patani leaders reacted against the Thai government policy towards them. Inspired by ideologies such as Nasserism, in the 1950s a Patani nationalist movement began to grow, leading to the South Thailand insurgency. By 1959, Tengku Jalal Nasir established the Patani National Liberation Front (BNPP), the first Malay rebel group.[2] At the time of their foundation the goal of the nationalist movements, such as PULO, was secession. The emphasis was laid in pursuing an armed struggle towards an independent state where Patani people could live with dignity without having alien cultural values imposed on them.[23]

The last third of the 20th century saw the emergence of different insurgent groups in the South. Despite some differences in ideology they shared broadly separatist aims, but all justified the use of violence in order to reach their goals, setting a pattern of attacking police and military posts, as well as schools and Thai government offices. The effectiveness of these groups was marred, however, by infighting and lack of unity among them.[24]

21st century: The violence expands and intensifies[edit]

A resurgence in violence by Pattani guerrilla groups began after 2001. While the region's traditional separatist insurgents had flags, leaders, claimed responsibility for the attacks, and made communiques, the new groups attacked more viciously and kept silent. This new development disoriented and confused the Thai authorities, who kept groping in the dark as the identity of the new insurgents in the conflict remained a mystery. Thailand held relatively free elections in February 2005, but no secessionist candidates contested the results in the south. In July the same year, the chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee admitted, "The attacks look like they are well-organized, but we do not know what group of people is behind them." Despite of the shroud of anonymity and the absence of concrete demands, revived groups, such as the GMIP, and particularly the BRN-Coordinate and its alleged armed wing the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), have been identified as leading the new insurgency.[25]

While earlier attacks were typified by drive-by shootings in which patrolling policemen were shot by gunmen on passing motorcycles, after 2001 they have escalated to well coordinated attacks on police establishments, with police stations and outposts ambushed by well-armed groups subsequently fleeing with stolen arms and ammunition. Other tactics used in order to gain publicity from shock and horror are slashing to death Buddhist monks, bombing temples, beheadings, intimidating pork vendors and their customers, as well as arson attacks on schools, killing the teachers and burning their bodies.[26]

Current insurgent groups proclaim militant jihadism and are not separatist anymore. Mostly led by Salafist hardliners, they have extreme and transnational religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of a constructive cultural or nationalistic Patani identity. Salafi jihadist groups are hostile to the cultural heritage and practices of traditional Malay Muslims, accusing them of being un-Islamic.[24] They are not concerned about an independent separate nation, instead their immediate aim is to make the Patani region ungovernable.[17]

Thai response to the insurgency has been hampered by clumsy methods, a lack of training in counter-insurgency, a lack of understanding of local culture, and rivalries between the police and the army. Many local policemen are allegedly involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. Often the army responds to the attacks with heavy-handed raids to search Muslim villages, which only results in reprisals. Insurgents routinely provoke the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace.

Main incidents after the 2001 insurgency upsurge[edit]

Attacks after 2001 concentrated on installations of the police and military. However, also schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region have been subject to arson and bombing. Local police officers of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 incidents related to the insurgency in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat by the end of 2001.[27] Other targets of the insurgents have been schoolteachers. The BRN-C, through its 'Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani' paramilitary wing, has been the main group behind the murder of a total of 157 teachers in the Southern Border Provinces between 2004 and 2013.[28][29]

A massive security presence in the region has failed to stem almost daily violence, usually involving drive-by shootings or small bombings. When the insurgents make a show of strength—generally at least every few months—they have eschewed large-scale attacks, preferring well-coordinated pinprick assaults at many locations while avoiding direct clashes with security forces.[30]

Timeline[edit]

1960-1998[edit]

Although the conflict was carried out with less intensity, armed resistance in the 1960s and 1970s involved up to 1,500 insurgents.[1]

In 1960, Barisan Revolusi Nasional was founded by Haji Abdul Karim in response to the introduction of a secular curriculum in Pattani's religious bording schools.[2]

In 1968, Patani United Liberation Organization was founded by Tengku Bira Kotanila (alias Kabir Abdul Rahman).PULO became the most powerful insurgent group during the 1960 - 2000 period of the war.[2]

On 29 November 1975, Thai marines allegedly murdered five Muslim youths in the Bacho district of the Narathiwat province. The government allegedly failed to conduct a proper investigation into the matter.[3]

On 11 December 1975, PULO organized mass protests in response to the event, which were joined by 70,000 Malay Muslims. A bomb was thrown into the crowd killing 12 and injuring at least 30 protestors. The attack was blamed on Buddhist extremists.[3]

The government then proceeded to charge and imprison the perpetrators, launch an official inquiry and compensate the families of the victims. Despite the fact that the majority of the protestors demands were granted, the event led to an escalation of the insurgency.[3]

In June 1977, Sabilillah (Path of God) bombed the Don Muang International Airport in Bangkok. In the aftermath of the bombing Sabilillah vanished into obscurity.[3]

In September 1977, Black December 1902 members threw a bomb into a Thai royal ceremony. 5 people were killed and 47 wounded. The royal family managed to escape unharmed.[3]

In 1977, security forces killed BNPP leader Tunku Yala Nasae.[3]

In 1993 the 'New PULO', a dissident faction of the original PULO, was established by Arrong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo.[2] In 1995, Nasoree Saesang founded the GMIP.[3]

In August 1996, 36 schools were torched in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat allegedly by members of the New PULO faction,[31]> reportedly a dissident faction of the original PULO established by Arrong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo.[2] The Thai Interior Ministry and Thai Military Intelligence reported that New PULO used unemployed youth and young drug addicts to carry out its terrorist missions.[24]

In 1997, members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), PULO and the New PULO established the United Mujahideen Front of Pattani in order to improve coordination between rebel factions.[2]

In August 1997, Bersatu launched an operation codenamed "Falling Leaves". Between August 1997 and January 1998, 33 separate attacks took place resulting in 9 deaths.[3]

In January 1998, Malaysia and Thailand launched a joint operation codenamed 'Pitak Tai' in order to crack down on insurgent outfits.[24] Malaysian authorities arrested New PULO's leader,Abdul Rohman Bazo, its military chief, Haji Daoh Thanam, and Bazo's senior assistant, Haji Mae Yala in Kedah, as well as PULO's military commander, Haji Sama-ae Thanam, in Kuala Lumpur, later handing them to Thai authorities.[3] The Thai government also encouraged local people to monitor the movements of drug traffickers and, as a result, the tough policy on drugs deprived PULO of recruits for its acts of terror.[24]

1999-2002[edit]

[icon] This section requires expansion. (October 2014)

Following the 11 September attacks in the United States, leaflets calling for Holy War and support for Osama bin Laden were distributed in Yala by militants.[32]

On 24 December 2001, insurgents launched a number of attacks on police posts in the three provinces.5 police and one defence volunteer killed.[1]

The Thai National Intelligence Agency had estimated that less than 1,000 armed militants were taking part in the conflict as of 2001.[3]

According to Thai Ministry of Interior estimates 50 insurgency related incidents occurred in 2001.[3]

By 2002, 75 insurgency-linked attacks amounted to 50 deaths among police and army personnel.[2]

2003[edit]

[icon] This section requires expansion. (October 2014)

In 2003, officials counted 149 incidents. The mounting scale and sophistication of the insurgency eventually prompted the government into a recognition that there was a serious issue in the southern provinces.[2]

2004[edit]

A further steep escalation of the violence in the Southern Border Provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat is reckoned to have begun on 4 January 2004 with the raiding of a Thai Army depot.[5]

On January 4, 2004, unidentified gunmen raided an army ammunition depot in Narathiwat Province in the early morning, and made off with over 400 rifles and other ammunition.[2]

On 5 January 2004, 2 policemen were killed while attempting to defuse a bomb outside a shopping mall in Pattani.A third policeman was injured in bomb blast that occurred in a nearby park.Two more bombs were successfully defused in nearby areas.Prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared martial law in the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala.[4]

On 22 January 2004, rebels killed a Buddhist monk.[4]

On 28 March 2004, a bomb planted by insurgents injured 29 people, including 10 Malaysian tourists.[4]

On 30 March 2004, masked men raided a quarry in the Yala district, stealing a total of 1.6 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, 56 sticks of dynamite, and 176 detonators.[2]

On 23 April 2004, militants killed an army officer and set fire to 50 public buildings in all 13 districts of the Narathiwat province.[4]

On 28 April 2004, militants launched a large scale string of attacks on armories and army positions in Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla. 108 rebels were killed in the aftermath of the attacks.[2]

On 10 June 2004, militants killed a night guard outside a government school and seized weapons from other security personnel who were inside.[4]

On 25 October 2004, 78 people were killed by Thai police in the aftermath of a riot over the detentions of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to Islamic separatists. Over 1,300 people were detained in the incident.[4]

On 28 October 2004, an IED detonated outside a bar, killing 2 people and injuring 21.[4]

On 2 November 2004, a Buddhist official was beheaded by suspected Muslim insurgents.[4]

On 4 November 2004, 9 people were killed including 2 policemen.[4]

On 7 November 2004, the Defence Minister of Thailand said that there had been more than 700 casualties in south Thailand since the unrest began in January. Many murders involved shooting and decapitation. During 2004 insurgents began to sow fear in attacks where Buddhists were beheaded.[33]

On 13 November 2004, 1 man was killed and at least 13 people injured when 5 bomb blasts occurred in various parts of the region.[4]

On 5 December 2004, Thailand airdropped nearly 100 million origami cranes over the southern regions of the country in an effort to bring peace. Militants respond with series of bombings in the following day.[4]

A total of 400 people were killed in over 1000 incidents during 2004.[1] [3]

2005[edit]

On 17 February 2005, a bomb exploded near a tourist hotel in the town of Sungai Kolok, killing 5 people and wounding over 40.Additionally 4 people killed in other incidents.[34]

On 3 April 2005, a series of bomb attacks in Songkhla killed two people leaving 66 injured. The bombings marked the beginning of attacks against ethnic Thai Chinese owned businesses who were considered Thaksin supporters and against southern Thailand independence as a Muslim state.

On 14 July 2005, a major attack was launched on the provincial capital of Yala city. 60 militants targeted an area near a hotel, the railway station, two convenience stores and a restaurant roaming the streets using guns, fire-bombs and explosives.[35]

On 18 July 2005, two militants entered a teashop, shot Lek Pongpla, a Buddhist cloth vendor, beheaded him and left the head outside of the shop.[36]

On 19 July 2005, the Thai Prime Minister enacted the "emergency powers law" in order to manage the three troubled states giving himself sweeping powers to direct military operations, suspend civil liberties, and censor the press. Several human rights organizations and local press expressed their concerns that these new powers might be used to violate civil liberty rights. However, the emergency decree was highly popular, with 72% of Bangkok residents and 86% of people in the three southern provinces supporting it.[37] Nevertheless the insurgency escalated further.

On 1 September 2005, three bombs exploded almost simultaneously.[38] Subsequently, 131 civilians from the south fled to neighbouring Malaysia seeking refuge from the Thai authorities. Thailand immediately accused the refugees of being insurgents and demanded that they be returned, sparking a diplomatic spat. Currently, the people are still in Malaysia.[39] Thailand, suspecting that insurgents may also have fled with the refugees, has asked Malaysia to return these Thai citizens but Malaysia has refused on humanitarian grounds.[40]

On 16 October 2005, a group of 20 separatists attacked a Buddhist monastery, killing three people. An extended state of emergency was announced in the 3 southern provinces plagued by the insurgency.The announcement sparked a large scale guerrilla raid on 60 targets, in which at least 7 people were killed and 90 weapons were stolen.[34]

On 16 November 2005, separatists killed 9 civilians and injured 9 others.[34]

A total of 500 people were killed during 2005.[1]

2006[edit]

A brief lull in the insurgency followed the 19 September 2006 coup that overthrew the government of Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. As Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin settled into his role as head of the junta, violence resumed. As of September 2006, more than 1,400 people had died in less than three years of southern violence. Most were innocent bystanders, both Buddhists and Muslims.

On 7 January 2006, four suspected militants fatally shoot two border-policemen in the back at a crowded weekend market in Yala Province. (The Nation) Three others were also killed in separate attacks on the same day.[41]

On 10 May 2006, a bomb exploded at a tea shop killing at least 3 people and injured more than a dozen.[34]

On 15 June 2006, during the 60th anniversary of the accession of Bhumibol Adulyadej to the Thai throne, well coordinated bomb-attacks against at least 40 government and official buildings occurred. Two police officials died and 11 others were injured. Experts say that the bomb attacks were a message to the Thai authorities, rather than an attempt to do real damage, as the bombs were loaded with small amounts of explosives. Had the devices been larger, the casualties and injuries would have been notably greater. The Thai media was late in reporting the incident, only doing so after the BBC and other international news services had announced it.

On 18 June 2006, mass graves of about 300 migrant workers were found in southern Thailand.[42][43]

On 27 June 2006, 7 people including 5 security personel were killed by separatist attacks.[34]

On 31 August 2006, 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in Yala province, killing a retired military officer and wounding 24 people. Afterwards, Army chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin announced that he would break with government policy and negotiate with the leaders of the insurgency. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with."[44] In a press conference the next day, he slammed the government for political interference, and asked that the government "Free the military and let it do the job."[45] By 16 September 2006, the Army admitted that it still wasn't sure who to negotiate with.[46]

In September 2006, Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat the unrest.[47]

2006 Hat Yai bombings. On 16 September 2006, six remotely detonated motorcycle bombs simultaneously exploded in the city of Hat Yai, killing four people and wounding more than sixty. A Canadian and a Malaysian were among the dead.[48]

On 21 September, 2 villagers were shot in Yala, killing one and wounding another.[49]

On 23 September, 4 policemen were injured in a bus stop explosion in Pattani. The bus stop was on a road that would be passed by the motorcade of Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn later that afternoon.[50][51]

On 25 September, 2 police stations and a military outpost were attacked by 30 gunmen in a coordinated series of attacks in Yala, leaving 2 dead and 1 injured.[52]

On 27 September, gunmen killed a grocer and two of his customers in Muang district of Yala and a traveller on the bus from Panare district to Mayo district of Pattani.[53]

On 28 September, a teacher protection unit in Sungai Padi district of Narathiwat province was ambushed by a bomb attack, seriously injuring 4 soldiers and killing one.[54]

On 18 October 2006, suspected Muslim guerillas raided an army base, killing one soldier and wounding 4 others.[34]

On 4 November, three schools burned to the ground and a person received a gunshot injury.[55]

On 5 November 2006, a bomb blast killed 2 soldiers and injured 3 others.4 people were killed and 6 wounded in a series of shootings and bomb blasts.[34]

On 9 November, 8 car and motorcycle showrooms were simultaneously bombed in Yala, injuring 13. Almost all gold shops in Muang district closed down for fear of their safety. Commercial banks remained opened but with tightened security.[56]

From January 2004 to October 2006, 1,815 people were killed and 2,729 were wounded in the insurgency.[57] Despite the renewed violence, a post-coup opinion poll found that Southerners had become the happiest people of Thailand.[58]

On 15 November 2006, militants shot dead 3 people in separate drive-by shootings, one soldier was also wounded in a bomb blast.[34]

On 17 November 2006, 3 bomb explosions killed one person and wounded at least 30 others.[34]

On 22 November 2006, Wan Kadir Che Wan, leader of Bersatu, one of the southern insurgent groups, told Al Jazeera television that the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network was helping local insurgents stage attacks in Thailand.[59]

On 27 November 27, 2006, after all schools in Pattani announced indefinite shutdown, teachers in Yala and Narathiwat decided to follow suit and close down the schools in the two provinces indefinitely due to fear for safety. The decision in Pattani was made after a series of arson attacks against schools and the brutal and fatal shooting of 2 schoolteachers.[60] In Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces over 1,000 schools were shut down.[61][62]

On 9 December 2006, a police informant was killed in a drive-by shooting.[34]

Despite the closing of the schools protest, on 29 December 2006 two more teachers were shot and burned to death.[63]

On 31 December 2006, 9 bomb blasts occurred Bangkok on New Year's Eve, killing 3 people and injuring 38.New Year's Eve celebrations were cancelled as result.[34]

2007[edit]

Despite conciliatory gestures from the junta, the insurgency continued and intensified. The death toll, 1,400 at the time of the coup, increased to 2,579 by mid-September 2007.[11] From January 2004 to 21 June 2007, the South witnessed 6,850 violent incidents related to the insurgency. At least 2,303 people were killed and more than 6,000 injured in that time, according to Srisompob Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University's Pattani campus.[64]

Junta chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin announced that the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military Task Force (CPM) 43 would be revived. Sonthi said the Army-led multi-agency Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command would be dissolved and its troops would come under the CPM 43, which would operate in parallel with the SBPAC. The SBPAC and CPM 43 had been dissolved in mid-2001 by former Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. Before that, CPM 43 was under the directive of the SBPAC. Sonthi also made himself head of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Previously, the ISOC had been headed by the Prime Minister.[65]

The ISOC was given 5.9 billion baht in funding for fiscal year 2007. By May 2007, General Sonthi asked the government for an additional emergency budget of 2 billion baht for ISOC, as the normal budget was running out. The money was under the "secret budget" category, which meant that state officials could spend it without having to account for it to the government.[66]

On 14 January a rubber tapper named Pin Khotchathin was beheaded in Yala. His head was found at a rubber plantation in Tambon Tasae in Yala's Mueang district five metres from his body.[67] It was the 22nd murder to feature attempted beheading since May 2004, although the militants were not always successful in removing their victim's head.[68] A handwritten note was left near Pin's head warning of further bloodshed to avenge what the attackers, calling themselves Pattani Warriors, claimed was a case of authorities killing separatist members.

Facing rising violence, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont accused Muslim junta chief Sonthi Boonyaratkalin of failing to do enough to curb the insurgency.[69]

On 18 February a series of bombings and arson attacks began in Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani, and Songkhla provinces. 6 people were killed and over 50 were injured.[70]

Violence escalated though in the months following the implementation of the junta's "hearts and minds" campaign. The monthly death toll increased by 30% in the 5 months after the coup compared to the 5 months before the coup.[71] Insurgents targeted Princess Sirindhorn by placing a bomb near her helicopter’s landing pad.[72] A senior aide to Queen Sirikit, Thanpuying Viriya Chavakul, was injured and narrowly escaped death when gunmen attacked her vehicle convoy on 21 February 2007 in Yala.[73] She later criticized the government for rotating troops too often, preventing them from building bonds with locals. She also made note of troops' lack of communications equipment and bulletproof vests.[74]

After an official visit to Thailand, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi volunteered to act as a mediator in arranging talks between insurgents and Thai authorities. Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram rejected the offer.[75]

During the Chinese New Year weekend (from the evening of 18 February 2007 to the afternoon of 19 February 2007), insurgents executed 38 bombing attacks, 26 cases of arson, and seven ambushes. The bombings targeted hotels, karaoke bars, power grids and commercial sites. Two public schools were torched. Three people were arrested.[76][77] Junta chief Sonthi and Interior Minister Aree Wongsearaya admitted that they knew in advance that attacks were going to take place, then failed to their occurrence.[78] Aree later admitted that the government's southern strategy was flawed.[79]

On 21 February, in their most significant act of economic terrorism and arson to date, insurgents burned down the Southland Rubber warehouse in Yala, destroying 5,000 tons of rubber worth approximately 400 million baht and engulfing Yala city in a dense cloud of black smoke for 12 hours. Thirty fire trucks fought to control the flames in the largest rubber warehouse in the deep south. Spikes were scattered on the road leading to the warehouse to slow down the emergency workers. No casualties were reported.[80]

In March 2007, the junta's top security advisor admitted that insurgents imported their techniques from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and were motivated by not only by nationalist reasons, like previous generations of insurgents, but religious extremism as well.[81][82] However, it noted that it still did not know who was behind the insurgency.[83]

To protect the Buddhist minority from violence, the Internal Security Operations Command produced Jatukham Rammathep amulets for public distribution. The renowned animist amulets were believed by some to have magical powers to protect their holders from violence and large sums were generally paid for them. The plan was developed by Colonel Manas Khongpan, deputy director of the ISOC in Yala province.[84]

In March 2007, Queen Sirikit vowed to protect people of all religions in the South, and initiated weapons training programmes for locals, particularly teachers. Sirikit's deputy aide-de-camp Napol Boonthap said that the government should review its strategy and not only use a reconciliatory approach towards the insurgents. "Legal action must also be taken against the wrongdoers to show we mean business," he said.[85]

On 14 March, 8 commuters from Betong to Hat Yai were executed after their van was stopped by insurgents. A roadside bomb delayed rangers stationed nearby in their efforts to reach the site.[86] A Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) executive blamed a portion of the violence directly on paramilitary rangers who instigated violence and then blamed insurgents for their deeds.[87]

Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn's motorcade was against targeted with a bombing in March 2007. A local police team found the bomb before it could explode.[85]

In April 2007, junta chief Sonthi rejected an American offer to help train Thai forces to quell the insurgency. Sonthi continued to deny that international terrorists operate in the South.[88]

On 9 April 2007, a pick-up truck carrying students and other passengers returning from a funeral was shot upon, killing two 12-year-old boys and two other 25-year-old university students. The funeral was for the Khuen Bang Lang tambon administration organisation chief, who was shot dead hours earlier the same day. The military initially claimed that insurgents were behind the shooting. It later admitted that village defence volunteers attacked, after allegedly being "provoked" by insurgent sympathisers on the truck. Several hundred angry villagers staged protests against the shooting, demanding the government take action against those responsible.[89]

Protest after a misapprehending shooting by security forces, Thai soldiers in Pattani shot and killed three Muslim teenagers on 13 April 2007. The soldiers, who were dispatched to investigate the torching of four mobile-phone relay outlets, opened fire on a group of teenagers when the soldiers thought the teenagers were charging at them. Locals reported that the teenagers were playing tag on the road near a weekly open market close to where the soldiers were investigating. Three teenagers, aged 13 to 15 years-old, were killed and two others were injured. Local Army commander Colonel Wanchai Paungkhumsa initially said the soldiers had acted in self-defense, saying that gunshots were fired from where a teenager was standing. Residents ended their protest after reaching a series of agreements with Pattani Governor Panu Uthairath over the shooting. The military agreed to investigate the shootings, and if it was a negligent act, The soldier would be faced criminal charge, transferred out of the area and an apology would be given to locals.[90]

In May 2007, Sonthi started withdrawing troops from the South, replacing them with territorial defence volunteers. He did not say why the regular army was to be reduced in the South.[91]

On 14 May 2007, Separatist insurgents shot dead a Thai-Buddhist couple working as fruit pickers in the majority-Muslim area of Bannang Sata, Yala provine and injured their three-year-old daughter. After gunning down Praphan Ponlarak, 36, and his wife Chaddakan, the assailants decapitated Praphan, making him the 29th victim to be beheaded in Thailand's troubled deep South.[92]

Violence continued with a noted trend towards targeting soldiers and policemen, particularly after the militants' actions were criticized by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.[93] On 9 May 2007, the army saw its worse casualty in a single incident in years, when seven soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing incident.[94] Two policemen were shot dead and their bodies burnt in another attack on 11 May 2007,[95][96] which the authorities suspect were conducted by the same group which killed the soldiers.[97] Another 11 soldiers were killed on 31 May 2007 in similar style to the incident on 9 May.[98]

Between 27 May and 29 May 2007, several concerted bombings occurred, both in Hat Yai downtown in front of markets, shops and hotels, and also in Saba Yoi, altogether killing more than four people and injuring over 20. The attacks targeted Chinese-Thai, who consider them 'Jews of the Far East' because they are barred from the Thai civil service and are mainly traders.[99]

In July 2007, Former Fourth Army chief Harn Leelanont criticized the junta's reconciliation policy in the South, saying it left security personnel incapable of containing the violence. He claimed that it left officials and innocent people as sitting ducks to be picked off by militants.[100]

The military junta went on a massive spending spree, buying new weaponry and a dozen fighter jets from Sweden, saying it needed the hardware to battle the insurgency.[101]

2008[edit]

According to the Thai Journalists Association, during the year 2008 alone there were over 500 attacks, resulting in more than 300 deaths in the four provinces where the insurgents operate.[102]

On 14 January 2008, insurgents killed 9 soldiers in a bomb and shooting attack.[103]

On 15 January 2008, a bombing left at least 39 people wounded in a market in Yala.[103]

On 24 January 2008, militants fatally shot a teacher.[103]

On 4 February 2008, a bomb detonated outside an Islamic boarding school, one person was killed and 12 wounded. A second bombing wounded 6 people.[103]

On 15 March 2008, a bombing occurred in the parking lot of hotel, 2 people were killed and 14 wounded in the incident.[103]

On 28 May 2008, 3 soldiers and 4 rebels were killed in a series of incidents across the south.[103]

On 5 July 2008, insurgents killed 3 cafe customers and injured 4 others.[103]

On 3 August 2008, five bombs went off in the town of Songkhla injuring 2 people. The same night, two bombs also exploded in Hat Yai, but caused no casualties.[104]

On 17 October 2008, 1 militant was killed and 5 others arrested.[103]

On 18 October 2008, two people were killed in drive-by shootings.[103]

On 4 November 2008, two bombs exploded at a tea stall killing one person and wounded at least 71.[103]

On 5 December 2008, 4 people were killed by a bomb planted at a farmacy store.[103]

2009[edit]

On 31 January 2009, a grenade blast killed 8 people and injured 27 others during outside a Buddhist temple.[105]

On 20 February 2009, two Thai soldiers were beheaded after a military convoy was ambushed. It was the second attack in in the same month following the same pattern.[106]

On 13 March 2009, militants killed 3 soldiers during an ambush in the Narathiwat province.[105]

On 19 March 2009, a roadside bomb killed 4 army rangers in the Pattani province.[105]

On 7 June 2009, insurgents killed 2 and injured 19 others in the Yi-ngo district of Narathiwat.[105]

On 8 June 2009, rebel gunmen killed at least 10 and wounded 19 mosque visitors in Narathiwat Province's Hoh-I-Rong district.[105]

On 13 June 2009, insurgents bombed a bus, killing 1 passenger and wounding 13 others in the center of Yala city.Additionally three people were killed and 1 wounded drive by incidents.[105]

On 18 June 2009, security forces killed 4 militants during clashes in the Yala Province.[105]

On 19 July 2009, two people were killed in separate drive by shootings in the Yala and Narathiwat provinces.[105]

On 20 July 2009, rebels shot and killed a man in the Pattani province.[105]

On 26 August 2009, a car bomb blast outside a restaurant wounded 26 people.[105]

On 2 September 2009, a number of drive-by shootings occurred in the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala left 8 dead. Security forces killed 2 militants in separate raids in the Yala province.[105]

On 3 September 2009, a bomb exploded in the city of Pattani killed 1 man and wounded 24 others.[105]

On 4 September 2009, a bomb detonated outside a restaurant, killing a policeman and wounding 12 other people.[105]

On 13 September 2009, guerrillas killed 5 paramilitary troops in the Yala province.[105]

On 23 October 2009, a Muslim man was killed by gunmen while leaving a mosque after prayers in Yala province. Also in Yala a Muslim couple was shot in their home and the husband was killed. On the same day the body of a Muslim man killed by insurgents was dumped on the side of the road in the Yarang district of Pattani province.[107]

On 28 October 2009, guerrillas killed 2 civilians in separate drive-by attacks.[105]

On 1 November 2009, a teenage girl was shot and killed in Yala province. A bomb exploded at the scene after the murder, wounding three police officers. The same day the police found the body of a man that had been handcuffed and murdered at a rice farm in the area.[107]

On 12 November 2009, a Buddhist couple was shot and killed and five people were wounded in an explosion when they rushed to the scene following the murder that took place at a rice mill in Pattani province.[107]

On 8 December 2009, a bomb exploded at a local Thai market in the Muang District of Narathiwat province, killing two people and wounding nine others. The blast happened about 1 km from a hotel where Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his visiting Malaysian counterpart, Najib Razak were having lunch during a trip to the local region that same day. Sources say the bomb was hidden in the gas tank of a motorcycle.[108]

On 10 December 2009, three Buddhist women were killed by a remote-controlled bomb outside a restaurant in Narathiwat.[109]

2010[edit]

On 2 January 2010, three soldiers and 3 civilians were injured by roadside bombs in Yala at 10 am in Bannang Sata district, Yala province.[110]

On 13 January 2010, Mayo district chief Wirat Prasetto was seriously injured along with ten other civilians when a bomb detonated at a pier in Pattani province. The bombing is being blamed on Muslim insurgents. One person was killed in the explosion.[111]

Two villagers sitting at a tea shop in Narathiwat were shot and murdered by gunmen on motorcycles.[107]

On 1 April 2010, suspect insurgents shot dead six villagers in Narathiwat province. Ten policemen and soldiers were also wounded when a roadside bomb exploded as they were traveling to the scene of the shootings.[112]

On 22 May 2010, two female villagers were killed in a drive-by shooting in Yala province by suspected separatist militants.[113] On 28 May 2010, two were killed and 52 injured in two bomb attacks in Yala[114]

On 8 September 2010, police apprehended a RKK leader while he was in his house in Yala province[115]

2011[edit]

On 27 January 2011, insurgents killed a school teacher in the Pattani province.[116]

On 11 February 2011, three people were shot and burned.[117] A car bomb exploded on the 13th which injured 18 people, civilians and soldiers, leaving seven hospitalised.[118] Meanwhile, an insurgent was shot dead by soldiers.

On 22 March 2011, a man and two women were shot in a village of Narathiwat Province on evening by about a dozen armed men. Police suspect the gunmen were Muslim insurgents who believed their victims were informants.[119]

On 23 March 2011, a roadside bomb went off in a village in Narathiwat when a truck carrying police arrived. None were wounded. The killings the night before may have been intended to lure security personnel to the scene to be attacked.[119]

On 18 April 2011, a car bomb exploded in the business district of Yala, killing a Thai paramilitary ranger and injuring 23 people including four other rangers.[120]

On 3 May 2011, two grenades were fired at Pattani Task Force 21 base, but did not hurt anyone.

On 11 May 2011, a bomb blast during a football match in Kapho District in Pattani Province killed four officers and wounding 13 others. Eight suspects were detained. In Yala Province, two officers and two civilians were injured after a roadside bomb detonated in Meung District.[121]

On 14 May 2011, four insurgents came and demanded money from a gas station. The wife of the owner refused, resulting them shooting her and her sister. After that, the owner of the gas station came and shot dead one of the insurgents, causing the other three to retreat. The dead insurgent turned out to be a minor leader operating in the area who was wanted for the 2009 Narathiwat bombings.

On 17 May 2011, a roadside bomb detonated in Yaha District in Yala Province, killing two monks and seriously wounding two of their security escorts. More than 100 local Muslims gathered at the local mosque and condemned the violence.[122] On 18 May, a Thahan Phran from the 47th Regiment was shot and seriously wounded in Yala, Meung District[123]

On 20 May 2011, a 30-man Thahan Phran unit from the same Regiment engaged and killed four insurgents in Ban Charupae in Than To District in Yala. They seized two AK-47 assault rifles, a .38 caliber pistol and nine mobile phones. One of the dead was identified as Ma-ae Aphibalbae, a key leader operating in the area who was sought for at least 28 alleged crimes, with a bounty of 2,000,000 baht.[124][125] Meanwhile in Narathiwat Province, two carbombs exploded, injuring a policeman and 8 other civilians.[126]

On 22 May 2011, in Nong Chik District, Pattani province, suspected insurgents shot a couple, Mr Pong and Mrs Somchit Khunee-art, killing both of them.[127]

On 24 May 2011, in Tak Bai, Narathiwat province, a bomb detonated, killing a policeman and a policewoman while they were distributing food to the local community. Pol Sgt Ubonwan Chindapetch was the first policewoman to die in an explosion in the south.[127] Meanwhile, in Sai Buri district, Pattani province, an unknown number of gunmen came and shot Muhammat Stapo, the younger brother of Ismael Rayahlong, a major RKK leader operating in the area who was suspected of the killing of two monks on 17 May.[128][129] In Krong Pinang District, Yala province, insurgents shot dead Barudin Sama, assistant village head of Ban Tohbala as he was riding to the tea shop.[127]

On 25 May 2011, 12 soldiers from the 13 Regiment in Yala were ambushed by three insurgents, resulting the death of one soldier, private Chuchat Kaeowonghio. A few hours later, a bomb detonated under a humvee carrying 20 soldiers, seriously wounding 6 of them.[129]

On 27 May 2011, police apprehended two RKK leaders in Narathiwat province.[130]

On 30 May 2011, a bomb went off in Meung district, Yala province, wounding five soldiers, and on 31 May, two insurgents accidentally detonated a bomb, killing themselves and injuring one other insurgent in Narathiwat province. One of the dead was identified as Abas Abu, wanted on multiple charges of attacking state officials and multiple bombings. His brother was the insurgent shot dead in February 2011.[131]

On 2 June 2011, eight Navy SEALS from Narathiwat Task Force 32 clashed with five RKK insurgents in the Budo Mountain Range, resulting the death of three insurgents while the other two got away. They seized two M16 assault rifles, 1 .38 pistol, 1 land mine, 1 grenade and over 100 rounds of ammunition. Two of the dead insurgents were identified as senior recruitment members of the RKK while the third was identified as the bomb maker of the group.[132][133][134]

On 4 June 2011, soldiers located two unexploded bombs in the middle of Tak Bai market.[135]

On 25 July 2011, 5 teachers and 2 security volunteers were wounded in the aftermath of an IED explosion in the Muang district.[136]

On 1 August 2011, a roadside bomb killed 1 and injured 2 soldiers in the Yarang District.[137]

In August 2011, 53 people were killed and 75 wounded, in insurgency related incidents.[138]

On 13 September 2011, Thai police confiscated five guns, ammunition and sums of currency in a house of a Narathiwat provincial administrative organisation.Evidence connected the house owner with insurgency organisations.[139]

On 14 September 2011, insurgents fire bombed the Palukasamoh Police Station complex, the almost complete building was completely destroyed.[140]

On 15 September 2011, five paramilitary rangers were killed and one wounded in a roadside bomb blast, in the Kapho district[140]

On 16 September 2011, three bombs exploded on the Charoen Khet road, Sungai Kolok district.In the aftermath of the incident, 4 people were killed and 110 injured, the majority of which were Malaysian tourists.[139]

On 23 September 2011, a bomb blast seriously wounded a soldier, guarding a school in the Rangae district.[141]

On 1 October 2011, a truck driver was shot and killed in Pattani province. In Narathiwat province, Chanae district, a village chief was shot dead. A motorcade of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre secretary-general Panu Uthairat was ambushed by armed men in Pattani, injuring none.[142][143][144]

On 3 October 2011, three people were shot, two houses were burnt, and a bomb went off near a tank carrying six soldiers in Pattani province. Police found a hole dug on the Pattani-Yala railway line and said it was in preparation for a bomb attack.[145] On 20 October, a wood trader was shot dead in Narathiwat Province[146]

On 13 October 2011, a Mayo district official along with his driver were killed, after four insurgents attacked them with automatic weapons, in the Pattani province.One person was killed and one injured by stray bullets in the same incident.Another attack occurred in the Panareh district.Four gunmen attacked a seafood processing business, killing three people and planting a bomb, which was later defused by Thai police.[147]

On 23 October 2011, a bomb exploded inside a convenience store, located on the Phichit Bamrung road, Muang Narathiwat municipality.A second bomb detonated inside a convenience store, located on the Chamroon Nara road, Muang Narathiwat municipality.In a third incident, 10 militants engaged in a firefight with defence volunteers, in the Kasoh village, Muang Narathiwat municipality.A total of 7 people were killed and 8 injured, in the three incidents.[148]

On 25 October 2011, 10 bombs went off in Meung District, Yala province, killing three people and injuring 44 others. Two of the dead were insurgents whose bombs accidentally went off when they hit a speed hump. Soldiers defused another 21 bombs. Over 60 insurgents were involved in this attack. Two soldiers were injured in separate attacks in Pattani province.[149]

On 30 October 2011, two men were shot and injured by suspected insurgents in Rueso district, Narathiwat province.[150]

On 31 October 2011, 10 bombs went off in five districts across Narathiwat province, injuring none. However, suspected insurgents shot dead two people at a petrol station and a third at a nearby grocery shop. In Yala province, a police corporal was wounded in an explosion.[151][152]

On 2 November 2011, in Yala province, a 20 kg bomb went off, injuring 2 police border patrol officers of the Yala 44 regiment, and seriously injuring one other, Sansern Nama.[153]

On 3 November 2011, in Narathiwat province, a 50-man police-military joint force arrested an insurgent who confessed to planting a bomb in Narathiwat on 30 October.[154] While in the Ra-ngae district, six hunters were killed and one seriously injured when insurgents blew their truck up. Later that day, six military personnel were injured in the same region.[155]

On 4 November 2011, an unknown number of insurgents fired M-79 grenade launchers into a military checkpoint, seriously injuring a passerby, Tiem Bangkeaw in Pattani province.[156] In Narathiwat province, a joint military-defense volunteer task force apprehended two suspected insurgents carrying a shotgun and a 9mm pistol.[157][158]

On 14 November 2011, a rubber taper was killed by rebels at his workplace, in the Narathiwat province.[159]

On 16 November 2011, 9 bombs exploded in the Muang, Yaring and Yarang districts.In the Nong Chik district, a military outpost came under assault rifle fire.In the Panare district, rebels perpetrated 3 grenade attacks.In the aftermath of the attacks, only minor material damage was recorded.[160]

On 20 November 2011, in Narathiwat province, a 50-men Thahan Phran squad from the 46th regiment got into a 30-minute gunfight with 4-5 groups of RKK insurgents, resulting the death of a key leader of the RKK, with a bounty of over 1 million baht, and was responsible for numerous attacks including one on the same regiment a year ago. Moreover, they apprehended 2 other insurgents as well.[161]

On 21 November 2011, an explosive device detonated outside a laundry shop located on the Charoen Pradit road, Pattani, injuring 9 people.Another bomb injured 6 policemen escorting monks in the Muang district.Insurgents blew up power poles in the Than To district.[162]

On 1 December 2011, a police task-force apprehended a RKK insurgent instructor in the Yarang district of the Yala province.[163] Meanwhile, a soldier, Priavte Kriangkrai Pornhormfai, was killed after stepping on a mine, and another, Siam Sealao, was seriously wounded.

On 5 December 2011, a 40-man Thahan Phran unit of the 45th regiment apprehended 3 suspected insurgents, a shotgun along with an amount of drugs were confiscated in the process, the arrest occurred in the Narathiwat province[164]

2012[edit]

On 1 February, a Thahan Phran, Thanong Sinthu, was shot in Pattani Province.[165]

On 3 February, an illegal oil trader was shot in Bacho District, Narathiwat Province. In a separate incident in Pattani Province a woman was killed and her husband and son were injured. Deep South Watch announced 33 dead and 55 injured in January as a result of clashes in south Thailand, with no insurgent casualties.[166][167][168]

On 4 February, a truck driver, Mahama Yakee, was shot in Pattani Province early in the morning.[169]

On 21 February, in Panare District, Pattani Province, 3 insurgents were killed after they clashed with the 44th regiment Thahan Phran, while 3 rangers were injured and 2 AK-47 rifles were seized. In Rueso District, Narathiwat Province, a former PULO leader was shot dead at his home. He has been known to have been approached by many RKK members to join their cause but he refused. Finally, in Si Sakhon District, Narathiwat Province, a 100-man Thahan Phran from the 46th regiment clashed with around 10 insurgents resulting one ranger, Sgt Rithidej Sriruangdej, seriously wounded, and key insurgent, wanted for many arrest warrants, killed.[170]

On 28 February, in Raman District, Yala Province, soldiers from the 12th special task force clashed with 3 insurgents, resulting the death of a key insurgent wanted on multiple charges and the apprehension of another insurgent.[171][172]

On 5 March, a blast at a market in the Tak Bai District wounded 8.[173][174]

On 7 March, 4 soldiers and a rubber tapper were killed in two separate attacks in Narathiwat and Pattani Provinces.[175] Two days later at least 50 militants attacked an army base in Yala Province, shooting electricity poles down to block escape routes, kidnapping 2 soldiers and injuring 12 more. The missing officers were later discovered shot to death with their hands bound and their weapons gone.[176]

On 10 March, a local politician was shot dead with a M-16 assault rifle and 9mm pistol in Pattani's Ka Por District by a group of four or five assailants in a sedan.[177]

On 12 March, two soldiers were wounded by a bomb explosion while providing security for teachers in Pattani's Sai Buri District.[178][179] Meanwhile, in Yarang District, an unknown number of persons set afire the office of the Rawaeng subdistrict Tambon Administration Organisation.[180][181]

On 15 March, a motorcycle bomb exploded in Pattani, killing one villager and wounding three others including two soldiers.[182]

On 17 March, one school girl was killed and four others injured, two critically, in a roadside bomb attack apparently intended for soldiers in Pattani.[183]

On 19 March, a member of a village security team was shot dead in Pattani's Yaring District.[184][185]

On 21 March, Thai army has accepted responsibility for killing four innocent civilians in the insurgency-plagued south two months ago.[186][187]

On 25 March, an assistant village head in Narathiwat and a defence volunteer in Pattani were killed in drive-by shooting's.[188] At night, a policeman was shot dead by militants in Pattani's Yarang District.[189]

On 29 March, a security guard was killed in a drive-by shooting's in Pattani’s Muang District.[190]

On 31 March, four bombs exploded in Yala shopping districts and the parking lot of a hotel in Hat Yai, killing 16 and injuring more than 300 others.[191][192]

On 3 April, a police officer from the Muang Pattani police station was seriously wounded by a gunman at a fishing pier in moo 6 of tambon Samilae in Pattani’s Muang District.[193]

On 4 April, two men on a motorcycle hurled a grenade at a PTT gas station at Ban Pongsata in Pattani's Yarang District.[194]

On 5 April, a car care shop owner was killed and his son seriously injured in a shooting in Pattani's Yaring District.[195]

On 11 April, three villagers were killed when gunmen opened fire at them as they were leaving a mosque in Pattani's Panare District.[196]

On 13 April, five passengers were wounded when gunmen on motorcycles attacked a bus in Pattani's Sai Buri District.[197]

On 15 April, police seized large amounts of weapons including 4 M16 assault rifles in Sai Buri District, Pattani Province.[198]

On 19 April, a 100-man squad clashed with a 14 insurgents in Yala Province, resulting the death of 5 insurgents and the others managed to escape.[199] After some forensic work, it was revealed that one of the dead insurgents was a key leader wanted on over 7 charges. Meanwhile in Narathiwat Province, a 30-man Thahan Phran unit from the 45th regiment apprehended 2 RKK members wanted on shooting 2 teachers in 2010. On a separate incident, a bomb detonated, injuring 5 soldiers in the same province.[198]

On 22 April, an insurgent was shot dead by combined police Thahan Phran forces after resisting arrest in Rueso District, Narathiwat Province.[200]

On 24 April village chief Sainung Ada was shot dead in Narathiwat Province.[201] In Tak Bai District, a bomb detonated injuring 3 civilians and 5 soldiers. A 5-year old boy was among the injured.[202]

On 23 July, a rubber tapper, Prinya Sinbut, was shot twice in the body and once in the arm, and is seriously wounded in Mae Lan District, Pattani Province.

On 25 July, after a warning that insurgents will intensify attacks during Ramadan, 5 anti-drug officers were killed and one seriously injured in a car bomb in Raman District. Authorities believe was in retaliation for recent drug suspect arrests.[203]

On 26 July, 2 men, Seng Changkid, and Kittisak Chamnanlee were slain after they left their house in Bannang Sata District[204] and an assistant village headman, Haree Vaebuesar, was shot dead in an ambush in Raman District.[205] All three events occurred in Yala Province.

On 28 July, four soldiers were killed in an ambush by 16 militants.[206]

On 29 July, 5 other civilians, all around Yala Province, were shot dead by insurgents.[207] In addition to this, 4 soldiers were wounded in an attack in the same province.[208]

On 11 September, over 100 insurgents including a major leader, Jae A-Lee, from the group Badan Penyelarasan Wawasan Baru Melayu Patani, surrendered to military authorities, demanding justice in exchange for halting the insurgency. Jae A-Lee also claimed that two other core leaders are in the process of submitting to the military. Jae A-Lee's one million baht bounty, as a reuslt of the deaths of 4 soldiers in 4 January, has also been whitewashed.[209]

2013[edit]

According to the region's Internal Security Operations Command, there were 320 bombings in the four border provinces between January and December 2013, compared with 276 reported bombings in 2012.[210] Experts alleged that the rise in deaths was linked to the stalling of peace talks while Yingluck Shinawatra's government faced anti-government protests in Bangkok and court proceedings against it over corruption.

On 10 February, insurgents killed five soldiers and wounded five others in two roadside bomb attacks in Yala province. According to Thai military officials, in the first attack militants detonated a car bomb as a truck carrying six soldiers passed by. Then they opened fire on the soldiers killing five of them, and taking away the dead soldiers' rifles. [211]

On 13 February, at least 17 Muslim insurgents including a commander were killed during an attack on a military base in Narathiwat. None of the Thai military defenders of the base were hurt. [212]

On 12 April, two soldiers were killed and six others wounded in a road side bombing. Suspected militants detonated an improvised bomb hidden on the road surface Pattani province's Panarae district. The soldiers were in two armored vehicles traveling Wednesday night to inspect damages from an earlier militant attack. One of the personnel carriers was badly damaged.[213]

On 26 April, four soldiers were killed and another four seriously injured while attempting to defuse a bomb. According to Thai authorities, the blast happened after troops moved the device which was hidden under a gas tank and placed under a bridge near the Narathiwat military base. [214]

On 1 May, police say suspected insurgents have killed six people including a two-year-old boy in one of the deadliest shootings in Thailand's south this year. [215]

Peace talks were also started in Kuala Lumpur in February at the behest of Malaysia. Barisan Revolusi Nasional's Hassan Taib led the talks, while the Thai government's team was led by Secretary-General of the National Security Council Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, tasked by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. However, the exiled leader of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation, Kasturi Mahkota, said attacks by his group would continue if they were not invited to the talks. For his part, Pattanatabut said that Thailand would not agree to independence or any contravention of the constitution of Thailand, but would seek to discuss degress of autonomy and an amnesty with the rebels. [216]

2014[edit]

9 February, A policeman's wife was shot dead and then set on fire in front of a terrified crowd at a busy market in Pattani, Thailand, officials reported. The woman, 28, was shot down on the afternoon of February 9, 2014 as she returned to her car from a market in the Ratapanyang area of Pattani province. After being shot, the woman's body was set alight, a police officer told AFP. The attack was allegedly carried out in revenge for the deaths of three Muslim brothers that took place during the week of February 2, 2014, aged three, five and nine. The boys were shot in front of their home in neighbouring Narathiwat province. Their pregnant mother and father were also shot in the attack but survived. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, at Prince of Songkla University in Pattani, said the boys' deaths "have set off a chain-reaction which will be hard to control unless authorities can bring to justice their killers". "The insurgent movement is taking their deaths as an opportunity for revenge. Local feelings over this are running very high," he said.[210]

14 March: Siriporn Srichai, a female schoolteacher, was shot dead and her body was burned in Mayo district of Pattani Province.[217]

24 May: Three people were killed and about 80 injured in 13 bomb blasts at at least five 7/11 stores and two gas stations.

28 May: Violence continued in Pattani as a bomb blast at a hospital car park injured 10 people including a soldier. Those injured included Pvt Phonlawat Nonthasen. The most seriously wounded in attacks that have left two dead and more than 70 wounded was a three-year-old girl, Vaesiteeaija Vaelong maimed for life when doctors had to amputate the remains of her right leg after it was mangled by the blast.[218]

28 August: Patimoh Saemaesae, a female schoolteacher, was killed and another teacher and a policeman were wounded in a bomb attack directed at the teachers and their police escort in Khok Pho District of Pattani Province.[219]

5 Sep: It has come to light that a paramilitary volunteer's attempt to portray an unarmed 14 year old Muslim boy falsely as an armed insurgent after killing him has come under investigation by the junta.[220]

12 October: A total of six schools were destroyed by fire in six coordinated arson attacks in Thung Yang Daeng and Mayo districts of Pattani Province;[221] some of the arsonists were subsequently arrested and confessed that their intention had been to set fire to 14 schools, but residents had managed to contact the authorities before they could carry out more arson attacks.[222]

4 November: The military decides to arm civilian groups by distributing thousands of assault rifles allegedly in order to help civilians to fight against the public order disturbing outfits. Human rights groups have protested against this measure, which in their eyes will only make the situation worse.[223]

29 November: Katesaya Muenkoto, a 29 year old woman died of bullet wounds in Khok Pho district in Pattani Province. She and a man were shot at while they were buying pork meat from a shop in the early morning. The attacker was driving a motorcycle and shot at them six times, hitting the woman in the head and the man in the back.[224]

Reactions and explanations[edit]

Official reactions[edit]

The government at first blamed the attacks on "bandits," and many outside observers do believe that local clan, commercial or criminal rivalries did play a part in the violence. In 2002, Thaksin stated, "There's no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common bandits." By 2004, however, he had reversed his position and came to regard the insurgency as a local front in the global War on Terrorism. Martial law was instituted in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in January 2004.[225]

Since the 2006 military coup, the Thai government has taken a more conciliatory approach to the insurgency, avoiding the excessive use of force that typified Thaksin's time, and beginning negotiations with known separatist groups. However, violence has escalated. This likely backs the assertion that there are several groups involved in the violence, few of whom have been placated by the government's change of strategy.[226]

On 3 June 2011, Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha stated that the insurgency is orchestrated from abroad and is funded via drug and oil smuggling.[227]

Political factors[edit]

The Thai authorities claim that the insurgency is not caused by the lack of political representation among the Muslim population. By the late 1990s, Muslims were holding unprecedentedly senior posts in Thai politics, for example with Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, a Malay Muslim from Yala, serving as Chairman of Parliament from 1996 to 2001 under the Democrats and later as Interior Minister during the first Thaksin government. Thaksin's first government (2001–2005) also saw 14 Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs) and several Muslim senators. Muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies in the border provinces, and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors. Muslims were able to voice their political grievances more openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom.

The Thaksin regime, however, began to dismantle the southern administration organization replacing it with a notoriously corrupt police force which immediately began widespread crackdowns. Consultation with local community leaders was also abolished. Discontent over the abuses led to growing violence during 2004 and 2005. Muslim politicians and leaders remained silent out of fear of repression, thus eroding their political legitimacy and support. This cost them dearly. In the 2005 general election, all but one of the eleven incumbent Muslim MPs who stood for election were voted out of office.[228]

Economic factors[edit]

Poverty and economic problems have been cited as a factor behind the insurgency.[229][230] However, the performance of the deep South’s economy improved markedly in the past few decades. Between 1983 and 2003, the average per capita income of Pattani grew from 9,340 baht to 57,621 baht, while that of Yala and Narathiwat also increased from 14,987 baht and 10,340 baht to 52,737 baht and 38,553 baht, respectively. However, the border provinces did have the lowest average income among all the southern provinces. Also, the national average is well below the estimated average needed to be considered an acceptable minimum wage by international organizations for SE Asia. One could thus argue that the average per capita income in the southernmost provinces is only about 20-25% of what the Thai minimum wage would be.[citation needed]

Household income improved from 2002 to 2004 by 21.99%, 19.27%, and 21.28% for Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, respectively. For comparison, income growth for all of Thailand in the same period was just 9.4%.

The percentage of people living below the poverty line also fell, from 40%, 36%, and 33% in 2000 to 18%, 10%, and 23% in 2004 for Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala, respectively. By 2004, the 3 provinces had 310,000 people living below the poverty line, compared to 610,000 in 2000. However, 45% of all poor Southerners lived in the 3 border provinces.[231][232]

Muslims in the border provinces generally have lower levels of educational attainment compared to their Buddhist neighbors. 69.80% of the Muslim population in the border provinces have only a primary school education, compared to 49.6% of Buddhists in the same provinces. Only 9.20% of Muslims have completed secondary education (including those who graduated from private Islamic schools), compared to 13.20% of Buddhists. Just 1.70% of the Muslim population have a bachelor’s degree, while 9.70% of Buddhists hold undergraduate degrees. Government schools are taught only in Thai and the secular educational system is being undermined by the destruction of schools and the murders of teachers by the insurgent outfits.[233]

The lesser educated Muslims also have reduced employment opportunities compared to their Buddhist neighbors. Government officials comprised only 2.4% of all working Muslims in the provinces, compared with 19.2% of all working Buddhists. Jobs in the Thai public sector are difficult to obtain for those Muslims who never fully accepted the Thai language or the Thai education system. Insurgent attacks on economic targets are further reducing employment opportunities for both Muslims and Buddhists in the provinces.

Leading insurgent groups[edit]

Original arms of the PULO and GMIP

Currently the most active insurgent movements are the BRN-Coordinate, its alleged armed wing the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), and the GMIP. PULO, the doyen of the Patani insurgent groups and formerly the most respected secessionist movement in the region, has been largely inactive in recent years.

BRN-C[edit]

The Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) is currently the most important group, spearheading the insurgency in Southern Thailand. It was revived after 2001 and its leaders are mainly Salafi religious teachers that have rejected the Pan-Arab socialist ideology of the early BRN, engaging in political activism by recruiting followers in mosques and indoctrinating at Islamic schools. This group has the vision of becoming a mass-organization, aiming towards having 400,000 members in its area of operation. The BRN-C has no constructive cultural or nationalistic goals, instead its immediate aim is to make Southern Thailand ungovernable. It has been largely successful at spreading and maintaining and atmosphere of terror and uncertainty through well-trained secret militant units that engage in assassinations and calculated destruction.[17][23]

RKK[edit]

The Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), allegedly one of the armed wings of the BRN-C,[23] has been one of the most brutal and ruthless groups of the South Thailand insurgency in recent years. It is formed by young, mostly Salafi, militants who routinely flee to Malaysia after carrying out violent attacks, including bombings, arson and murders, in Yala, Pattani or Narathiwat Province.[24] Although several RKK members have been arrested or killed by the Thai military in the past decade, it is very difficult for those involved in counter-insurgency to penetrate the structure of the group owing to its secrecy and great mobility.[234]

GMIP[edit]

Like the BRN-C, the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) is a group that experienced a revival after 2001 and has currently more hard-line Islamic political goals, to the detriment of its former nationalist cause.[235] Its members are now believed to have sympathies with Al Qaeda and with the establishment of the transnational Islamic Caliphate.[24]

BBMP[edit]

The Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani (BBMP), also known as 'Bersatu', was initially created in 1989 seeking to become an umbrella organization that would unify the efforts of insurgents in the region. The group has sought to drive wedges between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims, seeking to disrupt the educational system by attacking schools and harming teachers, an activity in which other groups are currently involved as well.[24] It was reported that some of Bersatu's prominent leaders were arrested or killed before 2004. The highly coordinated torching of 18 schools in January 2004 led some to suspect that the Bersatu groups were responsible,[236] but according to recent reports Bersatu's former leaders are being sidelined by younger terrorists and the coalition is not any longer functional.[237]

PULO[edit]

The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is a movement that was founded on the nationalist and secular values of Patani nation-building. Its priority was freeing Pattani from Thai rule by all means, including armed struggle.[23]

However, since 2001 the civil society in the three southern Thai provinces has experienced a widespread imposition of legalistic Salafi norms and the reality on the ground is today very different from what it was in former Southern Thailand. Salafism has heavily eroded Patani cultural identity and current insurgent groups have extreme religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of Patani nationalism. Although some of the present-day insurgents are very likely former PULO members, it is still unclear whether their fight for PULO's cause and it is likely that many may have become part of the more active and religious organizations that have overtaken PULO.[23] At any rate, in recent years PULO's leadership has largely lost control over the insurgents and has a very limited overall degree of influence over the insurgency in Southern Thailand.[17]

On 26 July 2009 Abu Yasir Fikri, President of PULO, and the "Emir" of the Group of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), Me Kuteh, agreed to join forces. Abu Yasir Fikri was allowed to speak on behalf of the GMIP on all political issues. The agreement included a section in which they agreed to form a unified military force, the Patani Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA would be commanded by the First Deputy Military Commander of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO).[238][239]

On 18 April 2009, PULO outlined a solution to conflict at the OICs Twelfth Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts to consider the Conditions of Muslim Communities and Minorities in Jeddah.[240]

Symbols[edit]

Al-raya flag of Jihad

In the last decade of the unrest in South Thailand, the black Al-raya flag has largely replaced the colourful secessionist flags formerly used by the different groups involved in the insurgency against the Thai government.[241][242]

Original flag of the PULO, still used today by original PULO faction headed by Abu Yasir fikri

Flag of Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GEMPAR)

Flag of Negara Patani Raya (State of Greater Patani)

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN)

Flag of the BRN-Koordinasi (BRN-C)

Flag of the BRN-Ulama

Flag used by "Dagger PULO" (1989-2005)

Flag of the united (five-star) PULO (2005–present)

High profile incidents[edit]

Krue Se Mosque Incident[edit]

On 28 April 2004, more than 100 militants carried out terrorist attacks against 10 police outposts across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla provinces in southern Thailand.[243] 32 gunmen retreated to the 425-year-old Krue Se Mosque, regarded by Muslims as the holiest mosque in Pattani.

General Pallop Pinmanee, commander of the Southern Peace Enhancement Center and Deputy Director of the Internal Security Operations Command, was the senior Army officer on the scene. After a tense seven-hour stand-off, Pallop ordered an all out assault on the mosque. All of the gunmen were killed. He later insisted, "I had no choice. I was afraid that as time passed the crowd would be sympathetic to the insurgents, to the point of trying to rescue them."[244]

It was later revealed that Pallop's order to storm the mosque contravened a direct order by Defense Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to seek a peaceful resolution to the stand-off no matter how long it took.[245] Pallop was immediately ordered out of the area, and later tendered his resignation as commander of the Southern Peace Enhancement Center. The forward command of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which Pallop headed, was also dissolved. A government investigative commission found that the security forces had overreacted. The Asian Centre for Human Rights questioned the independence and impartiality of the investigative commission. On 3 May 2004 during a Senate hearing, Senator Kraisak Choonhavan noted that most of those killed at Krue Se Mosque had been shot in the head and there were signs that ropes had been tied around their wrists, suggesting they had been executed after being captured.

The incident resulted in a personal conflict between Pallop and Defense Minister Chavalit, who was also director of the ISOC.[246] Pallop later demanded that the Defense Minister cease any involvement in the management of the southern insurgency.[247]

Tak Bai incident[edit]

Main article: Tak Bai Incident

In October 2004 the town of Tak Bai in Narathiwat province saw the most publicized incident of the insurgency. Six local men were arrested for having supplied weapons to insurgents. A demonstration was organized to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. The army used tear gas and water cannons on the crowd, and shooting started in which seven men were killed.

Hundreds of local people, mostly young men, were arrested. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to the Ingkayutthaboriharn army camp in the nearby province of Pattani. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks, and by the time the trucks reached their destination five hours later, in the heat of the day, 78 men had died of suffocation.

This incident sparked widespread protests across the south, and indeed across Thailand, since even non-Muslim Thais were appalled at the army's behaviour. Thaksin, however, gave the army his full support. Those responsible for the ill-treatment and death of the detainees received the most minor of non-custodial punishments. Thaksin's initial response was to defend the army's actions, saying that the 78 men died "because they were already weak from fasting during the month of Ramadan."

Charges were filed against 58 suspects accused of participating in the demonstration. The trials went on at a slow pace, and as of October 2006, the court had finished questioning of only two of the 1,500 witnesses in the case. Police were also unable to find 32 Tak Bai protesters who were still at large after fleeing arrest.[248]

On 2 November 2006, then Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont gave a formal apology for the incident.[249] The next day, the insurgents responded by increasing the number of violent acts by fivefold in comparison to the average the preceding month.[71]

Reconciliation and negotiation[edit]

Negotiation attempts[edit]

Attempts to negotiate with insurgents were hampered by the anonymity of the insurgency's leaders.

In May 2004, Wan Kadir Che Wan, exiled leader of Bersatu and for years one of the key symbolic figures in the guerrilla movement, stated that he would be willing to negotiate with the Government to end the southern violence. He also hinted that Bersatu would be willing to soften its previous demands for an independent state.[250][251]

The government initially welcomed the request to negotiate. However, the government response was severely criticized as being "knee-jerk" and "just looking to score cheap political points."[251] But when it became apparent that, despite his softened demand for limited autonomy, Wan Kadir Che Man had no influence over the violence, the negotiations were cancelled.[251] The government then began a policy of not attempting to officially negotiate with the insurgents.[252]

After being appointed Army Commander in 2005, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin expressed confidence that he could resolve the insurgency. He claimed that he would take a "new and effective" approach to a crisis and that "The Army is informed [of who the insurgents are] and will carry out their duties."[253]

On 1 September 2006, a day after 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in Yala province, Sonthi announced that he would break with the government no-negotiation policy. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with."[254] In a press conference the next day, he attacked the government for criticizing him for trying to negotiate with the anonymous insurgents, and demanded that the government "Free the military and let it do the job."[255] His confrontation with the government made his call for negotiation extremely popular with the media.[252] Afterwards, insurgents bombed 6 department stores in Hat Yai city, which until then had been free of insurgent activities. As always, the identity of the insurgents was not revealed. Sonthi was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat unrest in the far South.[47] By 19 September 2006 (after Sonthi overthrew the Thai government), the Army admitted that it was still unsure who to negotiate with.[256]

National Reconciliation Commission[edit]

On March 2005, respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun was appointed as chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, tasked with overseeing that peace is brought back to the South. A fierce critic of the Thaksin-government, Anand frequently criticized the handling of the southern unrest, and in particular the State of Emergency Decree. He has been quoted to have said, "The authorities have worked inefficiently. They have arrested innocent people instead of the real culprits, leading to mistrust among locals. So, giving them broader power may lead to increased violence and eventually a real crisis." Unfortunately, the situation deteriorated from 2005 to 2006, with escalating violence, especially among teachers and civilians. Despite much criticism of the Thaksin-government's policies, Anand refused to submit the NRC's final report, choosing instead to wait for the results of the 2006 legislative election.[257]

Anand finally submitted the NRC's recommendations on 5 June 2006.[258] Among them were

Introducing Islamic law

Making ethnic Pattani-Malay (Yawi) as a working language in the region

Establishing an unarmed peacekeeping force

Establishing a Peaceful Strategic Administrative Centre for Southern Border Provinces

The Thaksin government vowed to implement the recommendations. However, the recommendations were vigorously opposed by Prem Tinsulanonda, the President of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's Privy Council, who stated "We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai... We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language".[259]

Casualties[edit]

Note: Table is not comprehensive

Table is clearly incorrect. Statistics written here state that by end of 2012 "some" 3,380 deaths had resulted while the table shows in excess of 4,400 through 2011.

By end-2012 the conflict since 2004 had resulted in some 3,380 deaths, including 2,316 civilians, 372 troops, 278 police, 250 suspected insurgents, 157 education officials and seven Buddhist monks.[260]

According to one report in the Patani Post in late May 2014, about 6,000 people have been killed in the conflict during the last decade.[263]

Human Rights Issues[edit]

Human Rights Watch (HRW)[264] cites abuses on both sides. Numerous times the insurgents have murdered Buddhist monks collecting alms, and Buddhist villagers have been killed going about routine work such as rubber tapping, even though Buddhists have lived in the region for centuries. School teachers, headmasters, and students have been killed and schools torched presumably because schools represent a symbol of the Thai Government. Civil servants, regardless of religion, have been targeted for assassination.[102]

Meanwhile, local Muslims have been beaten, killed, or simply "disappeared" during police questioning and custody. Human Rights Watch has documented at least 20 such disappearances.[265] Soldiers and police have sometimes been indiscriminate when pursuing suspected insurgents, resulting in civilian collateral damage.

Of the 2,463 people killed in attacks from 2004 to 2007, 2,196 (89%) were civilians. Buddhist Thais and ethnic Malay Muslims were killed in bomb attacks, shootings, assassinations, ambushes, and machete hackings. At least 29 victims have been beheaded and mutilated.

"There have been hundreds of militant attacks on teachers, schools, public health workers, hospital staff, and community health centers. For the first time in the region's history of separatist insurgencies, Buddhist monks and novices are now among those killed and injured by separatist militants," HRW said in a 2007 report.

"Village-based militants called Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (Patani Freedom Fighters) in the loose network of BRN-Coordinate (National Revolution Front-Coordinate) have now emerged as the backbone of the new generation of separatist militants.

"Increasingly, they claim that the southern border provinces are not the land of Buddhist Thais, but a religious 'conflict zone' which must be divided between ethnic Malay Muslims and 'infidels'. The separatists seek to forcibly liberate Patani Darulsalam (Islamic Land of Patani), from what they call a Buddhist Thai occupation," HRW continued.[210]

The 2010 World Report from Human Rights Watch highlighted escalating human rights abuses throughout Thailand,[266] with the South reflecting overall policies against individual human rights. Sharply increased powers for police and the military were accompanied by a perceived lack of accountability.

Government harassment of suspected insurgents[edit]

The Asian Human Rights Commission accused the military of beating and torturing suspected insurgents by burning their genitals with cigarettes, smashing beer bottles over their knees, and chaining them to dogs. Such abuses were alleged to have occurred in October 2006, after the military seized power.[267]

In December 2006, a group of 20 Muslims, 9 men and 11 women aged between 2 and 55, sought political asylum in Malaysia. They claimed that the post-coup regime was more aggressive against civilians and that they were continuously harassed by the Army. The Army admitted that the group sought refuge in Malaysia out of fear for their lives - but that the threat was from forces.[268]

Unfinished journey (175)

(The one hundred and seventy-five, Depok, West Java, Indonesia, January 3, 2015,22.37 BST)

Whether we are helping our brothers who suffer misfortune?

Have we been concerned with our brothers who suffer calamities in the country such as landslides in banjarnegara, Central Java, bandung, Flood or accident and theexamination of our brothers who are in Russia, in Chehnya, Xinjiang, China, in thesouthern Philippines, Southern Thailand or against Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar,

Also prolonged suffering in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

When we have a wealth of course we can help them through the charity/social that isdirectly, or help with our physical energy, if we are not able to physically and material(property), not least through our prayer to God Almighty, so they are given fortitude and patience.

Indeed, Muslims are brothers the other Islamic, although we do not know each other beforehand.

Once we convert to Islam, then they all are our brothers, true brothers, sisters in this world and in the hereafter.

Let us consider the arguments from the Qur'an and the hadith below:

1.Rosululloh SAW said in the Hadith Bukhari:

"The Parable of the Muslims who love each other and love each other is like one body,

If one member of the body feels pain, the whole body will come to feel pain and could not sleep "

2.Sabda Rosululloh SAW in Bukhari:

"It was the perfect person from your faith, so that he loves his brother (fellow Islam) as he loves himself"

3.Rosululloh SAW said in Bukhari:

"A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim neighbor.

Can not persecute or. Let persecuted. Anyone who meets his needs then Allah will fulfill his needs.

Whoever frees his distress, then Allah will free her distress in the Day of Judgment. He who covers his disgrace, then Allah will cover his disgrace on the Day of Resurrection "

4.Rosululoh SAW said in Tirmidhi:

"Your smile for your brother is shodaqoh for you ..."

5.Rosululloh SAW said in Bukhari:

"Whoever cut ties with his brother for a year, then he like to kill her ..."

6.Rosululloh SAW said Abu Dawud:

"It is not lawful for a Muslim to break with his fellow Muslims more than 3 days, and if it dies then he go to hell"

7.Sabda Rosululloh SAW in Bukhari:

"It is not lawful for a man broke more than 3 nights. Passed each other, but that is turned away and that was also turned away. The best among the two is the start greeting "

8.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"People of faith with people of other faith is like a building.

Mutually reinforce each other "

9.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"Among people of faith do not mutually hasud, finding fault with each other, mutual anger and back to back ..."

10.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"Every Muslim against another Muslim is forbidden her his blood, his property (not to be stolen), and his honor (not allowed in abuse, vandalized his honor)"

11.Firman Allah in khujorot: 12

"Men of faith, shun berburuk sangka.sesungguhnya most prejudice is a sin. And do not find fault with others. Do most of you tattle on others. "

Of all the word of Allah and the word Rosululloh SAW above, it is clear that we are people of Islam are brothers.

True brothers, sisters, brothers lively semati, brothers and sisters in the world in the hereafter.

His name is relative, meaning we should love one another, love, caring, mutual greetings, visiting each other, help each other, help each other, and so on just like we behave in siblings. At the sister, the brother, the uncle, the nephew, even our parents.

If the siblings, his usual we not feel heavy for their help when there is trouble, there is a disaster, there is a need.

If siblings we lack money, we are happy to give money, or at least lend his.

If they are there is a need or problem, we necessarily help to escape from problems,

Even to the extent that we suppose to trade something good, then siblings we are interested in buying, we immediately gave her free, or willing to pay the cost of its course without taking, or at least we give a substantial discount for siblings us!

That is natural and true relationships among siblings.

And that is exactly what our relationship among fellow Muslim brothers.

As it is, and should indeed like that.

But, it is whether we practice it ???

In Fact:

There are many among us who have not been able to practice it fully and correctly.

Just imagine, we admit the true Muslims. Almost every day we Koran, studied religion, learning the Koran and Hadith, listen to the advice, tausiah of-cleric cleric and fathers clerics.

But, why our attitude to fellow Muslims is far from the teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith that we examine almost every day ???

If our merchants, we did not give a discount on them, even though they are right brother?

If they ask for help, we are reluctant to help, but they are right brother?

If they do not have money, we are reluctant memberiny or minimal meminjaminya.padahal them right brother?

If they can be a disaster, we are reluctant to help, or we want to help if given upah.padahal them right brother?

If they need a ride, we are reluctant to give a ride on mereka.atau want to give a ride home no money, as long as we can profit. Though it we brothers?

WHERE BROTHERHOOD THAT ???

WHERE siblings ???

STILL OUR MUSLIM KAH ???

OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE AWAY FROM MUSLIM IS BY Rosululloh SAW:

1.Orang Islam against Islam as body one.If one limb pain, then all the body will feel a sense sakitndan can not sleep

2.Orang faith with people of other faith is like a building, where another section mutually reinforcing

3. No one's perfect faith that he loves you as he loves his faith in himself

STILL TOO FAR FROM THE CRITERIA OF A FAITH AS IN spoken Allah:

"Indeed, those that faith is BERSAUDARA ..."

DG HOW WE THEN ???

MUSLIMKAH ALREADY WE, AS A PROPHETIC AND NET Allah ???

If not, start now memuslimkan ourselves ....... Ok?

Alhamdulillah jazakumullohu Khoiro

Muslim chaplain Alfarizi

By: Ndaru Triutomo, S.Si.

Readers are blessed Allah Ta'ala, each we definitely have problems. In fact, sometimes so severe that really test our patience.

Some people have to say "My patience has run out", or even to get out the words "Why I calamity of this kind, what my sin, what my mistake, but I also had a lot of worship, indeed God is not fair". This is partly an example of the words that we often hear. But these words are not justified in the Shari'ah, even showed weak person monotheism.

In this bulletin, we will review briefly about a very important matter to which every Muslim, namely patience.

Patience In 3 Case

Patience is a mental hold and keep it up to do something tidsk should be done. There are 3 forms of patience, namely patient in obedience to God, away from the patient of disobedience to God, and God's patience in destiny painful and troublesome.

[1] Patient In Obedience To God

Patience is important to this type owned by any servant, because the real life often feels heavy to run a variety of obedience. This is because the soul tend to like the ugly nature, as the word of Allah Ta'ala (which means): "Verily the lust commands to evil, except for those my Lord has mercy. Surely my Lord is Forgiving, infinite care. "(Surah Yusuf: 53).

Often we find a charity that he could not be continuous but to do it. They are eager to do many deeds in the beginning of time, but after it was abandoned. That requires patience so that we can continuously in charity, although the practice is simple. Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means) "Practice of the most loved by Allah Ta'ala is the practice of continuous although it slightly." (HR. Muslim).

Allah ta'ala preferred practice of continuous though simple, because it is able to help kontinunya a charity. One attempt to be continuous in the charity is to pray to God, such as by prayer: Allahumma a'inni 'ala dzikrika syukrika wa wa husni' ibadatik (O God, help me to always dhikr / remember You, thank You, and smarten worship Thee). "(HR. Abu Dawud and Ahmad, saheeh).

[2] Tolerance In Avoiding disobedience

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means) "Heaven is overwhelmed by things that are not fun, while hell was overwhelmed by things that are fun lust." (HR. Muslim). It takes patience to be able to keep away from things that are fun lust which in essence will plunge to hell. And disobedience including cases favored by lust.

A believer must control his lust and saw that the wickedness is not a trivial thing, but rather a case that could destroy him. Abdullah bin Mas'ud something from anhu said, "The believers see his sins as if he was sitting on the bottom of the mountain, the mountain he was afraid to overwrite it. While people who fajir (like sin) see his like flies passing over his nose. "(HR. Bukhari). All this can only be done with patience.

[3] Patient In Dealing Providence of God

Included into the pillars of faith is that we believe in their destiny or decree of Allah Ta'ala. There are two kinds of fate that befell man, in the form of pleasure and such sadness and tragedy. In the first type we must be grateful, grateful to God will add His blessings. As for the latter we must be patient. And both (grateful and patient) is the practice of worship that have value in the sight of Allah Ta'ala reward.

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means), "It's amazing the case of a believer. All cases (that happened) is good for him and not this is the case but only on themselves a believer. If he gets the happiness he was grateful then it is good for him. And if stricken by him to be patient then it is also good for him. "(HR. Muslim). Then attitude if misfortune befalls a Muslim is to be patient and believe that behind the tragedy that happened there wisdom of Allah Ta'ala.

As Allah says (which means), "Be sure we shall test you with something of fear, hunger, lack of wealth, lives and fruits. And give glad tidings to those who patiently. (They are) those who, when misfortune befalls, they say: "Inna lillaahi wa innaa ilaihi raaji'uun" (Surely we belong to Allah and to Him is our return.) "(QS. Al-Baqoroh 155-156 ).

In addition, the calamities that befall a believer is a test form, as Allah says (which means), "Do you think that you will enter heaven, And do not come to you (trials) as well as those who passed away before you? they were struck by misfortune and misery, and shaken (by various trials) that said the Apostle and those who believe with him: "When will the coming of God's help?" Remember, Verily God's help it Amat close. "(Surat al-Baqoroh: 214).

God Together People Tolerance

Allah ta'ala says (which means), "Ask for help (to God) with patience and prayer. Allah is with those who patiently. "(Surat al-Baqoroh: 153). In this verse, Allah commanded the believers to ask for help in the matter of the world and the hereafter with patience and prayer. In addition, this noble verse shows the primacy of the person that gets ma'iyyah patient (togetherness) God.

Togetherness God does not always mean the Essence of God is everywhere, including the patient with people, because it is clear that God is above the 'Throne, as in His word (which means), "Merciful The rest upon 'Throne "(QS Thaaha: 5). Unity of God with His servants mentioned in the Qur'an has two meanings, namely general and specific nature.

God togetherness general meaning of God's power and knowledge covering his servant, as in the word of God (which means): "And He is with you wherever you are. And Allah is Seer of what ye do. "(Surat al-Hadid: 4). Togetherness of this kind are common to all His creatures. The togetherness in this paragraph is a special character, which is unity in the sense of care and help of Allah Ta'ala that always accompanies his servant. So that all cases were considered severe, with God's help will feel light and easy. Thus the primacy of the people to be patient. (Taisir Kariimirrahman - Shaykh As-Sa'di).

Patience No Limit

Some people think patience has limits. So if it is considered to have crossed the line, he is allowed to act outside the rules. This feeling is not true. Allah ta'ala says (which means), "Only those who are patient who paid back their reward without limit." (QS. Az-Zumar: 10). God has prepared a reward for those who are impatient with countless reward. This shows the magnitude of the primacy of the patient.

Shaykh al-Sa'di said in his commentary: "So God promises to those who are patient with countless reward, that reward is not limited and is not measurable. It can not happen except for the primacy and patient position on the side of God ". If God has prepared such great reward for those who are patient, then why should we limit patience ?. In addition, we also believe that all the problems that come up, it is impossible to exceed the capabilities of a servant. As Allah says (which means), "God does not burden a person but according to his ability." (QS. Al-Baqoroh 286).

Therefore, all the problems that we experience, we can surely finish with patience, licenses, and the power of Allah Ta'ala. We believe that Allah Almighty is the One who has perfect wisdom in all the provisions given to His creatures. With this belief then it is fitting for us to be patient with all the provisions that happens to us, and remember it is a test for us. If we can be patient then Allah will raise the degree of us on his side.

We experienced exam when compared with the prophets and apostles then still much lighter. The most severe human test is the prophets. And man is tested in accordance with the content of his religious condition. As the history of Mus'ab ibn Sa'id -a tabi'in- of his father, he said, "O Messenger of Allah, which is the most severe human trials?" He sallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam said, "The Prophet, then its like and semisalnya again. Someone will be tested in accordance with the conditions of his religion. If religion is so strong (solid), then the weight of the test anyway. If religion is weak, then it will be tested in accordance with the quality of his religion. A servant will always get a trial until he walked the earth in a clean state of sin. "(HR. Tirmidhi, Saheeh). Therefore, when we are given a test, then remember there are still people who are heavier than the test that we have experienced, so it can help us to be patient.

Reward The Big Beginning Musing

Readers are blessed Allah Ta'ala, we have learned a very great reward for those who are patient. But keep in mind, reward the patient will only be obtained by people who do it at the beginning of the disaster. As for those who are patient after angry, then it also includes things that are good but do not get the promised reward.

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means): "Verily the name patience is when at the beginning of the disaster." (HR. Bukhari). Patience at the beginning of the disaster is very difficult to do, for it is God promised unlimited reward for the culprit. As for those who are not patient, even denounced destiny, so in essence he has denounced God.

Allah ta'ala says (which means), "No calamity befalls a person except with the permission of Allah; and he who believes in Allah, He will give instructions to his heart. And Allah knows all things. "(Surah Taghaabun: 11). Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam also said, "Allah Almighty says,' I am hurt by the children of Adam. He denounced the time, when I was (regulator) time, I am the tossing and turning night and day. "(HR. Muslim). Therefore, when we say, "Damn it all today" then surely we unconsciously have denounced the One who set the time, ie Allah Ta'ala. We seek refuge in Allah from denouncing destiny.

So little discussion of the patient, may we be permitted to act upon and put into a group of people who got the virtue of patience. [Ndaru Triutomo, S.Si.]

Crisis in Chechnya

Author And Page Information

by Anup ShahThis Page Last Updated Saturday, September 04, 2004

This page: http://www.globalissues.org/article/100/crisis-in-chechnya.

To print all information e.g. expanded side notes, shows alternative links, use the print version:

http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/100

A mountainous region, Chechnya has important oil deposits, as well as natural gas, limestone, gypsum, sulphur, and other minerals. Its mineral waters have made it a spa center. Major production includes oil, petrochemicals, oil-field equipment, foods, wines, and fruits. For centuries, the Chechen people's history and relationship with the regional power, Russia, has been full of turmoil.

Map of Chechnya

Maps courtesy of ITA's Quick Maps

The recent crisis during the past decade or so has seen numerous human rights violations and draws parallels to many other conflicts around the world. For example:

It is similar to the situation in Africa, where small nations have been trying to break free from their regional superpowers and colonial rulers.

It is similar to Kosovo or the Gulf War, where allied and NATO forces used humanitarian reasons and mass bombings with precise military technology to wage a high-tech war; here Russia attempts (and has attempted in the past) similar measures, albeit with less success compared to their NATO counter-parts.

It is similar to East Timor, Kosovo, various African and other recent conflicts where, again, the civilians are the main casualties who suffer most from this conflict.

It is similar to the above-mentioned conflicts as various international conventions, treaties and laws are violated by powerful nations in their sphere of influence.

And, as with most other conflicts throughout history, there are trade and access related reasons for this conflict as the issue of geopolitics, Caspian Sea oil and control of it comes to the fore.

Of course, that is not to simply degrade this conflict to “yet another conflict” as each war has unique situations and terrible consequences. However, it is another indication of how power struggles are at work throughout the world and throughout history.

Chechnya's separatist rebellion grows into regional Islamist insurgency

GALLERY

Violence surges in Ingushetia

Russia's heavy-handed tactics have helped transform a separatist rebellion in Ingushetia into something potentially worse: a radical Muslim insurgency that has spread across the region, draws support from different ethnic groups and appears to be gaining strength.

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By Philip P. Pan

Washington Post Foreign Service

Friday, October 30, 2009

SUNZHENSKY, RUSSIA -- Her face wet with tears and framed by a black shawl, Madina Albakova sat in her ransacked living room and described how she had become another teenage widow here in Ingushetia, the most volatile of Russia's Muslim republics.

THIS STORY

In Russia, an intensifying insurgency

Violence surges in Ingushetia

The details emerged between sobs: the arrival of the security forces earlier in the day, her husband's panicked attempt to flee, the gunfire that erupted without warning. He was a law student, barely 20 and "so beautiful," she said, but the soldiers planted a rifle next to his body and called him an Islamist rebel. Then they took everything of value -- the family's savings, a set of dishes, even baby clothes, she said.

Such heavy-handed tactics by the Russian security forces have helped transform the long-running separatist rebellion in Chechnya, east of Ingushetia, into something potentially worse: a radical Muslim insurgency that has spread across the region, draws support from various ethnic groups and appears to be gaining strength.

Moscow declared an end to military operations in Chechnya in April, a decade after then-President Vladimir Putin sent troops into the breakaway republic. But violence has surged in the mountains of Russia's southwest frontier since then, with the assassination of several officials, explosions and shootouts occurring almost daily, and suicide bombings making a comeback after a long lull. On Sunday, a popular Ingush opposition leader was fatally shot, months after the slaying of Chechnya's most prominent human rights activist.

The insurgency is a key reason Russia has been reluctant to support sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program; diplomats say the Kremlin is worried Tehran might retaliate by setting aside sectarian differences and backing the rebels in Muslim solidarity. Washington, meanwhile, is concerned that the area is becoming a recruiting ground for militias in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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At least 519 people were killed in rebel attacks and clashes with government forces from May to September, up from 299 during the same period last year, according to a study by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. The fighting is concentrated in the largely Muslim eastern part of the North Caucasus, an area the size of Oregon with 14 million people from as many as 50 ethnic groups.

After a brief calm following two wars, militant attacks have spiked in Chechnya, as well as in nearby Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. But the violence has been worst in Ingushetia, the smallest and poorest of Russia's provinces, where rebels and security forces compete in brutality and even rights activists carry guns.

A few hours after the soldiers killed Albakova's husband, Movsar Merzhoyev, in this rural district on Oct. 9, a car bomb exploded several miles away in what appeared to be a failed suicide attack. Over the next week, gun battles here left 11 suspected militants and three police officers dead.

Ingushetia has been on edge since June, when a suicide bomber hit the convoy of the republic's president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, putting him in a coma and killing three bodyguards. Two months later, as Yevkurov was returning to work, another suicide attack leveled the police department of Ingushetia's largest city, Nazran, killing at least 24 people and injuring 200 others.

Russia has long blamed violence in the region on Muslim extremists backed by foreign governments and terrorist networks, but radical Islam is relatively new here. In the 1990s, it was ethnic nationalism, not religious fervor, that motivated Chechen separatists. That changed, though, as fighting spilled beyond Chechnya and Russian forces used harsher tactics targeting devout Muslims.

In 2007, the rebel leader Doku Umarov abandoned the goal of Chechen independence and declared jihad instead, vowing to establish a fundamentalist Caucasus Emirate that would span the entire region. After Moscow proclaimed victory in Chechnya in April, he issued a video labeling civilians legitimate targets and reviving Riyad-us Saliheen, the self-described martyrs' brigade that launched terrorist attacks across Russia from 2002 to 2006.

A major figure in the recent violence is Alexander Tikhomirov, a young preacher known here as Sayid Buryatsky who joined the rebels last year after converting to Islam in his native Siberia and studying in Egypt.

Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from Islamic Rebellion in Xinjiang (1937))

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (August 2010)

Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937)

Part of Xinjiang Wars

Date 1937

Location    Xinjiang

Result        Sheng Shicai's pro-Soviet regime established its rule over the whole territory of Xinjiang province

Belligerents

Taiwan Republic of China National Revolutionary Army

Islamic Rebels    Taiwan Xinjiang provincial government

 Soviet Union

Russian Empire White Russian forces

Commanders and leaders

Taiwan Chiang Kai-shek

Taiwan Ma Hushan

Taiwan Ma Ju-lung

Taiwan Pai Tzu-li

Kichik Akhund

Abdul Niyaz †     Soviet Union Joseph Stalin

Soviet Union Sheng Shicai

Taiwan Ma Sheng-kuei

Strength

Republic of China Army Flag.svg 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) around 10,000 Chinese Muslim cavalry and footsoldiers

1,500 Turki Islamic Rebels   5,000 Soviet Russian Red Army troops Several thousand White Russian soldiers and Provincial Chinese troops

Soviet Invasion 1937

In 1937, an Islamic rebellion broke out in southern Xinjiang. The rebels were 1,500 Turki Muslims led by Kichik Akhund, tacitly aided by the 36th Division against the pro-Soviet provincial forces of Sheng Shicai.[1][2]

Sheng Shicai had moved against Divisional General Mahmut Muhiti, commander-in-chief of 6th Uyghur Division and deputy chief of the Kashgar Military Region. Muhiti resented the increased Russian influence and formed a secret group around himself. Sheng feared Muhiti may have allied with the Chinese Muslim general Ma Hu-shan. However, the Uighurs of Kashgar heard hostile reports on Ma Hu-shan from Uighur refugees from Khotan suffering under Ma.

Muhiti fled Kashgar on April 2, 1937 with a small number of his subordinates and some amount of gold to India via Yengi Hissar and Yarkand. Shortly before his departure he sent message to Ma Hu-Shan about his proposed arrival at Khotan. In response, Ma Hu-Shan ordered his troops to prepare a parade and feast to honour General Muhiti. This preparation pulled troops who guarded both mountain Passes to Kashmir, which allowed Muhiti the opportunity to change his route and slip through into Kashmir. Muhiti's flight resulted in Uighur troops rising in revolt in Yengi Hissar, Yarkand, and Artush, resulting in the execution of all pro-Soviet officials and a number of Soviet advisers. An independent Turkic administration was set up by two of his officers, Kichik Akhund Sijiang, who commanded troops in Artush, and Abdul Niyaz Sijiang, who commanded troops in Yarkand and Yengi Hissar.

Liu Pin, a provincial commander in Kashgar Region with 700 troops at his command, responded to the rebellion by launching a squadron of nine Soviet planes to bomb Yangi Hissar and Yarkand.[3] After Muhiti reached Srinagar in India, the following year, he went on pilgrimage to Mecca.[4] A buildup of Soviet military assets occurred in Xinjiang before the outbreak of war. Around Kasghar, the Soviets sent AA guns, fighter planes, and soldiers of Russian and Kyrgyz origin in great amounts.[5]

The start of the rebellion in Southern Xinjiang had immediate and tragic impact on the fate of about 400 Uyghur students, who had been sent by the Xinjiang government to the USSR (1935–37) to study in the University of Tashkent. They were all arrested during one night in May 1937 by the NKVD and executed without trials, allegedly by order of Joseph Stalin. Soviet diplomatic staff were also purged throughout the province in Soviet consulates in Urumchi, Karashar, Ghulja, Chuguchak and Altai. Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi Garegin Apresoff (former Soviet consul in Mashhad, Iran and the main architect of Soviet policies in Central Asia and the Middle East) was recalled to Moscow and shot by firing squad for allegedly participating in the so-called Fascist-Trotskyite Plot against Stalin and attempting to overthrow Sheng Shicai's regime on April 12, 1937, on commemoration day of April Uprising four years earlier.

The rebellion is also viewed by some historians as a plot by Mahmut Muhiti and Ma Hu-shan to convert Xinjiang into a base for fighting against Stalinists.[6]

36th Division invades Kashgar[edit]

Meanwhile, Ma Hushan and his Chinese Muslim troops of the 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) were watching the situation with interest, eager to seize more territory. Sheng Shicai surprisingly ordered 36th Division to quell Rebellion of 6th Uyghur Division, although initially 33rd and 34th Regiments of 6th Uyghur Division, which were stationed in Kashgar since August 20, 1934, did not join the Rebellion, because there were those who had previously trained in the USSR (during 1934-1935 a number of officers of 6th Uyghur Division were sent to Tashkent to study at the Military Academy there, also Soviet Generals Rybalko, Obuhoff and Dotkin consequently worked in Kashgar in 1934-1936, being the Soviet military advisers of Sheng Shicai's administration, and participated in organizing and training of staff of 6th Uyghur Division) . Having received the order the Tungans attacked Kashgar airfield on 20 May, but were defeated. Ten days later 1,500 Islamic irregulars under Kichik Akund attacked and seized Kashgar Old City. His troops wore arm bands with the words "Fi sabil Allah" (Arabic: in the way of Allah). The rebellion was followed by a Kyrgyz rising near Kucha and Muslim unrest in Kumul.[3]

Ma Hushan remained at Khotan watching the situation. His Chief of Staff Pai Tzu-li and Ma Ju-lung, the 1st brigade commander at Karghalik, persuaded him to strike against Kashgar. Ma Ju-lung arrived on 2 June at Kashgar to reportedly "put down the rebels of Kichik Akhund", but Kichik Akhund had secretly agreed to back off, he transferred his soldiers and himself to Akau while Kashgar was taken by Ma Hushan without a battle. The Fayzabad-Maral Bashi region was taken by Ma Sheng-kuei's 2nd brigade. Ma Hu-shan strengthened his position Southern Xinjiang and avoided engaging in battle, letting the Turkic Muslim rebels do the fighting as a diversion for Sheng's provincial army.[3]

General Abdul Niyaz

Ma Hushan surrounded Kashgar New City and explained to the British Consulate-General that the Chinese Muslim forces, still official the Kuomintang 36th Division, were acting in covenant with the Turkis (Uighurs) to overthrow the pro-Soviet Provincial government and replace it with an Islamic government loyal to the Republic of China Kuomintang government at Nanjing.[7]

Ma Hushan was paranoid about a Russian attack. He controlled the Kashgar-Khotan area, because it offered him a safe escape to British India, where he could take a steamer from Calcutta safely back to China sea ports, and then to the Gansu and Qinghai. He and his officers repeatedly had vowed to attack the Russians in conversations with Peter Fleming and sought to procure gas masks and airplanes to help them fight.

In August 1937, 5,000 Soviet Russian Red Army troops backed by an air unit and armoured regiment moved into Xinjiang at Sheng Shicai's request, whose Provincial troops suffered defeat from Muslim rebels in July 1937 at the battle near Karashar and were unable to continue their advance on the South. At the end of August Provincial forces, including White Russians, Red Army and NKVD units, heavily defeated Kichik Akhund's troops at Aksu with most of his troops being annihilated, after they were machine-gunned and bombed in air attack by a squadron of 24 Soviet airplanes in the open field near Aksu. As a result, Kichik Akhund and Abdul Niyaz escaped to Kashgar with only 200 men. After this battle Ma Sheng-kuei was bribed by Sheng Shicai to defect and turn against Ma Hushan. Ma Sheng-kuei marched on Kashgar on September 1, 1937, only to find that Ma Hushan, Ma Ju-lung, and Pai Tzu-li withdrew toward Karghalik with the 1st brigade. On 7 September, Ma Hushan and his officers deserted their troops and fled to India with gold. Ma brought thousand ounces in gold, which was confiscated by the British.[8]

The Chinese Muslim General Ma Zhanshan was allegedly one of the commanders of the Soviet army during the invasion. It was reported that he led Russian troops disguised in Chinese uniforms along with bombers during the attack, which was requested by Sheng Shicai.[9] Other sources do not mention this doubtful participation of Ma Zhanshan in this war, since he was a Commander in Chief of Cavalry in the National Revolutionary Army in China in 1937.[10]

General Chiang Yu-fen, a Provincial commander, despatched his men after Ma Hushan's 1st brigade, while other Provincial forces drove Abdu Niyaz and Kichik Akhund towards Yarkand. Red Army aircraft assisted the Provincial forces by dropping bombs, including some that contained mustard gas. These first flew from an airbase in Karakol, USSR, and then from captured airfields in Uchturpan and Kucha.[11] On 9 September Yarkand fell to Sheng, and on 15 September Abdul Niyaz was executed. On October 15 the Soviets bombed the city of Khotan where casualties numbered 2,000.[12][12] The remnants of the 36th division melted away through Kunlun Mountains in Qinghai and Northern Tibet.[3]

Aftermath[edit]

Before the war, Ma Hushan had exchanged message with the Nanjing Kuomintang government and had expected them to send aid, as he said in conversations with Peter Fleming. However, in 1937, at the same time of the Soviet attack, China was invaded by Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The pro-Soviet provincial forces of Sheng Shicai established their control over the whole of Xinjiang. All rivals were eliminated, and the defeat of the 36th division caused the control of the Chinese Central Government in Xinjiang to cease.

A memorial was set up by Sheng Shicai to dead Russians who were killed in combat by Ma Hushan. The memorial included Russian Orthodox crosses.[13][14]

The Republic of China government was fully aware of the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang province, and Soviet troops moving around Xinjiang and Gansu, but it was forced to mask these maneuvers to the public as "Japanese propaganda" to avoid an international incident and for continued military supplies from the Soviets.[15]

Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China

Elizabeth Van Wie Davis

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

January 2008

Overview 

•        The April 1990 armed uprising in Baren marked an increase in Uyghur Muslim violence in Xinjiang, China. Two justifications—ethnic separatism and religious rhetoric—are given. The Uyghurs, who reside throughout the immediate region, are the largest Turkic ethnic group living in Xinjiang as well as being overwhelmingly Muslim. This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and people. 

•        The desired outcome by groups that use violence is, broadly speaking, a separate Uyghur state, called either Uyghuristan or Eastern Turkistan, which lays claim to a large part of China. While some Uyghurs want a separate state, others want to maintain cultural distinction within an autonomous relationship with China, and others are integrating into the Chinese system. There is no single Uyghur agenda.

•        The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang occur sporadically, and the groups that claim responsibility are frequently splintering, merging, and collapsing.  Some of the Uyghur groups make claims that are difficult to substantiate.  Nonetheless, the Uyghur grievances against the Chinese government have old roots. Some of the newer elements include Turkey’s unofficial support and Muslim funding and training from abroad.

•        The heavy-handedness of the multiple “strike hard” campaigns by the central Chinese government in Xinjiang simultaneously tamps down violence in the short-run but fuels a sense of injustice and mistrust among the Uyghurs in the long-run. Beginning in 1996, regular “strike hard” campaigns were used to fight crime and threats to order by mobilizing police, but are used in this decade to deal increasingly with “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” A heavy police presence is a constant in Xinjiang.

•        U.S. policy on this issue is constrained.  Not only does the US need to work with China on issues of geostrategic importance, but also the Uyghurs who use violence have formed limited associations with groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations. The best option for the United States is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.

The Roots of the Problem

A January 2007 Chinese raid on a training camp in Xinjiang killed 18 terrorist suspects and one policeman. Seventeen more suspects were reported captured and explosives were seized. The raid was said to have provided new evidence of ties to “international terrorist forces.”  The raid marks the latest clash between Uyghur Muslim separatists and Chinese security services, reflecting a limited challenge to China’s mainland stability. In Beijing’s view, however, instability in Xinjiang could also bring instability to Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan. As with many of these disputes throughout Asia, the root causes of the problem are a complex mix of history, ethnicity, and religion, fueled by poverty, unemployment, social disparities, and political grievances.

The central government has gone through several waves regarding the treatment of religion and ethnicity within the territory of the People’s Republic of China.  Historically, ethnic minorities that are adherents to religions other than Chinese Buddhism raised fears of social unrest in China.  For instance in the nineteenth century, the Taiping Rebellion—including the Hakka subgroup and Zhuang minorities—and the Hui Minorities War  both had their roots in religious movements.  The Hui, ethnically Chinese but religiously Muslim, are a unique minority in China. The ethnic minorities and Muslim majority in Xinjiang, which means the “New Territories” in Chinese, were largely conquered and integrated into the Chinese state in the 1750s.  Xinjiang became a province in 1884, fixing a firm western border with Russia.  According to the noted historian Jonathan D. Spence, the Xinjiang region was not initially colonized or settled, but was maintained as a strategic frontier zone, with up to 20,000 Manchu and Chinese banner garrisons, at a huge annual cost. The largely Muslim inhabitants kept their own religious leaders, who were bound by salaries and titles to the Qing state (China).   After the dissolution of the Qing Dynasty, the last Chinese dynasty, the Republic of China’s Nationalists gradually saw the country fall into Japanese occupied territories and warlord fiefdoms, including Xinjiang, which was ruled by an autonomous military governor who nervously sought aid and sponsorship first from Soviet Russia and then from the Nationalists, before ultimately surrendering to the Communists in Xinjiang in September 1949.

Although initially declaring the People’s Republic of China as a multinational state  in 1949, the Communist Party’s Anti Rightist Policy of 1957 opposed “local nationalism” among ethnic minorities and clamped down on religions.  A decade later, the harsh Cultural Revolution (1966-76) saw many even greater injustices against ethnic minorities.  Religion was especially suppressed, but so was ethnic language, cultural cuisines and garb.  The Uyghur in Xinjiang, like other Muslim minorities throughout China, saw their religious texts and mosques destroyed, their religious leaders persecuted, and individual adherents punished.  With the more open policies of the late 1970s through the early 1990s, restrictions on minorities and religions began to loosen.  This opening resulted in more minorities speaking out against what were seen as discriminatory economic, religious, and political practices.  The Chinese government began to crack down in Xinjiang in 1996, shortly after the first meeting of the Shanghai Five, soon to be the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose members include Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

In addition to police and military crackdowns, Beijing believes that economic development can undermine Uyghur calls for independence and solve Xinjiang's problems. And economically, Xinjiang has dramatically improved relative to its economy of a decade ago, although it still lags behind the industrialized coastal areas. However, the very improvements attributed to economic enhancement open China to risk in Xinjiang. For example, as part of its development plans, Beijing is connecting Xinjiang to Central Asia through roads, rails and pipelines to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. But these very openings are exposing Xinjiang directly to Islamic militant training and arms as well as the drug trade emanating from these countries and beyond. 

State Responses

The response from Beijing has been officially reasonable, but less so in practice.  In September 1999, National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China was released by the Office of the State Council.  The policy outlines a fairly generous policy toward minorities.   The problem, of course, is always in the actual adherence to policy in real life situations where minorities are often viewed with various preconceived notions of race and ethnicity.  Open tolerance of minorities declined further in Xinjiang after September 11, 2001, when China felt it was now both internationally permissible to “crack down” on separatists in Xinjiang and nationally more urgent to protect its porous borders from an influx of more violent forms of Islam, borders which abut Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.  

Chinese central government policies are also reflected in recent policy statements.  For instance, at the May 2006 meeting of the Chinese National Islamic Council, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, urged Islamic leaders in China to play a positive role in building a “harmonious society.”   The message reflects the Chinese government’s perceived connection between Muslims, many of whom are also ethnic minorities in China, and social unrest.  According to Ye Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, “As Chinese Muslims advance with the nation, this is our response to the many turbid misunderstandings that tarnish the Muslim image: Islam is a peace-loving religion.  Chinese Muslims love peace, oppose turmoil and separatism, advocate tolerance and harmony, and treasure unity and stability.” 

Clearly the Chinese government has been cracking down on Uyghur militants. Western human rights groups are concerned about overall treatment of prisoners and the targeting of minorities, while the Chinese government is concerned that Islamic militant rhetoric and funding are finding their way into China. The issue then becomes whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority, using terrorism and separatism as an excuse to violate their human rights, or whether China itself is a victim of separatists and terror networks like the al-Qaeda camps,  which trained Uyghurs in Afghanistan for activities in Xinjiang.   The Chinese tend to refer to this concern by the three character slogan of separatism, extremism and terrorism, implying a distinct link between the three concepts.  For instance, Chinese President Hu Jintao said on June 17, 2004, that "We have to fight against the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism," in a speech at a summit meeting of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), adding that terrorism in all forms must be suppressed and double standards must be ruled out in fighting what is regarded as a grave threat to world peace and development. Efforts should be made to tackle the problems of regional confrontation and poverty, which are considered the roots of terrorism, said the Chinese president. "Terrorism is not automatically related to certain ethnic groups or religions," he added.  It is clear that the Chinese leadership fears that Xinjiang separatism has and will continue to gain support from transnational Muslim extremists, with possible ramifications both for other latent Chinese separatist movements without a Muslim connection and for other Chinese Muslims without a separatist agenda.

The central government’s policies on separatists include the use of force, certainly evident in Xinjiang, For example, in August 2001, the Chinese military undertook large-scale exercises in Xinjiang with an imposing parade of military hardware through the center of the city of Kashgar.  The Xinjiang exercises, which were spread over almost a month, reportedly involved 50,000 troops, one of the largest ever staged by the Chinese in the region, featuring dozens of armored personnel vehicles, tanks, and camouflaged trucks filled with troops, capped off by a flyover of fighter jets. The parade was presided over by General Fu Quanyou, then chief of general staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and a member of the Central Military Commission. A number of other generals and senior officers, based at the Lanzhou military region which co-ordinates defense in Xinjiang, also sat on the podium to view the parade.  The use of domestic force is possible partly because of the existing international war on terrorism, the prevailing perception of the linkages between terrorism and separatism, the general regional reluctance to condone ethnic separatism, and the global concern that religion is mixing with both terrorism and separatism.

Economic incentives, however, may well be the largest tool in the central government’s policies toward Xinjiang and the Uyghurs, especially the Western Development policies. The western regions, over half of China’s vast expanse of land with its highlands and deserts, are made up of six provinces and three autonomous regions, including Xinjiang. The Western Development policies were first an economic development strategy to reduce poverty and then an urgent social necessity of Chinese leaders. In the early 1980s, then-leader Deng Xiaoping developed a policy to first develop the eastern coastal regions, which already had a better economic foundation than the western regions, and then second to increase the development of the western regions after the development of the eastern regions reached a certain point. In the following decades the poverty gap between eastern and western China widened, resulting in Beijing’s creation in June 1999 of a leading group responsible for the development of the western regions with Premier Zhu Rongji and 17 ministerial-level officials as members. The attempt to use economic tools to address ethnic separatism in Xinjiang reflects the Chinese government’s long-standing belief that most peoples, Uyghurs included, primarily want a good economic life for themselves and their children.

The current Chinese government, under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, is acutely aware of the challenges and dangers that lesser development in the western regions like Xinjiang means for not only China’s overall continued prosperity, but also for political stability, the possible enticements of Islamic extremism, and the calls for ethnic separatism. In 2006, Wang Jinxiang, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission, assured the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that the national strategy to develop the country's western region had made great progress. He said that a total of one trillion yuan (US$125 B) has been spent building infrastructure in western China with an annual average regional economic growth rate of 10.6 percent for six years in a row.   China, continuing with its transportation infrastructure projects, will build twelve new highways in Xinjiang to connect with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. The longest road will stretch 1,680 kilometers from Xinjiang to Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, and finally reach Europe, scheduled for completion before 2010.  Other infrastructure projects either significantly underway or completed as of 2007 are: a south-to-north water diversion, a west-to-east natural gas transfer, a west-to-east power transmission and the completed Qinghai-Tibet Railway.    

 The underlying idea is that if the western regions, most notably Xinjiang, have sufficient development, then the minorities will prosper, be less restive, give less support for separatist  activities, and be more integrated into the fortunes—both economic and political—of China.  A complicating factor that has become manifest along with this economic development has been migration into the western regions, primarily of Han (or majority) Chinese.  Not only is this making the western regions more ethnically Chinese, but also it is reinforcing the “minority” status of the Uyghurs, who watch the better paying jobs go to Han Chinese while the harder labor, poorer paying positions are given to Uyghurs. The other ethnic groups living in Xinjiang—Kazaks, Hui, Kirgiz, Mongols, and others—have more mixed feelings about Han money and people moving into the region.

In addition to the national Western Development policies, there are the provincial and local policies in Xinjiang.   As in many places, politics are local in China.  While it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of Muslim status and politics inside of China, with a Muslim population of approximately 20 million,  there is a decidedly regional, provincial and ethnic character to Islam in China as well. China’s ten Muslim ethnic minorities usually find common cause only when they feel an issue denigrates Islam, as was the case with the offensive Danish cartoons of the Muslim prophet Mohammed. The largest group, the Hui who have blended fairly well into Chinese society, regard some Uyghurs as unpatriotic separatists who give other Chinese Muslims a bad name. The Hui “don't tend to get too involved in international Islamic conflict," said Dr. Dru Gladney, a scholar of Chinese ethnic minorities. "They don't want to be branded as radical Muslims."  

The local perception of groups as radical Muslims or ethnic separatists can have severe consequences. Provincial policies also include the threat of force. Armed police held a large-scale anti-terror exercise in Xinjiang on August 30, 2005. In the exercise, special police forces fought and subdued a group of "armed terrorists" who took over a company building and held some people as hostages following a failed attack at a prison.   

There are mixed policy assessments in the Xinjiang region itself regarding the Uyghurs.  On the one hand, deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a Han Chinese, Zhang Xiuming, implied that separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang is an issue when he said, “We need to take the initiative and go on the offensive, crack down on gangs as soon as they surface and strike the first blow. We must absolutely not permit the three vicious forces to build organizations, have ringleaders, control weapons and develop an atmosphere. We need to destroy them one by one as we discover them and absolutely not allow them to build up momentum.”  On the other hand, the Chair of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government and a Uyghur Chinese, Ismael Tiliwaldi, implied something quite different, when he said, “In Xinjiang, not one incident of explosion or assassination took place in the last few years....Last year Xinjiang’s public security situation was very good...”

It is clear nonetheless that both the central government and the provincial authorities broadly fall on the side of avoiding becoming a victim of terrorist or separatist activities when it comes to the question of whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority or whether China itself is a victim of Uyghur militants.  For instance, following the mass protests and violent riots of April 1990 in Baren township, there were further Uyghur demonstrations and disturbances in various cities including Yining, Khotan and Aksu in the mid-1990s.  This was followed by the Chinese government response: the initiation of a "strike hard" campaign against crime throughout China in 1996 which made Uyghurs and separatists in Xinjiang a key target. After the forceful suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs in the city of Yining in February 1997, several days of serious unrest reigned in the city. A renewed national "strike hard" campaign against crime was initiated in April 2001 and has never formally been brought to a close. Several levels of police conspicuously and daily patrolled the Uyghur sections of Urumqi in 2007; Han police officers patrolled the streets in a six-man formation wearing black uniforms and black flack jackets, armed with batons and side arms. 

China’s official statement on "East Turkestan terrorists" published in January 2002 listed several groups allegedly responsible for violence, including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the Islamic Reformist Party ‘Shock Brigade’, the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkestan International Committee.  There is not always clarity in the way these groups are officially labeled nor do these groups seem to stay static. For instance, in 1997, the Uyghurstan Liberation Front and the United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (UNRF) overcame their differences and joined together in a jihad in Xinjiang. The UNRF fears Uyghurs who agree with China, and announced that it had assassinated an imam of the mosque in Kashgar in 1996 because of his pro-China views.  When China destroyed an Islamist camp in Xinjiang in January 2007, killing 18 suspected terrorists and capturing 17 others, a police spokeswoman, Ba Yan, said the training camp was run by ETIM. 

Some of the issues between Uyghurs and the Chinese government, however, seem unrelated to separatist issues.  In another recent incident, hundreds of Uyghurs protested outside government offices over plans to push them off their farmlands to build a dam, according to a Chinese police official and Radio Free Asia. Police arrested at least 16 protesters in Xinjiang's Yili county, the site of clashes between security forces and Uyghurs in 1997. The June 2004 protests began outside the offices of a reservoir and hydropower station planned for the local Tekas River, according to U.S.-based Radio Free Asia. Authorities plan to move about 18,000 farmers, forestry workers and herders to make way for the reservoir, but protesters said they've been paid only 880 yuan (about US$100) out of 38,000 yuan (US$4,600) promised to them, the station said, citing anonymous witnesses. An officer at Tekas County police headquarters confirmed the June 11, 2004, protest, saying, "The protest was big. People don't want to move because they aren't satisfied with the amount of compensation for resettlement.” 

International Responses

It is less clear how the international community stands on this question of whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority or whether China itself is a victim of Uyghur militants. A report produced in December 2001 by the US Congressional Research Service, for instance, documented a number of armed groups operating in the region.  Its list of armed groups included: the United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan, the Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan, the Wolves of Lop Nor, the Xinjiang Liberation Organization, the Uighur Liberation Organization, the Home of East Turkestan Youth and the Free Turkestan Movement. Pakistan also considers several of these organizations as terrorist or militant separatist organizations.

The US did agree in 2002 to specifically single out ETIM as a terrorist organization in response to a planned attack on the US Embassy in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.  Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage announced that ETIM had been added to a State Department list of terrorist groups, freezing its assets in the United States, saying the group “committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians without any regard for who was hurt.” A spokesman for the embassy went further, accusing ETIM of working with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network and “planning attacks against U.S. interests abroad, including the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.” ETIM's leader and China's most-wanted terrorist, Hasan Mahsum, who was later killed by Pakistani forces on October 2, 2003, said, “We don't have any organizational contact or relations with al Qaeda or the Taliban…. Maybe some individuals fought alongside them on their own.”   Two suspected ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan in May 2002 for planning terrorist attacks. The Kyrgyz government has identified the men as Mamet Yasyn and Mamet Sadyk and said they were planning attacks on embassies, markets and public gathering places in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

However, the US has declined to formally add another Uyghur organization, ETLO, to its list. In a Radio Free Asia interview, conducted on 24 January 2003, the leader of ETLO, Mehmet Emin Hazret reportedly stated, “Our principle [sic] goal is to achieve independence for East Turkestan by peaceful means. But to show our enemies and friends our determination on the East Turkestan issue, we view a military wing as inevitable.”  Regarding other Uyghur militants, Chinese officials asked the United States to return Chinese Uyghurs captured fighting in Afghanistan. The United States has rejected China's claims and in May 2006 released five Uyghurs  to Albania, a neutral third country, while continuing to hold thirteen more Chinese Uyghurs in the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay.  Lawyers for these thirteen Uyghurs say the men were moved to Guantanamo Bay's high-security facility,  while the U.S. Government does not comment on enemy combatants held in Guantanamo.

Pakistan, both a neighbor and friend of China, has taken a more stringent line toward Uyghurs, closer to the policies of most Central Asian neighbors. China and Pakistan agreed to enter into an extradition treaty to facilitate the exchange of prisoners in 2003. Ismail Kadir, reported to be the third highest leader of ETIM, was returned to China in March 2002 following his capture by Pakistani authorities reportedly in either Kashmir or in the city of Rawalpindi, northern Pakistan, home to a sizeable community of Uyghurs. In Pakistan, a senior Interior Ministry official confirmed Kadir's repatriation to China, saying the man had been arrested in March. “He was sent back to China after being interrogated,” the official said giving no further details.  Ismail Semed, allegedly another Uyghur ETIM founder, was executed in Urumqi after being deported from Pakistan where he had fled after serving two jail terms for alleged involvement in the violent Baren uprising in 1990. Semed was convicted in October 2005 of “attempting to split the motherland” and the possession of firearms and explosives.  And Pakistani troops reportedly killed Hasan Mahsum, yet another ETIM leader, in the South Waziristan region of Pakistan on 2 October 2003.   Pakistan President Musharraf stated during his November 2003 visit to Beijing that “his country will never allow anybody, including the terrorist force of ‘East Turkestan’, to use the territory of Pakistan to carry out any form of anti-China activities.”  Thousands of Uyghurs reportedly travel to and from Pakistan for business and religious purposes, particularly to study in Pakistan’s madrassas. China believes that more than 1,000 Uyghurs were trained by bin Laden's forces in Afghanistan,  with approximately 110 returning to China, about 300 allegedly captured or killed by U.S. forces, and about 600 escaping to northern Pakistan.  In addition, some reports suggest that Uyghurs have been trained in unofficial Pakistan militant training camps.  

This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the Uyghur population resident in Central Asia who are associated with the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and individuals.  Uyghurs are often viewed with a great deal of leeriness in Central Asia.  Uyghur separatists within Xinjiang drew inspiration and envy from their Central Asian neighbors' independence after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and they increased their movement toward a separate Uyghur state. Militant Uyghur groups exploited Xinjiang’s porous border with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan to establish training camps outside of China's reach  as well as to move explosives and small arms into China.  Additionally, it is much easier for citizens of surrounding countries to serendipitously travel into China. “This year, we have arrested 19 people from abroad who were sent to Xinjiang for violent sabotage,'” Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan told reporters at a news conference in Xinjiang's capital, Urumqi. “When they entered the territory of Xinjiang, we immediately caught them,” Wang said without elaborating.  

The very rapid growth of economic relations and connecting infrastructure between China and Central Asian countries  has also enabled the enhanced movement of ideas, weapons and people. There are roughly a half million Uyghurs in Central Asia.  Most of the Central Asian governments, notably Kyrgyzstan, have made several attempts to crack down on Uyghurs whom they view as undesirable or militant. There is a tendency to view Uyghurs with suspicion—they are frequently unemployed and thus seen as thieves and troublemakers as well as harboring discontent toward their host governments. Uyghurs in Central Asian countries often join hands with other dissident groups, united by the global Islamic resurgence. For instance, Uzbek leaders believe that ethnic Uyghurs from Central Asia and China are members of the terrorist organization known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  Since the beginning of 2005, there has been a wave of “election-related turmoil” or so-called “Color Revolutions” in Central Asia, with terrorist and extremist forces often funded from outside and uniting religious extremists with political dissidents against authoritarian governments. Afghanistan has witnessed the resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda in the wake of a new wave of terrorist attacks following the Iraq War. More severely, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other extremist groups are quickly winning popular support in Central Asia, particularly in the poverty-stricken Fergana countryside, bespeaking a reemerging grim security situation in the region that poses new challenges to both Central Asian countries and China.

Energy

Although most experts would agree that the primary issues at stake in Xinjiang are ethnic separatism and Muslim extremism, the issue of energy is not negligible.  Not only does Xinjiang have considerable energy resources in terms of gas and oil, in addition to its former role as the Chinese nuclear test grounds, but also Xinjiang is the gateway to Central Asian energy resources.  China is pursuing pipeline deals with its oil rich neighbors in Central Asia, as well as Russia, to help meet the booming economy's demand for energy.

China and Kazakhstan started energy cooperation in 1997, marked by an intergovernmental agreement covering diverse means of collaboration in oil and gas fields, including an oil pipeline between western Kazakhstan and China's Xinjiang. The transnational Atasu pipeline was completed in November 2005. The deal, signed in 2004, came as Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev and President Hu Jintao signed a broad agreement for joint exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. The two sides also are stepping up consideration of plans for a natural gas pipeline to connect gas fields in the Caspian Sea with China.   Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement to build up international passenger and freight rail transport, as part of an effort to boost trade and complete routes through Kazakhstan to Europe.  A China-Kazakhstan rail link opened in 1992.  Additionally, China and Kazakhstan have opened a free trade zone at their mutual border to further enhance their already rapidly growing economic relationship.

Gas pipelines from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to China are also in the works. These pipelines, if connected with the Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline, will also contribute to the implementation of China’s Western Development policies. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, now deceased, and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a framework agreement on oil and gas cooperation on April 3, 2006, including a Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline to be commissioned in 2009.  Turkmenistan's gas reserves are considered to be the largest in Central Asia.  These developments usher in new energy cooperation between China and Central Asia, and these energy supplies—unlike Middle Eastern or other energy supplies—do not require maritime security.

Alternative Futures

The future that most worries the Chinese is that the Uyghur Muslim movement in Xinjiang will, on the one hand, externally hook up with international Muslim movements throughout Asia and the Middle East, bringing with it an influx of Islamic extremism and a desire to challenge the Chinese central government.  On the other hand, the Chinese fear the Uyghur movement could internally radicalize other minorities, whether it was the ethnic Tibetans or the Muslim Hui.  While Beijing is currently successfully managing the separatist movements in China, the possibility of increased difficulty is linked partly to elements outside of Chinese control, such as political instability or increased Islamic extremism in neighboring Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.  Partly, however, the progress of separatist movements in China will be determined by the Chinese themselves in policies and reactions.  If “strike hard” campaigns do or are seen to discriminate against nonviolent Uyghurs and if the perception that economic development in Xinjiang aids Han Chinese at the expense of Uyghurs, the separatist movements will be fueled.

The region as a whole has concerns about growing Uyghur violence.  Central Asian countries, especially those with sizable Uyghur minorities, already worry about Uyghur violence and agitation.  Many of the regional governments, especially authoritarian secular governments, in South Asia and Central Asia are worried about the contagion of increasing Muslim radicalization.  The governments of Southeast Asia are also worried about growing radical networks and training camps, but they also fear the very idea of a fragmenting China.  Not only is China economically important to the region, but also political instability in China would impact all of Asia.

Implications for the United States

Given that the existing scope of the Uyghur Muslim separatist movement in China remains weak and under reasonable control, this need not be a top issue for the United States. Although Beijing has decided to cast this ethnic separatist movement in light of new global perceptions following September 11, 2001, the Uyghur issue, both inside of China and in the neighboring countries, well predates the war on terrorism.  While this is a genuine ethnic separatist movement with at least some ties to global Muslim networks, it is not supported by any of the immediate neighboring country governments and thus is unlikely to erupt into a major concern in the near term.

The United States is constrained in its policy on this issue in any case.  Not only does the US need to work with China on issues of geostrategic importance, but also the Uyghurs who use violence have formed limited associations with groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations.  The best option for the United States is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.

The primary concern for the United States has been  and should remain human rights abuses.  The US-led war on terrorism has led some international human rights organizations to speculate that this new international environment will lead to an increase in human rights abuses globally.  Many of the human rights groups that watch Xinjiang, especially the Chinese “strike hard” campaigns, fear that China is using the war on terror to disregard the human rights of Uyghurs. Not only are human rights abuses abhorrent in and of themselves, but also the Chinese worsen the problem by targeting and antagonizing nonviolent Uyghurs.

A focus on human rights is consistent with the US decision to cite one Uyghur militant group as a terrorist organization, specifically when it was asserted by a third party government that that organization (ETIM) was targeting both civilians and an American embassy, but not to label other Uyghur organizations as terrorists.  There are a few issues with the Uyghur detainees held at Guantanamo, according to a 2007 Congressional Research Service Report, with some Uyghurs being released and other Uyghurs being held indefinitely.   The United States should neither absolutely agree to other countries’ allegations of who is a terrorist nor ignore the growing linkages between extremist organizations that train and arm militants.

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines)

This article is about the insurgency of 1969-2014. For the insurgency of 1899–1913, see Moro Rebellion. For the pre-1899 conflict, see Spanish–Moro conflict.

This article is outdated. (March 2014)

This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling. (December 2014)

It has been suggested that North Cotabato Conflict be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since May 2012.

It has been suggested that Civil conflict in the Philippines be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since February 2014.

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

Part of the Cold War, the War on Terror, and the Civil conflict in the Philippines

PMC BAlikatan Exercise.jpg

MILF militant lying prone.jpg

Above: Filipino and US Troops during the PMC Balikatan Exercise

Below: A member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front training with a light machine gun.

Date March 29, 1969 – ongoing

Location    Philippines (mainly in Mindanao)

Status        Ongoing

Territorial

changes    Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao formed in August 1, 1989

Belligerents

 Philippines

Supported by:

 United States (advisors)[1]

 Australia[2]

 Malaysia (since 2011)[3][4][5][6]

 Indonesia[6][7]

IMT:[6][show]

 Moro National Liberation Front [8]

 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (until 2014)

Former support:

 Egypt[7]

 Libya[9][10][11]

Former alleged support:

 Iran[9][12]

 Indonesia[11]

 Malaysia (until 2001)[10][11]

 Pakistan[9][13][14]

 Saudi Arabia[10][14][15][16]

 Lebanon[9][13]

 Palestine[13]

 North Korea[9][13][17]

 China[9][13][18]

 Vietnam[9]         Abu Sayyaf

 Rajah Sulaiman Movement

 Jemaah Islamiyah

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

 MILF rogue factions[19]

 Khilafah Islamiyah[20]

Supported by:

al-Qaeda[21]

Former alleged support:

 Iran[12][13]

 Iraq[13]

Commanders and leaders

Philippines Ferdinand Marcos (1969–1986)

Philippines Corazon Aquino (1986–1992)

Philippines Fidel V. Ramos (1992–1998)

Philippines Joseph Estrada (1998–2001)

Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010)

Philippines Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)        Nur Misuari

 Habier Malik

 Muslimin Sema

 Murad Ibrahim

 Hashim Salamat         Khadaffy Janjalani †

 Ameril Umbra Kato

Casualties and losses

572 Filipino soldiers[22]

17 American soldiers[23]

(since 2002)

160,000[24]

[show] v t e

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

In 1969, political tensions and open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and jihadist rebel groups.[25] The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established by University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari to condemn the killings of more than 60 Filipino Muslims and later became an aggressor against the government while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group from the MNLF, was established to seek an Islamic state within the Philippines and is more radical and more aggressive. Conflict dates back to 1899 during the uprising of the Bangsamoro people to resist foreign rule from the United States. Hostilities ignited again starting in the 1960s when the government started to resist upcoming rebellions by killing more than 60 Filipino Muslims and continues up to present.

Casualty statistics vary for the conflict however the conservative estimates of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicate that at least 6,015 people were killed in armed conflict between the Government of Philippines and ASG, BIFM, MILF, and MNLF factions between 1989 and 2012.[26]

Contents  [hide]

1 Origins

2 History

2.1 Marcos (1969–1986)

2.2 C. Aquino and Ramos (1986–1998)

2.3 The North Cotabato conflict (2000)

2.4 Estrada and Arroyo (1998–2010)

2.5 Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)

3 See also

4 Notes

5 External links

Origins[edit]

Main articles: Spanish–Moro conflict, Moro Rebellion and Philippine resistance against Japan § Moro resistance on Mindanao and Sulu

The aftermath of the First Battle of Bud Dajo

Fronts and captures in Basilan

The Moros had a history of resistance against Spanish, American, and Japanese rule for 400 years. The origin of the war between the Moros and Filipinos started during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines. During the Spanish–Moro conflict, Spain repeatedly tried to conquer the Moro Sultanate of Sulu,Sultanate of Maguindanao, and the Confederation of sultanates in Lanao. The violent armed struggle against the Japanese, Filipinos, Spanish, and Americans is considered by current Moro Muslim leaders as part of the four centuries long "national liberation movement" of the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation).[27] The 400 year long resistance against the Japanese, Americans, and Spanish by the Moro Muslims persisted and morphed into their current war for independence against the Philippine state.[28]

Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, another conflict sparked in southern Philippines between the revolutionary Muslims in the Philippines and the United States Military that took place between 1899 and 1913. Filipinos opposed foreign rule from the United States that claimed the Philippines as their territory. On August 14, 1898, after defeating Spanish forces, the United States had established a military government in the Philippines under General Wesley Merritt as Military Governor.[29] American forces took control from the Spanish government in Jolo on May 18, 1899, and at Zamboanga in December 1899.[30] Brigadier General John C. Bates was sent to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II. Kiram was disappointed knowing that the American forces would take over since he expected to regain sovereignty after the defeat of Spanish forces in the archipelago. Bates' main goal was to guarantee Moro neutrality in the Philippine-American War, and to establish order in the southern Philippines. After some negotiation, the Bates Treaty was signed which was based on an earlier Spanish treaty. The Bates Treaty did ensure the neutrality of the Muslims in the south but it was actually set up to buy time for the Americans until the war in the north ended.

On March 20, 1900, General Bates was replaced by Brigadier General William August Kobbé and the District of Mindanao-Jolo was upgraded to a full department. American forces in Mindanao were reinforced and hostilities with the Moro people lessened although there are reports of Americans and other civilians being attacked and slain by Moros.

Insurrection began in 1900 and lasted for a year. The American forces then move push inside the settles of Moro people. Kobbé was replaced by George Whitefield Davis as the commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo and put up better relationships with the Moro people.

It continued for more than three decades which resulted in significant loss of life.[citation needed] Military governors were appointed by the United States to ensure peace and stability within the region. The conflict ended at the term of Major General John J. Pershing, the third and final military governor of Moro Province, although major resistance continued in Bud Dajo and Mount Bagsak in Jolo.

Repeated rebellions by the Moros against American rule continued to break out even after the main Moro Rebellion ended, right up to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II. During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the Moros waged an insurgency against the Japanese on Mindanao and Sulu until the Japanese were defeated and driven out.

History[edit]

Marcos (1969–1986)[edit]

Under President Ferdinand Marcos, 68 Filipino Muslim military trainees were murdered in Corregidor allegedly by soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[31][32] The trainees were believed to be a part of an upcoming rebellion.[32] By then, University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to condemn the killings of the 68 Filipino Muslims and to seek the establishment of a Bangsamoro nation through force of arms.[32]

In 1969, the MNLF waged armed conflict against the Philippine government.[32] During one of the fierce battles of the insurgency in 1974, Jolo was burned down and news of the tragedy galvanized other Muslims around the world to pay greater attention to the conflict. Two years later, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement, declaring ceasefire on both sides. Within the agreement provided that Mindanao would remain a part of the Philippines but 13 of its provinces would be under the autonomous government for the Bangsamoro people.[32] President Marcos went against the agreement and violence ensued.

In 1977, Shiekh Salamat Hashim established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group of the MNLF seeking to establish an Islamic state.[33] Conflicts between these rebel groups and the Armed Forces of the Philippines would continue until the end of the regime of President Marcos.

C. Aquino and Ramos (1986–1998)[edit]

Earlier in her term, President Corazon Aquino arranged a meeting with MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and several MNLF rebel groups in Sulu, which paved the way for a series of negotiations. In 1989, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act No. 6734 or the ARMM Organic Act, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.[34]

In 1991, Abdurajak Janjalani, a former teacher who studied Islam in the Middle East, formed the Abu Sayyaf Group after reportedly meeting Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Janjalani recruited former members of the MNLF for the more radical and theocratic Abu Sayyaf.[32]

Under the Presidency of Fidel V. Ramos, several negotiations and peace talks[25] were held and the ARMM was solidified and was to have its own geopolitical system.[32]

The North Cotabato conflict (2000)[edit]

Background

1000 MILF rebels under the command of Umbra Kato have seized control of thirty five villages in the North Cotabato province. 2000 Philippine troops with helicopters and artillery were sent in to the seized area on August 9 to liberate it from the rebels. The MILF had wanted North Cotabato to be included in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The government and MILF had been negotiating for the inclusion of the province in the Muslim Autonomous Region but the Supreme Court had struck down the proposal after hearing concern from local Christian leaders in the region.

Conflict

The rebel troops were ordered to leave the area by their commanders but the contingents under Kato refused to leave the villages they had occupied and instead dug in. The Philippine Army responded on August 9 by bombarding them. The next day, the government forces moved to retake the villages recapturing two of them from the rebels.[35][36]

Estrada and Arroyo (1998–2010)[edit]

Political map of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

During his term President Joseph Ejercito Estrada he declared an "all-out war" against the MILF on March 21, 2000 although a series of negotiations for cessation of hostilities were held.[33] Apparently, several conflicts in and around Mindanao erupted and clashes between the Philippine Military and the rebel groups resulted in massive loss of lives.

During his term, these rebel groups kidnapped three Italian priests, two were later released and one was shot dead;[37][38] seized the municipal hall of Talayan, Maguindanao and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; the bombing of the ferry Our Lady of Mediatrix at Ozamiz; and the takeover of Narciso Ramos Highway. All these incidents resulted in massive loss of investments abroad, especially in the area of Mindanao.

As a result, the Armed Forces of the Philippines launched a successful campaign against these rebel groups and 43 minor camps, 13 major camps including the MILF headquarters, and Camp Abubakar[39] fell. MILF suffered heavy losses and the head of MILF, Sheikh Salamat Hashim, fled the country and sought refuge in Malaysia. On October 5, 2000, 609 rebels surrendered in Cagayan de Oro, along with renegade town mayor Mulapandi Cosain Sarip.[40] These was followed by another massive surrender of 855 rebels on December 29, 2000. President Joseph Ejercito Estrada then ordered that the Philippine flag be raised in Mindanao which symbolized victory. It was raised on July 9, 2000 near a Madh'hab and again the next day along with President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, which held a feast inside a classroom just meters away from a mosque.[39]

As a result, several Islamic rebel groups retaliated, bombing several key locations within the National Capital Region on December 30, 2000. It resulted in 22 deaths and hundreds of people injured. Saifullah Yunos, one of the perpetrators was arrested in Cagayan de Oro as he was about to board a plane bound to Manila in May 2003.[41] In 2004, two members of the Jemaah Islamiyah were arrested, namely Mamasao Naga and Abdul Pata as they were identified by Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi as responsible for the train bombing.[42] al-Ghozi was also arrested, but was later killed in a firefight when he tried to escape the prison on October 13, 2003.

On May 27, 2001, the Abu Sayyaf seized twenty hostages from an upscale resort in Palawan. Four of the hostages managed to escape.[43] The kidnapping group composed of 40 gunmen then seized the Dr. Jose Torres Memorial Hospital and St. Peter's Church compound in the town of Lamitan in Basilan[44] and claimed to have taken captive 200 people although 20 people were confirmed to be taken captive inside the hospital, including the staff and the patients.[45][46]

There was a crossfire between the Army and the Abu Sayyaf rebels in Lamitan following the takeover of Dr. Jose Torres Memorial Hospital which resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers, including the army captain.[46] Up to 22 soldiers were reportedly to have been killed in an effort to rescue the hostages.

Five more captives escaped during the battle at Lamitan. Two of the captives were killed prior to the siege in Lamitan, including the beheading of one.[43] The Abu Sayyaf then conducted series of raids, including one at a coconut plantation[47] where the rebel groups hacked the heads of two men using bolo knives. The owners and a security guard was also held captive and the rebel groups burnt down two buildings, including a chapel a week after the battle in Lamitan.[47] Another raid was conducted in August 2, 2001 on Barangay Balobo in Lamitan, Basilan. After three days, the Philippine Army rescued numerous hostages[48] after they overtook the hideout of the militants where 11 bodies were found beheaded.[49] Other hostages were either released or had escaped.[48]

On June 13, 2001, the number of hostages was calculated at around 28 as three more people were found beheaded in Basilan,[50] including that of Guillermo Sobero.[51] They were beheaded since the Philippine Army would not halt the rescue operation.[51]

The Burhams were still on the group of 14 still held captive according to three hostages who escaped on October 2001.[51] On June 7, 2002, after a year of being held captive, a rescue mission was conducted and resulted in the deaths of Martin Burnham and a nurse named Ediborah Yap[52] after being caught in the crossfire. Martin was killed by three gunshots in the chest while Gracia was wounded in her right leg. By this time Nur Misuari ordered his supporters to attack government targets to prevent the holding of elections on ARMM on November 2001, ushering his exit as the governor of the region.[32] Misuari would be later arrested in 2007 in Malaysia and was deported back to the Philippines for trial.[32]

On July 2004, Gracia Burnham testified at a trial of eight Abu Sayyaf members and identified six of the suspects as being her erstwhile captors, including Alhamzer Limbong, Abdul Azan Diamla, Abu Khari Moctar, Bas Ishmael, Alzen Jandul and Dazid Baize. Fourteen Abu Sayyaf members were sentenced to life imprisonment while four were acquitted. Alhamzer Limbong was later killed in a prison uprising.[53]

These rebel groups, especially the Abu Sayyaf conducted several terror attacks, namely the bombings at Zamboanga in October 2002; the bombing of SuperFerry 14 on February 2004; the simultaneous bombings in Central Mindanao on October 2006; the beheadings of several Philippine Marines on July 2007; the Batasang Pambansa bombing on November 2007; and the 2009 bombings in Mindanao.

Numerous clashes erupted between the Philippine Army and the rebel groups, such as the clash on June 14, 2009 that killed 10 rebels.[54]

Since 2001, the Philippines and the United States have been on a campaign to battle this insurgency, known as War on Terror. To combat the insurgency, the United States and the Philippines conducted the Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines,[55] a part of the worldwide campaign against terrorism known as Operation Enduring Freedom.

Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)[edit]

See also: Zamboanga City crisis

In 2013, two main camps of the Abu Sayyaf group were overrun by forces of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in its latest offensive in Patikul.[56] According to MNLF leader Nur Misuari, the MNLF offensive against the Abu Sayyaf is because of the MNLF opposition to the Abu Sayyafs human rights abuses which goes against Islam.

During the term of President Benigno Aquino III, a series of peace talks for the cessation of hostilities was held, including the meeting of MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ibrahim in Tokyo, Japan which was lauded on both sides.[32] Norway also joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) on January 2011, overseeing the ceasefire agreement between the government and MILF on Mindanao. Despite the peace talks, a series of conflicts erupted. on September 10, 2011, Jal Idris, a hardcore member of Abu Sayyaf, was arrested by government forces after a crossfire between the Philippine Army and the rebel group[57] The Armed Forces of the Philippines also killed three Abu Sayyaf militants in a stand-off[58] the following day after the arrest of Jal Idris.

Terrorism continued throughout President Benigno's term, notable cases include when 4 merchants and a guide were killed by Abu Sayyaf bandits in January 2011.[59] and later a soldier who was killed in a clash against the rebels.[60] In August 2011, rebel factions attacked a village in Sulu, killing 7 Marines and taking 7 civilians captive. They later freed 2 of the hostages after a ransom was paid.[61] Also, several areas of Mindanao were bombed in August by the government, and a Filipino businesswoman was abducted in September 2011[62] who was later freed after the three gunmen were gunned down by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[63]

On October 20th 2011, the MILF was blamed for an attack on 40 government soldiers in the province of Basilan, which lead to the deaths of 19 soldiers and 6 MILF fighters.[64] This thereby violated the ceasefire agreement between the government and MILF. This caused outrage in the government, which lead to the continuation of the war against terrorism in the country.

On the website of the Moro National Liberation Front, Nur Misuari declared its support for China against the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute, calling both China and the Moro people as victims of Philippine colonialism, and noting China's history of friendly relations with the Moros.[65] The MNLF website also denounced America's assistance to the Philippines in their colonization of the Moro people in addition to denouncing the Philippines claims to the islands disputed with China, and denouncing America for siding with the Philippines in the dispute, noting that in 1988 China "punished" Vietnam for attempting to set up a military presence on the disputed islands. The website also pointed out that the Moros and China maintained peaceful relations, while on the other hand the Moros had to resist other colonial powers, having to fight the Spanish, fight the Americans, and fight the Japanese, in addition to fighting the Philippines.[66]

The Zamboanga City crisis erupted on September 9, 2013 when a MNLF faction known by other groups as the Rogue MNLF Elements (RME), under the Sulu State Revolutionary Command (SSRC), led by Ustadz Habier Malik and Khaid Ajibon attempted to raise the flag of the self-proclaimed Bangsamoro Republik at Zamboanga City Hall (which had earlier declared its independence on August 12, 2013 in Talipao, Sulu), and took civilians hostage. This armed incursion was met by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which sought to free the hostages and expel the MNLF from the city. The standoff degenerated into urban warfare, and had brought parts of the city under a standstill for days. On September 28, the government declared the end of military operations in Zamboanga City after successfully defeating the MNLF and rescuing all the hostages.

On January 24, 2014, the Philippines government chief negotiator Miriam Coronel Ferer and MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal signed a peace agreement in Kuala Lumpur. The agreement would pave the way for the creation of the new Muslim autonomous entity called "Bangsamoro" under a law to be approved by the Philippine Congress.[67] The government aims to set up the region by 2016. The agreement calls for Muslim self-rule in parts of the southern Philippines in exchange for a deactivation of rebel forces by the MILF. MILF forces would turn over their firearms to a third party to be selected by the MILF and the Philippine government. A regional police force would be established, and the Philippine military would reduce the presence of troops and help disband private armies in the area.[68]

South Thailand insurgency

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

South Thailand insurgency

Souththailandmap.GIF

Map of the southern provinces of Thailand showing the Malay-Muslim majority areas

Date 1960[5] – ongoing

(55 years)

Location    Southern Thailand (4 provinces[6]—Songkhla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat)

Status        Ongoing

Belligerents

Emblem of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.svg Royal Thai Armed Forces

Emblem of Royal Thai Police.png Royal Thai Police       Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg National Revolution Front (BRN)

Flag of Jihad.svg Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)

Flag of Jihad.svg Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP)

Flag of Jihad.svg United Mujahideen Front of Pattani (BBMP)

Flag of Jihad.svg Islamic Front for the Liberation of Pattani (BIPP)

Flag of Pattani.svg Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

Flag of Jihad.svg Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) [1]

Flag of Jihad.svg BNPP[2]

Pusaka [1]

Pemuda [1]

Black December 1902 [3]

Flag of Jihad.svg Saibillillah [3]

Hikmat Allah Abadan [3]

Supported by: Flag of Aceh.svg Free Aceh Movement [4]

Plo emblem.png Palestine Liberation Organization [3]

Commanders and leaders

Flag of Thailand.svg Sarit Dhanarajata

Flag of Thailand.svg Praphas Charusathien

Flag of Thailand.svg Anupong Paochinda

Flag of Thailand.svg Praphas Charusathien

Flag of Thailand.svg Pongsapat Pongcharoen

Flag of Thailand.svg Kowit Wattana

Flag of Thailand.svg Prayuth Chan-ocha       Flag of Jihad.svg Tunku Yala Nasae [3]

Flag of Jihad.svg Wan Kadir Che Wan

Flag of Jihad.svg Abdullah Sungkar

Flag of Pattani.svg Kabir Abdul Rahman

Flag of Pattani.svg Sama-ae Thanam [3]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Sapaeing Basoe [1]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Masae Useng [1]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Hassan Taib

Tengku Jalal Nasir[2]

Flag of Jihad.svg Nasoree Saesang [3]

Strength

Emblem of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.svg 306,000   5,000 - 30,000 [2]

Casualties and losses

499 soldiers, 312 policemen, and 181 defense volunteers killed[7]   399 dead[7]

Total casualties: 5,352 killed and 9,965 injured[7]

[show] v t e

South Thailand Insurgency

The South Thailand Insurgency (Thai: ความไม่สงบในชายแดนภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย) is an intractable conflict taking place mainly in Southern Thailand. It originated in the 1960s as an ethnic separatist insurgency in the historical Malay Patani Region, made up of the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, but has become more complex and increasingly violent since 2001.

The former Sultanate of Patani, which comprised the southern Thai provinces of Pattani (Patani), Yala (Jala), Narathiwat (Menara)—also known as the three Southern Border Provinces (SBP)[8]—as well as neighboring parts of Songkhla Province (Singgora), and the northeastern part of Malaysia (Kelantan), was conquered by the Kingdom of Siam in 1785 and, except for Kelantan, the area has been governed by Thailand ever since.

Although low level separatist violence had occurred in the region for decades, the campaign escalated after 2001, with a recrudescence in 2004, occasionally spilling over into other provinces.[9] Outside the region, incidents blamed on southern insurgents have occurred in Bangkok and Phuket.[10]

In July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assumed wide-ranging emergency powers to deal with the southern violence, but the insurgency escalated further. On 19 September 2006, a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup. The junta implemented a major policy shift by replacing Thaksin's earlier approach with a campaign to win over the "hearts and minds" of the insurgents.[11] Despite little progress in curbing the violence, the junta declared that security was improving and that peace would come to the region by 2008.[12] By March 2008, however, the death toll surpassed 3,000.[13]

During the Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted a "sense of optimism" and said that he was confident of bringing peace into the region within 2010.[14] But by the end of 2010 insurgency-related violence had increased, confounding the government's optimism.[15] Finally in March 2011, the government conceded that violence was increasing and could not be solved in a few months.[16]

Local leaders have persistently demanded at least a level of autonomy from Thailand for the Patani region and some of the separatist insurgent movements have made a series of demands for peace talks and negotiations. However, these groups have been largely sidelined by the BRN-C, the group currently spearheading the insurgency which sees no reason for negotiations and is against talks with other insurgent groups. The BRN-C has as its immediate aim to make Southern Thailand ungovernable and has largely been successful at it.[17]

Estimates of the strength of the insurgency vary greatly. In 2004 General Panlop Pinmanee claimed that there were only 500 hard-core insurgents. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Around 2004 some Thai analysts believed that foreign Islamic terrorist groups were infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims were balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict.

Over 6,000 people have died and more than 10,000 have been injured between 2004 and 2014 in a formerly ethnic separatist insurgency, which has currently been taken over by hard-line Jihadis and pitted them against both the Thai-speaking Buddhist minority and local Muslims who have a moderate approach or who support the Thai government.

Contents  [hide]

1 History of the insurgency

1.1 Historical background

1.2 Forced assimilation and local nationalism

1.3 21st century: The violence expands and intensifies

1.4 Main incidents after the 2001 insurgency upsurge

1.5 Timeline

1.5.1 1960-1998

1.5.2 1999-2002

1.5.3 2003

1.5.4 2004

1.5.5 2005

1.5.6 2006

1.5.7 2007

1.5.8 2008

1.5.9 2009

1.5.10 2010

1.5.11 2011

1.5.12 2012

1.5.13 2013

1.5.14 2014

2 Reactions and explanations

2.1 Official reactions

2.2 Political factors

2.3 Economic factors

3 Leading insurgent groups

3.1 BRN-C

3.2 RKK

3.3 GMIP

3.4 BBMP

3.5 PULO

3.6 Symbols

4 High profile incidents

4.1 Krue Se Mosque Incident

4.2 Tak Bai incident

5 Reconciliation and negotiation

5.1 Negotiation attempts

5.2 National Reconciliation Commission

6 Casualties

7 Human Rights Issues

7.1 Government harassment of suspected insurgents

8 See also

9 Further reading

10 References

11 Further reading

12 External links

History of the insurgency[edit]

Malay Muslim provinces in Southern Thailand with northern Malaysia.

Thailand

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politics and government of

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Historical background[edit]

Despite the ethnic affinity of the people of the Patani region with their Malay neighbours to the south, the old Patani Kingdom was led by Sultans who historically preferred to pay tribute to the distant Siamese kings in Bangkok. For many centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas, ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgment of Siamese suzerainty, leaving the Patani rulers largely alone.[18]

Forced assimilation and local nationalism[edit]

Thai rule over the historical Patani region was confirmed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. However, until well into the 20th century, the government in Bangkok had interfered little, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local laws based on Islam regarding issues on inheritance and family. However, by 1934 Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion of a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Patani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand.[19]

The National Culture Act was enforced as a result of the Thaification process, promoting the concept of 'Thai-ness' and its centralist aims. Its 'Mandate 3' was directly aimed at the Patani people.[20] By 1944, Thai civil law was enforced throughout the land including the Patani region overriding earlier concessions to local Islamic administrative practices.[21] The school curriculum was revised to that of a Thai-centric one with all lessons in the Thai language, to the detriment of the local Jawi. Traditional Muslim courts that used to handle civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok. This forced assimilation process and the perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society became an irritant for the harmonious relationship between the ethnic Malay Patani people and the Thai state.[22]

In 1947, Haji Sulong founder of the Patani People’s Movement launched a petition campaign, demanding autonomy, language and cultural rights, and implementation of Islamic law.[2] However, in January 1948, Sulong was arrested on treason charges along with other local leaders branded as 'separatist'. Sulong was released from jail only in 1952 but disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1954.[2]

Denied recognition as a culturally separate ethnic minority, Patani leaders reacted against the Thai government policy towards them. Inspired by ideologies such as Nasserism, in the 1950s a Patani nationalist movement began to grow, leading to the South Thailand insurgency. By 1959, Tengku Jalal Nasir established the Patani National Liberation Front (BNPP), the first Malay rebel group.[2] At the time of their foundation the goal of the nationalist movements, such as PULO, was secession. The emphasis was laid in pursuing an armed struggle towards an independent state where Patani people could live with dignity without having alien cultural values imposed on them.[23]

The last third of the 20th century saw the emergence of different insurgent groups in the South. Despite some differences in ideology they shared broadly separatist aims, but all justified the use of violence in order to reach their goals, setting a pattern of attacking police and military posts, as well as schools and Thai government offices. The effectiveness of these groups was marred, however, by infighting and lack of unity among them.[24]

21st century: The violence expands and intensifies[edit]

A resurgence in violence by Pattani guerrilla groups began after 2001. While the region's traditional separatist insurgents had flags, leaders, claimed responsibility for the attacks, and made communiques, the new groups attacked more viciously and kept silent. This new development disoriented and confused the Thai authorities, who kept groping in the dark as the identity of the new insurgents in the conflict remained a mystery. Thailand held relatively free elections in February 2005, but no secessionist candidates contested the results in the south. In July the same year, the chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee admitted, "The attacks look like they are well-organized, but we do not know what group of people is behind them." Despite of the shroud of anonymity and the absence of concrete demands, revived groups, such as the GMIP, and particularly the BRN-Coordinate and its alleged armed wing the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), have been identified as leading the new insurgency.[25]

While earlier attacks were typified by drive-by shootings in which patrolling policemen were shot by gunmen on passing motorcycles, after 2001 they have escalated to well coordinated attacks on police establishments, with police stations and outposts ambushed by well-armed groups subsequently fleeing with stolen arms and ammunition. Other tactics used in order to gain publicity from shock and horror are slashing to death Buddhist monks, bombing temples, beheadings, intimidating pork vendors and their customers, as well as arson attacks on schools, killing the teachers and burning their bodies.[26]

Current insurgent groups proclaim militant jihadism and are not separatist anymore. Mostly led by Salafist hardliners, they have extreme and transnational religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of a constructive cultural or nationalistic Patani identity. Salafi jihadist groups are hostile to the cultural heritage and practices of traditional Malay Muslims, accusing them of being un-Islamic.[24] They are not concerned about an independent separate nation, instead their immediate aim is to make the Patani region ungovernable.[17]

Thai response to the insurgency has been hampered by clumsy methods, a lack of training in counter-insurgency, a lack of understanding of local culture, and rivalries between the police and the army. Many local policemen are allegedly involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. Often the army responds to the attacks with heavy-handed raids to search Muslim villages, which only results in reprisals. Insurgents routinely provoke the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace.

Main incidents after the 2001 insurgency upsurge[edit]

Attacks after 2001 concentrated on installations of the police and military. However, also schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region have been subject to arson and bombing. Local police officers of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 incidents related to the insurgency in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat by the end of 2001.[27] Other targets of the insurgents have been schoolteachers. The BRN-C, through its 'Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani' paramilitary wing, has been the main group behind the murder of a total of 157 teachers in the Southern Border Provinces between 2004 and 2013.[28][29]

A massive security presence in the region has failed to stem almost daily violence, usually involving drive-by shootings or small bombings. When the insurgents make a show of strength—generally at least every few months—they have eschewed large-scale attacks, preferring well-coordinated pinprick assaults at many locations while avoiding direct clashes with security forces.[30]

Timeline[edit]

1960-1998[edit]

Although the conflict was carried out with less intensity, armed resistance in the 1960s and 1970s involved up to 1,500 insurgents.[1]

In 1960, Barisan Revolusi Nasional was founded by Haji Abdul Karim in response to the introduction of a secular curriculum in Pattani's religious bording schools.[2]

In 1968, Patani United Liberation Organization was founded by Tengku Bira Kotanila (alias Kabir Abdul Rahman).PULO became the most powerful insurgent group during the 1960 - 2000 period of the war.[2]

On 29 November 1975, Thai marines allegedly murdered five Muslim youths in the Bacho district of the Narathiwat province. The government allegedly failed to conduct a proper investigation into the matter.[3]

On 11 December 1975, PULO organized mass protests in response to the event, which were joined by 70,000 Malay Muslims. A bomb was thrown into the crowd killing 12 and injuring at least 30 protestors. The attack was blamed on Buddhist extremists.[3]

The government then proceeded to charge and imprison the perpetrators, launch an official inquiry and compensate the families of the victims. Despite the fact that the majority of the protestors demands were granted, the event led to an escalation of the insurgency.[3]

In June 1977, Sabilillah (Path of God) bombed the Don Muang International Airport in Bangkok. In the aftermath of the bombing Sabilillah vanished into obscurity.[3]

In September 1977, Black December 1902 members threw a bomb into a Thai royal ceremony. 5 people were killed and 47 wounded. The royal family managed to escape unharmed.[3]

In 1977, security forces killed BNPP leader Tunku Yala Nasae.[3]

In 1993 the 'New PULO', a dissident faction of the original PULO, was established by Arrong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo.[2] In 1995, Nasoree Saesang founded the GMIP.[3]

In August 1996, 36 schools were torched in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat allegedly by members of the New PULO faction,[31]> reportedly a dissident faction of the original PULO established by Arrong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo.[2] The Thai Interior Ministry and Thai Military Intelligence reported that New PULO used unemployed youth and young drug addicts to carry out its terrorist missions.[24]

In 1997, members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), PULO and the New PULO established the United Mujahideen Front of Pattani in order to improve coordination between rebel factions.[2]

In August 1997, Bersatu launched an operation codenamed "Falling Leaves". Between August 1997 and January 1998, 33 separate attacks took place resulting in 9 deaths.[3]

In January 1998, Malaysia and Thailand launched a joint operation codenamed 'Pitak Tai' in order to crack down on insurgent outfits.[24] Malaysian authorities arrested New PULO's leader,Abdul Rohman Bazo, its military chief, Haji Daoh Thanam, and Bazo's senior assistant, Haji Mae Yala in Kedah, as well as PULO's military commander, Haji Sama-ae Thanam, in Kuala Lumpur, later handing them to Thai authorities.[3] The Thai government also encouraged local people to monitor the movements of drug traffickers and, as a result, the tough policy on drugs deprived PULO of recruits for its acts of terror.[24]

1999-2002[edit]

[icon] This section requires expansion. (October 2014)

Following the 11 September attacks in the United States, leaflets calling for Holy War and support for Osama bin Laden were distributed in Yala by militants.[32]

On 24 December 2001, insurgents launched a number of attacks on police posts in the three provinces.5 police and one defence volunteer killed.[1]

The Thai National Intelligence Agency had estimated that less than 1,000 armed militants were taking part in the conflict as of 2001.[3]

According to Thai Ministry of Interior estimates 50 insurgency related incidents occurred in 2001.[3]

By 2002, 75 insurgency-linked attacks amounted to 50 deaths among police and army personnel.[2]

2003[edit]

[icon] This section requires expansion. (October 2014)

In 2003, officials counted 149 incidents. The mounting scale and sophistication of the insurgency eventually prompted the government into a recognition that there was a serious issue in the southern provinces.[2]

2004[edit]

A further steep escalation of the violence in the Southern Border Provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat is reckoned to have begun on 4 January 2004 with the raiding of a Thai Army depot.[5]

On January 4, 2004, unidentified gunmen raided an army ammunition depot in Narathiwat Province in the early morning, and made off with over 400 rifles and other ammunition.[2]

On 5 January 2004, 2 policemen were killed while attempting to defuse a bomb outside a shopping mall in Pattani.A third policeman was injured in bomb blast that occurred in a nearby park.Two more bombs were successfully defused in nearby areas.Prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared martial law in the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala.[4]

On 22 January 2004, rebels killed a Buddhist monk.[4]

On 28 March 2004, a bomb planted by insurgents injured 29 people, including 10 Malaysian tourists.[4]

On 30 March 2004, masked men raided a quarry in the Yala district, stealing a total of 1.6 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, 56 sticks of dynamite, and 176 detonators.[2]

On 23 April 2004, militants killed an army officer and set fire to 50 public buildings in all 13 districts of the Narathiwat province.[4]

On 28 April 2004, militants launched a large scale string of attacks on armories and army positions in Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla. 108 rebels were killed in the aftermath of the attacks.[2]

On 10 June 2004, militants killed a night guard outside a government school and seized weapons from other security personnel who were inside.[4]

On 25 October 2004, 78 people were killed by Thai police in the aftermath of a riot over the detentions of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to Islamic separatists. Over 1,300 people were detained in the incident.[4]

On 28 October 2004, an IED detonated outside a bar, killing 2 people and injuring 21.[4]

On 2 November 2004, a Buddhist official was beheaded by suspected Muslim insurgents.[4]

On 4 November 2004, 9 people were killed including 2 policemen.[4]

On 7 November 2004, the Defence Minister of Thailand said that there had been more than 700 casualties in south Thailand since the unrest began in January. Many murders involved shooting and decapitation. During 2004 insurgents began to sow fear in attacks where Buddhists were beheaded.[33]

On 13 November 2004, 1 man was killed and at least 13 people injured when 5 bomb blasts occurred in various parts of the region.[4]

On 5 December 2004, Thailand airdropped nearly 100 million origami cranes over the southern regions of the country in an effort to bring peace. Militants respond with series of bombings in the following day.[4]

A total of 400 people were killed in over 1000 incidents during 2004.[1] [3]

2005[edit]

On 17 February 2005, a bomb exploded near a tourist hotel in the town of Sungai Kolok, killing 5 people and wounding over 40.Additionally 4 people killed in other incidents.[34]

On 3 April 2005, a series of bomb attacks in Songkhla killed two people leaving 66 injured. The bombings marked the beginning of attacks against ethnic Thai Chinese owned businesses who were considered Thaksin supporters and against southern Thailand independence as a Muslim state.

On 14 July 2005, a major attack was launched on the provincial capital of Yala city. 60 militants targeted an area near a hotel, the railway station, two convenience stores and a restaurant roaming the streets using guns, fire-bombs and explosives.[35]

On 18 July 2005, two militants entered a teashop, shot Lek Pongpla, a Buddhist cloth vendor, beheaded him and left the head outside of the shop.[36]

On 19 July 2005, the Thai Prime Minister enacted the "emergency powers law" in order to manage the three troubled states giving himself sweeping powers to direct military operations, suspend civil liberties, and censor the press. Several human rights organizations and local press expressed their concerns that these new powers might be used to violate civil liberty rights. However, the emergency decree was highly popular, with 72% of Bangkok residents and 86% of people in the three southern provinces supporting it.[37] Nevertheless the insurgency escalated further.

On 1 September 2005, three bombs exploded almost simultaneously.[38] Subsequently, 131 civilians from the south fled to neighbouring Malaysia seeking refuge from the Thai authorities. Thailand immediately accused the refugees of being insurgents and demanded that they be returned, sparking a diplomatic spat. Currently, the people are still in Malaysia.[39] Thailand, suspecting that insurgents may also have fled with the refugees, has asked Malaysia to return these Thai citizens but Malaysia has refused on humanitarian grounds.[40]

On 16 October 2005, a group of 20 separatists attacked a Buddhist monastery, killing three people. An extended state of emergency was announced in the 3 southern provinces plagued by the insurgency.The announcement sparked a large scale guerrilla raid on 60 targets, in which at least 7 people were killed and 90 weapons were stolen.[34]

On 16 November 2005, separatists killed 9 civilians and injured 9 others.[34]

A total of 500 people were killed during 2005.[1]

2006[edit]

A brief lull in the insurgency followed the 19 September 2006 coup that overthrew the government of Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. As Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin settled into his role as head of the junta, violence resumed. As of September 2006, more than 1,400 people had died in less than three years of southern violence. Most were innocent bystanders, both Buddhists and Muslims.

On 7 January 2006, four suspected militants fatally shoot two border-policemen in the back at a crowded weekend market in Yala Province. (The Nation) Three others were also killed in separate attacks on the same day.[41]

On 10 May 2006, a bomb exploded at a tea shop killing at least 3 people and injured more than a dozen.[34]

On 15 June 2006, during the 60th anniversary of the accession of Bhumibol Adulyadej to the Thai throne, well coordinated bomb-attacks against at least 40 government and official buildings occurred. Two police officials died and 11 others were injured. Experts say that the bomb attacks were a message to the Thai authorities, rather than an attempt to do real damage, as the bombs were loaded with small amounts of explosives. Had the devices been larger, the casualties and injuries would have been notably greater. The Thai media was late in reporting the incident, only doing so after the BBC and other international news services had announced it.

On 18 June 2006, mass graves of about 300 migrant workers were found in southern Thailand.[42][43]

On 27 June 2006, 7 people including 5 security personel were killed by separatist attacks.[34]

On 31 August 2006, 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in Yala province, killing a retired military officer and wounding 24 people. Afterwards, Army chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin announced that he would break with government policy and negotiate with the leaders of the insurgency. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with."[44] In a press conference the next day, he slammed the government for political interference, and asked that the government "Free the military and let it do the job."[45] By 16 September 2006, the Army admitted that it still wasn't sure who to negotiate with.[46]

In September 2006, Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat the unrest.[47]

2006 Hat Yai bombings. On 16 September 2006, six remotely detonated motorcycle bombs simultaneously exploded in the city of Hat Yai, killing four people and wounding more than sixty. A Canadian and a Malaysian were among the dead.[48]

On 21 September, 2 villagers were shot in Yala, killing one and wounding another.[49]

On 23 September, 4 policemen were injured in a bus stop explosion in Pattani. The bus stop was on a road that would be passed by the motorcade of Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn later that afternoon.[50][51]

On 25 September, 2 police stations and a military outpost were attacked by 30 gunmen in a coordinated series of attacks in Yala, leaving 2 dead and 1 injured.[52]

On 27 September, gunmen killed a grocer and two of his customers in Muang district of Yala and a traveller on the bus from Panare district to Mayo district of Pattani.[53]

On 28 September, a teacher protection unit in Sungai Padi district of Narathiwat province was ambushed by a bomb attack, seriously injuring 4 soldiers and killing one.[54]

On 18 October 2006, suspected Muslim guerillas raided an army base, killing one soldier and wounding 4 others.[34]

On 4 November, three schools burned to the ground and a person received a gunshot injury.[55]

On 5 November 2006, a bomb blast killed 2 soldiers and injured 3 others.4 people were killed and 6 wounded in a series of shootings and bomb blasts.[34]

On 9 November, 8 car and motorcycle showrooms were simultaneously bombed in Yala, injuring 13. Almost all gold shops in Muang district closed down for fear of their safety. Commercial banks remained opened but with tightened security.[56]

From January 2004 to October 2006, 1,815 people were killed and 2,729 were wounded in the insurgency.[57] Despite the renewed violence, a post-coup opinion poll found that Southerners had become the happiest people of Thailand.[58]

On 15 November 2006, militants shot dead 3 people in separate drive-by shootings, one soldier was also wounded in a bomb blast.[34]

On 17 November 2006, 3 bomb explosions killed one person and wounded at least 30 others.[34]

On 22 November 2006, Wan Kadir Che Wan, leader of Bersatu, one of the southern insurgent groups, told Al Jazeera television that the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network was helping local insurgents stage attacks in Thailand.[59]

On 27 November 27, 2006, after all schools in Pattani announced indefinite shutdown, teachers in Yala and Narathiwat decided to follow suit and close down the schools in the two provinces indefinitely due to fear for safety. The decision in Pattani was made after a series of arson attacks against schools and the brutal and fatal shooting of 2 schoolteachers.[60] In Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces over 1,000 schools were shut down.[61][62]

On 9 December 2006, a police informant was killed in a drive-by shooting.[34]

Despite the closing of the schools protest, on 29 December 2006 two more teachers were shot and burned to death.[63]

On 31 December 2006, 9 bomb blasts occurred Bangkok on New Year's Eve, killing 3 people and injuring 38.New Year's Eve celebrations were cancelled as result.[34]

2007[edit]

Despite conciliatory gestures from the junta, the insurgency continued and intensified. The death toll, 1,400 at the time of the coup, increased to 2,579 by mid-September 2007.[11] From January 2004 to 21 June 2007, the South witnessed 6,850 violent incidents related to the insurgency. At least 2,303 people were killed and more than 6,000 injured in that time, according to Srisompob Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University's Pattani campus.[64]

Junta chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin announced that the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military Task Force (CPM) 43 would be revived. Sonthi said the Army-led multi-agency Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command would be dissolved and its troops would come under the CPM 43, which would operate in parallel with the SBPAC. The SBPAC and CPM 43 had been dissolved in mid-2001 by former Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. Before that, CPM 43 was under the directive of the SBPAC. Sonthi also made himself head of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Previously, the ISOC had been headed by the Prime Minister.[65]

The ISOC was given 5.9 billion baht in funding for fiscal year 2007. By May 2007, General Sonthi asked the government for an additional emergency budget of 2 billion baht for ISOC, as the normal budget was running out. The money was under the "secret budget" category, which meant that state officials could spend it without having to account for it to the government.[66]

On 14 January a rubber tapper named Pin Khotchathin was beheaded in Yala. His head was found at a rubber plantation in Tambon Tasae in Yala's Mueang district five metres from his body.[67] It was the 22nd murder to feature attempted beheading since May 2004, although the militants were not always successful in removing their victim's head.[68] A handwritten note was left near Pin's head warning of further bloodshed to avenge what the attackers, calling themselves Pattani Warriors, claimed was a case of authorities killing separatist members.

Facing rising violence, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont accused Muslim junta chief Sonthi Boonyaratkalin of failing to do enough to curb the insurgency.[69]

On 18 February a series of bombings and arson attacks began in Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani, and Songkhla provinces. 6 people were killed and over 50 were injured.[70]

Violence escalated though in the months following the implementation of the junta's "hearts and minds" campaign. The monthly death toll increased by 30% in the 5 months after the coup compared to the 5 months before the coup.[71] Insurgents targeted Princess Sirindhorn by placing a bomb near her helicopter’s landing pad.[72] A senior aide to Queen Sirikit, Thanpuying Viriya Chavakul, was injured and narrowly escaped death when gunmen attacked her vehicle convoy on 21 February 2007 in Yala.[73] She later criticized the government for rotating troops too often, preventing them from building bonds with locals. She also made note of troops' lack of communications equipment and bulletproof vests.[74]

After an official visit to Thailand, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi volunteered to act as a mediator in arranging talks between insurgents and Thai authorities. Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram rejected the offer.[75]

During the Chinese New Year weekend (from the evening of 18 February 2007 to the afternoon of 19 February 2007), insurgents executed 38 bombing attacks, 26 cases of arson, and seven ambushes. The bombings targeted hotels, karaoke bars, power grids and commercial sites. Two public schools were torched. Three people were arrested.[76][77] Junta chief Sonthi and Interior Minister Aree Wongsearaya admitted that they knew in advance that attacks were going to take place, then failed to their occurrence.[78] Aree later admitted that the government's southern strategy was flawed.[79]

On 21 February, in their most significant act of economic terrorism and arson to date, insurgents burned down the Southland Rubber warehouse in Yala, destroying 5,000 tons of rubber worth approximately 400 million baht and engulfing Yala city in a dense cloud of black smoke for 12 hours. Thirty fire trucks fought to control the flames in the largest rubber warehouse in the deep south. Spikes were scattered on the road leading to the warehouse to slow down the emergency workers. No casualties were reported.[80]

In March 2007, the junta's top security advisor admitted that insurgents imported their techniques from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and were motivated by not only by nationalist reasons, like previous generations of insurgents, but religious extremism as well.[81][82] However, it noted that it still did not know who was behind the insurgency.[83]

To protect the Buddhist minority from violence, the Internal Security Operations Command produced Jatukham Rammathep amulets for public distribution. The renowned animist amulets were believed by some to have magical powers to protect their holders from violence and large sums were generally paid for them. The plan was developed by Colonel Manas Khongpan, deputy director of the ISOC in Yala province.[84]

In March 2007, Queen Sirikit vowed to protect people of all religions in the South, and initiated weapons training programmes for locals, particularly teachers. Sirikit's deputy aide-de-camp Napol Boonthap said that the government should review its strategy and not only use a reconciliatory approach towards the insurgents. "Legal action must also be taken against the wrongdoers to show we mean business," he said.[85]

On 14 March, 8 commuters from Betong to Hat Yai were executed after their van was stopped by insurgents. A roadside bomb delayed rangers stationed nearby in their efforts to reach the site.[86] A Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) executive blamed a portion of the violence directly on paramilitary rangers who instigated violence and then blamed insurgents for their deeds.[87]

Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn's motorcade was against targeted with a bombing in March 2007. A local police team found the bomb before it could explode.[85]

In April 2007, junta chief Sonthi rejected an American offer to help train Thai forces to quell the insurgency. Sonthi continued to deny that international terrorists operate in the South.[88]

On 9 April 2007, a pick-up truck carrying students and other passengers returning from a funeral was shot upon, killing two 12-year-old boys and two other 25-year-old university students. The funeral was for the Khuen Bang Lang tambon administration organisation chief, who was shot dead hours earlier the same day. The military initially claimed that insurgents were behind the shooting. It later admitted that village defence volunteers attacked, after allegedly being "provoked" by insurgent sympathisers on the truck. Several hundred angry villagers staged protests against the shooting, demanding the government take action against those responsible.[89]

Protest after a misapprehending shooting by security forces, Thai soldiers in Pattani shot and killed three Muslim teenagers on 13 April 2007. The soldiers, who were dispatched to investigate the torching of four mobile-phone relay outlets, opened fire on a group of teenagers when the soldiers thought the teenagers were charging at them. Locals reported that the teenagers were playing tag on the road near a weekly open market close to where the soldiers were investigating. Three teenagers, aged 13 to 15 years-old, were killed and two others were injured. Local Army commander Colonel Wanchai Paungkhumsa initially said the soldiers had acted in self-defense, saying that gunshots were fired from where a teenager was standing. Residents ended their protest after reaching a series of agreements with Pattani Governor Panu Uthairath over the shooting. The military agreed to investigate the shootings, and if it was a negligent act, The soldier would be faced criminal charge, transferred out of the area and an apology would be given to locals.[90]

In May 2007, Sonthi started withdrawing troops from the South, replacing them with territorial defence volunteers. He did not say why the regular army was to be reduced in the South.[91]

On 14 May 2007, Separatist insurgents shot dead a Thai-Buddhist couple working as fruit pickers in the majority-Muslim area of Bannang Sata, Yala provine and injured their three-year-old daughter. After gunning down Praphan Ponlarak, 36, and his wife Chaddakan, the assailants decapitated Praphan, making him the 29th victim to be beheaded in Thailand's troubled deep South.[92]

Violence continued with a noted trend towards targeting soldiers and policemen, particularly after the militants' actions were criticized by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.[93] On 9 May 2007, the army saw its worse casualty in a single incident in years, when seven soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing incident.[94] Two policemen were shot dead and their bodies burnt in another attack on 11 May 2007,[95][96] which the authorities suspect were conducted by the same group which killed the soldiers.[97] Another 11 soldiers were killed on 31 May 2007 in similar style to the incident on 9 May.[98]

Between 27 May and 29 May 2007, several concerted bombings occurred, both in Hat Yai downtown in front of markets, shops and hotels, and also in Saba Yoi, altogether killing more than four people and injuring over 20. The attacks targeted Chinese-Thai, who consider them 'Jews of the Far East' because they are barred from the Thai civil service and are mainly traders.[99]

In July 2007, Former Fourth Army chief Harn Leelanont criticized the junta's reconciliation policy in the South, saying it left security personnel incapable of containing the violence. He claimed that it left officials and innocent people as sitting ducks to be picked off by militants.[100]

The military junta went on a massive spending spree, buying new weaponry and a dozen fighter jets from Sweden, saying it needed the hardware to battle the insurgency.[101]

2008[edit]

According to the Thai Journalists Association, during the year 2008 alone there were over 500 attacks, resulting in more than 300 deaths in the four provinces where the insurgents operate.[102]

On 14 January 2008, insurgents killed 9 soldiers in a bomb and shooting attack.[103]

On 15 January 2008, a bombing left at least 39 people wounded in a market in Yala.[103]

On 24 January 2008, militants fatally shot a teacher.[103]

On 4 February 2008, a bomb detonated outside an Islamic boarding school, one person was killed and 12 wounded. A second bombing wounded 6 people.[103]

On 15 March 2008, a bombing occurred in the parking lot of hotel, 2 people were killed and 14 wounded in the incident.[103]

On 28 May 2008, 3 soldiers and 4 rebels were killed in a series of incidents across the south.[103]

On 5 July 2008, insurgents killed 3 cafe customers and injured 4 others.[103]

On 3 August 2008, five bombs went off in the town of Songkhla injuring 2 people. The same night, two bombs also exploded in Hat Yai, but caused no casualties.[104]

On 17 October 2008, 1 militant was killed and 5 others arrested.[103]

On 18 October 2008, two people were killed in drive-by shootings.[103]

On 4 November 2008, two bombs exploded at a tea stall killing one person and wounded at least 71.[103]

On 5 December 2008, 4 people were killed by a bomb planted at a farmacy store.[103]

2009[edit]

On 31 January 2009, a grenade blast killed 8 people and injured 27 others during outside a Buddhist temple.[105]

On 20 February 2009, two Thai soldiers were beheaded after a military convoy was ambushed. It was the second attack in in the same month following the same pattern.[106]

On 13 March 2009, militants killed 3 soldiers during an ambush in the Narathiwat province.[105]

On 19 March 2009, a roadside bomb killed 4 army rangers in the Pattani province.[105]

On 7 June 2009, insurgents killed 2 and injured 19 others in the Yi-ngo district of Narathiwat.[105]

On 8 June 2009, rebel gunmen killed at least 10 and wounded 19 mosque visitors in Narathiwat Province's Hoh-I-Rong district.[105]

On 13 June 2009, insurgents bombed a bus, killing 1 passenger and wounding 13 others in the center of Yala city.Additionally three people were killed and 1 wounded drive by incidents.[105]

On 18 June 2009, security forces killed 4 militants during clashes in the Yala Province.[105]

On 19 July 2009, two people were killed in separate drive by shootings in the Yala and Narathiwat provinces.[105]

On 20 July 2009, rebels shot and killed a man in the Pattani province.[105]

On 26 August 2009, a car bomb blast outside a restaurant wounded 26 people.[105]

On 2 September 2009, a number of drive-by shootings occurred in the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala left 8 dead. Security forces killed 2 militants in separate raids in the Yala province.[105]

On 3 September 2009, a bomb exploded in the city of Pattani killed 1 man and wounded 24 others.[105]

On 4 September 2009, a bomb detonated outside a restaurant, killing a policeman and wounding 12 other people.[105]

On 13 September 2009, guerrillas killed 5 paramilitary troops in the Yala province.[105]

On 23 October 2009, a Muslim man was killed by gunmen while leaving a mosque after prayers in Yala province. Also in Yala a Muslim couple was shot in their home and the husband was killed. On the same day the body of a Muslim man killed by insurgents was dumped on the side of the road in the Yarang district of Pattani province.[107]

On 28 October 2009, guerrillas killed 2 civilians in separate drive-by attacks.[105]

On 1 November 2009, a teenage girl was shot and killed in Yala province. A bomb exploded at the scene after the murder, wounding three police officers. The same day the police found the body of a man that had been handcuffed and murdered at a rice farm in the area.[107]

On 12 November 2009, a Buddhist couple was shot and killed and five people were wounded in an explosion when they rushed to the scene following the murder that took place at a rice mill in Pattani province.[107]

On 8 December 2009, a bomb exploded at a local Thai market in the Muang District of Narathiwat province, killing two people and wounding nine others. The blast happened about 1 km from a hotel where Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his visiting Malaysian counterpart, Najib Razak were having lunch during a trip to the local region that same day. Sources say the bomb was hidden in the gas tank of a motorcycle.[108]

On 10 December 2009, three Buddhist women were killed by a remote-controlled bomb outside a restaurant in Narathiwat.[109]

2010[edit]

On 2 January 2010, three soldiers and 3 civilians were injured by roadside bombs in Yala at 10 am in Bannang Sata district, Yala province.[110]

On 13 January 2010, Mayo district chief Wirat Prasetto was seriously injured along with ten other civilians when a bomb detonated at a pier in Pattani province. The bombing is being blamed on Muslim insurgents. One person was killed in the explosion.[111]

Two villagers sitting at a tea shop in Narathiwat were shot and murdered by gunmen on motorcycles.[107]

On 1 April 2010, suspect insurgents shot dead six villagers in Narathiwat province. Ten policemen and soldiers were also wounded when a roadside bomb exploded as they were traveling to the scene of the shootings.[112]

On 22 May 2010, two female villagers were killed in a drive-by shooting in Yala province by suspected separatist militants.[113] On 28 May 2010, two were killed and 52 injured in two bomb attacks in Yala[114]

On 8 September 2010, police apprehended a RKK leader while he was in his house in Yala province[115]

2011[edit]

On 27 January 2011, insurgents killed a school teacher in the Pattani province.[116]

On 11 February 2011, three people were shot and burned.[117] A car bomb exploded on the 13th which injured 18 people, civilians and soldiers, leaving seven hospitalised.[118] Meanwhile, an insurgent was shot dead by soldiers.

On 22 March 2011, a man and two women were shot in a village of Narathiwat Province on evening by about a dozen armed men. Police suspect the gunmen were Muslim insurgents who believed their victims were informants.[119]

On 23 March 2011, a roadside bomb went off in a village in Narathiwat when a truck carrying police arrived. None were wounded. The killings the night before may have been intended to lure security personnel to the scene to be attacked.[119]

On 18 April 2011, a car bomb exploded in the business district of Yala, killing a Thai paramilitary ranger and injuring 23 people including four other rangers.[120]

On 3 May 2011, two grenades were fired at Pattani Task Force 21 base, but did not hurt anyone.

On 11 May 2011, a bomb blast during a football match in Kapho District in Pattani Province killed four officers and wounding 13 others. Eight suspects were detained. In Yala Province, two officers and two civilians were injured after a roadside bomb detonated in Meung District.[121]

On 14 May 2011, four insurgents came and demanded money from a gas station. The wife of the owner refused, resulting them shooting her and her sister. After that, the owner of the gas station came and shot dead one of the insurgents, causing the other three to retreat. The dead insurgent turned out to be a minor leader operating in the area who was wanted for the 2009 Narathiwat bombings.

On 17 May 2011, a roadside bomb detonated in Yaha District in Yala Province, killing two monks and seriously wounding two of their security escorts. More than 100 local Muslims gathered at the local mosque and condemned the violence.[122] On 18 May, a Thahan Phran from the 47th Regiment was shot and seriously wounded in Yala, Meung District[123]

On 20 May 2011, a 30-man Thahan Phran unit from the same Regiment engaged and killed four insurgents in Ban Charupae in Than To District in Yala. They seized two AK-47 assault rifles, a .38 caliber pistol and nine mobile phones. One of the dead was identified as Ma-ae Aphibalbae, a key leader operating in the area who was sought for at least 28 alleged crimes, with a bounty of 2,000,000 baht.[124][125] Meanwhile in Narathiwat Province, two carbombs exploded, injuring a policeman and 8 other civilians.[126]

On 22 May 2011, in Nong Chik District, Pattani province, suspected insurgents shot a couple, Mr Pong and Mrs Somchit Khunee-art, killing both of them.[127]

On 24 May 2011, in Tak Bai, Narathiwat province, a bomb detonated, killing a policeman and a policewoman while they were distributing food to the local community. Pol Sgt Ubonwan Chindapetch was the first policewoman to die in an explosion in the south.[127] Meanwhile, in Sai Buri district, Pattani province, an unknown number of gunmen came and shot Muhammat Stapo, the younger brother of Ismael Rayahlong, a major RKK leader operating in the area who was suspected of the killing of two monks on 17 May.[128][129] In Krong Pinang District, Yala province, insurgents shot dead Barudin Sama, assistant village head of Ban Tohbala as he was riding to the tea shop.[127]

On 25 May 2011, 12 soldiers from the 13 Regiment in Yala were ambushed by three insurgents, resulting the death of one soldier, private Chuchat Kaeowonghio. A few hours later, a bomb detonated under a humvee carrying 20 soldiers, seriously wounding 6 of them.[129]

On 27 May 2011, police apprehended two RKK leaders in Narathiwat province.[130]

On 30 May 2011, a bomb went off in Meung district, Yala province, wounding five soldiers, and on 31 May, two insurgents accidentally detonated a bomb, killing themselves and injuring one other insurgent in Narathiwat province. One of the dead was identified as Abas Abu, wanted on multiple charges of attacking state officials and multiple bombings. His brother was the insurgent shot dead in February 2011.[131]

On 2 June 2011, eight Navy SEALS from Narathiwat Task Force 32 clashed with five RKK insurgents in the Budo Mountain Range, resulting the death of three insurgents while the other two got away. They seized two M16 assault rifles, 1 .38 pistol, 1 land mine, 1 grenade and over 100 rounds of ammunition. Two of the dead insurgents were identified as senior recruitment members of the RKK while the third was identified as the bomb maker of the group.[132][133][134]

On 4 June 2011, soldiers located two unexploded bombs in the middle of Tak Bai market.[135]

On 25 July 2011, 5 teachers and 2 security volunteers were wounded in the aftermath of an IED explosion in the Muang district.[136]

On 1 August 2011, a roadside bomb killed 1 and injured 2 soldiers in the Yarang District.[137]

In August 2011, 53 people were killed and 75 wounded, in insurgency related incidents.[138]

On 13 September 2011, Thai police confiscated five guns, ammunition and sums of currency in a house of a Narathiwat provincial administrative organisation.Evidence connected the house owner with insurgency organisations.[139]

On 14 September 2011, insurgents fire bombed the Palukasamoh Police Station complex, the almost complete building was completely destroyed.[140]

On 15 September 2011, five paramilitary rangers were killed and one wounded in a roadside bomb blast, in the Kapho district[140]

On 16 September 2011, three bombs exploded on the Charoen Khet road, Sungai Kolok district.In the aftermath of the incident, 4 people were killed and 110 injured, the majority of which were Malaysian tourists.[139]

On 23 September 2011, a bomb blast seriously wounded a soldier, guarding a school in the Rangae district.[141]

On 1 October 2011, a truck driver was shot and killed in Pattani province. In Narathiwat province, Chanae district, a village chief was shot dead. A motorcade of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre secretary-general Panu Uthairat was ambushed by armed men in Pattani, injuring none.[142][143][144]

On 3 October 2011, three people were shot, two houses were burnt, and a bomb went off near a tank carrying six soldiers in Pattani province. Police found a hole dug on the Pattani-Yala railway line and said it was in preparation for a bomb attack.[145] On 20 October, a wood trader was shot dead in Narathiwat Province[146]

On 13 October 2011, a Mayo district official along with his driver were killed, after four insurgents attacked them with automatic weapons, in the Pattani province.One person was killed and one injured by stray bullets in the same incident.Another attack occurred in the Panareh district.Four gunmen attacked a seafood processing business, killing three people and planting a bomb, which was later defused by Thai police.[147]

On 23 October 2011, a bomb exploded inside a convenience store, located on the Phichit Bamrung road, Muang Narathiwat municipality.A second bomb detonated inside a convenience store, located on the Chamroon Nara road, Muang Narathiwat municipality.In a third incident, 10 militants engaged in a firefight with defence volunteers, in the Kasoh village, Muang Narathiwat municipality.A total of 7 people were killed and 8 injured, in the three incidents.[148]

On 25 October 2011, 10 bombs went off in Meung District, Yala province, killing three people and injuring 44 others. Two of the dead were insurgents whose bombs accidentally went off when they hit a speed hump. Soldiers defused another 21 bombs. Over 60 insurgents were involved in this attack. Two soldiers were injured in separate attacks in Pattani province.[149]

On 30 October 2011, two men were shot and injured by suspected insurgents in Rueso district, Narathiwat province.[150]

On 31 October 2011, 10 bombs went off in five districts across Narathiwat province, injuring none. However, suspected insurgents shot dead two people at a petrol station and a third at a nearby grocery shop. In Yala province, a police corporal was wounded in an explosion.[151][152]

On 2 November 2011, in Yala province, a 20 kg bomb went off, injuring 2 police border patrol officers of the Yala 44 regiment, and seriously injuring one other, Sansern Nama.[153]

On 3 November 2011, in Narathiwat province, a 50-man police-military joint force arrested an insurgent who confessed to planting a bomb in Narathiwat on 30 October.[154] While in the Ra-ngae district, six hunters were killed and one seriously injured when insurgents blew their truck up. Later that day, six military personnel were injured in the same region.[155]

On 4 November 2011, an unknown number of insurgents fired M-79 grenade launchers into a military checkpoint, seriously injuring a passerby, Tiem Bangkeaw in Pattani province.[156] In Narathiwat province, a joint military-defense volunteer task force apprehended two suspected insurgents carrying a shotgun and a 9mm pistol.[157][158]

On 14 November 2011, a rubber taper was killed by rebels at his workplace, in the Narathiwat province.[159]

On 16 November 2011, 9 bombs exploded in the Muang, Yaring and Yarang districts.In the Nong Chik district, a military outpost came under assault rifle fire.In the Panare district, rebels perpetrated 3 grenade attacks.In the aftermath of the attacks, only minor material damage was recorded.[160]

On 20 November 2011, in Narathiwat province, a 50-men Thahan Phran squad from the 46th regiment got into a 30-minute gunfight with 4-5 groups of RKK insurgents, resulting the death of a key leader of the RKK, with a bounty of over 1 million baht, and was responsible for numerous attacks including one on the same regiment a year ago. Moreover, they apprehended 2 other insurgents as well.[161]

On 21 November 2011, an explosive device detonated outside a laundry shop located on the Charoen Pradit road, Pattani, injuring 9 people.Another bomb injured 6 policemen escorting monks in the Muang district.Insurgents blew up power poles in the Than To district.[162]

On 1 December 2011, a police task-force apprehended a RKK insurgent instructor in the Yarang district of the Yala province.[163] Meanwhile, a soldier, Priavte Kriangkrai Pornhormfai, was killed after stepping on a mine, and another, Siam Sealao, was seriously wounded.

On 5 December 2011, a 40-man Thahan Phran unit of the 45th regiment apprehended 3 suspected insurgents, a shotgun along with an amount of drugs were confiscated in the process, the arrest occurred in the Narathiwat province[164]

2012[edit]

On 1 February, a Thahan Phran, Thanong Sinthu, was shot in Pattani Province.[165]

On 3 February, an illegal oil trader was shot in Bacho District, Narathiwat Province. In a separate incident in Pattani Province a woman was killed and her husband and son were injured. Deep South Watch announced 33 dead and 55 injured in January as a result of clashes in south Thailand, with no insurgent casualties.[166][167][168]

On 4 February, a truck driver, Mahama Yakee, was shot in Pattani Province early in the morning.[169]

On 21 February, in Panare District, Pattani Province, 3 insurgents were killed after they clashed with the 44th regiment Thahan Phran, while 3 rangers were injured and 2 AK-47 rifles were seized. In Rueso District, Narathiwat Province, a former PULO leader was shot dead at his home. He has been known to have been approached by many RKK members to join their cause but he refused. Finally, in Si Sakhon District, Narathiwat Province, a 100-man Thahan Phran from the 46th regiment clashed with around 10 insurgents resulting one ranger, Sgt Rithidej Sriruangdej, seriously wounded, and key insurgent, wanted for many arrest warrants, killed.[170]

On 28 February, in Raman District, Yala Province, soldiers from the 12th special task force clashed with 3 insurgents, resulting the death of a key insurgent wanted on multiple charges and the apprehension of another insurgent.[171][172]

On 5 March, a blast at a market in the Tak Bai District wounded 8.[173][174]

On 7 March, 4 soldiers and a rubber tapper were killed in two separate attacks in Narathiwat and Pattani Provinces.[175] Two days later at least 50 militants attacked an army base in Yala Province, shooting electricity poles down to block escape routes, kidnapping 2 soldiers and injuring 12 more. The missing officers were later discovered shot to death with their hands bound and their weapons gone.[176]

On 10 March, a local politician was shot dead with a M-16 assault rifle and 9mm pistol in Pattani's Ka Por District by a group of four or five assailants in a sedan.[177]

On 12 March, two soldiers were wounded by a bomb explosion while providing security for teachers in Pattani's Sai Buri District.[178][179] Meanwhile, in Yarang District, an unknown number of persons set afire the office of the Rawaeng subdistrict Tambon Administration Organisation.[180][181]

On 15 March, a motorcycle bomb exploded in Pattani, killing one villager and wounding three others including two soldiers.[182]

On 17 March, one school girl was killed and four others injured, two critically, in a roadside bomb attack apparently intended for soldiers in Pattani.[183]

On 19 March, a member of a village security team was shot dead in Pattani's Yaring District.[184][185]

On 21 March, Thai army has accepted responsibility for killing four innocent civilians in the insurgency-plagued south two months ago.[186][187]

On 25 March, an assistant village head in Narathiwat and a defence volunteer in Pattani were killed in drive-by shooting's.[188] At night, a policeman was shot dead by militants in Pattani's Yarang District.[189]

On 29 March, a security guard was killed in a drive-by shooting's in Pattani’s Muang District.[190]

On 31 March, four bombs exploded in Yala shopping districts and the parking lot of a hotel in Hat Yai, killing 16 and injuring more than 300 others.[191][192]

On 3 April, a police officer from the Muang Pattani police station was seriously wounded by a gunman at a fishing pier in moo 6 of tambon Samilae in Pattani’s Muang District.[193]

On 4 April, two men on a motorcycle hurled a grenade at a PTT gas station at Ban Pongsata in Pattani's Yarang District.[194]

On 5 April, a car care shop owner was killed and his son seriously injured in a shooting in Pattani's Yaring District.[195]

On 11 April, three villagers were killed when gunmen opened fire at them as they were leaving a mosque in Pattani's Panare District.[196]

On 13 April, five passengers were wounded when gunmen on motorcycles attacked a bus in Pattani's Sai Buri District.[197]

On 15 April, police seized large amounts of weapons including 4 M16 assault rifles in Sai Buri District, Pattani Province.[198]

On 19 April, a 100-man squad clashed with a 14 insurgents in Yala Province, resulting the death of 5 insurgents and the others managed to escape.[199] After some forensic work, it was revealed that one of the dead insurgents was a key leader wanted on over 7 charges. Meanwhile in Narathiwat Province, a 30-man Thahan Phran unit from the 45th regiment apprehended 2 RKK members wanted on shooting 2 teachers in 2010. On a separate incident, a bomb detonated, injuring 5 soldiers in the same province.[198]

On 22 April, an insurgent was shot dead by combined police Thahan Phran forces after resisting arrest in Rueso District, Narathiwat Province.[200]

On 24 April village chief Sainung Ada was shot dead in Narathiwat Province.[201] In Tak Bai District, a bomb detonated injuring 3 civilians and 5 soldiers. A 5-year old boy was among the injured.[202]

On 23 July, a rubber tapper, Prinya Sinbut, was shot twice in the body and once in the arm, and is seriously wounded in Mae Lan District, Pattani Province.

On 25 July, after a warning that insurgents will intensify attacks during Ramadan, 5 anti-drug officers were killed and one seriously injured in a car bomb in Raman District. Authorities believe was in retaliation for recent drug suspect arrests.[203]

On 26 July, 2 men, Seng Changkid, and Kittisak Chamnanlee were slain after they left their house in Bannang Sata District[204] and an assistant village headman, Haree Vaebuesar, was shot dead in an ambush in Raman District.[205] All three events occurred in Yala Province.

On 28 July, four soldiers were killed in an ambush by 16 militants.[206]

On 29 July, 5 other civilians, all around Yala Province, were shot dead by insurgents.[207] In addition to this, 4 soldiers were wounded in an attack in the same province.[208]

On 11 September, over 100 insurgents including a major leader, Jae A-Lee, from the group Badan Penyelarasan Wawasan Baru Melayu Patani, surrendered to military authorities, demanding justice in exchange for halting the insurgency. Jae A-Lee also claimed that two other core leaders are in the process of submitting to the military. Jae A-Lee's one million baht bounty, as a reuslt of the deaths of 4 soldiers in 4 January, has also been whitewashed.[209]

2013[edit]

According to the region's Internal Security Operations Command, there were 320 bombings in the four border provinces between January and December 2013, compared with 276 reported bombings in 2012.[210] Experts alleged that the rise in deaths was linked to the stalling of peace talks while Yingluck Shinawatra's government faced anti-government protests in Bangkok and court proceedings against it over corruption.

On 10 February, insurgents killed five soldiers and wounded five others in two roadside bomb attacks in Yala province. According to Thai military officials, in the first attack militants detonated a car bomb as a truck carrying six soldiers passed by. Then they opened fire on the soldiers killing five of them, and taking away the dead soldiers' rifles. [211]

On 13 February, at least 17 Muslim insurgents including a commander were killed during an attack on a military base in Narathiwat. None of the Thai military defenders of the base were hurt. [212]

On 12 April, two soldiers were killed and six others wounded in a road side bombing. Suspected militants detonated an improvised bomb hidden on the road surface Pattani province's Panarae district. The soldiers were in two armored vehicles traveling Wednesday night to inspect damages from an earlier militant attack. One of the personnel carriers was badly damaged.[213]

On 26 April, four soldiers were killed and another four seriously injured while attempting to defuse a bomb. According to Thai authorities, the blast happened after troops moved the device which was hidden under a gas tank and placed under a bridge near the Narathiwat military base. [214]

On 1 May, police say suspected insurgents have killed six people including a two-year-old boy in one of the deadliest shootings in Thailand's south this year. [215]

Peace talks were also started in Kuala Lumpur in February at the behest of Malaysia. Barisan Revolusi Nasional's Hassan Taib led the talks, while the Thai government's team was led by Secretary-General of the National Security Council Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, tasked by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. However, the exiled leader of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation, Kasturi Mahkota, said attacks by his group would continue if they were not invited to the talks. For his part, Pattanatabut said that Thailand would not agree to independence or any contravention of the constitution of Thailand, but would seek to discuss degress of autonomy and an amnesty with the rebels. [216]

2014[edit]

9 February, A policeman's wife was shot dead and then set on fire in front of a terrified crowd at a busy market in Pattani, Thailand, officials reported. The woman, 28, was shot down on the afternoon of February 9, 2014 as she returned to her car from a market in the Ratapanyang area of Pattani province. After being shot, the woman's body was set alight, a police officer told AFP. The attack was allegedly carried out in revenge for the deaths of three Muslim brothers that took place during the week of February 2, 2014, aged three, five and nine. The boys were shot in front of their home in neighbouring Narathiwat province. Their pregnant mother and father were also shot in the attack but survived. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, at Prince of Songkla University in Pattani, said the boys' deaths "have set off a chain-reaction which will be hard to control unless authorities can bring to justice their killers". "The insurgent movement is taking their deaths as an opportunity for revenge. Local feelings over this are running very high," he said.[210]

14 March: Siriporn Srichai, a female schoolteacher, was shot dead and her body was burned in Mayo district of Pattani Province.[217]

24 May: Three people were killed and about 80 injured in 13 bomb blasts at at least five 7/11 stores and two gas stations.

28 May: Violence continued in Pattani as a bomb blast at a hospital car park injured 10 people including a soldier. Those injured included Pvt Phonlawat Nonthasen. The most seriously wounded in attacks that have left two dead and more than 70 wounded was a three-year-old girl, Vaesiteeaija Vaelong maimed for life when doctors had to amputate the remains of her right leg after it was mangled by the blast.[218]

28 August: Patimoh Saemaesae, a female schoolteacher, was killed and another teacher and a policeman were wounded in a bomb attack directed at the teachers and their police escort in Khok Pho District of Pattani Province.[219]

5 Sep: It has come to light that a paramilitary volunteer's attempt to portray an unarmed 14 year old Muslim boy falsely as an armed insurgent after killing him has come under investigation by the junta.[220]

12 October: A total of six schools were destroyed by fire in six coordinated arson attacks in Thung Yang Daeng and Mayo districts of Pattani Province;[221] some of the arsonists were subsequently arrested and confessed that their intention had been to set fire to 14 schools, but residents had managed to contact the authorities before they could carry out more arson attacks.[222]

4 November: The military decides to arm civilian groups by distributing thousands of assault rifles allegedly in order to help civilians to fight against the public order disturbing outfits. Human rights groups have protested against this measure, which in their eyes will only make the situation worse.[223]

29 November: Katesaya Muenkoto, a 29 year old woman died of bullet wounds in Khok Pho district in Pattani Province. She and a man were shot at while they were buying pork meat from a shop in the early morning. The attacker was driving a motorcycle and shot at them six times, hitting the woman in the head and the man in the back.[224]

Reactions and explanations[edit]

Official reactions[edit]

The government at first blamed the attacks on "bandits," and many outside observers do believe that local clan, commercial or criminal rivalries did play a part in the violence. In 2002, Thaksin stated, "There's no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common bandits." By 2004, however, he had reversed his position and came to regard the insurgency as a local front in the global War on Terrorism. Martial law was instituted in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in January 2004.[225]

Since the 2006 military coup, the Thai government has taken a more conciliatory approach to the insurgency, avoiding the excessive use of force that typified Thaksin's time, and beginning negotiations with known separatist groups. However, violence has escalated. This likely backs the assertion that there are several groups involved in the violence, few of whom have been placated by the government's change of strategy.[226]

On 3 June 2011, Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha stated that the insurgency is orchestrated from abroad and is funded via drug and oil smuggling.[227]

Political factors[edit]

The Thai authorities claim that the insurgency is not caused by the lack of political representation among the Muslim population. By the late 1990s, Muslims were holding unprecedentedly senior posts in Thai politics, for example with Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, a Malay Muslim from Yala, serving as Chairman of Parliament from 1996 to 2001 under the Democrats and later as Interior Minister during the first Thaksin government. Thaksin's first government (2001–2005) also saw 14 Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs) and several Muslim senators. Muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies in the border provinces, and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors. Muslims were able to voice their political grievances more openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom.

The Thaksin regime, however, began to dismantle the southern administration organization replacing it with a notoriously corrupt police force which immediately began widespread crackdowns. Consultation with local community leaders was also abolished. Discontent over the abuses led to growing violence during 2004 and 2005. Muslim politicians and leaders remained silent out of fear of repression, thus eroding their political legitimacy and support. This cost them dearly. In the 2005 general election, all but one of the eleven incumbent Muslim MPs who stood for election were voted out of office.[228]

Economic factors[edit]

Poverty and economic problems have been cited as a factor behind the insurgency.[229][230] However, the performance of the deep South’s economy improved markedly in the past few decades. Between 1983 and 2003, the average per capita income of Pattani grew from 9,340 baht to 57,621 baht, while that of Yala and Narathiwat also increased from 14,987 baht and 10,340 baht to 52,737 baht and 38,553 baht, respectively. However, the border provinces did have the lowest average income among all the southern provinces. Also, the national average is well below the estimated average needed to be considered an acceptable minimum wage by international organizations for SE Asia. One could thus argue that the average per capita income in the southernmost provinces is only about 20-25% of what the Thai minimum wage would be.[citation needed]

Household income improved from 2002 to 2004 by 21.99%, 19.27%, and 21.28% for Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, respectively. For comparison, income growth for all of Thailand in the same period was just 9.4%.

The percentage of people living below the poverty line also fell, from 40%, 36%, and 33% in 2000 to 18%, 10%, and 23% in 2004 for Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala, respectively. By 2004, the 3 provinces had 310,000 people living below the poverty line, compared to 610,000 in 2000. However, 45% of all poor Southerners lived in the 3 border provinces.[231][232]

Muslims in the border provinces generally have lower levels of educational attainment compared to their Buddhist neighbors. 69.80% of the Muslim population in the border provinces have only a primary school education, compared to 49.6% of Buddhists in the same provinces. Only 9.20% of Muslims have completed secondary education (including those who graduated from private Islamic schools), compared to 13.20% of Buddhists. Just 1.70% of the Muslim population have a bachelor’s degree, while 9.70% of Buddhists hold undergraduate degrees. Government schools are taught only in Thai and the secular educational system is being undermined by the destruction of schools and the murders of teachers by the insurgent outfits.[233]

The lesser educated Muslims also have reduced employment opportunities compared to their Buddhist neighbors. Government officials comprised only 2.4% of all working Muslims in the provinces, compared with 19.2% of all working Buddhists. Jobs in the Thai public sector are difficult to obtain for those Muslims who never fully accepted the Thai language or the Thai education system. Insurgent attacks on economic targets are further reducing employment opportunities for both Muslims and Buddhists in the provinces.

Leading insurgent groups[edit]

Original arms of the PULO and GMIP

Currently the most active insurgent movements are the BRN-Coordinate, its alleged armed wing the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), and the GMIP. PULO, the doyen of the Patani insurgent groups and formerly the most respected secessionist movement in the region, has been largely inactive in recent years.

BRN-C[edit]

The Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) is currently the most important group, spearheading the insurgency in Southern Thailand. It was revived after 2001 and its leaders are mainly Salafi religious teachers that have rejected the Pan-Arab socialist ideology of the early BRN, engaging in political activism by recruiting followers in mosques and indoctrinating at Islamic schools. This group has the vision of becoming a mass-organization, aiming towards having 400,000 members in its area of operation. The BRN-C has no constructive cultural or nationalistic goals, instead its immediate aim is to make Southern Thailand ungovernable. It has been largely successful at spreading and maintaining and atmosphere of terror and uncertainty through well-trained secret militant units that engage in assassinations and calculated destruction.[17][23]

RKK[edit]

The Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), allegedly one of the armed wings of the BRN-C,[23] has been one of the most brutal and ruthless groups of the South Thailand insurgency in recent years. It is formed by young, mostly Salafi, militants who routinely flee to Malaysia after carrying out violent attacks, including bombings, arson and murders, in Yala, Pattani or Narathiwat Province.[24] Although several RKK members have been arrested or killed by the Thai military in the past decade, it is very difficult for those involved in counter-insurgency to penetrate the structure of the group owing to its secrecy and great mobility.[234]

GMIP[edit]

Like the BRN-C, the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) is a group that experienced a revival after 2001 and has currently more hard-line Islamic political goals, to the detriment of its former nationalist cause.[235] Its members are now believed to have sympathies with Al Qaeda and with the establishment of the transnational Islamic Caliphate.[24]

BBMP[edit]

The Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani (BBMP), also known as 'Bersatu', was initially created in 1989 seeking to become an umbrella organization that would unify the efforts of insurgents in the region. The group has sought to drive wedges between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims, seeking to disrupt the educational system by attacking schools and harming teachers, an activity in which other groups are currently involved as well.[24] It was reported that some of Bersatu's prominent leaders were arrested or killed before 2004. The highly coordinated torching of 18 schools in January 2004 led some to suspect that the Bersatu groups were responsible,[236] but according to recent reports Bersatu's former leaders are being sidelined by younger terrorists and the coalition is not any longer functional.[237]

PULO[edit]

The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is a movement that was founded on the nationalist and secular values of Patani nation-building. Its priority was freeing Pattani from Thai rule by all means, including armed struggle.[23]

However, since 2001 the civil society in the three southern Thai provinces has experienced a widespread imposition of legalistic Salafi norms and the reality on the ground is today very different from what it was in former Southern Thailand. Salafism has heavily eroded Patani cultural identity and current insurgent groups have extreme religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of Patani nationalism. Although some of the present-day insurgents are very likely former PULO members, it is still unclear whether their fight for PULO's cause and it is likely that many may have become part of the more active and religious organizations that have overtaken PULO.[23] At any rate, in recent years PULO's leadership has largely lost control over the insurgents and has a very limited overall degree of influence over the insurgency in Southern Thailand.[17]

On 26 July 2009 Abu Yasir Fikri, President of PULO, and the "Emir" of the Group of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), Me Kuteh, agreed to join forces. Abu Yasir Fikri was allowed to speak on behalf of the GMIP on all political issues. The agreement included a section in which they agreed to form a unified military force, the Patani Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA would be commanded by the First Deputy Military Commander of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO).[238][239]

On 18 April 2009, PULO outlined a solution to conflict at the OICs Twelfth Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts to consider the Conditions of Muslim Communities and Minorities in Jeddah.[240]

Symbols[edit]

Al-raya flag of Jihad

In the last decade of the unrest in South Thailand, the black Al-raya flag has largely replaced the colourful secessionist flags formerly used by the different groups involved in the insurgency against the Thai government.[241][242]

Original flag of the PULO, still used today by original PULO faction headed by Abu Yasir fikri

Flag of Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GEMPAR)

Flag of Negara Patani Raya (State of Greater Patani)

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN)

Flag of the BRN-Koordinasi (BRN-C)

Flag of the BRN-Ulama

Flag used by "Dagger PULO" (1989-2005)

Flag of the united (five-star) PULO (2005–present)

High profile incidents[edit]

Krue Se Mosque Incident[edit]

On 28 April 2004, more than 100 militants carried out terrorist attacks against 10 police outposts across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla provinces in southern Thailand.[243] 32 gunmen retreated to the 425-year-old Krue Se Mosque, regarded by Muslims as the holiest mosque in Pattani.

General Pallop Pinmanee, commander of the Southern Peace Enhancement Center and Deputy Director of the Internal Security Operations Command, was the senior Army officer on the scene. After a tense seven-hour stand-off, Pallop ordered an all out assault on the mosque. All of the gunmen were killed. He later insisted, "I had no choice. I was afraid that as time passed the crowd would be sympathetic to the insurgents, to the point of trying to rescue them."[244]

It was later revealed that Pallop's order to storm the mosque contravened a direct order by Defense Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to seek a peaceful resolution to the stand-off no matter how long it took.[245] Pallop was immediately ordered out of the area, and later tendered his resignation as commander of the Southern Peace Enhancement Center. The forward command of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which Pallop headed, was also dissolved. A government investigative commission found that the security forces had overreacted. The Asian Centre for Human Rights questioned the independence and impartiality of the investigative commission. On 3 May 2004 during a Senate hearing, Senator Kraisak Choonhavan noted that most of those killed at Krue Se Mosque had been shot in the head and there were signs that ropes had been tied around their wrists, suggesting they had been executed after being captured.

The incident resulted in a personal conflict between Pallop and Defense Minister Chavalit, who was also director of the ISOC.[246] Pallop later demanded that the Defense Minister cease any involvement in the management of the southern insurgency.[247]

Tak Bai incident[edit]

Main article: Tak Bai Incident

In October 2004 the town of Tak Bai in Narathiwat province saw the most publicized incident of the insurgency. Six local men were arrested for having supplied weapons to insurgents. A demonstration was organized to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. The army used tear gas and water cannons on the crowd, and shooting started in which seven men were killed.

Hundreds of local people, mostly young men, were arrested. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to the Ingkayutthaboriharn army camp in the nearby province of Pattani. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks, and by the time the trucks reached their destination five hours later, in the heat of the day, 78 men had died of suffocation.

This incident sparked widespread protests across the south, and indeed across Thailand, since even non-Muslim Thais were appalled at the army's behaviour. Thaksin, however, gave the army his full support. Those responsible for the ill-treatment and death of the detainees received the most minor of non-custodial punishments. Thaksin's initial response was to defend the army's actions, saying that the 78 men died "because they were already weak from fasting during the month of Ramadan."

Charges were filed against 58 suspects accused of participating in the demonstration. The trials went on at a slow pace, and as of October 2006, the court had finished questioning of only two of the 1,500 witnesses in the case. Police were also unable to find 32 Tak Bai protesters who were still at large after fleeing arrest.[248]

On 2 November 2006, then Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont gave a formal apology for the incident.[249] The next day, the insurgents responded by increasing the number of violent acts by fivefold in comparison to the average the preceding month.[71]

Reconciliation and negotiation[edit]

Negotiation attempts[edit]

Attempts to negotiate with insurgents were hampered by the anonymity of the insurgency's leaders.

In May 2004, Wan Kadir Che Wan, exiled leader of Bersatu and for years one of the key symbolic figures in the guerrilla movement, stated that he would be willing to negotiate with the Government to end the southern violence. He also hinted that Bersatu would be willing to soften its previous demands for an independent state.[250][251]

The government initially welcomed the request to negotiate. However, the government response was severely criticized as being "knee-jerk" and "just looking to score cheap political points."[251] But when it became apparent that, despite his softened demand for limited autonomy, Wan Kadir Che Man had no influence over the violence, the negotiations were cancelled.[251] The government then began a policy of not attempting to officially negotiate with the insurgents.[252]

After being appointed Army Commander in 2005, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin expressed confidence that he could resolve the insurgency. He claimed that he would take a "new and effective" approach to a crisis and that "The Army is informed [of who the insurgents are] and will carry out their duties."[253]

On 1 September 2006, a day after 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in Yala province, Sonthi announced that he would break with the government no-negotiation policy. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with."[254] In a press conference the next day, he attacked the government for criticizing him for trying to negotiate with the anonymous insurgents, and demanded that the government "Free the military and let it do the job."[255] His confrontation with the government made his call for negotiation extremely popular with the media.[252] Afterwards, insurgents bombed 6 department stores in Hat Yai city, which until then had been free of insurgent activities. As always, the identity of the insurgents was not revealed. Sonthi was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat unrest in the far South.[47] By 19 September 2006 (after Sonthi overthrew the Thai government), the Army admitted that it was still unsure who to negotiate with.[256]

National Reconciliation Commission[edit]

On March 2005, respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun was appointed as chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, tasked with overseeing that peace is brought back to the South. A fierce critic of the Thaksin-government, Anand frequently criticized the handling of the southern unrest, and in particular the State of Emergency Decree. He has been quoted to have said, "The authorities have worked inefficiently. They have arrested innocent people instead of the real culprits, leading to mistrust among locals. So, giving them broader power may lead to increased violence and eventually a real crisis." Unfortunately, the situation deteriorated from 2005 to 2006, with escalating violence, especially among teachers and civilians. Despite much criticism of the Thaksin-government's policies, Anand refused to submit the NRC's final report, choosing instead to wait for the results of the 2006 legislative election.[257]

Anand finally submitted the NRC's recommendations on 5 June 2006.[258] Among them were

Introducing Islamic law

Making ethnic Pattani-Malay (Yawi) as a working language in the region

Establishing an unarmed peacekeeping force

Establishing a Peaceful Strategic Administrative Centre for Southern Border Provinces

The Thaksin government vowed to implement the recommendations. However, the recommendations were vigorously opposed by Prem Tinsulanonda, the President of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's Privy Council, who stated "We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai... We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language".[259]

Casualties[edit]

Note: Table is not comprehensive

Table is clearly incorrect. Statistics written here state that by end of 2012 "some" 3,380 deaths had resulted while the table shows in excess of 4,400 through 2011.

By end-2012 the conflict since 2004 had resulted in some 3,380 deaths, including 2,316 civilians, 372 troops, 278 police, 250 suspected insurgents, 157 education officials and seven Buddhist monks.[260]

Year Killed

2004 625[261]

2005 550[261]

2006 780[261]

2007 770[261]

2008 450[261]

2009 310[261]

2010 521[262]

2011 535[262]

According to one report in the Patani Post in late May 2014, about 6,000 people have been killed in the conflict during the last decade.[263]

Human Rights Issues[edit]

Human Rights Watch (HRW)[264] cites abuses on both sides. Numerous times the insurgents have murdered Buddhist monks collecting alms, and Buddhist villagers have been killed going about routine work such as rubber tapping, even though Buddhists have lived in the region for centuries. School teachers, headmasters, and students have been killed and schools torched presumably because schools represent a symbol of the Thai Government. Civil servants, regardless of religion, have been targeted for assassination.[102]

Meanwhile, local Muslims have been beaten, killed, or simply "disappeared" during police questioning and custody. Human Rights Watch has documented at least 20 such disappearances.[265] Soldiers and police have sometimes been indiscriminate when pursuing suspected insurgents, resulting in civilian collateral damage.

Of the 2,463 people killed in attacks from 2004 to 2007, 2,196 (89%) were civilians. Buddhist Thais and ethnic Malay Muslims were killed in bomb attacks, shootings, assassinations, ambushes, and machete hackings. At least 29 victims have been beheaded and mutilated.

"There have been hundreds of militant attacks on teachers, schools, public health workers, hospital staff, and community health centers. For the first time in the region's history of separatist insurgencies, Buddhist monks and novices are now among those killed and injured by separatist militants," HRW said in a 2007 report.

"Village-based militants called Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (Patani Freedom Fighters) in the loose network of BRN-Coordinate (National Revolution Front-Coordinate) have now emerged as the backbone of the new generation of separatist militants.

"Increasingly, they claim that the southern border provinces are not the land of Buddhist Thais, but a religious 'conflict zone' which must be divided between ethnic Malay Muslims and 'infidels'. The separatists seek to forcibly liberate Patani Darulsalam (Islamic Land of Patani), from what they call a Buddhist Thai occupation," HRW continued.[210]

The 2010 World Report from Human Rights Watch highlighted escalating human rights abuses throughout Thailand,[266] with the South reflecting overall policies against individual human rights. Sharply increased powers for police and the military were accompanied by a perceived lack of accountability.

Government harassment of suspected insurgents[edit]

The Asian Human Rights Commission accused the military of beating and torturing suspected insurgents by burning their genitals with cigarettes, smashing beer bottles over their knees, and chaining them to dogs. Such abuses were alleged to have occurred in October 2006, after the military seized power.[267]

In December 2006, a group of 20 Muslims, 9 men and 11 women aged between 2 and 55, sought political asylum in Malaysia. They claimed that the post-coup regime was more aggressive against civilians and that they were continuously harassed by the Army. The Army admitted that the group sought refuge in Malaysia out of fear for their lives - but that the threat was from forces.[268]

A group of Muslims from Narathiwat that fled to Malaysia in March 2007 claimed that they were escaping intimidation and brutality by the military. The group complained that they have been beaten and that their sons have been missing or detained since 2005. It also claimed that some youths had died after they were poisoned during detention.[269]

In late January, 2012, an unknown number of insurgents ambushed a thahan pran base before retreating. The rangers chased the insurgents and were fired upUnfinished journey (175)

(The one hundred and seventy-five, Depok, West Java, Indonesia, January 3, 2015,22.37 BST)

Whether we are helping our brothers who suffer misfortune?

Have we been concerned with our brothers who suffer calamities in the country such as landslides in banjarnegara, Central Java, bandung, Flood or accident and theexamination of our brothers who are in Russia, in Chehnya, Xinjiang, China, in thesouthern Philippines, Southern Thailand or against Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar,

Also prolonged suffering in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

When we have a wealth of course we can help them through the charity/social that isdirectly, or help with our physical energy, if we are not able to physically and material(property), not least through our prayer to God Almighty, so they are given fortitude and patience.

Indeed, Muslims are brothers the other Islamic, although we do not know each other beforehand.

Once we convert to Islam, then they all are our brothers, true brothers, sisters in this world and in the hereafter.

Let us consider the arguments from the Qur'an and the hadith below:

1.Rosululloh SAW said in the Hadith Bukhari:

"The Parable of the Muslims who love each other and love each other is like one body,

If one member of the body feels pain, the whole body will come to feel pain and could not sleep "

2.Sabda Rosululloh SAW in Bukhari:

"It was the perfect person from your faith, so that he loves his brother (fellow Islam) as he loves himself"

3.Rosululloh SAW said in Bukhari:

"A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim neighbor.

Can not persecute or. Let persecuted. Anyone who meets his needs then Allah will fulfill his needs.

Whoever frees his distress, then Allah will free her distress in the Day of Judgment. He who covers his disgrace, then Allah will cover his disgrace on the Day of Resurrection "

4.Rosululoh SAW said in Tirmidhi:

"Your smile for your brother is shodaqoh for you ..."

5.Rosululloh SAW said in Bukhari:

"Whoever cut ties with his brother for a year, then he like to kill her ..."

6.Rosululloh SAW said Abu Dawud:

"It is not lawful for a Muslim to break with his fellow Muslims more than 3 days, and if it dies then he go to hell"

7.Sabda Rosululloh SAW in Bukhari:

"It is not lawful for a man broke more than 3 nights. Passed each other, but that is turned away and that was also turned away. The best among the two is the start greeting "

8.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"People of faith with people of other faith is like a building.

Mutually reinforce each other "

9.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"Among people of faith do not mutually hasud, finding fault with each other, mutual anger and back to back ..."

10.Rosululloh SAW said in a Muslim:

"Every Muslim against another Muslim is forbidden her his blood, his property (not to be stolen), and his honor (not allowed in abuse, vandalized his honor)"

11.Firman Allah in khujorot: 12

"Men of faith, shun berburuk sangka.sesungguhnya most prejudice is a sin. And do not find fault with others. Do most of you tattle on others. "

Of all the word of Allah and the word Rosululloh SAW above, it is clear that we are people of Islam are brothers.

True brothers, sisters, brothers lively semati, brothers and sisters in the world in the hereafter.

His name is relative, meaning we should love one another, love, caring, mutual greetings, visiting each other, help each other, help each other, and so on just like we behave in siblings. At the sister, the brother, the uncle, the nephew, even our parents.

If the siblings, his usual we not feel heavy for their help when there is trouble, there is a disaster, there is a need.

If siblings we lack money, we are happy to give money, or at least lend his.

If they are there is a need or problem, we necessarily help to escape from problems,

Even to the extent that we suppose to trade something good, then siblings we are interested in buying, we immediately gave her free, or willing to pay the cost of its course without taking, or at least we give a substantial discount for siblings us!

That is natural and true relationships among siblings.

And that is exactly what our relationship among fellow Muslim brothers.

As it is, and should indeed like that.

But, it is whether we practice it ???

In Fact:

There are many among us who have not been able to practice it fully and correctly.

Just imagine, we admit the true Muslims. Almost every day we Koran, studied religion, learning the Koran and Hadith, listen to the advice, tausiah of-cleric cleric and fathers clerics.

But, why our attitude to fellow Muslims is far from the teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith that we examine almost every day ???

If our merchants, we did not give a discount on them, even though they are right brother?

If they ask for help, we are reluctant to help, but they are right brother?

If they do not have money, we are reluctant memberiny or minimal meminjaminya.padahal them right brother?

If they can be a disaster, we are reluctant to help, or we want to help if given upah.padahal them right brother?

If they need a ride, we are reluctant to give a ride on mereka.atau want to give a ride home no money, as long as we can profit. Though it we brothers?

WHERE BROTHERHOOD THAT ???

WHERE siblings ???

STILL OUR MUSLIM KAH ???

OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE AWAY FROM MUSLIM IS BY Rosululloh SAW:

1.Orang Islam against Islam as body one.If one limb pain, then all the body will feel a sense sakitndan can not sleep

2.Orang faith with people of other faith is like a building, where another section mutually reinforcing

3. No one's perfect faith that he loves you as he loves his faith in himself

STILL TOO FAR FROM THE CRITERIA OF A FAITH AS IN spoken Allah:

"Indeed, those that faith is BERSAUDARA ..."

DG HOW WE THEN ???

MUSLIMKAH ALREADY WE, AS A PROPHETIC AND NET Allah ???

If not, start now memuslimkan ourselves ....... Ok?

Alhamdulillah jazakumullohu Khoiro

Muslim chaplain Alfarizi

By: Ndaru Triutomo, S.Si.

Readers are blessed Allah Ta'ala, each we definitely have problems. In fact, sometimes so severe that really test our patience.

Some people have to say "My patience has run out", or even to get out the words "Why I calamity of this kind, what my sin, what my mistake, but I also had a lot of worship, indeed God is not fair". This is partly an example of the words that we often hear. But these words are not justified in the Shari'ah, even showed weak person monotheism.

In this bulletin, we will review briefly about a very important matter to which every Muslim, namely patience.

Patience In 3 Case

Patience is a mental hold and keep it up to do something tidsk should be done. There are 3 forms of patience, namely patient in obedience to God, away from the patient of disobedience to God, and God's patience in destiny painful and troublesome.

[1] Patient In Obedience To God

Patience is important to this type owned by any servant, because the real life often feels heavy to run a variety of obedience. This is because the soul tend to like the ugly nature, as the word of Allah Ta'ala (which means): "Verily the lust commands to evil, except for those my Lord has mercy. Surely my Lord is Forgiving, infinite care. "(Surah Yusuf: 53).

Often we find a charity that he could not be continuous but to do it. They are eager to do many deeds in the beginning of time, but after it was abandoned. That requires patience so that we can continuously in charity, although the practice is simple. Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means) "Practice of the most loved by Allah Ta'ala is the practice of continuous although it slightly." (HR. Muslim).

Allah ta'ala preferred practice of continuous though simple, because it is able to help kontinunya a charity. One attempt to be continuous in the charity is to pray to God, such as by prayer: Allahumma a'inni 'ala dzikrika syukrika wa wa husni' ibadatik (O God, help me to always dhikr / remember You, thank You, and smarten worship Thee). "(HR. Abu Dawud and Ahmad, saheeh).

[2] Tolerance In Avoiding disobedience

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means) "Heaven is overwhelmed by things that are not fun, while hell was overwhelmed by things that are fun lust." (HR. Muslim). It takes patience to be able to keep away from things that are fun lust which in essence will plunge to hell. And disobedience including cases favored by lust.

A believer must control his lust and saw that the wickedness is not a trivial thing, but rather a case that could destroy him. Abdullah bin Mas'ud something from anhu said, "The believers see his sins as if he was sitting on the bottom of the mountain, the mountain he was afraid to overwrite it. While people who fajir (like sin) see his like flies passing over his nose. "(HR. Bukhari). All this can only be done with patience.

[3] Patient In Dealing Providence of God

Included into the pillars of faith is that we believe in their destiny or decree of Allah Ta'ala. There are two kinds of fate that befell man, in the form of pleasure and such sadness and tragedy. In the first type we must be grateful, grateful to God will add His blessings. As for the latter we must be patient. And both (grateful and patient) is the practice of worship that have value in the sight of Allah Ta'ala reward.

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means), "It's amazing the case of a believer. All cases (that happened) is good for him and not this is the case but only on themselves a believer. If he gets the happiness he was grateful then it is good for him. And if stricken by him to be patient then it is also good for him. "(HR. Muslim). Then attitude if misfortune befalls a Muslim is to be patient and believe that behind the tragedy that happened there wisdom of Allah Ta'ala.

As Allah says (which means), "Be sure we shall test you with something of fear, hunger, lack of wealth, lives and fruits. And give glad tidings to those who patiently. (They are) those who, when misfortune befalls, they say: "Inna lillaahi wa innaa ilaihi raaji'uun" (Surely we belong to Allah and to Him is our return.) "(QS. Al-Baqoroh 155-156 ).

In addition, the calamities that befall a believer is a test form, as Allah says (which means), "Do you think that you will enter heaven, And do not come to you (trials) as well as those who passed away before you? they were struck by misfortune and misery, and shaken (by various trials) that said the Apostle and those who believe with him: "When will the coming of God's help?" Remember, Verily God's help it Amat close. "(Surat al-Baqoroh: 214).

God Together People Tolerance

Allah ta'ala says (which means), "Ask for help (to God) with patience and prayer. Allah is with those who patiently. "(Surat al-Baqoroh: 153). In this verse, Allah commanded the believers to ask for help in the matter of the world and the hereafter with patience and prayer. In addition, this noble verse shows the primacy of the person that gets ma'iyyah patient (togetherness) God.

Togetherness God does not always mean the Essence of God is everywhere, including the patient with people, because it is clear that God is above the 'Throne, as in His word (which means), "Merciful The rest upon 'Throne "(QS Thaaha: 5). Unity of God with His servants mentioned in the Qur'an has two meanings, namely general and specific nature.

God togetherness general meaning of God's power and knowledge covering his servant, as in the word of God (which means): "And He is with you wherever you are. And Allah is Seer of what ye do. "(Surat al-Hadid: 4). Togetherness of this kind are common to all His creatures. The togetherness in this paragraph is a special character, which is unity in the sense of care and help of Allah Ta'ala that always accompanies his servant. So that all cases were considered severe, with God's help will feel light and easy. Thus the primacy of the people to be patient. (Taisir Kariimirrahman - Shaykh As-Sa'di).

Patience No Limit

Some people think patience has limits. So if it is considered to have crossed the line, he is allowed to act outside the rules. This feeling is not true. Allah ta'ala says (which means), "Only those who are patient who paid back their reward without limit." (QS. Az-Zumar: 10). God has prepared a reward for those who are impatient with countless reward. This shows the magnitude of the primacy of the patient.

Shaykh al-Sa'di said in his commentary: "So God promises to those who are patient with countless reward, that reward is not limited and is not measurable. It can not happen except for the primacy and patient position on the side of God ". If God has prepared such great reward for those who are patient, then why should we limit patience ?. In addition, we also believe that all the problems that come up, it is impossible to exceed the capabilities of a servant. As Allah says (which means), "God does not burden a person but according to his ability." (QS. Al-Baqoroh 286).

Therefore, all the problems that we experience, we can surely finish with patience, licenses, and the power of Allah Ta'ala. We believe that Allah Almighty is the One who has perfect wisdom in all the provisions given to His creatures. With this belief then it is fitting for us to be patient with all the provisions that happens to us, and remember it is a test for us. If we can be patient then Allah will raise the degree of us on his side.

We experienced exam when compared with the prophets and apostles then still much lighter. The most severe human test is the prophets. And man is tested in accordance with the content of his religious condition. As the history of Mus'ab ibn Sa'id -a tabi'in- of his father, he said, "O Messenger of Allah, which is the most severe human trials?" He sallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam said, "The Prophet, then its like and semisalnya again. Someone will be tested in accordance with the conditions of his religion. If religion is so strong (solid), then the weight of the test anyway. If religion is weak, then it will be tested in accordance with the quality of his religion. A servant will always get a trial until he walked the earth in a clean state of sin. "(HR. Tirmidhi, Saheeh). Therefore, when we are given a test, then remember there are still people who are heavier than the test that we have experienced, so it can help us to be patient.

Reward The Big Beginning Musing

Readers are blessed Allah Ta'ala, we have learned a very great reward for those who are patient. But keep in mind, reward the patient will only be obtained by people who do it at the beginning of the disaster. As for those who are patient after angry, then it also includes things that are good but do not get the promised reward.

Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam said (which means): "Verily the name patience is when at the beginning of the disaster." (HR. Bukhari). Patience at the beginning of the disaster is very difficult to do, for it is God promised unlimited reward for the culprit. As for those who are not patient, even denounced destiny, so in essence he has denounced God.

Allah ta'ala says (which means), "No calamity befalls a person except with the permission of Allah; and he who believes in Allah, He will give instructions to his heart. And Allah knows all things. "(Surah Taghaabun: 11). Shallalahu Prophet 'alaihi wa sallam also said, "Allah Almighty says,' I am hurt by the children of Adam. He denounced the time, when I was (regulator) time, I am the tossing and turning night and day. "(HR. Muslim). Therefore, when we say, "Damn it all today" then surely we unconsciously have denounced the One who set the time, ie Allah Ta'ala. We seek refuge in Allah from denouncing destiny.

So little discussion of the patient, may we be permitted to act upon and put into a group of people who got the virtue of patience. [Ndaru Triutomo, S.Si.]

Crisis in Chechnya

Author And Page Information

by Anup ShahThis Page Last Updated Saturday, September 04, 2004

This page: http://www.globalissues.org/article/100/crisis-in-chechnya.

To print all information e.g. expanded side notes, shows alternative links, use the print version:

http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/100

A mountainous region, Chechnya has important oil deposits, as well as natural gas, limestone, gypsum, sulphur, and other minerals. Its mineral waters have made it a spa center. Major production includes oil, petrochemicals, oil-field equipment, foods, wines, and fruits. For centuries, the Chechen people's history and relationship with the regional power, Russia, has been full of turmoil.

Map of Chechnya

Maps courtesy of ITA's Quick Maps

The recent crisis during the past decade or so has seen numerous human rights violations and draws parallels to many other conflicts around the world. For example:

It is similar to the situation in Africa, where small nations have been trying to break free from their regional superpowers and colonial rulers.

It is similar to Kosovo or the Gulf War, where allied and NATO forces used humanitarian reasons and mass bombings with precise military technology to wage a high-tech war; here Russia attempts (and has attempted in the past) similar measures, albeit with less success compared to their NATO counter-parts.

It is similar to East Timor, Kosovo, various African and other recent conflicts where, again, the civilians are the main casualties who suffer most from this conflict.

It is similar to the above-mentioned conflicts as various international conventions, treaties and laws are violated by powerful nations in their sphere of influence.

And, as with most other conflicts throughout history, there are trade and access related reasons for this conflict as the issue of geopolitics, Caspian Sea oil and control of it comes to the fore.

Of course, that is not to simply degrade this conflict to “yet another conflict” as each war has unique situations and terrible consequences. However, it is another indication of how power struggles are at work throughout the world and throughout history.

Chechnya's separatist rebellion grows into regional Islamist insurgency

GALLERY

Violence surges in Ingushetia

Russia's heavy-handed tactics have helped transform a separatist rebellion in Ingushetia into something potentially worse: a radical Muslim insurgency that has spread across the region, draws support from different ethnic groups and appears to be gaining strength.

» LAUNCH PHOTO GALLERY

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By Philip P. Pan

Washington Post Foreign Service

Friday, October 30, 2009

SUNZHENSKY, RUSSIA -- Her face wet with tears and framed by a black shawl, Madina Albakova sat in her ransacked living room and described how she had become another teenage widow here in Ingushetia, the most volatile of Russia's Muslim republics.

THIS STORY

In Russia, an intensifying insurgency

Violence surges in Ingushetia

The details emerged between sobs: the arrival of the security forces earlier in the day, her husband's panicked attempt to flee, the gunfire that erupted without warning. He was a law student, barely 20 and "so beautiful," she said, but the soldiers planted a rifle next to his body and called him an Islamist rebel. Then they took everything of value -- the family's savings, a set of dishes, even baby clothes, she said.

Such heavy-handed tactics by the Russian security forces have helped transform the long-running separatist rebellion in Chechnya, east of Ingushetia, into something potentially worse: a radical Muslim insurgency that has spread across the region, draws support from various ethnic groups and appears to be gaining strength.

Moscow declared an end to military operations in Chechnya in April, a decade after then-President Vladimir Putin sent troops into the breakaway republic. But violence has surged in the mountains of Russia's southwest frontier since then, with the assassination of several officials, explosions and shootouts occurring almost daily, and suicide bombings making a comeback after a long lull. On Sunday, a popular Ingush opposition leader was fatally shot, months after the slaying of Chechnya's most prominent human rights activist.

The insurgency is a key reason Russia has been reluctant to support sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program; diplomats say the Kremlin is worried Tehran might retaliate by setting aside sectarian differences and backing the rebels in Muslim solidarity. Washington, meanwhile, is concerned that the area is becoming a recruiting ground for militias in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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At least 519 people were killed in rebel attacks and clashes with government forces from May to September, up from 299 during the same period last year, according to a study by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. The fighting is concentrated in the largely Muslim eastern part of the North Caucasus, an area the size of Oregon with 14 million people from as many as 50 ethnic groups.

After a brief calm following two wars, militant attacks have spiked in Chechnya, as well as in nearby Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. But the violence has been worst in Ingushetia, the smallest and poorest of Russia's provinces, where rebels and security forces compete in brutality and even rights activists carry guns.

A few hours after the soldiers killed Albakova's husband, Movsar Merzhoyev, in this rural district on Oct. 9, a car bomb exploded several miles away in what appeared to be a failed suicide attack. Over the next week, gun battles here left 11 suspected militants and three police officers dead.

Ingushetia has been on edge since June, when a suicide bomber hit the convoy of the republic's president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, putting him in a coma and killing three bodyguards. Two months later, as Yevkurov was returning to work, another suicide attack leveled the police department of Ingushetia's largest city, Nazran, killing at least 24 people and injuring 200 others.

Russia has long blamed violence in the region on Muslim extremists backed by foreign governments and terrorist networks, but radical Islam is relatively new here. In the 1990s, it was ethnic nationalism, not religious fervor, that motivated Chechen separatists. That changed, though, as fighting spilled beyond Chechnya and Russian forces used harsher tactics targeting devout Muslims.

In 2007, the rebel leader Doku Umarov abandoned the goal of Chechen independence and declared jihad instead, vowing to establish a fundamentalist Caucasus Emirate that would span the entire region. After Moscow proclaimed victory in Chechnya in April, he issued a video labeling civilians legitimate targets and reviving Riyad-us Saliheen, the self-described martyrs' brigade that launched terrorist attacks across Russia from 2002 to 2006.

A major figure in the recent violence is Alexander Tikhomirov, a young preacher known here as Sayid Buryatsky who joined the rebels last year after converting to Islam in his native Siberia and studying in Egypt.

Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937)

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Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937)

Part of Xinjiang Wars

Date 1937

Location    Xinjiang

Result        Sheng Shicai's pro-Soviet regime established its rule over the whole territory of Xinjiang province

Belligerents

Taiwan Republic of China National Revolutionary Army

Islamic Rebels    Taiwan Xinjiang provincial government

 Soviet Union

Russian Empire White Russian forces

Commanders and leaders

Taiwan Chiang Kai-shek

Taiwan Ma Hushan

Taiwan Ma Ju-lung

Taiwan Pai Tzu-li

Kichik Akhund

Abdul Niyaz †     Soviet Union Joseph Stalin

Soviet Union Sheng Shicai

Taiwan Ma Sheng-kuei

Strength

Republic of China Army Flag.svg 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) around 10,000 Chinese Muslim cavalry and footsoldiers

1,500 Turki Islamic Rebels   5,000 Soviet Russian Red Army troops Several thousand White Russian soldiers and Provincial Chinese troops

Soviet Invasion 1937

In 1937, an Islamic rebellion broke out in southern Xinjiang. The rebels were 1,500 Turki Muslims led by Kichik Akhund, tacitly aided by the 36th Division against the pro-Soviet provincial forces of Sheng Shicai.[1][2]

Contents  [hide]

1 Start of rebellion

2 36th Division invades Kashgar

3 Aftermath

4 See also

5 References

Start of rebellion[edit]

Sheng Shicai had moved against Divisional General Mahmut Muhiti, commander-in-chief of 6th Uyghur Division and deputy chief of the Kashgar Military Region. Muhiti resented the increased Russian influence and formed a secret group around himself. Sheng feared Muhiti may have allied with the Chinese Muslim general Ma Hu-shan. However, the Uighurs of Kashgar heard hostile reports on Ma Hu-shan from Uighur refugees from Khotan suffering under Ma.

Muhiti fled Kashgar on April 2, 1937 with a small number of his subordinates and some amount of gold to India via Yengi Hissar and Yarkand. Shortly before his departure he sent message to Ma Hu-Shan about his proposed arrival at Khotan. In response, Ma Hu-Shan ordered his troops to prepare a parade and feast to honour General Muhiti. This preparation pulled troops who guarded both mountain Passes to Kashmir, which allowed Muhiti the opportunity to change his route and slip through into Kashmir. Muhiti's flight resulted in Uighur troops rising in revolt in Yengi Hissar, Yarkand, and Artush, resulting in the execution of all pro-Soviet officials and a number of Soviet advisers. An independent Turkic administration was set up by two of his officers, Kichik Akhund Sijiang, who commanded troops in Artush, and Abdul Niyaz Sijiang, who commanded troops in Yarkand and Yengi Hissar.

Liu Pin, a provincial commander in Kashgar Region with 700 troops at his command, responded to the rebellion by launching a squadron of nine Soviet planes to bomb Yangi Hissar and Yarkand.[3] After Muhiti reached Srinagar in India, the following year, he went on pilgrimage to Mecca.[4] A buildup of Soviet military assets occurred in Xinjiang before the outbreak of war. Around Kasghar, the Soviets sent AA guns, fighter planes, and soldiers of Russian and Kyrgyz origin in great amounts.[5]

The start of the rebellion in Southern Xinjiang had immediate and tragic impact on the fate of about 400 Uyghur students, who had been sent by the Xinjiang government to the USSR (1935–37) to study in the University of Tashkent. They were all arrested during one night in May 1937 by the NKVD and executed without trials, allegedly by order of Joseph Stalin. Soviet diplomatic staff were also purged throughout the province in Soviet consulates in Urumchi, Karashar, Ghulja, Chuguchak and Altai. Soviet Consul-General in Urumchi Garegin Apresoff (former Soviet consul in Mashhad, Iran and the main architect of Soviet policies in Central Asia and the Middle East) was recalled to Moscow and shot by firing squad for allegedly participating in the so-called Fascist-Trotskyite Plot against Stalin and attempting to overthrow Sheng Shicai's regime on April 12, 1937, on commemoration day of April Uprising four years earlier.

The rebellion is also viewed by some historians as a plot by Mahmut Muhiti and Ma Hu-shan to convert Xinjiang into a base for fighting against Stalinists.[6]

36th Division invades Kashgar[edit]

Meanwhile, Ma Hushan and his Chinese Muslim troops of the 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army) were watching the situation with interest, eager to seize more territory. Sheng Shicai surprisingly ordered 36th Division to quell Rebellion of 6th Uyghur Division, although initially 33rd and 34th Regiments of 6th Uyghur Division, which were stationed in Kashgar since August 20, 1934, did not join the Rebellion, because there were those who had previously trained in the USSR (during 1934-1935 a number of officers of 6th Uyghur Division were sent to Tashkent to study at the Military Academy there, also Soviet Generals Rybalko, Obuhoff and Dotkin consequently worked in Kashgar in 1934-1936, being the Soviet military advisers of Sheng Shicai's administration, and participated in organizing and training of staff of 6th Uyghur Division) . Having received the order the Tungans attacked Kashgar airfield on 20 May, but were defeated. Ten days later 1,500 Islamic irregulars under Kichik Akund attacked and seized Kashgar Old City. His troops wore arm bands with the words "Fi sabil Allah" (Arabic: in the way of Allah). The rebellion was followed by a Kyrgyz rising near Kucha and Muslim unrest in Kumul.[3]

Ma Hushan remained at Khotan watching the situation. His Chief of Staff Pai Tzu-li and Ma Ju-lung, the 1st brigade commander at Karghalik, persuaded him to strike against Kashgar. Ma Ju-lung arrived on 2 June at Kashgar to reportedly "put down the rebels of Kichik Akhund", but Kichik Akhund had secretly agreed to back off, he transferred his soldiers and himself to Akau while Kashgar was taken by Ma Hushan without a battle. The Fayzabad-Maral Bashi region was taken by Ma Sheng-kuei's 2nd brigade. Ma Hu-shan strengthened his position Southern Xinjiang and avoided engaging in battle, letting the Turkic Muslim rebels do the fighting as a diversion for Sheng's provincial army.[3]

General Abdul Niyaz

Ma Hushan surrounded Kashgar New City and explained to the British Consulate-General that the Chinese Muslim forces, still official the Kuomintang 36th Division, were acting in covenant with the Turkis (Uighurs) to overthrow the pro-Soviet Provincial government and replace it with an Islamic government loyal to the Republic of China Kuomintang government at Nanjing.[7]

Ma Hushan was paranoid about a Russian attack. He controlled the Kashgar-Khotan area, because it offered him a safe escape to British India, where he could take a steamer from Calcutta safely back to China sea ports, and then to the Gansu and Qinghai. He and his officers repeatedly had vowed to attack the Russians in conversations with Peter Fleming and sought to procure gas masks and airplanes to help them fight.

In August 1937, 5,000 Soviet Russian Red Army troops backed by an air unit and armoured regiment moved into Xinjiang at Sheng Shicai's request, whose Provincial troops suffered defeat from Muslim rebels in July 1937 at the battle near Karashar and were unable to continue their advance on the South. At the end of August Provincial forces, including White Russians, Red Army and NKVD units, heavily defeated Kichik Akhund's troops at Aksu with most of his troops being annihilated, after they were machine-gunned and bombed in air attack by a squadron of 24 Soviet airplanes in the open field near Aksu. As a result, Kichik Akhund and Abdul Niyaz escaped to Kashgar with only 200 men. After this battle Ma Sheng-kuei was bribed by Sheng Shicai to defect and turn against Ma Hushan. Ma Sheng-kuei marched on Kashgar on September 1, 1937, only to find that Ma Hushan, Ma Ju-lung, and Pai Tzu-li withdrew toward Karghalik with the 1st brigade. On 7 September, Ma Hushan and his officers deserted their troops and fled to India with gold. Ma brought thousand ounces in gold, which was confiscated by the British.[8]

The Chinese Muslim General Ma Zhanshan was allegedly one of the commanders of the Soviet army during the invasion. It was reported that he led Russian troops disguised in Chinese uniforms along with bombers during the attack, which was requested by Sheng Shicai.[9] Other sources do not mention this doubtful participation of Ma Zhanshan in this war, since he was a Commander in Chief of Cavalry in the National Revolutionary Army in China in 1937.[10]

General Chiang Yu-fen, a Provincial commander, despatched his men after Ma Hushan's 1st brigade, while other Provincial forces drove Abdu Niyaz and Kichik Akhund towards Yarkand. Red Army aircraft assisted the Provincial forces by dropping bombs, including some that contained mustard gas. These first flew from an airbase in Karakol, USSR, and then from captured airfields in Uchturpan and Kucha.[11] On 9 September Yarkand fell to Sheng, and on 15 September Abdul Niyaz was executed. On October 15 the Soviets bombed the city of Khotan where casualties numbered 2,000.[12][12] The remnants of the 36th division melted away through Kunlun Mountains in Qinghai and Northern Tibet.[3]

Aftermath[edit]

Before the war, Ma Hushan had exchanged message with the Nanjing Kuomintang government and had expected them to send aid, as he said in conversations with Peter Fleming. However, in 1937, at the same time of the Soviet attack, China was invaded by Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The pro-Soviet provincial forces of Sheng Shicai established their control over the whole of Xinjiang. All rivals were eliminated, and the defeat of the 36th division caused the control of the Chinese Central Government in Xinjiang to cease.

A memorial was set up by Sheng Shicai to dead Russians who were killed in combat by Ma Hushan. The memorial included Russian Orthodox crosses.[13][14]

The Republic of China government was fully aware of the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang province, and Soviet troops moving around Xinjiang and Gansu, but it was forced to mask these maneuvers to the public as "Japanese propaganda" to avoid an international incident and for continued military supplies from the Soviets.[15]

Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China

Elizabeth Van Wie Davis

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

January 2008

Overview 

•        The April 1990 armed uprising in Baren marked an increase in Uyghur Muslim violence in Xinjiang, China. Two justifications—ethnic separatism and religious rhetoric—are given. The Uyghurs, who reside throughout the immediate region, are the largest Turkic ethnic group living in Xinjiang as well as being overwhelmingly Muslim. This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and people. 

•        The desired outcome by groups that use violence is, broadly speaking, a separate Uyghur state, called either Uyghuristan or Eastern Turkistan, which lays claim to a large part of China. While some Uyghurs want a separate state, others want to maintain cultural distinction within an autonomous relationship with China, and others are integrating into the Chinese system. There is no single Uyghur agenda.

•        The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang occur sporadically, and the groups that claim responsibility are frequently splintering, merging, and collapsing.  Some of the Uyghur groups make claims that are difficult to substantiate.  Nonetheless, the Uyghur grievances against the Chinese government have old roots. Some of the newer elements include Turkey’s unofficial support and Muslim funding and training from abroad.

•        The heavy-handedness of the multiple “strike hard” campaigns by the central Chinese government in Xinjiang simultaneously tamps down violence in the short-run but fuels a sense of injustice and mistrust among the Uyghurs in the long-run. Beginning in 1996, regular “strike hard” campaigns were used to fight crime and threats to order by mobilizing police, but are used in this decade to deal increasingly with “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” A heavy police presence is a constant in Xinjiang.

•        U.S. policy on this issue is constrained.  Not only does the US need to work with China on issues of geostrategic importance, but also the Uyghurs who use violence have formed limited associations with groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations. The best option for the United States is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.

The Roots of the Problem

A January 2007 Chinese raid on a training camp in Xinjiang killed 18 terrorist suspects and one policeman. Seventeen more suspects were reported captured and explosives were seized. The raid was said to have provided new evidence of ties to “international terrorist forces.”  The raid marks the latest clash between Uyghur Muslim separatists and Chinese security services, reflecting a limited challenge to China’s mainland stability. In Beijing’s view, however, instability in Xinjiang could also bring instability to Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan. As with many of these disputes throughout Asia, the root causes of the problem are a complex mix of history, ethnicity, and religion, fueled by poverty, unemployment, social disparities, and political grievances.

The central government has gone through several waves regarding the treatment of religion and ethnicity within the territory of the People’s Republic of China.  Historically, ethnic minorities that are adherents to religions other than Chinese Buddhism raised fears of social unrest in China.  For instance in the nineteenth century, the Taiping Rebellion—including the Hakka subgroup and Zhuang minorities—and the Hui Minorities War  both had their roots in religious movements.  The Hui, ethnically Chinese but religiously Muslim, are a unique minority in China. The ethnic minorities and Muslim majority in Xinjiang, which means the “New Territories” in Chinese, were largely conquered and integrated into the Chinese state in the 1750s.  Xinjiang became a province in 1884, fixing a firm western border with Russia.  According to the noted historian Jonathan D. Spence, the Xinjiang region was not initially colonized or settled, but was maintained as a strategic frontier zone, with up to 20,000 Manchu and Chinese banner garrisons, at a huge annual cost. The largely Muslim inhabitants kept their own religious leaders, who were bound by salaries and titles to the Qing state (China).   After the dissolution of the Qing Dynasty, the last Chinese dynasty, the Republic of China’s Nationalists gradually saw the country fall into Japanese occupied territories and warlord fiefdoms, including Xinjiang, which was ruled by an autonomous military governor who nervously sought aid and sponsorship first from Soviet Russia and then from the Nationalists, before ultimately surrendering to the Communists in Xinjiang in September 1949.

Although initially declaring the People’s Republic of China as a multinational state  in 1949, the Communist Party’s Anti Rightist Policy of 1957 opposed “local nationalism” among ethnic minorities and clamped down on religions.  A decade later, the harsh Cultural Revolution (1966-76) saw many even greater injustices against ethnic minorities.  Religion was especially suppressed, but so was ethnic language, cultural cuisines and garb.  The Uyghur in Xinjiang, like other Muslim minorities throughout China, saw their religious texts and mosques destroyed, their religious leaders persecuted, and individual adherents punished.  With the more open policies of the late 1970s through the early 1990s, restrictions on minorities and religions began to loosen.  This opening resulted in more minorities speaking out against what were seen as discriminatory economic, religious, and political practices.  The Chinese government began to crack down in Xinjiang in 1996, shortly after the first meeting of the Shanghai Five, soon to be the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose members include Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

In addition to police and military crackdowns, Beijing believes that economic development can undermine Uyghur calls for independence and solve Xinjiang's problems. And economically, Xinjiang has dramatically improved relative to its economy of a decade ago, although it still lags behind the industrialized coastal areas. However, the very improvements attributed to economic enhancement open China to risk in Xinjiang. For example, as part of its development plans, Beijing is connecting Xinjiang to Central Asia through roads, rails and pipelines to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. But these very openings are exposing Xinjiang directly to Islamic militant training and arms as well as the drug trade emanating from these countries and beyond. 

State Responses

The response from Beijing has been officially reasonable, but less so in practice.  In September 1999, National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China was released by the Office of the State Council.  The policy outlines a fairly generous policy toward minorities.   The problem, of course, is always in the actual adherence to policy in real life situations where minorities are often viewed with various preconceived notions of race and ethnicity.  Open tolerance of minorities declined further in Xinjiang after September 11, 2001, when China felt it was now both internationally permissible to “crack down” on separatists in Xinjiang and nationally more urgent to protect its porous borders from an influx of more violent forms of Islam, borders which abut Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.  

Chinese central government policies are also reflected in recent policy statements.  For instance, at the May 2006 meeting of the Chinese National Islamic Council, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, urged Islamic leaders in China to play a positive role in building a “harmonious society.”   The message reflects the Chinese government’s perceived connection between Muslims, many of whom are also ethnic minorities in China, and social unrest.  According to Ye Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, “As Chinese Muslims advance with the nation, this is our response to the many turbid misunderstandings that tarnish the Muslim image: Islam is a peace-loving religion.  Chinese Muslims love peace, oppose turmoil and separatism, advocate tolerance and harmony, and treasure unity and stability.” 

Clearly the Chinese government has been cracking down on Uyghur militants. Western human rights groups are concerned about overall treatment of prisoners and the targeting of minorities, while the Chinese government is concerned that Islamic militant rhetoric and funding are finding their way into China. The issue then becomes whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority, using terrorism and separatism as an excuse to violate their human rights, or whether China itself is a victim of separatists and terror networks like the al-Qaeda camps,  which trained Uyghurs in Afghanistan for activities in Xinjiang.   The Chinese tend to refer to this concern by the three character slogan of separatism, extremism and terrorism, implying a distinct link between the three concepts.  For instance, Chinese President Hu Jintao said on June 17, 2004, that "We have to fight against the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism," in a speech at a summit meeting of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), adding that terrorism in all forms must be suppressed and double standards must be ruled out in fighting what is regarded as a grave threat to world peace and development. Efforts should be made to tackle the problems of regional confrontation and poverty, which are considered the roots of terrorism, said the Chinese president. "Terrorism is not automatically related to certain ethnic groups or religions," he added.  It is clear that the Chinese leadership fears that Xinjiang separatism has and will continue to gain support from transnational Muslim extremists, with possible ramifications both for other latent Chinese separatist movements without a Muslim connection and for other Chinese Muslims without a separatist agenda.

The central government’s policies on separatists include the use of force, certainly evident in Xinjiang, For example, in August 2001, the Chinese military undertook large-scale exercises in Xinjiang with an imposing parade of military hardware through the center of the city of Kashgar.  The Xinjiang exercises, which were spread over almost a month, reportedly involved 50,000 troops, one of the largest ever staged by the Chinese in the region, featuring dozens of armored personnel vehicles, tanks, and camouflaged trucks filled with troops, capped off by a flyover of fighter jets. The parade was presided over by General Fu Quanyou, then chief of general staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and a member of the Central Military Commission. A number of other generals and senior officers, based at the Lanzhou military region which co-ordinates defense in Xinjiang, also sat on the podium to view the parade.  The use of domestic force is possible partly because of the existing international war on terrorism, the prevailing perception of the linkages between terrorism and separatism, the general regional reluctance to condone ethnic separatism, and the global concern that religion is mixing with both terrorism and separatism.

Economic incentives, however, may well be the largest tool in the central government’s policies toward Xinjiang and the Uyghurs, especially the Western Development policies. The western regions, over half of China’s vast expanse of land with its highlands and deserts, are made up of six provinces and three autonomous regions, including Xinjiang. The Western Development policies were first an economic development strategy to reduce poverty and then an urgent social necessity of Chinese leaders. In the early 1980s, then-leader Deng Xiaoping developed a policy to first develop the eastern coastal regions, which already had a better economic foundation than the western regions, and then second to increase the development of the western regions after the development of the eastern regions reached a certain point. In the following decades the poverty gap between eastern and western China widened, resulting in Beijing’s creation in June 1999 of a leading group responsible for the development of the western regions with Premier Zhu Rongji and 17 ministerial-level officials as members. The attempt to use economic tools to address ethnic separatism in Xinjiang reflects the Chinese government’s long-standing belief that most peoples, Uyghurs included, primarily want a good economic life for themselves and their children.

The current Chinese government, under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, is acutely aware of the challenges and dangers that lesser development in the western regions like Xinjiang means for not only China’s overall continued prosperity, but also for political stability, the possible enticements of Islamic extremism, and the calls for ethnic separatism. In 2006, Wang Jinxiang, deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission, assured the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that the national strategy to develop the country's western region had made great progress. He said that a total of one trillion yuan (US$125 B) has been spent building infrastructure in western China with an annual average regional economic growth rate of 10.6 percent for six years in a row.   China, continuing with its transportation infrastructure projects, will build twelve new highways in Xinjiang to connect with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. The longest road will stretch 1,680 kilometers from Xinjiang to Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, and finally reach Europe, scheduled for completion before 2010.  Other infrastructure projects either significantly underway or completed as of 2007 are: a south-to-north water diversion, a west-to-east natural gas transfer, a west-to-east power transmission and the completed Qinghai-Tibet Railway.    

 The underlying idea is that if the western regions, most notably Xinjiang, have sufficient development, then the minorities will prosper, be less restive, give less support for separatist  activities, and be more integrated into the fortunes—both economic and political—of China.  A complicating factor that has become manifest along with this economic development has been migration into the western regions, primarily of Han (or majority) Chinese.  Not only is this making the western regions more ethnically Chinese, but also it is reinforcing the “minority” status of the Uyghurs, who watch the better paying jobs go to Han Chinese while the harder labor, poorer paying positions are given to Uyghurs. The other ethnic groups living in Xinjiang—Kazaks, Hui, Kirgiz, Mongols, and others—have more mixed feelings about Han money and people moving into the region.

In addition to the national Western Development policies, there are the provincial and local policies in Xinjiang.   As in many places, politics are local in China.  While it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of Muslim status and politics inside of China, with a Muslim population of approximately 20 million,  there is a decidedly regional, provincial and ethnic character to Islam in China as well. China’s ten Muslim ethnic minorities usually find common cause only when they feel an issue denigrates Islam, as was the case with the offensive Danish cartoons of the Muslim prophet Mohammed. The largest group, the Hui who have blended fairly well into Chinese society, regard some Uyghurs as unpatriotic separatists who give other Chinese Muslims a bad name. The Hui “don't tend to get too involved in international Islamic conflict," said Dr. Dru Gladney, a scholar of Chinese ethnic minorities. "They don't want to be branded as radical Muslims."  

The local perception of groups as radical Muslims or ethnic separatists can have severe consequences. Provincial policies also include the threat of force. Armed police held a large-scale anti-terror exercise in Xinjiang on August 30, 2005. In the exercise, special police forces fought and subdued a group of "armed terrorists" who took over a company building and held some people as hostages following a failed attack at a prison.   

There are mixed policy assessments in the Xinjiang region itself regarding the Uyghurs.  On the one hand, deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a Han Chinese, Zhang Xiuming, implied that separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang is an issue when he said, “We need to take the initiative and go on the offensive, crack down on gangs as soon as they surface and strike the first blow. We must absolutely not permit the three vicious forces to build organizations, have ringleaders, control weapons and develop an atmosphere. We need to destroy them one by one as we discover them and absolutely not allow them to build up momentum.”  On the other hand, the Chair of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government and a Uyghur Chinese, Ismael Tiliwaldi, implied something quite different, when he said, “In Xinjiang, not one incident of explosion or assassination took place in the last few years....Last year Xinjiang’s public security situation was very good...”

It is clear nonetheless that both the central government and the provincial authorities broadly fall on the side of avoiding becoming a victim of terrorist or separatist activities when it comes to the question of whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority or whether China itself is a victim of Uyghur militants.  For instance, following the mass protests and violent riots of April 1990 in Baren township, there were further Uyghur demonstrations and disturbances in various cities including Yining, Khotan and Aksu in the mid-1990s.  This was followed by the Chinese government response: the initiation of a "strike hard" campaign against crime throughout China in 1996 which made Uyghurs and separatists in Xinjiang a key target. After the forceful suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs in the city of Yining in February 1997, several days of serious unrest reigned in the city. A renewed national "strike hard" campaign against crime was initiated in April 2001 and has never formally been brought to a close. Several levels of police conspicuously and daily patrolled the Uyghur sections of Urumqi in 2007; Han police officers patrolled the streets in a six-man formation wearing black uniforms and black flack jackets, armed with batons and side arms. 

China’s official statement on "East Turkestan terrorists" published in January 2002 listed several groups allegedly responsible for violence, including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the Islamic Reformist Party ‘Shock Brigade’, the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkestan International Committee.  There is not always clarity in the way these groups are officially labeled nor do these groups seem to stay static. For instance, in 1997, the Uyghurstan Liberation Front and the United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (UNRF) overcame their differences and joined together in a jihad in Xinjiang. The UNRF fears Uyghurs who agree with China, and announced that it had assassinated an imam of the mosque in Kashgar in 1996 because of his pro-China views.  When China destroyed an Islamist camp in Xinjiang in January 2007, killing 18 suspected terrorists and capturing 17 others, a police spokeswoman, Ba Yan, said the training camp was run by ETIM. 

Some of the issues between Uyghurs and the Chinese government, however, seem unrelated to separatist issues.  In another recent incident, hundreds of Uyghurs protested outside government offices over plans to push them off their farmlands to build a dam, according to a Chinese police official and Radio Free Asia. Police arrested at least 16 protesters in Xinjiang's Yili county, the site of clashes between security forces and Uyghurs in 1997. The June 2004 protests began outside the offices of a reservoir and hydropower station planned for the local Tekas River, according to U.S.-based Radio Free Asia. Authorities plan to move about 18,000 farmers, forestry workers and herders to make way for the reservoir, but protesters said they've been paid only 880 yuan (about US$100) out of 38,000 yuan (US$4,600) promised to them, the station said, citing anonymous witnesses. An officer at Tekas County police headquarters confirmed the June 11, 2004, protest, saying, "The protest was big. People don't want to move because they aren't satisfied with the amount of compensation for resettlement.” 

International Responses

It is less clear how the international community stands on this question of whether China is victimizing the Uyghur minority or whether China itself is a victim of Uyghur militants. A report produced in December 2001 by the US Congressional Research Service, for instance, documented a number of armed groups operating in the region.  Its list of armed groups included: the United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan, the Organization for the Liberation of Uighurstan, the Wolves of Lop Nor, the Xinjiang Liberation Organization, the Uighur Liberation Organization, the Home of East Turkestan Youth and the Free Turkestan Movement. Pakistan also considers several of these organizations as terrorist or militant separatist organizations.

The US did agree in 2002 to specifically single out ETIM as a terrorist organization in response to a planned attack on the US Embassy in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.  Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage announced that ETIM had been added to a State Department list of terrorist groups, freezing its assets in the United States, saying the group “committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians without any regard for who was hurt.” A spokesman for the embassy went further, accusing ETIM of working with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network and “planning attacks against U.S. interests abroad, including the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.” ETIM's leader and China's most-wanted terrorist, Hasan Mahsum, who was later killed by Pakistani forces on October 2, 2003, said, “We don't have any organizational contact or relations with al Qaeda or the Taliban…. Maybe some individuals fought alongside them on their own.”   Two suspected ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan in May 2002 for planning terrorist attacks. The Kyrgyz government has identified the men as Mamet Yasyn and Mamet Sadyk and said they were planning attacks on embassies, markets and public gathering places in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

However, the US has declined to formally add another Uyghur organization, ETLO, to its list. In a Radio Free Asia interview, conducted on 24 January 2003, the leader of ETLO, Mehmet Emin Hazret reportedly stated, “Our principle [sic] goal is to achieve independence for East Turkestan by peaceful means. But to show our enemies and friends our determination on the East Turkestan issue, we view a military wing as inevitable.”  Regarding other Uyghur militants, Chinese officials asked the United States to return Chinese Uyghurs captured fighting in Afghanistan. The United States has rejected China's claims and in May 2006 released five Uyghurs  to Albania, a neutral third country, while continuing to hold thirteen more Chinese Uyghurs in the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay.  Lawyers for these thirteen Uyghurs say the men were moved to Guantanamo Bay's high-security facility,  while the U.S. Government does not comment on enemy combatants held in Guantanamo.

Pakistan, both a neighbor and friend of China, has taken a more stringent line toward Uyghurs, closer to the policies of most Central Asian neighbors. China and Pakistan agreed to enter into an extradition treaty to facilitate the exchange of prisoners in 2003. Ismail Kadir, reported to be the third highest leader of ETIM, was returned to China in March 2002 following his capture by Pakistani authorities reportedly in either Kashmir or in the city of Rawalpindi, northern Pakistan, home to a sizeable community of Uyghurs. In Pakistan, a senior Interior Ministry official confirmed Kadir's repatriation to China, saying the man had been arrested in March. “He was sent back to China after being interrogated,” the official said giving no further details.  Ismail Semed, allegedly another Uyghur ETIM founder, was executed in Urumqi after being deported from Pakistan where he had fled after serving two jail terms for alleged involvement in the violent Baren uprising in 1990. Semed was convicted in October 2005 of “attempting to split the motherland” and the possession of firearms and explosives.  And Pakistani troops reportedly killed Hasan Mahsum, yet another ETIM leader, in the South Waziristan region of Pakistan on 2 October 2003.   Pakistan President Musharraf stated during his November 2003 visit to Beijing that “his country will never allow anybody, including the terrorist force of ‘East Turkestan’, to use the territory of Pakistan to carry out any form of anti-China activities.”  Thousands of Uyghurs reportedly travel to and from Pakistan for business and religious purposes, particularly to study in Pakistan’s madrassas. China believes that more than 1,000 Uyghurs were trained by bin Laden's forces in Afghanistan,  with approximately 110 returning to China, about 300 allegedly captured or killed by U.S. forces, and about 600 escaping to northern Pakistan.  In addition, some reports suggest that Uyghurs have been trained in unofficial Pakistan militant training camps.  

This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the Uyghur population resident in Central Asia who are associated with the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and individuals.  Uyghurs are often viewed with a great deal of leeriness in Central Asia.  Uyghur separatists within Xinjiang drew inspiration and envy from their Central Asian neighbors' independence after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and they increased their movement toward a separate Uyghur state. Militant Uyghur groups exploited Xinjiang’s porous border with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan to establish training camps outside of China's reach  as well as to move explosives and small arms into China.  Additionally, it is much easier for citizens of surrounding countries to serendipitously travel into China. “This year, we have arrested 19 people from abroad who were sent to Xinjiang for violent sabotage,'” Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan told reporters at a news conference in Xinjiang's capital, Urumqi. “When they entered the territory of Xinjiang, we immediately caught them,” Wang said without elaborating.  

The very rapid growth of economic relations and connecting infrastructure between China and Central Asian countries  has also enabled the enhanced movement of ideas, weapons and people. There are roughly a half million Uyghurs in Central Asia.  Most of the Central Asian governments, notably Kyrgyzstan, have made several attempts to crack down on Uyghurs whom they view as undesirable or militant. There is a tendency to view Uyghurs with suspicion—they are frequently unemployed and thus seen as thieves and troublemakers as well as harboring discontent toward their host governments. Uyghurs in Central Asian countries often join hands with other dissident groups, united by the global Islamic resurgence. For instance, Uzbek leaders believe that ethnic Uyghurs from Central Asia and China are members of the terrorist organization known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  Since the beginning of 2005, there has been a wave of “election-related turmoil” or so-called “Color Revolutions” in Central Asia, with terrorist and extremist forces often funded from outside and uniting religious extremists with political dissidents against authoritarian governments. Afghanistan has witnessed the resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda in the wake of a new wave of terrorist attacks following the Iraq War. More severely, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other extremist groups are quickly winning popular support in Central Asia, particularly in the poverty-stricken Fergana countryside, bespeaking a reemerging grim security situation in the region that poses new challenges to both Central Asian countries and China.

Energy

Although most experts would agree that the primary issues at stake in Xinjiang are ethnic separatism and Muslim extremism, the issue of energy is not negligible.  Not only does Xinjiang have considerable energy resources in terms of gas and oil, in addition to its former role as the Chinese nuclear test grounds, but also Xinjiang is the gateway to Central Asian energy resources.  China is pursuing pipeline deals with its oil rich neighbors in Central Asia, as well as Russia, to help meet the booming economy's demand for energy.

China and Kazakhstan started energy cooperation in 1997, marked by an intergovernmental agreement covering diverse means of collaboration in oil and gas fields, including an oil pipeline between western Kazakhstan and China's Xinjiang. The transnational Atasu pipeline was completed in November 2005. The deal, signed in 2004, came as Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev and President Hu Jintao signed a broad agreement for joint exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. The two sides also are stepping up consideration of plans for a natural gas pipeline to connect gas fields in the Caspian Sea with China.   Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement to build up international passenger and freight rail transport, as part of an effort to boost trade and complete routes through Kazakhstan to Europe.  A China-Kazakhstan rail link opened in 1992.  Additionally, China and Kazakhstan have opened a free trade zone at their mutual border to further enhance their already rapidly growing economic relationship.

Gas pipelines from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to China are also in the works. These pipelines, if connected with the Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline, will also contribute to the implementation of China’s Western Development policies. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, now deceased, and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a framework agreement on oil and gas cooperation on April 3, 2006, including a Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline to be commissioned in 2009.  Turkmenistan's gas reserves are considered to be the largest in Central Asia.  These developments usher in new energy cooperation between China and Central Asia, and these energy supplies—unlike Middle Eastern or other energy supplies—do not require maritime security.

Alternative Futures

The future that most worries the Chinese is that the Uyghur Muslim movement in Xinjiang will, on the one hand, externally hook up with international Muslim movements throughout Asia and the Middle East, bringing with it an influx of Islamic extremism and a desire to challenge the Chinese central government.  On the other hand, the Chinese fear the Uyghur movement could internally radicalize other minorities, whether it was the ethnic Tibetans or the Muslim Hui.  While Beijing is currently successfully managing the separatist movements in China, the possibility of increased difficulty is linked partly to elements outside of Chinese control, such as political instability or increased Islamic extremism in neighboring Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.  Partly, however, the progress of separatist movements in China will be determined by the Chinese themselves in policies and reactions.  If “strike hard” campaigns do or are seen to discriminate against nonviolent Uyghurs and if the perception that economic development in Xinjiang aids Han Chinese at the expense of Uyghurs, the separatist movements will be fueled.

The region as a whole has concerns about growing Uyghur violence.  Central Asian countries, especially those with sizable Uyghur minorities, already worry about Uyghur violence and agitation.  Many of the regional governments, especially authoritarian secular governments, in South Asia and Central Asia are worried about the contagion of increasing Muslim radicalization.  The governments of Southeast Asia are also worried about growing radical networks and training camps, but they also fear the very idea of a fragmenting China.  Not only is China economically important to the region, but also political instability in China would impact all of Asia.

Implications for the United States

Given that the existing scope of the Uyghur Muslim separatist movement in China remains weak and under reasonable control, this need not be a top issue for the United States. Although Beijing has decided to cast this ethnic separatist movement in light of new global perceptions following September 11, 2001, the Uyghur issue, both inside of China and in the neighboring countries, well predates the war on terrorism.  While this is a genuine ethnic separatist movement with at least some ties to global Muslim networks, it is not supported by any of the immediate neighboring country governments and thus is unlikely to erupt into a major concern in the near term.

The United States is constrained in its policy on this issue in any case.  Not only does the US need to work with China on issues of geostrategic importance, but also the Uyghurs who use violence have formed limited associations with groups that are categorized as terrorist organizations.  The best option for the United States is to continue to encourage China to use the rule of law and to respect human rights.

The primary concern for the United States has been  and should remain human rights abuses.  The US-led war on terrorism has led some international human rights organizations to speculate that this new international environment will lead to an increase in human rights abuses globally.  Many of the human rights groups that watch Xinjiang, especially the Chinese “strike hard” campaigns, fear that China is using the war on terror to disregard the human rights of Uyghurs. Not only are human rights abuses abhorrent in and of themselves, but also the Chinese worsen the problem by targeting and antagonizing nonviolent Uyghurs.

A focus on human rights is consistent with the US decision to cite one Uyghur militant group as a terrorist organization, specifically when it was asserted by a third party government that that organization (ETIM) was targeting both civilians and an American embassy, but not to label other Uyghur organizations as terrorists.  There are a few issues with the Uyghur detainees held at Guantanamo, according to a 2007 Congressional Research Service Report, with some Uyghurs being released and other Uyghurs being held indefinitely.   The United States should neither absolutely agree to other countries’ allegations of who is a terrorist nor ignore the growing linkages between extremist organizations that train and arm militants.

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines)

This article is about the insurgency of 1969-2014. For the insurgency of 1899–1913, see Moro Rebellion. For the pre-1899 conflict, see Spanish–Moro conflict.

This article is outdated. (March 2014)

This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling. (December 2014)

It has been suggested that North Cotabato Conflict be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since May 2012.

It has been suggested that Civil conflict in the Philippines be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since February 2014.

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

Part of the Cold War, the War on Terror, and the Civil conflict in the Philippines

PMC BAlikatan Exercise.jpg

MILF militant lying prone.jpg

Above: Filipino and US Troops during the PMC Balikatan Exercise

Below: A member of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front training with a light machine gun.

Date March 29, 1969 – ongoing

Location    Philippines (mainly in Mindanao)

Status        Ongoing

Territorial

changes    Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao formed in August 1, 1989

Belligerents

 Philippines

Supported by:

 United States (advisors)[1]

 Australia[2]

 Malaysia (since 2011)[3][4][5][6]

 Indonesia[6][7]

IMT:[6][show]

 Moro National Liberation Front [8]

 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (until 2014)

Former support:

 Egypt[7]

 Libya[9][10][11]

Former alleged support:

 Iran[9][12]

 Indonesia[11]

 Malaysia (until 2001)[10][11]

 Pakistan[9][13][14]

 Saudi Arabia[10][14][15][16]

 Lebanon[9][13]

 Palestine[13]

 North Korea[9][13][17]

 China[9][13][18]

 Vietnam[9]         Abu Sayyaf

 Rajah Sulaiman Movement

 Jemaah Islamiyah

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

 MILF rogue factions[19]

 Khilafah Islamiyah[20]

Supported by:

al-Qaeda[21]

Former alleged support:

 Iran[12][13]

 Iraq[13]

Commanders and leaders

Philippines Ferdinand Marcos (1969–1986)

Philippines Corazon Aquino (1986–1992)

Philippines Fidel V. Ramos (1992–1998)

Philippines Joseph Estrada (1998–2001)

Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010)

Philippines Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)        Nur Misuari

 Habier Malik

 Muslimin Sema

 Murad Ibrahim

 Hashim Salamat         Khadaffy Janjalani †

 Ameril Umbra Kato

Casualties and losses

572 Filipino soldiers[22]

17 American soldiers[23]

(since 2002)

160,000[24]

[show] v t e

Moro insurgency in the Philippines

In 1969, political tensions and open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and jihadist rebel groups.[25] The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established by University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari to condemn the killings of more than 60 Filipino Muslims and later became an aggressor against the government while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group from the MNLF, was established to seek an Islamic state within the Philippines and is more radical and more aggressive. Conflict dates back to 1899 during the uprising of the Bangsamoro people to resist foreign rule from the United States. Hostilities ignited again starting in the 1960s when the government started to resist upcoming rebellions by killing more than 60 Filipino Muslims and continues up to present.

Casualty statistics vary for the conflict however the conservative estimates of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicate that at least 6,015 people were killed in armed conflict between the Government of Philippines and ASG, BIFM, MILF, and MNLF factions between 1989 and 2012.[26]

Contents  [hide]

1 Origins

2 History

2.1 Marcos (1969–1986)

2.2 C. Aquino and Ramos (1986–1998)

2.3 The North Cotabato conflict (2000)

2.4 Estrada and Arroyo (1998–2010)

2.5 Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)

3 See also

4 Notes

5 External links

Origins[edit]

Main articles: Spanish–Moro conflict, Moro Rebellion and Philippine resistance against Japan § Moro resistance on Mindanao and Sulu

The aftermath of the First Battle of Bud Dajo

Fronts and captures in Basilan

The Moros had a history of resistance against Spanish, American, and Japanese rule for 400 years. The origin of the war between the Moros and Filipinos started during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines. During the Spanish–Moro conflict, Spain repeatedly tried to conquer the Moro Sultanate of Sulu,Sultanate of Maguindanao, and the Confederation of sultanates in Lanao. The violent armed struggle against the Japanese, Filipinos, Spanish, and Americans is considered by current Moro Muslim leaders as part of the four centuries long "national liberation movement" of the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation).[27] The 400 year long resistance against the Japanese, Americans, and Spanish by the Moro Muslims persisted and morphed into their current war for independence against the Philippine state.[28]

Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, another conflict sparked in southern Philippines between the revolutionary Muslims in the Philippines and the United States Military that took place between 1899 and 1913. Filipinos opposed foreign rule from the United States that claimed the Philippines as their territory. On August 14, 1898, after defeating Spanish forces, the United States had established a military government in the Philippines under General Wesley Merritt as Military Governor.[29] American forces took control from the Spanish government in Jolo on May 18, 1899, and at Zamboanga in December 1899.[30] Brigadier General John C. Bates was sent to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II. Kiram was disappointed knowing that the American forces would take over since he expected to regain sovereignty after the defeat of Spanish forces in the archipelago. Bates' main goal was to guarantee Moro neutrality in the Philippine-American War, and to establish order in the southern Philippines. After some negotiation, the Bates Treaty was signed which was based on an earlier Spanish treaty. The Bates Treaty did ensure the neutrality of the Muslims in the south but it was actually set up to buy time for the Americans until the war in the north ended.

On March 20, 1900, General Bates was replaced by Brigadier General William August Kobbé and the District of Mindanao-Jolo was upgraded to a full department. American forces in Mindanao were reinforced and hostilities with the Moro people lessened although there are reports of Americans and other civilians being attacked and slain by Moros.

Insurrection began in 1900 and lasted for a year. The American forces then move push inside the settles of Moro people. Kobbé was replaced by George Whitefield Davis as the commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo and put up better relationships with the Moro people.

It continued for more than three decades which resulted in significant loss of life.[citation needed] Military governors were appointed by the United States to ensure peace and stability within the region. The conflict ended at the term of Major General John J. Pershing, the third and final military governor of Moro Province, although major resistance continued in Bud Dajo and Mount Bagsak in Jolo.

Repeated rebellions by the Moros against American rule continued to break out even after the main Moro Rebellion ended, right up to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II. During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the Moros waged an insurgency against the Japanese on Mindanao and Sulu until the Japanese were defeated and driven out.

History[edit]

Marcos (1969–1986)[edit]

Under President Ferdinand Marcos, 68 Filipino Muslim military trainees were murdered in Corregidor allegedly by soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[31][32] The trainees were believed to be a part of an upcoming rebellion.[32] By then, University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to condemn the killings of the 68 Filipino Muslims and to seek the establishment of a Bangsamoro nation through force of arms.[32]

In 1969, the MNLF waged armed conflict against the Philippine government.[32] During one of the fierce battles of the insurgency in 1974, Jolo was burned down and news of the tragedy galvanized other Muslims around the world to pay greater attention to the conflict. Two years later, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement, declaring ceasefire on both sides. Within the agreement provided that Mindanao would remain a part of the Philippines but 13 of its provinces would be under the autonomous government for the Bangsamoro people.[32] President Marcos went against the agreement and violence ensued.

In 1977, Shiekh Salamat Hashim established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group of the MNLF seeking to establish an Islamic state.[33] Conflicts between these rebel groups and the Armed Forces of the Philippines would continue until the end of the regime of President Marcos.

C. Aquino and Ramos (1986–1998)[edit]

Earlier in her term, President Corazon Aquino arranged a meeting with MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and several MNLF rebel groups in Sulu, which paved the way for a series of negotiations. In 1989, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act No. 6734 or the ARMM Organic Act, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.[34]

In 1991, Abdurajak Janjalani, a former teacher who studied Islam in the Middle East, formed the Abu Sayyaf Group after reportedly meeting Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Janjalani recruited former members of the MNLF for the more radical and theocratic Abu Sayyaf.[32]

Under the Presidency of Fidel V. Ramos, several negotiations and peace talks[25] were held and the ARMM was solidified and was to have its own geopolitical system.[32]

The North Cotabato conflict (2000)[edit]

Background

1000 MILF rebels under the command of Umbra Kato have seized control of thirty five villages in the North Cotabato province. 2000 Philippine troops with helicopters and artillery were sent in to the seized area on August 9 to liberate it from the rebels. The MILF had wanted North Cotabato to be included in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The government and MILF had been negotiating for the inclusion of the province in the Muslim Autonomous Region but the Supreme Court had struck down the proposal after hearing concern from local Christian leaders in the region.

Conflict

The rebel troops were ordered to leave the area by their commanders but the contingents under Kato refused to leave the villages they had occupied and instead dug in. The Philippine Army responded on August 9 by bombarding them. The next day, the government forces moved to retake the villages recapturing two of them from the rebels.[35][36]

Estrada and Arroyo (1998–2010)[edit]

Political map of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

During his term President Joseph Ejercito Estrada he declared an "all-out war" against the MILF on March 21, 2000 although a series of negotiations for cessation of hostilities were held.[33] Apparently, several conflicts in and around Mindanao erupted and clashes between the Philippine Military and the rebel groups resulted in massive loss of lives.

During his term, these rebel groups kidnapped three Italian priests, two were later released and one was shot dead;[37][38] seized the municipal hall of Talayan, Maguindanao and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; the bombing of the ferry Our Lady of Mediatrix at Ozamiz; and the takeover of Narciso Ramos Highway. All these incidents resulted in massive loss of investments abroad, especially in the area of Mindanao.

As a result, the Armed Forces of the Philippines launched a successful campaign against these rebel groups and 43 minor camps, 13 major camps including the MILF headquarters, and Camp Abubakar[39] fell. MILF suffered heavy losses and the head of MILF, Sheikh Salamat Hashim, fled the country and sought refuge in Malaysia. On October 5, 2000, 609 rebels surrendered in Cagayan de Oro, along with renegade town mayor Mulapandi Cosain Sarip.[40] These was followed by another massive surrender of 855 rebels on December 29, 2000. President Joseph Ejercito Estrada then ordered that the Philippine flag be raised in Mindanao which symbolized victory. It was raised on July 9, 2000 near a Madh'hab and again the next day along with President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, which held a feast inside a classroom just meters away from a mosque.[39]

As a result, several Islamic rebel groups retaliated, bombing several key locations within the National Capital Region on December 30, 2000. It resulted in 22 deaths and hundreds of people injured. Saifullah Yunos, one of the perpetrators was arrested in Cagayan de Oro as he was about to board a plane bound to Manila in May 2003.[41] In 2004, two members of the Jemaah Islamiyah were arrested, namely Mamasao Naga and Abdul Pata as they were identified by Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi as responsible for the train bombing.[42] al-Ghozi was also arrested, but was later killed in a firefight when he tried to escape the prison on October 13, 2003.

On May 27, 2001, the Abu Sayyaf seized twenty hostages from an upscale resort in Palawan. Four of the hostages managed to escape.[43] The kidnapping group composed of 40 gunmen then seized the Dr. Jose Torres Memorial Hospital and St. Peter's Church compound in the town of Lamitan in Basilan[44] and claimed to have taken captive 200 people although 20 people were confirmed to be taken captive inside the hospital, including the staff and the patients.[45][46]

There was a crossfire between the Army and the Abu Sayyaf rebels in Lamitan following the takeover of Dr. Jose Torres Memorial Hospital which resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers, including the army captain.[46] Up to 22 soldiers were reportedly to have been killed in an effort to rescue the hostages.

Five more captives escaped during the battle at Lamitan. Two of the captives were killed prior to the siege in Lamitan, including the beheading of one.[43] The Abu Sayyaf then conducted series of raids, including one at a coconut plantation[47] where the rebel groups hacked the heads of two men using bolo knives. The owners and a security guard was also held captive and the rebel groups burnt down two buildings, including a chapel a week after the battle in Lamitan.[47] Another raid was conducted in August 2, 2001 on Barangay Balobo in Lamitan, Basilan. After three days, the Philippine Army rescued numerous hostages[48] after they overtook the hideout of the militants where 11 bodies were found beheaded.[49] Other hostages were either released or had escaped.[48]

On June 13, 2001, the number of hostages was calculated at around 28 as three more people were found beheaded in Basilan,[50] including that of Guillermo Sobero.[51] They were beheaded since the Philippine Army would not halt the rescue operation.[51]

The Burhams were still on the group of 14 still held captive according to three hostages who escaped on October 2001.[51] On June 7, 2002, after a year of being held captive, a rescue mission was conducted and resulted in the deaths of Martin Burnham and a nurse named Ediborah Yap[52] after being caught in the crossfire. Martin was killed by three gunshots in the chest while Gracia was wounded in her right leg. By this time Nur Misuari ordered his supporters to attack government targets to prevent the holding of elections on ARMM on November 2001, ushering his exit as the governor of the region.[32] Misuari would be later arrested in 2007 in Malaysia and was deported back to the Philippines for trial.[32]

On July 2004, Gracia Burnham testified at a trial of eight Abu Sayyaf members and identified six of the suspects as being her erstwhile captors, including Alhamzer Limbong, Abdul Azan Diamla, Abu Khari Moctar, Bas Ishmael, Alzen Jandul and Dazid Baize. Fourteen Abu Sayyaf members were sentenced to life imprisonment while four were acquitted. Alhamzer Limbong was later killed in a prison uprising.[53]

These rebel groups, especially the Abu Sayyaf conducted several terror attacks, namely the bombings at Zamboanga in October 2002; the bombing of SuperFerry 14 on February 2004; the simultaneous bombings in Central Mindanao on October 2006; the beheadings of several Philippine Marines on July 2007; the Batasang Pambansa bombing on November 2007; and the 2009 bombings in Mindanao.

Numerous clashes erupted between the Philippine Army and the rebel groups, such as the clash on June 14, 2009 that killed 10 rebels.[54]

Since 2001, the Philippines and the United States have been on a campaign to battle this insurgency, known as War on Terror. To combat the insurgency, the United States and the Philippines conducted the Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines,[55] a part of the worldwide campaign against terrorism known as Operation Enduring Freedom.

Benigno Aquino III (2010–present)[edit]

See also: Zamboanga City crisis

In 2013, two main camps of the Abu Sayyaf group were overrun by forces of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in its latest offensive in Patikul.[56] According to MNLF leader Nur Misuari, the MNLF offensive against the Abu Sayyaf is because of the MNLF opposition to the Abu Sayyafs human rights abuses which goes against Islam.

During the term of President Benigno Aquino III, a series of peace talks for the cessation of hostilities was held, including the meeting of MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ibrahim in Tokyo, Japan which was lauded on both sides.[32] Norway also joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) on January 2011, overseeing the ceasefire agreement between the government and MILF on Mindanao. Despite the peace talks, a series of conflicts erupted. on September 10, 2011, Jal Idris, a hardcore member of Abu Sayyaf, was arrested by government forces after a crossfire between the Philippine Army and the rebel group[57] The Armed Forces of the Philippines also killed three Abu Sayyaf militants in a stand-off[58] the following day after the arrest of Jal Idris.

Terrorism continued throughout President Benigno's term, notable cases include when 4 merchants and a guide were killed by Abu Sayyaf bandits in January 2011.[59] and later a soldier who was killed in a clash against the rebels.[60] In August 2011, rebel factions attacked a village in Sulu, killing 7 Marines and taking 7 civilians captive. They later freed 2 of the hostages after a ransom was paid.[61] Also, several areas of Mindanao were bombed in August by the government, and a Filipino businesswoman was abducted in September 2011[62] who was later freed after the three gunmen were gunned down by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[63]

On October 20th 2011, the MILF was blamed for an attack on 40 government soldiers in the province of Basilan, which lead to the deaths of 19 soldiers and 6 MILF fighters.[64] This thereby violated the ceasefire agreement between the government and MILF. This caused outrage in the government, which lead to the continuation of the war against terrorism in the country.

On the website of the Moro National Liberation Front, Nur Misuari declared its support for China against the Philippines in the South China Sea dispute, calling both China and the Moro people as victims of Philippine colonialism, and noting China's history of friendly relations with the Moros.[65] The MNLF website also denounced America's assistance to the Philippines in their colonization of the Moro people in addition to denouncing the Philippines claims to the islands disputed with China, and denouncing America for siding with the Philippines in the dispute, noting that in 1988 China "punished" Vietnam for attempting to set up a military presence on the disputed islands. The website also pointed out that the Moros and China maintained peaceful relations, while on the other hand the Moros had to resist other colonial powers, having to fight the Spanish, fight the Americans, and fight the Japanese, in addition to fighting the Philippines.[66]

The Zamboanga City crisis erupted on September 9, 2013 when a MNLF faction known by other groups as the Rogue MNLF Elements (RME), under the Sulu State Revolutionary Command (SSRC), led by Ustadz Habier Malik and Khaid Ajibon attempted to raise the flag of the self-proclaimed Bangsamoro Republik at Zamboanga City Hall (which had earlier declared its independence on August 12, 2013 in Talipao, Sulu), and took civilians hostage. This armed incursion was met by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which sought to free the hostages and expel the MNLF from the city. The standoff degenerated into urban warfare, and had brought parts of the city under a standstill for days. On September 28, the government declared the end of military operations in Zamboanga City after successfully defeating the MNLF and rescuing all the hostages.

On January 24, 2014, the Philippines government chief negotiator Miriam Coronel Ferer and MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal signed a peace agreement in Kuala Lumpur. The agreement would pave the way for the creation of the new Muslim autonomous entity called "Bangsamoro" under a law to be approved by the Philippine Congress.[67] The government aims to set up the region by 2016. The agreement calls for Muslim self-rule in parts of the southern Philippines in exchange for a deactivation of rebel forces by the MILF. MILF forces would turn over their firearms to a third party to be selected by the MILF and the Philippine government. A regional police force would be established, and the Philippine military would reduce the presence of troops and help disband private armies in the area.[68]

South Thailand insurgency

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

South Thailand insurgency

Souththailandmap.GIF

Map of the southern provinces of Thailand showing the Malay-Muslim majority areas

Date 1960[5] – ongoing

(55 years)

Location    Southern Thailand (4 provinces[6]—Songkhla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat)

Status        Ongoing

Belligerents

Emblem of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.svg Royal Thai Armed Forces

Emblem of Royal Thai Police.png Royal Thai Police       Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg National Revolution Front (BRN)

Flag of Jihad.svg Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)

Flag of Jihad.svg Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP)

Flag of Jihad.svg United Mujahideen Front of Pattani (BBMP)

Flag of Jihad.svg Islamic Front for the Liberation of Pattani (BIPP)

Flag of Pattani.svg Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

Flag of Jihad.svg Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) [1]

Flag of Jihad.svg BNPP[2]

Pusaka [1]

Pemuda [1]

Black December 1902 [3]

Flag of Jihad.svg Saibillillah [3]

Hikmat Allah Abadan [3]

Supported by: Flag of Aceh.svg Free Aceh Movement [4]

Plo emblem.png Palestine Liberation Organization [3]

Commanders and leaders

Flag of Thailand.svg Sarit Dhanarajata

Flag of Thailand.svg Praphas Charusathien

Flag of Thailand.svg Anupong Paochinda

Flag of Thailand.svg Praphas Charusathien

Flag of Thailand.svg Pongsapat Pongcharoen

Flag of Thailand.svg Kowit Wattana

Flag of Thailand.svg Prayuth Chan-ocha       Flag of Jihad.svg Tunku Yala Nasae [3]

Flag of Jihad.svg Wan Kadir Che Wan

Flag of Jihad.svg Abdullah Sungkar

Flag of Pattani.svg Kabir Abdul Rahman

Flag of Pattani.svg Sama-ae Thanam [3]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Sapaeing Basoe [1]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Masae Useng [1]

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional.svg Hassan Taib

Tengku Jalal Nasir[2]

Flag of Jihad.svg Nasoree Saesang [3]

Strength

Emblem of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.svg 306,000   5,000 - 30,000 [2]

Casualties and losses

499 soldiers, 312 policemen, and 181 defense volunteers killed[7]   399 dead[7]

Total casualties: 5,352 killed and 9,965 injured[7]

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South Thailand Insurgency

The South Thailand Insurgency (Thai: ความไม่สงบในชายแดนภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย) is an intractable conflict taking place mainly in Southern Thailand. It originated in the 1960s as an ethnic separatist insurgency in the historical Malay Patani Region, made up of the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, but has become more complex and increasingly violent since 2001.

The former Sultanate of Patani, which comprised the southern Thai provinces of Pattani (Patani), Yala (Jala), Narathiwat (Menara)—also known as the three Southern Border Provinces (SBP)[8]—as well as neighboring parts of Songkhla Province (Singgora), and the northeastern part of Malaysia (Kelantan), was conquered by the Kingdom of Siam in 1785 and, except for Kelantan, the area has been governed by Thailand ever since.

Although low level separatist violence had occurred in the region for decades, the campaign escalated after 2001, with a recrudescence in 2004, occasionally spilling over into other provinces.[9] Outside the region, incidents blamed on southern insurgents have occurred in Bangkok and Phuket.[10]

In July 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assumed wide-ranging emergency powers to deal with the southern violence, but the insurgency escalated further. On 19 September 2006, a military junta ousted Thaksin Shinawatra in a coup. The junta implemented a major policy shift by replacing Thaksin's earlier approach with a campaign to win over the "hearts and minds" of the insurgents.[11] Despite little progress in curbing the violence, the junta declared that security was improving and that peace would come to the region by 2008.[12] By March 2008, however, the death toll surpassed 3,000.[13]

During the Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted a "sense of optimism" and said that he was confident of bringing peace into the region within 2010.[14] But by the end of 2010 insurgency-related violence had increased, confounding the government's optimism.[15] Finally in March 2011, the government conceded that violence was increasing and could not be solved in a few months.[16]

Local leaders have persistently demanded at least a level of autonomy from Thailand for the Patani region and some of the separatist insurgent movements have made a series of demands for peace talks and negotiations. However, these groups have been largely sidelined by the BRN-C, the group currently spearheading the insurgency which sees no reason for negotiations and is against talks with other insurgent groups. The BRN-C has as its immediate aim to make Southern Thailand ungovernable and has largely been successful at it.[17]

Estimates of the strength of the insurgency vary greatly. In 2004 General Panlop Pinmanee claimed that there were only 500 hard-core insurgents. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Around 2004 some Thai analysts believed that foreign Islamic terrorist groups were infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims were balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict.

Over 6,000 people have died and more than 10,000 have been injured between 2004 and 2014 in a formerly ethnic separatist insurgency, which has currently been taken over by hard-line Jihadis and pitted them against both the Thai-speaking Buddhist minority and local Muslims who have a moderate approach or who support the Thai government.

Contents  [hide]

1 History of the insurgency

1.1 Historical background

1.2 Forced assimilation and local nationalism

1.3 21st century: The violence expands and intensifies

1.4 Main incidents after the 2001 insurgency upsurge

1.5 Timeline

1.5.1 1960-1998

1.5.2 1999-2002

1.5.3 2003

1.5.4 2004

1.5.5 2005

1.5.6 2006

1.5.7 2007

1.5.8 2008

1.5.9 2009

1.5.10 2010

1.5.11 2011

1.5.12 2012

1.5.13 2013

1.5.14 2014

2 Reactions and explanations

2.1 Official reactions

2.2 Political factors

2.3 Economic factors

3 Leading insurgent groups

3.1 BRN-C

3.2 RKK

3.3 GMIP

3.4 BBMP

3.5 PULO

3.6 Symbols

4 High profile incidents

4.1 Krue Se Mosque Incident

4.2 Tak Bai incident

5 Reconciliation and negotiation

5.1 Negotiation attempts

5.2 National Reconciliation Commission

6 Casualties

7 Human Rights Issues

7.1 Government harassment of suspected insurgents

8 See also

9 Further reading

10 References

11 Further reading

12 External links

History of the insurgency[edit]

Malay Muslim provinces in Southern Thailand with northern Malaysia.

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Historical background[edit]

Despite the ethnic affinity of the people of the Patani region with their Malay neighbours to the south, the old Patani Kingdom was led by Sultans who historically preferred to pay tribute to the distant Siamese kings in Bangkok. For many centuries the King of Siam restricted himself to exacting a periodic tribute in the form of Bunga mas, ritual trees with gold leaves and flowers that were a symbolic acknowledgment of Siamese suzerainty, leaving the Patani rulers largely alone.[18]

Forced assimilation and local nationalism[edit]

Thai rule over the historical Patani region was confirmed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. However, until well into the 20th century, the government in Bangkok had interfered little, relying on local officials for the implementation of policies within the Patani region. This included an exemption in implementing Thai Civil Law, which had allowed Muslims to continue their observance of local laws based on Islam regarding issues on inheritance and family. However, by 1934 Marshall Plaek Phibunsongkhram set in motion of a process of Thaification which had as its objective the cultural assimilation of the Patani people, among other ethnic groups in Thailand.[19]

The National Culture Act was enforced as a result of the Thaification process, promoting the concept of 'Thai-ness' and its centralist aims. Its 'Mandate 3' was directly aimed at the Patani people.[20] By 1944, Thai civil law was enforced throughout the land including the Patani region overriding earlier concessions to local Islamic administrative practices.[21] The school curriculum was revised to that of a Thai-centric one with all lessons in the Thai language, to the detriment of the local Jawi. Traditional Muslim courts that used to handle civil cases were removed and replaced with civil courts run and approved by the central government in Bangkok. This forced assimilation process and the perceived imposition of Thai-Buddhist cultural practices upon their society became an irritant for the harmonious relationship between the ethnic Malay Patani people and the Thai state.[22]

In 1947, Haji Sulong founder of the Patani People’s Movement launched a petition campaign, demanding autonomy, language and cultural rights, and implementation of Islamic law.[2] However, in January 1948, Sulong was arrested on treason charges along with other local leaders branded as 'separatist'. Sulong was released from jail only in 1952 but disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1954.[2]

Denied recognition as a culturally separate ethnic minority, Patani leaders reacted against the Thai government policy towards them. Inspired by ideologies such as Nasserism, in the 1950s a Patani nationalist movement began to grow, leading to the South Thailand insurgency. By 1959, Tengku Jalal Nasir established the Patani National Liberation Front (BNPP), the first Malay rebel group.[2] At the time of their foundation the goal of the nationalist movements, such as PULO, was secession. The emphasis was laid in pursuing an armed struggle towards an independent state where Patani people could live with dignity without having alien cultural values imposed on them.[23]

The last third of the 20th century saw the emergence of different insurgent groups in the South. Despite some differences in ideology they shared broadly separatist aims, but all justified the use of violence in order to reach their goals, setting a pattern of attacking police and military posts, as well as schools and Thai government offices. The effectiveness of these groups was marred, however, by infighting and lack of unity among them.[24]

21st century: The violence expands and intensifies[edit]

A resurgence in violence by Pattani guerrilla groups began after 2001. While the region's traditional separatist insurgents had flags, leaders, claimed responsibility for the attacks, and made communiques, the new groups attacked more viciously and kept silent. This new development disoriented and confused the Thai authorities, who kept groping in the dark as the identity of the new insurgents in the conflict remained a mystery. Thailand held relatively free elections in February 2005, but no secessionist candidates contested the results in the south. In July the same year, the chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee admitted, "The attacks look like they are well-organized, but we do not know what group of people is behind them." Despite of the shroud of anonymity and the absence of concrete demands, revived groups, such as the GMIP, and particularly the BRN-Coordinate and its alleged armed wing the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), have been identified as leading the new insurgency.[25]

While earlier attacks were typified by drive-by shootings in which patrolling policemen were shot by gunmen on passing motorcycles, after 2001 they have escalated to well coordinated attacks on police establishments, with police stations and outposts ambushed by well-armed groups subsequently fleeing with stolen arms and ammunition. Other tactics used in order to gain publicity from shock and horror are slashing to death Buddhist monks, bombing temples, beheadings, intimidating pork vendors and their customers, as well as arson attacks on schools, killing the teachers and burning their bodies.[26]

Current insurgent groups proclaim militant jihadism and are not separatist anymore. Mostly led by Salafist hardliners, they have extreme and transnational religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of a constructive cultural or nationalistic Patani identity. Salafi jihadist groups are hostile to the cultural heritage and practices of traditional Malay Muslims, accusing them of being un-Islamic.[24] They are not concerned about an independent separate nation, instead their immediate aim is to make the Patani region ungovernable.[17]

Thai response to the insurgency has been hampered by clumsy methods, a lack of training in counter-insurgency, a lack of understanding of local culture, and rivalries between the police and the army. Many local policemen are allegedly involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. Often the army responds to the attacks with heavy-handed raids to search Muslim villages, which only results in reprisals. Insurgents routinely provoke the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace.

Main incidents after the 2001 insurgency upsurge[edit]

Attacks after 2001 concentrated on installations of the police and military. However, also schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region have been subject to arson and bombing. Local police officers of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 incidents related to the insurgency in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat by the end of 2001.[27] Other targets of the insurgents have been schoolteachers. The BRN-C, through its 'Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani' paramilitary wing, has been the main group behind the murder of a total of 157 teachers in the Southern Border Provinces between 2004 and 2013.[28][29]

A massive security presence in the region has failed to stem almost daily violence, usually involving drive-by shootings or small bombings. When the insurgents make a show of strength—generally at least every few months—they have eschewed large-scale attacks, preferring well-coordinated pinprick assaults at many locations while avoiding direct clashes with security forces.[30]

Timeline[edit]

1960-1998[edit]

Although the conflict was carried out with less intensity, armed resistance in the 1960s and 1970s involved up to 1,500 insurgents.[1]

In 1960, Barisan Revolusi Nasional was founded by Haji Abdul Karim in response to the introduction of a secular curriculum in Pattani's religious bording schools.[2]

In 1968, Patani United Liberation Organization was founded by Tengku Bira Kotanila (alias Kabir Abdul Rahman).PULO became the most powerful insurgent group during the 1960 - 2000 period of the war.[2]

On 29 November 1975, Thai marines allegedly murdered five Muslim youths in the Bacho district of the Narathiwat province. The government allegedly failed to conduct a proper investigation into the matter.[3]

On 11 December 1975, PULO organized mass protests in response to the event, which were joined by 70,000 Malay Muslims. A bomb was thrown into the crowd killing 12 and injuring at least 30 protestors. The attack was blamed on Buddhist extremists.[3]

The government then proceeded to charge and imprison the perpetrators, launch an official inquiry and compensate the families of the victims. Despite the fact that the majority of the protestors demands were granted, the event led to an escalation of the insurgency.[3]

In June 1977, Sabilillah (Path of God) bombed the Don Muang International Airport in Bangkok. In the aftermath of the bombing Sabilillah vanished into obscurity.[3]

In September 1977, Black December 1902 members threw a bomb into a Thai royal ceremony. 5 people were killed and 47 wounded. The royal family managed to escape unharmed.[3]

In 1977, security forces killed BNPP leader Tunku Yala Nasae.[3]

In 1993 the 'New PULO', a dissident faction of the original PULO, was established by Arrong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo.[2] In 1995, Nasoree Saesang founded the GMIP.[3]

In August 1996, 36 schools were torched in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat allegedly by members of the New PULO faction,[31]> reportedly a dissident faction of the original PULO established by Arrong Moo-reng and Hayi Abdul Rohman Bazo.[2] The Thai Interior Ministry and Thai Military Intelligence reported that New PULO used unemployed youth and young drug addicts to carry out its terrorist missions.[24]

In 1997, members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), PULO and the New PULO established the United Mujahideen Front of Pattani in order to improve coordination between rebel factions.[2]

In August 1997, Bersatu launched an operation codenamed "Falling Leaves". Between August 1997 and January 1998, 33 separate attacks took place resulting in 9 deaths.[3]

In January 1998, Malaysia and Thailand launched a joint operation codenamed 'Pitak Tai' in order to crack down on insurgent outfits.[24] Malaysian authorities arrested New PULO's leader,Abdul Rohman Bazo, its military chief, Haji Daoh Thanam, and Bazo's senior assistant, Haji Mae Yala in Kedah, as well as PULO's military commander, Haji Sama-ae Thanam, in Kuala Lumpur, later handing them to Thai authorities.[3] The Thai government also encouraged local people to monitor the movements of drug traffickers and, as a result, the tough policy on drugs deprived PULO of recruits for its acts of terror.[24]

1999-2002[edit]

[icon] This section requires expansion. (October 2014)

Following the 11 September attacks in the United States, leaflets calling for Holy War and support for Osama bin Laden were distributed in Yala by militants.[32]

On 24 December 2001, insurgents launched a number of attacks on police posts in the three provinces.5 police and one defence volunteer killed.[1]

The Thai National Intelligence Agency had estimated that less than 1,000 armed militants were taking part in the conflict as of 2001.[3]

According to Thai Ministry of Interior estimates 50 insurgency related incidents occurred in 2001.[3]

By 2002, 75 insurgency-linked attacks amounted to 50 deaths among police and army personnel.[2]

2003[edit]

[icon] This section requires expansion. (October 2014)

In 2003, officials counted 149 incidents. The mounting scale and sophistication of the insurgency eventually prompted the government into a recognition that there was a serious issue in the southern provinces.[2]

2004[edit]

A further steep escalation of the violence in the Southern Border Provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat is reckoned to have begun on 4 January 2004 with the raiding of a Thai Army depot.[5]

On January 4, 2004, unidentified gunmen raided an army ammunition depot in Narathiwat Province in the early morning, and made off with over 400 rifles and other ammunition.[2]

On 5 January 2004, 2 policemen were killed while attempting to defuse a bomb outside a shopping mall in Pattani.A third policeman was injured in bomb blast that occurred in a nearby park.Two more bombs were successfully defused in nearby areas.Prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared martial law in the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala.[4]

On 22 January 2004, rebels killed a Buddhist monk.[4]

On 28 March 2004, a bomb planted by insurgents injured 29 people, including 10 Malaysian tourists.[4]

On 30 March 2004, masked men raided a quarry in the Yala district, stealing a total of 1.6 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, 56 sticks of dynamite, and 176 detonators.[2]

On 23 April 2004, militants killed an army officer and set fire to 50 public buildings in all 13 districts of the Narathiwat province.[4]

On 28 April 2004, militants launched a large scale string of attacks on armories and army positions in Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla. 108 rebels were killed in the aftermath of the attacks.[2]

On 10 June 2004, militants killed a night guard outside a government school and seized weapons from other security personnel who were inside.[4]

On 25 October 2004, 78 people were killed by Thai police in the aftermath of a riot over the detentions of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to Islamic separatists. Over 1,300 people were detained in the incident.[4]

On 28 October 2004, an IED detonated outside a bar, killing 2 people and injuring 21.[4]

On 2 November 2004, a Buddhist official was beheaded by suspected Muslim insurgents.[4]

On 4 November 2004, 9 people were killed including 2 policemen.[4]

On 7 November 2004, the Defence Minister of Thailand said that there had been more than 700 casualties in south Thailand since the unrest began in January. Many murders involved shooting and decapitation. During 2004 insurgents began to sow fear in attacks where Buddhists were beheaded.[33]

On 13 November 2004, 1 man was killed and at least 13 people injured when 5 bomb blasts occurred in various parts of the region.[4]

On 5 December 2004, Thailand airdropped nearly 100 million origami cranes over the southern regions of the country in an effort to bring peace. Militants respond with series of bombings in the following day.[4]

A total of 400 people were killed in over 1000 incidents during 2004.[1] [3]

2005[edit]

On 17 February 2005, a bomb exploded near a tourist hotel in the town of Sungai Kolok, killing 5 people and wounding over 40.Additionally 4 people killed in other incidents.[34]

On 3 April 2005, a series of bomb attacks in Songkhla killed two people leaving 66 injured. The bombings marked the beginning of attacks against ethnic Thai Chinese owned businesses who were considered Thaksin supporters and against southern Thailand independence as a Muslim state.

On 14 July 2005, a major attack was launched on the provincial capital of Yala city. 60 militants targeted an area near a hotel, the railway station, two convenience stores and a restaurant roaming the streets using guns, fire-bombs and explosives.[35]

On 18 July 2005, two militants entered a teashop, shot Lek Pongpla, a Buddhist cloth vendor, beheaded him and left the head outside of the shop.[36]

On 19 July 2005, the Thai Prime Minister enacted the "emergency powers law" in order to manage the three troubled states giving himself sweeping powers to direct military operations, suspend civil liberties, and censor the press. Several human rights organizations and local press expressed their concerns that these new powers might be used to violate civil liberty rights. However, the emergency decree was highly popular, with 72% of Bangkok residents and 86% of people in the three southern provinces supporting it.[37] Nevertheless the insurgency escalated further.

On 1 September 2005, three bombs exploded almost simultaneously.[38] Subsequently, 131 civilians from the south fled to neighbouring Malaysia seeking refuge from the Thai authorities. Thailand immediately accused the refugees of being insurgents and demanded that they be returned, sparking a diplomatic spat. Currently, the people are still in Malaysia.[39] Thailand, suspecting that insurgents may also have fled with the refugees, has asked Malaysia to return these Thai citizens but Malaysia has refused on humanitarian grounds.[40]

On 16 October 2005, a group of 20 separatists attacked a Buddhist monastery, killing three people. An extended state of emergency was announced in the 3 southern provinces plagued by the insurgency.The announcement sparked a large scale guerrilla raid on 60 targets, in which at least 7 people were killed and 90 weapons were stolen.[34]

On 16 November 2005, separatists killed 9 civilians and injured 9 others.[34]

A total of 500 people were killed during 2005.[1]

2006[edit]

A brief lull in the insurgency followed the 19 September 2006 coup that overthrew the government of Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. As Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin settled into his role as head of the junta, violence resumed. As of September 2006, more than 1,400 people had died in less than three years of southern violence. Most were innocent bystanders, both Buddhists and Muslims.

On 7 January 2006, four suspected militants fatally shoot two border-policemen in the back at a crowded weekend market in Yala Province. (The Nation) Three others were also killed in separate attacks on the same day.[41]

On 10 May 2006, a bomb exploded at a tea shop killing at least 3 people and injured more than a dozen.[34]

On 15 June 2006, during the 60th anniversary of the accession of Bhumibol Adulyadej to the Thai throne, well coordinated bomb-attacks against at least 40 government and official buildings occurred. Two police officials died and 11 others were injured. Experts say that the bomb attacks were a message to the Thai authorities, rather than an attempt to do real damage, as the bombs were loaded with small amounts of explosives. Had the devices been larger, the casualties and injuries would have been notably greater. The Thai media was late in reporting the incident, only doing so after the BBC and other international news services had announced it.

On 18 June 2006, mass graves of about 300 migrant workers were found in southern Thailand.[42][43]

On 27 June 2006, 7 people including 5 security personel were killed by separatist attacks.[34]

On 31 August 2006, 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in Yala province, killing a retired military officer and wounding 24 people. Afterwards, Army chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin announced that he would break with government policy and negotiate with the leaders of the insurgency. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with."[44] In a press conference the next day, he slammed the government for political interference, and asked that the government "Free the military and let it do the job."[45] By 16 September 2006, the Army admitted that it still wasn't sure who to negotiate with.[46]

In September 2006, Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat the unrest.[47]

2006 Hat Yai bombings. On 16 September 2006, six remotely detonated motorcycle bombs simultaneously exploded in the city of Hat Yai, killing four people and wounding more than sixty. A Canadian and a Malaysian were among the dead.[48]

On 21 September, 2 villagers were shot in Yala, killing one and wounding another.[49]

On 23 September, 4 policemen were injured in a bus stop explosion in Pattani. The bus stop was on a road that would be passed by the motorcade of Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn later that afternoon.[50][51]

On 25 September, 2 police stations and a military outpost were attacked by 30 gunmen in a coordinated series of attacks in Yala, leaving 2 dead and 1 injured.[52]

On 27 September, gunmen killed a grocer and two of his customers in Muang district of Yala and a traveller on the bus from Panare district to Mayo district of Pattani.[53]

On 28 September, a teacher protection unit in Sungai Padi district of Narathiwat province was ambushed by a bomb attack, seriously injuring 4 soldiers and killing one.[54]

On 18 October 2006, suspected Muslim guerillas raided an army base, killing one soldier and wounding 4 others.[34]

On 4 November, three schools burned to the ground and a person received a gunshot injury.[55]

On 5 November 2006, a bomb blast killed 2 soldiers and injured 3 others.4 people were killed and 6 wounded in a series of shootings and bomb blasts.[34]

On 9 November, 8 car and motorcycle showrooms were simultaneously bombed in Yala, injuring 13. Almost all gold shops in Muang district closed down for fear of their safety. Commercial banks remained opened but with tightened security.[56]

From January 2004 to October 2006, 1,815 people were killed and 2,729 were wounded in the insurgency.[57] Despite the renewed violence, a post-coup opinion poll found that Southerners had become the happiest people of Thailand.[58]

On 15 November 2006, militants shot dead 3 people in separate drive-by shootings, one soldier was also wounded in a bomb blast.[34]

On 17 November 2006, 3 bomb explosions killed one person and wounded at least 30 others.[34]

On 22 November 2006, Wan Kadir Che Wan, leader of Bersatu, one of the southern insurgent groups, told Al Jazeera television that the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network was helping local insurgents stage attacks in Thailand.[59]

On 27 November 27, 2006, after all schools in Pattani announced indefinite shutdown, teachers in Yala and Narathiwat decided to follow suit and close down the schools in the two provinces indefinitely due to fear for safety. The decision in Pattani was made after a series of arson attacks against schools and the brutal and fatal shooting of 2 schoolteachers.[60] In Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces over 1,000 schools were shut down.[61][62]

On 9 December 2006, a police informant was killed in a drive-by shooting.[34]

Despite the closing of the schools protest, on 29 December 2006 two more teachers were shot and burned to death.[63]

On 31 December 2006, 9 bomb blasts occurred Bangkok on New Year's Eve, killing 3 people and injuring 38.New Year's Eve celebrations were cancelled as result.[34]

2007[edit]

Despite conciliatory gestures from the junta, the insurgency continued and intensified. The death toll, 1,400 at the time of the coup, increased to 2,579 by mid-September 2007.[11] From January 2004 to 21 June 2007, the South witnessed 6,850 violent incidents related to the insurgency. At least 2,303 people were killed and more than 6,000 injured in that time, according to Srisompob Jitpiromsri of Prince of Songkhla University's Pattani campus.[64]

Junta chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin announced that the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military Task Force (CPM) 43 would be revived. Sonthi said the Army-led multi-agency Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command would be dissolved and its troops would come under the CPM 43, which would operate in parallel with the SBPAC. The SBPAC and CPM 43 had been dissolved in mid-2001 by former Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. Before that, CPM 43 was under the directive of the SBPAC. Sonthi also made himself head of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Previously, the ISOC had been headed by the Prime Minister.[65]

The ISOC was given 5.9 billion baht in funding for fiscal year 2007. By May 2007, General Sonthi asked the government for an additional emergency budget of 2 billion baht for ISOC, as the normal budget was running out. The money was under the "secret budget" category, which meant that state officials could spend it without having to account for it to the government.[66]

On 14 January a rubber tapper named Pin Khotchathin was beheaded in Yala. His head was found at a rubber plantation in Tambon Tasae in Yala's Mueang district five metres from his body.[67] It was the 22nd murder to feature attempted beheading since May 2004, although the militants were not always successful in removing their victim's head.[68] A handwritten note was left near Pin's head warning of further bloodshed to avenge what the attackers, calling themselves Pattani Warriors, claimed was a case of authorities killing separatist members.

Facing rising violence, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont accused Muslim junta chief Sonthi Boonyaratkalin of failing to do enough to curb the insurgency.[69]

On 18 February a series of bombings and arson attacks began in Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani, and Songkhla provinces. 6 people were killed and over 50 were injured.[70]

Violence escalated though in the months following the implementation of the junta's "hearts and minds" campaign. The monthly death toll increased by 30% in the 5 months after the coup compared to the 5 months before the coup.[71] Insurgents targeted Princess Sirindhorn by placing a bomb near her helicopter’s landing pad.[72] A senior aide to Queen Sirikit, Thanpuying Viriya Chavakul, was injured and narrowly escaped death when gunmen attacked her vehicle convoy on 21 February 2007 in Yala.[73] She later criticized the government for rotating troops too often, preventing them from building bonds with locals. She also made note of troops' lack of communications equipment and bulletproof vests.[74]

After an official visit to Thailand, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi volunteered to act as a mediator in arranging talks between insurgents and Thai authorities. Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram rejected the offer.[75]

During the Chinese New Year weekend (from the evening of 18 February 2007 to the afternoon of 19 February 2007), insurgents executed 38 bombing attacks, 26 cases of arson, and seven ambushes. The bombings targeted hotels, karaoke bars, power grids and commercial sites. Two public schools were torched. Three people were arrested.[76][77] Junta chief Sonthi and Interior Minister Aree Wongsearaya admitted that they knew in advance that attacks were going to take place, then failed to their occurrence.[78] Aree later admitted that the government's southern strategy was flawed.[79]

On 21 February, in their most significant act of economic terrorism and arson to date, insurgents burned down the Southland Rubber warehouse in Yala, destroying 5,000 tons of rubber worth approximately 400 million baht and engulfing Yala city in a dense cloud of black smoke for 12 hours. Thirty fire trucks fought to control the flames in the largest rubber warehouse in the deep south. Spikes were scattered on the road leading to the warehouse to slow down the emergency workers. No casualties were reported.[80]

In March 2007, the junta's top security advisor admitted that insurgents imported their techniques from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and were motivated by not only by nationalist reasons, like previous generations of insurgents, but religious extremism as well.[81][82] However, it noted that it still did not know who was behind the insurgency.[83]

To protect the Buddhist minority from violence, the Internal Security Operations Command produced Jatukham Rammathep amulets for public distribution. The renowned animist amulets were believed by some to have magical powers to protect their holders from violence and large sums were generally paid for them. The plan was developed by Colonel Manas Khongpan, deputy director of the ISOC in Yala province.[84]

In March 2007, Queen Sirikit vowed to protect people of all religions in the South, and initiated weapons training programmes for locals, particularly teachers. Sirikit's deputy aide-de-camp Napol Boonthap said that the government should review its strategy and not only use a reconciliatory approach towards the insurgents. "Legal action must also be taken against the wrongdoers to show we mean business," he said.[85]

On 14 March, 8 commuters from Betong to Hat Yai were executed after their van was stopped by insurgents. A roadside bomb delayed rangers stationed nearby in their efforts to reach the site.[86] A Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) executive blamed a portion of the violence directly on paramilitary rangers who instigated violence and then blamed insurgents for their deeds.[87]

Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn's motorcade was against targeted with a bombing in March 2007. A local police team found the bomb before it could explode.[85]

In April 2007, junta chief Sonthi rejected an American offer to help train Thai forces to quell the insurgency. Sonthi continued to deny that international terrorists operate in the South.[88]

On 9 April 2007, a pick-up truck carrying students and other passengers returning from a funeral was shot upon, killing two 12-year-old boys and two other 25-year-old university students. The funeral was for the Khuen Bang Lang tambon administration organisation chief, who was shot dead hours earlier the same day. The military initially claimed that insurgents were behind the shooting. It later admitted that village defence volunteers attacked, after allegedly being "provoked" by insurgent sympathisers on the truck. Several hundred angry villagers staged protests against the shooting, demanding the government take action against those responsible.[89]

Protest after a misapprehending shooting by security forces, Thai soldiers in Pattani shot and killed three Muslim teenagers on 13 April 2007. The soldiers, who were dispatched to investigate the torching of four mobile-phone relay outlets, opened fire on a group of teenagers when the soldiers thought the teenagers were charging at them. Locals reported that the teenagers were playing tag on the road near a weekly open market close to where the soldiers were investigating. Three teenagers, aged 13 to 15 years-old, were killed and two others were injured. Local Army commander Colonel Wanchai Paungkhumsa initially said the soldiers had acted in self-defense, saying that gunshots were fired from where a teenager was standing. Residents ended their protest after reaching a series of agreements with Pattani Governor Panu Uthairath over the shooting. The military agreed to investigate the shootings, and if it was a negligent act, The soldier would be faced criminal charge, transferred out of the area and an apology would be given to locals.[90]

In May 2007, Sonthi started withdrawing troops from the South, replacing them with territorial defence volunteers. He did not say why the regular army was to be reduced in the South.[91]

On 14 May 2007, Separatist insurgents shot dead a Thai-Buddhist couple working as fruit pickers in the majority-Muslim area of Bannang Sata, Yala provine and injured their three-year-old daughter. After gunning down Praphan Ponlarak, 36, and his wife Chaddakan, the assailants decapitated Praphan, making him the 29th victim to be beheaded in Thailand's troubled deep South.[92]

Violence continued with a noted trend towards targeting soldiers and policemen, particularly after the militants' actions were criticized by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.[93] On 9 May 2007, the army saw its worse casualty in a single incident in years, when seven soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing incident.[94] Two policemen were shot dead and their bodies burnt in another attack on 11 May 2007,[95][96] which the authorities suspect were conducted by the same group which killed the soldiers.[97] Another 11 soldiers were killed on 31 May 2007 in similar style to the incident on 9 May.[98]

Between 27 May and 29 May 2007, several concerted bombings occurred, both in Hat Yai downtown in front of markets, shops and hotels, and also in Saba Yoi, altogether killing more than four people and injuring over 20. The attacks targeted Chinese-Thai, who consider them 'Jews of the Far East' because they are barred from the Thai civil service and are mainly traders.[99]

In July 2007, Former Fourth Army chief Harn Leelanont criticized the junta's reconciliation policy in the South, saying it left security personnel incapable of containing the violence. He claimed that it left officials and innocent people as sitting ducks to be picked off by militants.[100]

The military junta went on a massive spending spree, buying new weaponry and a dozen fighter jets from Sweden, saying it needed the hardware to battle the insurgency.[101]

2008[edit]

According to the Thai Journalists Association, during the year 2008 alone there were over 500 attacks, resulting in more than 300 deaths in the four provinces where the insurgents operate.[102]

On 14 January 2008, insurgents killed 9 soldiers in a bomb and shooting attack.[103]

On 15 January 2008, a bombing left at least 39 people wounded in a market in Yala.[103]

On 24 January 2008, militants fatally shot a teacher.[103]

On 4 February 2008, a bomb detonated outside an Islamic boarding school, one person was killed and 12 wounded. A second bombing wounded 6 people.[103]

On 15 March 2008, a bombing occurred in the parking lot of hotel, 2 people were killed and 14 wounded in the incident.[103]

On 28 May 2008, 3 soldiers and 4 rebels were killed in a series of incidents across the south.[103]

On 5 July 2008, insurgents killed 3 cafe customers and injured 4 others.[103]

On 3 August 2008, five bombs went off in the town of Songkhla injuring 2 people. The same night, two bombs also exploded in Hat Yai, but caused no casualties.[104]

On 17 October 2008, 1 militant was killed and 5 others arrested.[103]

On 18 October 2008, two people were killed in drive-by shootings.[103]

On 4 November 2008, two bombs exploded at a tea stall killing one person and wounded at least 71.[103]

On 5 December 2008, 4 people were killed by a bomb planted at a farmacy store.[103]

2009[edit]

On 31 January 2009, a grenade blast killed 8 people and injured 27 others during outside a Buddhist temple.[105]

On 20 February 2009, two Thai soldiers were beheaded after a military convoy was ambushed. It was the second attack in in the same month following the same pattern.[106]

On 13 March 2009, militants killed 3 soldiers during an ambush in the Narathiwat province.[105]

On 19 March 2009, a roadside bomb killed 4 army rangers in the Pattani province.[105]

On 7 June 2009, insurgents killed 2 and injured 19 others in the Yi-ngo district of Narathiwat.[105]

On 8 June 2009, rebel gunmen killed at least 10 and wounded 19 mosque visitors in Narathiwat Province's Hoh-I-Rong district.[105]

On 13 June 2009, insurgents bombed a bus, killing 1 passenger and wounding 13 others in the center of Yala city.Additionally three people were killed and 1 wounded drive by incidents.[105]

On 18 June 2009, security forces killed 4 militants during clashes in the Yala Province.[105]

On 19 July 2009, two people were killed in separate drive by shootings in the Yala and Narathiwat provinces.[105]

On 20 July 2009, rebels shot and killed a man in the Pattani province.[105]

On 26 August 2009, a car bomb blast outside a restaurant wounded 26 people.[105]

On 2 September 2009, a number of drive-by shootings occurred in the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala left 8 dead. Security forces killed 2 militants in separate raids in the Yala province.[105]

On 3 September 2009, a bomb exploded in the city of Pattani killed 1 man and wounded 24 others.[105]

On 4 September 2009, a bomb detonated outside a restaurant, killing a policeman and wounding 12 other people.[105]

On 13 September 2009, guerrillas killed 5 paramilitary troops in the Yala province.[105]

On 23 October 2009, a Muslim man was killed by gunmen while leaving a mosque after prayers in Yala province. Also in Yala a Muslim couple was shot in their home and the husband was killed. On the same day the body of a Muslim man killed by insurgents was dumped on the side of the road in the Yarang district of Pattani province.[107]

On 28 October 2009, guerrillas killed 2 civilians in separate drive-by attacks.[105]

On 1 November 2009, a teenage girl was shot and killed in Yala province. A bomb exploded at the scene after the murder, wounding three police officers. The same day the police found the body of a man that had been handcuffed and murdered at a rice farm in the area.[107]

On 12 November 2009, a Buddhist couple was shot and killed and five people were wounded in an explosion when they rushed to the scene following the murder that took place at a rice mill in Pattani province.[107]

On 8 December 2009, a bomb exploded at a local Thai market in the Muang District of Narathiwat province, killing two people and wounding nine others. The blast happened about 1 km from a hotel where Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his visiting Malaysian counterpart, Najib Razak were having lunch during a trip to the local region that same day. Sources say the bomb was hidden in the gas tank of a motorcycle.[108]

On 10 December 2009, three Buddhist women were killed by a remote-controlled bomb outside a restaurant in Narathiwat.[109]

2010[edit]

On 2 January 2010, three soldiers and 3 civilians were injured by roadside bombs in Yala at 10 am in Bannang Sata district, Yala province.[110]

On 13 January 2010, Mayo district chief Wirat Prasetto was seriously injured along with ten other civilians when a bomb detonated at a pier in Pattani province. The bombing is being blamed on Muslim insurgents. One person was killed in the explosion.[111]

Two villagers sitting at a tea shop in Narathiwat were shot and murdered by gunmen on motorcycles.[107]

On 1 April 2010, suspect insurgents shot dead six villagers in Narathiwat province. Ten policemen and soldiers were also wounded when a roadside bomb exploded as they were traveling to the scene of the shootings.[112]

On 22 May 2010, two female villagers were killed in a drive-by shooting in Yala province by suspected separatist militants.[113] On 28 May 2010, two were killed and 52 injured in two bomb attacks in Yala[114]

On 8 September 2010, police apprehended a RKK leader while he was in his house in Yala province[115]

2011[edit]

On 27 January 2011, insurgents killed a school teacher in the Pattani province.[116]

On 11 February 2011, three people were shot and burned.[117] A car bomb exploded on the 13th which injured 18 people, civilians and soldiers, leaving seven hospitalised.[118] Meanwhile, an insurgent was shot dead by soldiers.

On 22 March 2011, a man and two women were shot in a village of Narathiwat Province on evening by about a dozen armed men. Police suspect the gunmen were Muslim insurgents who believed their victims were informants.[119]

On 23 March 2011, a roadside bomb went off in a village in Narathiwat when a truck carrying police arrived. None were wounded. The killings the night before may have been intended to lure security personnel to the scene to be attacked.[119]

On 18 April 2011, a car bomb exploded in the business district of Yala, killing a Thai paramilitary ranger and injuring 23 people including four other rangers.[120]

On 3 May 2011, two grenades were fired at Pattani Task Force 21 base, but did not hurt anyone.

On 11 May 2011, a bomb blast during a football match in Kapho District in Pattani Province killed four officers and wounding 13 others. Eight suspects were detained. In Yala Province, two officers and two civilians were injured after a roadside bomb detonated in Meung District.[121]

On 14 May 2011, four insurgents came and demanded money from a gas station. The wife of the owner refused, resulting them shooting her and her sister. After that, the owner of the gas station came and shot dead one of the insurgents, causing the other three to retreat. The dead insurgent turned out to be a minor leader operating in the area who was wanted for the 2009 Narathiwat bombings.

On 17 May 2011, a roadside bomb detonated in Yaha District in Yala Province, killing two monks and seriously wounding two of their security escorts. More than 100 local Muslims gathered at the local mosque and condemned the violence.[122] On 18 May, a Thahan Phran from the 47th Regiment was shot and seriously wounded in Yala, Meung District[123]

On 20 May 2011, a 30-man Thahan Phran unit from the same Regiment engaged and killed four insurgents in Ban Charupae in Than To District in Yala. They seized two AK-47 assault rifles, a .38 caliber pistol and nine mobile phones. One of the dead was identified as Ma-ae Aphibalbae, a key leader operating in the area who was sought for at least 28 alleged crimes, with a bounty of 2,000,000 baht.[124][125] Meanwhile in Narathiwat Province, two carbombs exploded, injuring a policeman and 8 other civilians.[126]

On 22 May 2011, in Nong Chik District, Pattani province, suspected insurgents shot a couple, Mr Pong and Mrs Somchit Khunee-art, killing both of them.[127]

On 24 May 2011, in Tak Bai, Narathiwat province, a bomb detonated, killing a policeman and a policewoman while they were distributing food to the local community. Pol Sgt Ubonwan Chindapetch was the first policewoman to die in an explosion in the south.[127] Meanwhile, in Sai Buri district, Pattani province, an unknown number of gunmen came and shot Muhammat Stapo, the younger brother of Ismael Rayahlong, a major RKK leader operating in the area who was suspected of the killing of two monks on 17 May.[128][129] In Krong Pinang District, Yala province, insurgents shot dead Barudin Sama, assistant village head of Ban Tohbala as he was riding to the tea shop.[127]

On 25 May 2011, 12 soldiers from the 13 Regiment in Yala were ambushed by three insurgents, resulting the death of one soldier, private Chuchat Kaeowonghio. A few hours later, a bomb detonated under a humvee carrying 20 soldiers, seriously wounding 6 of them.[129]

On 27 May 2011, police apprehended two RKK leaders in Narathiwat province.[130]

On 30 May 2011, a bomb went off in Meung district, Yala province, wounding five soldiers, and on 31 May, two insurgents accidentally detonated a bomb, killing themselves and injuring one other insurgent in Narathiwat province. One of the dead was identified as Abas Abu, wanted on multiple charges of attacking state officials and multiple bombings. His brother was the insurgent shot dead in February 2011.[131]

On 2 June 2011, eight Navy SEALS from Narathiwat Task Force 32 clashed with five RKK insurgents in the Budo Mountain Range, resulting the death of three insurgents while the other two got away. They seized two M16 assault rifles, 1 .38 pistol, 1 land mine, 1 grenade and over 100 rounds of ammunition. Two of the dead insurgents were identified as senior recruitment members of the RKK while the third was identified as the bomb maker of the group.[132][133][134]

On 4 June 2011, soldiers located two unexploded bombs in the middle of Tak Bai market.[135]

On 25 July 2011, 5 teachers and 2 security volunteers were wounded in the aftermath of an IED explosion in the Muang district.[136]

On 1 August 2011, a roadside bomb killed 1 and injured 2 soldiers in the Yarang District.[137]

In August 2011, 53 people were killed and 75 wounded, in insurgency related incidents.[138]

On 13 September 2011, Thai police confiscated five guns, ammunition and sums of currency in a house of a Narathiwat provincial administrative organisation.Evidence connected the house owner with insurgency organisations.[139]

On 14 September 2011, insurgents fire bombed the Palukasamoh Police Station complex, the almost complete building was completely destroyed.[140]

On 15 September 2011, five paramilitary rangers were killed and one wounded in a roadside bomb blast, in the Kapho district[140]

On 16 September 2011, three bombs exploded on the Charoen Khet road, Sungai Kolok district.In the aftermath of the incident, 4 people were killed and 110 injured, the majority of which were Malaysian tourists.[139]

On 23 September 2011, a bomb blast seriously wounded a soldier, guarding a school in the Rangae district.[141]

On 1 October 2011, a truck driver was shot and killed in Pattani province. In Narathiwat province, Chanae district, a village chief was shot dead. A motorcade of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre secretary-general Panu Uthairat was ambushed by armed men in Pattani, injuring none.[142][143][144]

On 3 October 2011, three people were shot, two houses were burnt, and a bomb went off near a tank carrying six soldiers in Pattani province. Police found a hole dug on the Pattani-Yala railway line and said it was in preparation for a bomb attack.[145] On 20 October, a wood trader was shot dead in Narathiwat Province[146]

On 13 October 2011, a Mayo district official along with his driver were killed, after four insurgents attacked them with automatic weapons, in the Pattani province.One person was killed and one injured by stray bullets in the same incident.Another attack occurred in the Panareh district.Four gunmen attacked a seafood processing business, killing three people and planting a bomb, which was later defused by Thai police.[147]

On 23 October 2011, a bomb exploded inside a convenience store, located on the Phichit Bamrung road, Muang Narathiwat municipality.A second bomb detonated inside a convenience store, located on the Chamroon Nara road, Muang Narathiwat municipality.In a third incident, 10 militants engaged in a firefight with defence volunteers, in the Kasoh village, Muang Narathiwat municipality.A total of 7 people were killed and 8 injured, in the three incidents.[148]

On 25 October 2011, 10 bombs went off in Meung District, Yala province, killing three people and injuring 44 others. Two of the dead were insurgents whose bombs accidentally went off when they hit a speed hump. Soldiers defused another 21 bombs. Over 60 insurgents were involved in this attack. Two soldiers were injured in separate attacks in Pattani province.[149]

On 30 October 2011, two men were shot and injured by suspected insurgents in Rueso district, Narathiwat province.[150]

On 31 October 2011, 10 bombs went off in five districts across Narathiwat province, injuring none. However, suspected insurgents shot dead two people at a petrol station and a third at a nearby grocery shop. In Yala province, a police corporal was wounded in an explosion.[151][152]

On 2 November 2011, in Yala province, a 20 kg bomb went off, injuring 2 police border patrol officers of the Yala 44 regiment, and seriously injuring one other, Sansern Nama.[153]

On 3 November 2011, in Narathiwat province, a 50-man police-military joint force arrested an insurgent who confessed to planting a bomb in Narathiwat on 30 October.[154] While in the Ra-ngae district, six hunters were killed and one seriously injured when insurgents blew their truck up. Later that day, six military personnel were injured in the same region.[155]

On 4 November 2011, an unknown number of insurgents fired M-79 grenade launchers into a military checkpoint, seriously injuring a passerby, Tiem Bangkeaw in Pattani province.[156] In Narathiwat province, a joint military-defense volunteer task force apprehended two suspected insurgents carrying a shotgun and a 9mm pistol.[157][158]

On 14 November 2011, a rubber taper was killed by rebels at his workplace, in the Narathiwat province.[159]

On 16 November 2011, 9 bombs exploded in the Muang, Yaring and Yarang districts.In the Nong Chik district, a military outpost came under assault rifle fire.In the Panare district, rebels perpetrated 3 grenade attacks.In the aftermath of the attacks, only minor material damage was recorded.[160]

On 20 November 2011, in Narathiwat province, a 50-men Thahan Phran squad from the 46th regiment got into a 30-minute gunfight with 4-5 groups of RKK insurgents, resulting the death of a key leader of the RKK, with a bounty of over 1 million baht, and was responsible for numerous attacks including one on the same regiment a year ago. Moreover, they apprehended 2 other insurgents as well.[161]

On 21 November 2011, an explosive device detonated outside a laundry shop located on the Charoen Pradit road, Pattani, injuring 9 people.Another bomb injured 6 policemen escorting monks in the Muang district.Insurgents blew up power poles in the Than To district.[162]

On 1 December 2011, a police task-force apprehended a RKK insurgent instructor in the Yarang district of the Yala province.[163] Meanwhile, a soldier, Priavte Kriangkrai Pornhormfai, was killed after stepping on a mine, and another, Siam Sealao, was seriously wounded.

On 5 December 2011, a 40-man Thahan Phran unit of the 45th regiment apprehended 3 suspected insurgents, a shotgun along with an amount of drugs were confiscated in the process, the arrest occurred in the Narathiwat province[164]

2012[edit]

On 1 February, a Thahan Phran, Thanong Sinthu, was shot in Pattani Province.[165]

On 3 February, an illegal oil trader was shot in Bacho District, Narathiwat Province. In a separate incident in Pattani Province a woman was killed and her husband and son were injured. Deep South Watch announced 33 dead and 55 injured in January as a result of clashes in south Thailand, with no insurgent casualties.[166][167][168]

On 4 February, a truck driver, Mahama Yakee, was shot in Pattani Province early in the morning.[169]

On 21 February, in Panare District, Pattani Province, 3 insurgents were killed after they clashed with the 44th regiment Thahan Phran, while 3 rangers were injured and 2 AK-47 rifles were seized. In Rueso District, Narathiwat Province, a former PULO leader was shot dead at his home. He has been known to have been approached by many RKK members to join their cause but he refused. Finally, in Si Sakhon District, Narathiwat Province, a 100-man Thahan Phran from the 46th regiment clashed with around 10 insurgents resulting one ranger, Sgt Rithidej Sriruangdej, seriously wounded, and key insurgent, wanted for many arrest warrants, killed.[170]

On 28 February, in Raman District, Yala Province, soldiers from the 12th special task force clashed with 3 insurgents, resulting the death of a key insurgent wanted on multiple charges and the apprehension of another insurgent.[171][172]

On 5 March, a blast at a market in the Tak Bai District wounded 8.[173][174]

On 7 March, 4 soldiers and a rubber tapper were killed in two separate attacks in Narathiwat and Pattani Provinces.[175] Two days later at least 50 militants attacked an army base in Yala Province, shooting electricity poles down to block escape routes, kidnapping 2 soldiers and injuring 12 more. The missing officers were later discovered shot to death with their hands bound and their weapons gone.[176]

On 10 March, a local politician was shot dead with a M-16 assault rifle and 9mm pistol in Pattani's Ka Por District by a group of four or five assailants in a sedan.[177]

On 12 March, two soldiers were wounded by a bomb explosion while providing security for teachers in Pattani's Sai Buri District.[178][179] Meanwhile, in Yarang District, an unknown number of persons set afire the office of the Rawaeng subdistrict Tambon Administration Organisation.[180][181]

On 15 March, a motorcycle bomb exploded in Pattani, killing one villager and wounding three others including two soldiers.[182]

On 17 March, one school girl was killed and four others injured, two critically, in a roadside bomb attack apparently intended for soldiers in Pattani.[183]

On 19 March, a member of a village security team was shot dead in Pattani's Yaring District.[184][185]

On 21 March, Thai army has accepted responsibility for killing four innocent civilians in the insurgency-plagued south two months ago.[186][187]

On 25 March, an assistant village head in Narathiwat and a defence volunteer in Pattani were killed in drive-by shooting's.[188] At night, a policeman was shot dead by militants in Pattani's Yarang District.[189]

On 29 March, a security guard was killed in a drive-by shooting's in Pattani’s Muang District.[190]

On 31 March, four bombs exploded in Yala shopping districts and the parking lot of a hotel in Hat Yai, killing 16 and injuring more than 300 others.[191][192]

On 3 April, a police officer from the Muang Pattani police station was seriously wounded by a gunman at a fishing pier in moo 6 of tambon Samilae in Pattani’s Muang District.[193]

On 4 April, two men on a motorcycle hurled a grenade at a PTT gas station at Ban Pongsata in Pattani's Yarang District.[194]

On 5 April, a car care shop owner was killed and his son seriously injured in a shooting in Pattani's Yaring District.[195]

On 11 April, three villagers were killed when gunmen opened fire at them as they were leaving a mosque in Pattani's Panare District.[196]

On 13 April, five passengers were wounded when gunmen on motorcycles attacked a bus in Pattani's Sai Buri District.[197]

On 15 April, police seized large amounts of weapons including 4 M16 assault rifles in Sai Buri District, Pattani Province.[198]

On 19 April, a 100-man squad clashed with a 14 insurgents in Yala Province, resulting the death of 5 insurgents and the others managed to escape.[199] After some forensic work, it was revealed that one of the dead insurgents was a key leader wanted on over 7 charges. Meanwhile in Narathiwat Province, a 30-man Thahan Phran unit from the 45th regiment apprehended 2 RKK members wanted on shooting 2 teachers in 2010. On a separate incident, a bomb detonated, injuring 5 soldiers in the same province.[198]

On 22 April, an insurgent was shot dead by combined police Thahan Phran forces after resisting arrest in Rueso District, Narathiwat Province.[200]

On 24 April village chief Sainung Ada was shot dead in Narathiwat Province.[201] In Tak Bai District, a bomb detonated injuring 3 civilians and 5 soldiers. A 5-year old boy was among the injured.[202]

On 23 July, a rubber tapper, Prinya Sinbut, was shot twice in the body and once in the arm, and is seriously wounded in Mae Lan District, Pattani Province.

On 25 July, after a warning that insurgents will intensify attacks during Ramadan, 5 anti-drug officers were killed and one seriously injured in a car bomb in Raman District. Authorities believe was in retaliation for recent drug suspect arrests.[203]

On 26 July, 2 men, Seng Changkid, and Kittisak Chamnanlee were slain after they left their house in Bannang Sata District[204] and an assistant village headman, Haree Vaebuesar, was shot dead in an ambush in Raman District.[205] All three events occurred in Yala Province.

On 28 July, four soldiers were killed in an ambush by 16 militants.[206]

On 29 July, 5 other civilians, all around Yala Province, were shot dead by insurgents.[207] In addition to this, 4 soldiers were wounded in an attack in the same province.[208]

On 11 September, over 100 insurgents including a major leader, Jae A-Lee, from the group Badan Penyelarasan Wawasan Baru Melayu Patani, surrendered to military authorities, demanding justice in exchange for halting the insurgency. Jae A-Lee also claimed that two other core leaders are in the process of submitting to the military. Jae A-Lee's one million baht bounty, as a reuslt of the deaths of 4 soldiers in 4 January, has also been whitewashed.[209]

2013[edit]

According to the region's Internal Security Operations Command, there were 320 bombings in the four border provinces between January and December 2013, compared with 276 reported bombings in 2012.[210] Experts alleged that the rise in deaths was linked to the stalling of peace talks while Yingluck Shinawatra's government faced anti-government protests in Bangkok and court proceedings against it over corruption.

On 10 February, insurgents killed five soldiers and wounded five others in two roadside bomb attacks in Yala province. According to Thai military officials, in the first attack militants detonated a car bomb as a truck carrying six soldiers passed by. Then they opened fire on the soldiers killing five of them, and taking away the dead soldiers' rifles. [211]

On 13 February, at least 17 Muslim insurgents including a commander were killed during an attack on a military base in Narathiwat. None of the Thai military defenders of the base were hurt. [212]

On 12 April, two soldiers were killed and six others wounded in a road side bombing. Suspected militants detonated an improvised bomb hidden on the road surface Pattani province's Panarae district. The soldiers were in two armored vehicles traveling Wednesday night to inspect damages from an earlier militant attack. One of the personnel carriers was badly damaged.[213]

On 26 April, four soldiers were killed and another four seriously injured while attempting to defuse a bomb. According to Thai authorities, the blast happened after troops moved the device which was hidden under a gas tank and placed under a bridge near the Narathiwat military base. [214]

On 1 May, police say suspected insurgents have killed six people including a two-year-old boy in one of the deadliest shootings in Thailand's south this year. [215]

Peace talks were also started in Kuala Lumpur in February at the behest of Malaysia. Barisan Revolusi Nasional's Hassan Taib led the talks, while the Thai government's team was led by Secretary-General of the National Security Council Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanatabut, tasked by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. However, the exiled leader of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation, Kasturi Mahkota, said attacks by his group would continue if they were not invited to the talks. For his part, Pattanatabut said that Thailand would not agree to independence or any contravention of the constitution of Thailand, but would seek to discuss degress of autonomy and an amnesty with the rebels. [216]

2014[edit]

9 February, A policeman's wife was shot dead and then set on fire in front of a terrified crowd at a busy market in Pattani, Thailand, officials reported. The woman, 28, was shot down on the afternoon of February 9, 2014 as she returned to her car from a market in the Ratapanyang area of Pattani province. After being shot, the woman's body was set alight, a police officer told AFP. The attack was allegedly carried out in revenge for the deaths of three Muslim brothers that took place during the week of February 2, 2014, aged three, five and nine. The boys were shot in front of their home in neighbouring Narathiwat province. Their pregnant mother and father were also shot in the attack but survived. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, at Prince of Songkla University in Pattani, said the boys' deaths "have set off a chain-reaction which will be hard to control unless authorities can bring to justice their killers". "The insurgent movement is taking their deaths as an opportunity for revenge. Local feelings over this are running very high," he said.[210]

14 March: Siriporn Srichai, a female schoolteacher, was shot dead and her body was burned in Mayo district of Pattani Province.[217]

24 May: Three people were killed and about 80 injured in 13 bomb blasts at at least five 7/11 stores and two gas stations.

28 May: Violence continued in Pattani as a bomb blast at a hospital car park injured 10 people including a soldier. Those injured included Pvt Phonlawat Nonthasen. The most seriously wounded in attacks that have left two dead and more than 70 wounded was a three-year-old girl, Vaesiteeaija Vaelong maimed for life when doctors had to amputate the remains of her right leg after it was mangled by the blast.[218]

28 August: Patimoh Saemaesae, a female schoolteacher, was killed and another teacher and a policeman were wounded in a bomb attack directed at the teachers and their police escort in Khok Pho District of Pattani Province.[219]

5 Sep: It has come to light that a paramilitary volunteer's attempt to portray an unarmed 14 year old Muslim boy falsely as an armed insurgent after killing him has come under investigation by the junta.[220]

12 October: A total of six schools were destroyed by fire in six coordinated arson attacks in Thung Yang Daeng and Mayo districts of Pattani Province;[221] some of the arsonists were subsequently arrested and confessed that their intention had been to set fire to 14 schools, but residents had managed to contact the authorities before they could carry out more arson attacks.[222]

4 November: The military decides to arm civilian groups by distributing thousands of assault rifles allegedly in order to help civilians to fight against the public order disturbing outfits. Human rights groups have protested against this measure, which in their eyes will only make the situation worse.[223]

29 November: Katesaya Muenkoto, a 29 year old woman died of bullet wounds in Khok Pho district in Pattani Province. She and a man were shot at while they were buying pork meat from a shop in the early morning. The attacker was driving a motorcycle and shot at them six times, hitting the woman in the head and the man in the back.[224]

Reactions and explanations[edit]

Official reactions[edit]

The government at first blamed the attacks on "bandits," and many outside observers do believe that local clan, commercial or criminal rivalries did play a part in the violence. In 2002, Thaksin stated, "There's no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common bandits." By 2004, however, he had reversed his position and came to regard the insurgency as a local front in the global War on Terrorism. Martial law was instituted in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in January 2004.[225]

Since the 2006 military coup, the Thai government has taken a more conciliatory approach to the insurgency, avoiding the excessive use of force that typified Thaksin's time, and beginning negotiations with known separatist groups. However, violence has escalated. This likely backs the assertion that there are several groups involved in the violence, few of whom have been placated by the government's change of strategy.[226]

On 3 June 2011, Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha stated that the insurgency is orchestrated from abroad and is funded via drug and oil smuggling.[227]

Political factors[edit]

The Thai authorities claim that the insurgency is not caused by the lack of political representation among the Muslim population. By the late 1990s, Muslims were holding unprecedentedly senior posts in Thai politics, for example with Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, a Malay Muslim from Yala, serving as Chairman of Parliament from 1996 to 2001 under the Democrats and later as Interior Minister during the first Thaksin government. Thaksin's first government (2001–2005) also saw 14 Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs) and several Muslim senators. Muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies in the border provinces, and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors. Muslims were able to voice their political grievances more openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom.

The Thaksin regime, however, began to dismantle the southern administration organization replacing it with a notoriously corrupt police force which immediately began widespread crackdowns. Consultation with local community leaders was also abolished. Discontent over the abuses led to growing violence during 2004 and 2005. Muslim politicians and leaders remained silent out of fear of repression, thus eroding their political legitimacy and support. This cost them dearly. In the 2005 general election, all but one of the eleven incumbent Muslim MPs who stood for election were voted out of office.[228]

Economic factors[edit]

Poverty and economic problems have been cited as a factor behind the insurgency.[229][230] However, the performance of the deep South’s economy improved markedly in the past few decades. Between 1983 and 2003, the average per capita income of Pattani grew from 9,340 baht to 57,621 baht, while that of Yala and Narathiwat also increased from 14,987 baht and 10,340 baht to 52,737 baht and 38,553 baht, respectively. However, the border provinces did have the lowest average income among all the southern provinces. Also, the national average is well below the estimated average needed to be considered an acceptable minimum wage by international organizations for SE Asia. One could thus argue that the average per capita income in the southernmost provinces is only about 20-25% of what the Thai minimum wage would be.[citation needed]

Household income improved from 2002 to 2004 by 21.99%, 19.27%, and 21.28% for Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, respectively. For comparison, income growth for all of Thailand in the same period was just 9.4%.

The percentage of people living below the poverty line also fell, from 40%, 36%, and 33% in 2000 to 18%, 10%, and 23% in 2004 for Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala, respectively. By 2004, the 3 provinces had 310,000 people living below the poverty line, compared to 610,000 in 2000. However, 45% of all poor Southerners lived in the 3 border provinces.[231][232]

Muslims in the border provinces generally have lower levels of educational attainment compared to their Buddhist neighbors. 69.80% of the Muslim population in the border provinces have only a primary school education, compared to 49.6% of Buddhists in the same provinces. Only 9.20% of Muslims have completed secondary education (including those who graduated from private Islamic schools), compared to 13.20% of Buddhists. Just 1.70% of the Muslim population have a bachelor’s degree, while 9.70% of Buddhists hold undergraduate degrees. Government schools are taught only in Thai and the secular educational system is being undermined by the destruction of schools and the murders of teachers by the insurgent outfits.[233]

The lesser educated Muslims also have reduced employment opportunities compared to their Buddhist neighbors. Government officials comprised only 2.4% of all working Muslims in the provinces, compared with 19.2% of all working Buddhists. Jobs in the Thai public sector are difficult to obtain for those Muslims who never fully accepted the Thai language or the Thai education system. Insurgent attacks on economic targets are further reducing employment opportunities for both Muslims and Buddhists in the provinces.

Leading insurgent groups[edit]

Original arms of the PULO and GMIP

Currently the most active insurgent movements are the BRN-Coordinate, its alleged armed wing the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), and the GMIP. PULO, the doyen of the Patani insurgent groups and formerly the most respected secessionist movement in the region, has been largely inactive in recent years.

BRN-C[edit]

The Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) is currently the most important group, spearheading the insurgency in Southern Thailand. It was revived after 2001 and its leaders are mainly Salafi religious teachers that have rejected the Pan-Arab socialist ideology of the early BRN, engaging in political activism by recruiting followers in mosques and indoctrinating at Islamic schools. This group has the vision of becoming a mass-organization, aiming towards having 400,000 members in its area of operation. The BRN-C has no constructive cultural or nationalistic goals, instead its immediate aim is to make Southern Thailand ungovernable. It has been largely successful at spreading and maintaining and atmosphere of terror and uncertainty through well-trained secret militant units that engage in assassinations and calculated destruction.[17][23]

RKK[edit]

The Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), allegedly one of the armed wings of the BRN-C,[23] has been one of the most brutal and ruthless groups of the South Thailand insurgency in recent years. It is formed by young, mostly Salafi, militants who routinely flee to Malaysia after carrying out violent attacks, including bombings, arson and murders, in Yala, Pattani or Narathiwat Province.[24] Although several RKK members have been arrested or killed by the Thai military in the past decade, it is very difficult for those involved in counter-insurgency to penetrate the structure of the group owing to its secrecy and great mobility.[234]

GMIP[edit]

Like the BRN-C, the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) is a group that experienced a revival after 2001 and has currently more hard-line Islamic political goals, to the detriment of its former nationalist cause.[235] Its members are now believed to have sympathies with Al Qaeda and with the establishment of the transnational Islamic Caliphate.[24]

BBMP[edit]

The Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani (BBMP), also known as 'Bersatu', was initially created in 1989 seeking to become an umbrella organization that would unify the efforts of insurgents in the region. The group has sought to drive wedges between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims, seeking to disrupt the educational system by attacking schools and harming teachers, an activity in which other groups are currently involved as well.[24] It was reported that some of Bersatu's prominent leaders were arrested or killed before 2004. The highly coordinated torching of 18 schools in January 2004 led some to suspect that the Bersatu groups were responsible,[236] but according to recent reports Bersatu's former leaders are being sidelined by younger terrorists and the coalition is not any longer functional.[237]

PULO[edit]

The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is a movement that was founded on the nationalist and secular values of Patani nation-building. Its priority was freeing Pattani from Thai rule by all means, including armed struggle.[23]

However, since 2001 the civil society in the three southern Thai provinces has experienced a widespread imposition of legalistic Salafi norms and the reality on the ground is today very different from what it was in former Southern Thailand. Salafism has heavily eroded Patani cultural identity and current insurgent groups have extreme religious goals, such as an Islamic Caliphate, to the detriment of Patani nationalism. Although some of the present-day insurgents are very likely former PULO members, it is still unclear whether their fight for PULO's cause and it is likely that many may have become part of the more active and religious organizations that have overtaken PULO.[23] At any rate, in recent years PULO's leadership has largely lost control over the insurgents and has a very limited overall degree of influence over the insurgency in Southern Thailand.[17]

On 26 July 2009 Abu Yasir Fikri, President of PULO, and the "Emir" of the Group of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), Me Kuteh, agreed to join forces. Abu Yasir Fikri was allowed to speak on behalf of the GMIP on all political issues. The agreement included a section in which they agreed to form a unified military force, the Patani Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA would be commanded by the First Deputy Military Commander of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO).[238][239]

On 18 April 2009, PULO outlined a solution to conflict at the OICs Twelfth Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts to consider the Conditions of Muslim Communities and Minorities in Jeddah.[240]

Symbols[edit]

Al-raya flag of Jihad

In the last decade of the unrest in South Thailand, the black Al-raya flag has largely replaced the colourful secessionist flags formerly used by the different groups involved in the insurgency against the Thai government.[241][242]

Original flag of the PULO, still used today by original PULO faction headed by Abu Yasir fikri

Flag of Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GEMPAR)

Flag of Negara Patani Raya (State of Greater Patani)

Flag of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN)

Flag of the BRN-Koordinasi (BRN-C)

Flag of the BRN-Ulama

Flag used by "Dagger PULO" (1989-2005)

Flag of the united (five-star) PULO (2005–present)

High profile incidents[edit]

Krue Se Mosque Incident[edit]

On 28 April 2004, more than 100 militants carried out terrorist attacks against 10 police outposts across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla provinces in southern Thailand.[243] 32 gunmen retreated to the 425-year-old Krue Se Mosque, regarded by Muslims as the holiest mosque in Pattani.

General Pallop Pinmanee, commander of the Southern Peace Enhancement Center and Deputy Director of the Internal Security Operations Command, was the senior Army officer on the scene. After a tense seven-hour stand-off, Pallop ordered an all out assault on the mosque. All of the gunmen were killed. He later insisted, "I had no choice. I was afraid that as time passed the crowd would be sympathetic to the insurgents, to the point of trying to rescue them."[244]

It was later revealed that Pallop's order to storm the mosque contravened a direct order by Defense Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to seek a peaceful resolution to the stand-off no matter how long it took.[245] Pallop was immediately ordered out of the area, and later tendered his resignation as commander of the Southern Peace Enhancement Center. The forward command of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which Pallop headed, was also dissolved. A government investigative commission found that the security forces had overreacted. The Asian Centre for Human Rights questioned the independence and impartiality of the investigative commission. On 3 May 2004 during a Senate hearing, Senator Kraisak Choonhavan noted that most of those killed at Krue Se Mosque had been shot in the head and there were signs that ropes had been tied around their wrists, suggesting they had been executed after being captured.

The incident resulted in a personal conflict between Pallop and Defense Minister Chavalit, who was also director of the ISOC.[246] Pallop later demanded that the Defense Minister cease any involvement in the management of the southern insurgency.[247]

Tak Bai incident[edit]

Main article: Tak Bai Incident

In October 2004 the town of Tak Bai in Narathiwat province saw the most publicized incident of the insurgency. Six local men were arrested for having supplied weapons to insurgents. A demonstration was organized to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. The army used tear gas and water cannons on the crowd, and shooting started in which seven men were killed.

Hundreds of local people, mostly young men, were arrested. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to the Ingkayutthaboriharn army camp in the nearby province of Pattani. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks, and by the time the trucks reached their destination five hours later, in the heat of the day, 78 men had died of suffocation.

This incident sparked widespread protests across the south, and indeed across Thailand, since even non-Muslim Thais were appalled at the army's behaviour. Thaksin, however, gave the army his full support. Those responsible for the ill-treatment and death of the detainees received the most minor of non-custodial punishments. Thaksin's initial response was to defend the army's actions, saying that the 78 men died "because they were already weak from fasting during the month of Ramadan."

Charges were filed against 58 suspects accused of participating in the demonstration. The trials went on at a slow pace, and as of October 2006, the court had finished questioning of only two of the 1,500 witnesses in the case. Police were also unable to find 32 Tak Bai protesters who were still at large after fleeing arrest.[248]

On 2 November 2006, then Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont gave a formal apology for the incident.[249] The next day, the insurgents responded by increasing the number of violent acts by fivefold in comparison to the average the preceding month.[71]

Reconciliation and negotiation[edit]

Negotiation attempts[edit]

Attempts to negotiate with insurgents were hampered by the anonymity of the insurgency's leaders.

In May 2004, Wan Kadir Che Wan, exiled leader of Bersatu and for years one of the key symbolic figures in the guerrilla movement, stated that he would be willing to negotiate with the Government to end the southern violence. He also hinted that Bersatu would be willing to soften its previous demands for an independent state.[250][251]

The government initially welcomed the request to negotiate. However, the government response was severely criticized as being "knee-jerk" and "just looking to score cheap political points."[251] But when it became apparent that, despite his softened demand for limited autonomy, Wan Kadir Che Man had no influence over the violence, the negotiations were cancelled.[251] The government then began a policy of not attempting to officially negotiate with the insurgents.[252]

After being appointed Army Commander in 2005, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin expressed confidence that he could resolve the insurgency. He claimed that he would take a "new and effective" approach to a crisis and that "The Army is informed [of who the insurgents are] and will carry out their duties."[253]

On 1 September 2006, a day after 22 commercial banks were simultaneously bombed in Yala province, Sonthi announced that he would break with the government no-negotiation policy. However, he noted that "We still don't know who is the real head of the militants we are fighting with."[254] In a press conference the next day, he attacked the government for criticizing him for trying to negotiate with the anonymous insurgents, and demanded that the government "Free the military and let it do the job."[255] His confrontation with the government made his call for negotiation extremely popular with the media.[252] Afterwards, insurgents bombed 6 department stores in Hat Yai city, which until then had been free of insurgent activities. As always, the identity of the insurgents was not revealed. Sonthi was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat unrest in the far South.[47] By 19 September 2006 (after Sonthi overthrew the Thai government), the Army admitted that it was still unsure who to negotiate with.[256]

National Reconciliation Commission[edit]

On March 2005, respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun was appointed as chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, tasked with overseeing that peace is brought back to the South. A fierce critic of the Thaksin-government, Anand frequently criticized the handling of the southern unrest, and in particular the State of Emergency Decree. He has been quoted to have said, "The authorities have worked inefficiently. They have arrested innocent people instead of the real culprits, leading to mistrust among locals. So, giving them broader power may lead to increased violence and eventually a real crisis." Unfortunately, the situation deteriorated from 2005 to 2006, with escalating violence, especially among teachers and civilians. Despite much criticism of the Thaksin-government's policies, Anand refused to submit the NRC's final report, choosing instead to wait for the results of the 2006 legislative election.[257]

Anand finally submitted the NRC's recommendations on 5 June 2006.[258] Among them were

Introducing Islamic law

Making ethnic Pattani-Malay (Yawi) as a working language in the region

Establishing an unarmed peacekeeping force

Establishing a Peaceful Strategic Administrative Centre for Southern Border Provinces

The Thaksin government vowed to implement the recommendations. However, the recommendations were vigorously opposed by Prem Tinsulanonda, the President of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's Privy Council, who stated "We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai... We have to be proud to be Thai and have the Thai language as the sole national language".[259]

Casualties[edit]

Note: Table is not comprehensive

Table is clearly incorrect. Statistics written here state that by end of 2012 "some" 3,380 deaths had resulted while the table shows in excess of 4,400 through 2011.

By end-2012 the conflict since 2004 had resulted in some 3,380 deaths, including 2,316 civilians, 372 troops, 278 police, 250 suspected insurgents, 157 education officials and seven Buddhist monks.[260]

Year Killed

2004 625[261]

2005 550[261]

2006 780[261]

2007 770[261]

2008 450[261]

2009 310[261]

2010 521[262]

2011 535[262]

According to one report in the Patani Post in late May 2014, about 6,000 people have been killed in the conflict during the last decade.[263]

Human Rights Issues[edit]

Human Rights Watch (HRW)[264] cites abuses on both sides. Numerous times the insurgents have murdered Buddhist monks collecting alms, and Buddhist villagers have been killed going about routine work such as rubber tapping, even though Buddhists have lived in the region for centuries. School teachers, headmasters, and students have been killed and schools torched presumably because schools represent a symbol of the Thai Government. Civil servants, regardless of religion, have been targeted for assassination.[102]

Meanwhile, local Muslims have been beaten, killed, or simply "disappeared" during police questioning and custody. Human Rights Watch has documented at least 20 such disappearances.[265] Soldiers and police have sometimes been indiscriminate when pursuing suspected insurgents, resulting in civilian collateral damage.

Of the 2,463 people killed in attacks from 2004 to 2007, 2,196 (89%) were civilians. Buddhist Thais and ethnic Malay Muslims were killed in bomb attacks, shootings, assassinations, ambushes, and machete hackings. At least 29 victims have been beheaded and mutilated.

"There have been hundreds of militant attacks on teachers, schools, public health workers, hospital staff, and community health centers. For the first time in the region's history of separatist insurgencies, Buddhist monks and novices are now among those killed and injured by separatist militants," HRW said in a 2007 report.

"Village-based militants called Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (Patani Freedom Fighters) in the loose network of BRN-Coordinate (National Revolution Front-Coordinate) have now emerged as the backbone of the new generation of separatist militants.

"Increasingly, they claim that the southern border provinces are not the land of Buddhist Thais, but a religious 'conflict zone' which must be divided between ethnic Malay Muslims and 'infidels'. The separatists seek to forcibly liberate Patani Darulsalam (Islamic Land of Patani), from what they call a Buddhist Thai occupation," HRW continued.[210]

The 2010 World Report from Human Rights Watch highlighted escalating human rights abuses throughout Thailand,[266] with the South reflecting overall policies against individual human rights. Sharply increased powers for police and the military were accompanied by a perceived lack of accountability.

Government harassment of suspected insurgents[edit]

The Asian Human Rights Commission accused the military of beating and torturing suspected insurgents by burning their genitals with cigarettes, smashing beer bottles over their knees, and chaining them to dogs. Such abuses were alleged to have occurred in October 2006, after the military seized power.[267]

In December 2006, a group of 20 Muslims, 9 men and 11 women aged between 2 and 55, sought political asylum in Malaysia. They claimed that the post-coup regime was more aggressive against civilians and that they were continuously harassed by the Army. The Army admitted that the group sought refuge in Malaysia out of fear for their lives - but that the threat was from forces.[268]

A group of Muslims from Narathiwat that fled to Malaysia in March 2007 claimed that they were escaping intimidation and brutality by the military. The group complained that they have been beaten and that their sons have been missing or detained since 2005. It also claimed that some youths had died after they were poisoned during detention.[269]

In late January, 2012, an unknown number of insurgents ambushed a thahan pran base before retreating. The rangers chased the insurgents and were fired upon from a pick up truck. The rangers fired back in self-defence resulting for dead civilians in the truck with others wounded. The rangers found AK-47 assault rifles but also claimed that the four dead civilians were not affiliated with insurgents in anyway. Soldiers from the 4th army regiment are investigating.This killing has angered many Thai Muslims as the four dead persons are mosque leaders (an imam, a moulana,a khatib, and a bilai).[270]

In early February, the ministry of interior proposed a 7.5 million baht to all victims of the insurgency including those from the Tak Bai Massacre and the Kru Se Mosque Incident.[271]

 on from a pick up truck. The rangers fired back in self-defence resulting for dead civilians in the truck with others wounded. The rangers found AK-47 assault rifles but also claimed that the four dead civilians were not affiliated with insurgents in anyway. Soldiers from the 4th army regiment are investigating.This killing has angered many Thai Muslims as the four dead persons are mosque leaders (an imam, a moulana,a khatib, and a bilai).[270]

In early February, the ministry of interior proposed a 7.5 million baht to all victims of the insurgency including those from the Tak Bai Massacre and the Kru Se Mosque Incident.[271]

  

A group of Muslims from Narathiwat that fled to Malaysia in March 2007 claimed that they were escaping intimidation and brutality by the military. The group complained that they have been beaten and that their sons have been missing or detained since 2005. It also claimed that some youths had died after they were poisoned during detention.[269]

In late January, 2012, an unknown number of insurgents ambushed a thahan pran base before retreating. The rangers chased the insurgents and were fired upon from a pick up truck. The rangers fired back in self-defence resulting for dead civilians in the truck with others wounded. The rangers found AK-47 assault rifles but also claimed that the four dead civilians were not affiliated with insurgents in anyway. Soldiers from the 4th army regiment are investigating.This killing has angered many Thai Muslims as the four dead persons are mosque leaders (an imam, a moulana,a khatib, and a bilai).[270]

In early February, the ministry of interior proposed a 7.5 million baht to all victims of the insurgency including those from the Tak Bai Massacre and the Kru Se Mosque Incident.[271]